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1ABSTRACT
By 1888 Britain had secured control over the
f V
f v /\ territories on the northwest coast of Borneo and
commanded the eastern part of the South China Sea,
This may be viewed as the culmination of a fifty 
year policy of involvement in the area. During 
the l8^0 *s and 1850*s that policy was hesitant and 
faltering. But after i860 it became a definite 
movement toward domination of the route between 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Two basic factors of 
British Far Eastern policy were involved. One was 
the need to maintain and protect the trade route 
to China. The other factor was the evolution of 
an imperial policy - the change-over from primarily 
a commercially based to a politically based policy.
The change took place during the quarter of a 
century following i860. British activity was 
motivated more and more by the idea that another 
power might acquire a territorial footing in north­
west Borneo and threaten the trade routes..
During the l86o*s Britain granted naval pro­
tection to Sarawak* It was then but a step to 
proclaiming a sphere of influence over the whole coast.
These moves were as much a reaction to the French
presence in Cochin China as they were a reflection
of the new imperialist feeling arising in Britain* 
The suspicion of German intentions in the area 
moved Britain to ± r engthen her position* She 
sponsored the state of North Borneo under rule 
by a chartered company* By a protocol with 
Germany and Spain she defined her sphere in 
Borneo* Finally Britain granted protectorates 
over Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo*
The purpose of this thesis is to study Britain* 
position in Borneo from i860 to 1888 and to show 
how it reflected the development of policy in 
London.
3.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND AND RETTING OF THE THEME?
T hF  SOUTH CHINA SEA AREA IN THE MID 
19th CENTURY
The basis of British Far Eastern policy during 
much of the 19th century was the valuable China trade 
and the security of the commercial routes by which 
that trade was exploited. The problem facing policy 
makers in London was not the acquisition of large 
amounts of territory - an idea repugnant to succes­
sive colonial secretaries - but the possession of 
strategically located and. small naval stations and 
entrepots which could command the sea routes through 
the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca and the 
South China Sea. So dominant was the Manchester 
school of thinking upon British colonial policy 
during the middle years of the century that colonies 
were considered by some to be burdensome and no
1
longer worth holding.
The nature of the China trade.
Following the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 182*4 the
preoccupation in the Far East was the China trade.
For the next fifty years British governments struggled
with the problems of the protection of that trade.
Until 1833 trade between Britain and China was
carried on, in theory, exclusively by the East
India Company, although after the founding of the
free port of Singapore in 1819 private traders
engaged in the China trade bv transhipping their
2
cargoes at that port. Company ships brought tea 
' and silk to Britain. Ships outward bound from 
British ports carried cotton and woollen textiles
1. C.A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism 
(Copenhagen 192*4) , pp 12-75. Bodelsen analyses the
separatist and colonial reform movements and notes the
distinction in attitude toward the larger European-
settled dominions such as Canada and Australia and the
smaller denendent colonies such as Mauritius. See also 
Herman Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies 
183Q-18U1. (London lS6iV. and A.P.Thornton, the Imperial 
Idea, and Its Enemies (London 1959) Ch.l. Thornton considers
senaratism more an assumption than a movement.
7. M. Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 
I800-18U?.(Cambridge 1951)? PP*36-375 175* Greenberg 
estimates that by 183^ over half of British trade with 
China was in private hands.
9.
and iron and steel products to India. Raw cotton, 
pepper and opium were shipped to Canton from Indian
V
ports, and from the archipelago came birds’-nests,
^    .
rattans, camphor, tin and pepper. Until the beginning
of the 19th century large shipments of silver went to 
China in payment for company exports. This proved 
such a drain that opfum was developed as a major 
trading commodity with China despite Chinese import 
restrictions. Come opium originated in Turkey but 
(i A , most of it was grown as a company monopoly in India. 
It was smuggled into China by country traders with 
the co-operation of Chinese merchants and boatmen., 
Lionel Curtis notes that opium shipments from company 
sources in India in 1770 amounted to 200 chests, in 
I83O, *+,000 chests and by l8*+0 had increased by more
3
than seven times. As the trade was a smuggling
3. L. Curtis, The Capital Question of China (London 
1932), p.?7* See also H.B. Morse, The Chronicles of the 
East India. Company Trading to China 163^-1.83^. (Oxford 
1926) + iii ^ 383 and iv,38.3V and The" Trade and Administration 
of the Chinese Empire (London 1908), p. 33^ +* Greenberg, 
op.cit.. p.221 and Morse indicate a much greater increase 
in opium shipments to China during the period. See 
official reports in P.P. .1830, V (61+J+).p.65 (The China 
Trade) and P.P., 1830, VI (6Ub), pp.670-7 (House of Lords 
Report on the affairs of the East India Company, and 
trade between Great Britain, the East Indies and China).
10
operation accurate figures are not available.
However, most sources agree that there was a 
continuous increase in the amount of opium shipped 
to China from the late 18th century on and that 
after 1833 the increase was great indeed. The 
increase reversed the flow of silver. From the 
first decade of the 19th century an increasing 
amount of silver left China in payment for Indian
h
goods.
Although control of the China trade was in 
• the hands of the company licenses were granted to 
private merchants and ship captains to engage in 
this lucrative commerce. It was the activities of 
these country traders which made possible the 
. financing of the company*s China operations. Country 
traders built up favourable balances in Canton 
mainly by commerce in opium. The company used 
the credit balances to finance the tea '’investment" 
and gave the country traders bills on its account
U. Greenberg, p.10. In the 1806-7 season #7 million 
in silver bullion and coin was shipped from China to 
India.
11.
1
payable in India, Singapore or London,
While opium was a contraband item and handled
by the private traders, tea was a company monopoly*
The tea trade was the main commercial activity of
the' East India Company after its loss of the monopoly
6
of the India trade. It was important to Britain.
During the last years of the companyfs monopoly of
trade in Chins tea duties raised about one-tenth of
the country1s total revenue and averaged £3*3
1
million annually. Following the reduction of the
import tax in 1833 and the end of the company1s
monopoly the same year the amount shipped to Britain
increased rapidly., During the first "free season"
8
the increase was *+0 per cent. By 18^3 the annual 
consumption of tea per capita was 1 .1+7 rounds and in 
1866 it reached 3*37 pounds.
IT Greenberg, op.cit. p.11. cites W.Milburn, Oriental 
Commerce, (London 1813) 11,^83^ and estimates that in 
the early shears of the 19th century the annual credit 
balance of country traders in Canton was £1 million,
6 . C.R. Fay, f.The Movement Toward Free Trade1, in The 
Cambridge History of the British Empire, ii, 399*
7. Greenberg, o p.clt. , p.3*
8. Ibid., p. 1857^
9. H.J. Habakkuk,TFree Trade and Imperial Expansion, 1 
1853-1870, in The Cambridge History  , ii, 77?-*
Silk was also an important item of import from 
China, Tea and silk together formed the hulk of 
imports for which payment was made possible by the 
considerable shipments of opium from India.
The China trade increased throughout the middle
decades of the 19th century. Until India replaced
China as the chief supplier, tea remained the basic
Import commodity. At the end of the Ifith century
the value of all imports into Britain from China
averaged £1*8 million annually* During the next
few decades the value of imports grew steadily.. They
averaged £*+.3 million annually between 1811 and 1820.
Then with the end of the company monopoly, the
opening of more ports and the establishment of
Hong Kong following the first war with China trade
received new stimulus.. Between l8 ?k and 1863 annual
imports averaged £9.8 million. By the mid-l860’s
Britain succeeded in capturing predominance in the
China trade. Between 186b and 1873 annual imports
10
were in the vicinity of £12 million.
10. Statistics are from Greenberg and Milburn, and from 
’Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom’ for the 
years 1830, 183?, I8k0 , 18k?, and 1 8 ?0 compiled by the 
Statistics Office, Customs and Excise Department (PRO,
Trade routes to the East.
The protection of the long commercial routes 
to India, Singapore and China, especially in time 
of war, was a chief concern of the British govern­
ment in Far Eastern policy. By the end of the 
first quarter of the century the two main routes 
via the Mediterranean and Egypt, and around Africa 
were secured by possession of naval stations at 
convenient intervals. The Mediterranean route was 
guarded by Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands 
and Aden. Naval stations at Sierra Leone, St. Helena, 
X . , /  Simons Bay, Trincomalee and Mauritiiis protected the 
African route. British naval~~power was supreme in 
the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal after the defeat 
of the French fleets late in the 18th century and at 
Trafalgar in 1805*
The usual route of trading vessels bound further 
east to China from the Straits of Malacca or Sunda
Customs V25,/30,/35,A0,A5). See also P.P.. 1830 
vi (6^6) p.6kh-, for figures on trade, 1820 and 1828:
H.L. Hoskins in British Routes to India. (London 1928), 
p..8 7, states that during the decades prior to the Anglo- 
Dutch settlement of the eastern question in 182*+ British 
imports from the whole of the Far East tripled while 
exports quadrupled. Fay, on.cit.. p.hOO, notes that in 
18h0 imports from India and China combined were £9 .6 million
1U.
was through the South China Sea between Borneo and the 
Malay peninsula, the western passage. A passage by 
way of the Moluccas and west of New Guinea, the Pitt 
Passage, was frequently used, however, especially 
during the period of the northeast monsoons, October 
to April. Milburn in Oriental Commerce notes a third- 
route, through the Straits of Macassar, as !much 
frequented by ships bound to China late in the seasonT.
Ships from Singapore rounded the peninsula between 
Pedro Branca and Point Romania and headed directly 
north on a track which carried them in sight of and 
eastward of Pulau Conaore, off the coast of Annam.
Thence, two routes were open. One, directly north 
by Hainan Island and the other, by way of the funnel, 
a passage north-easterly through the shoals to the 
p ^  VPawlawan Passage and the west coast of Luzon to the 
islands off the Canton estuary. The latter route 
was used during the south-westerly monsoon. From the 
Sunda Straits ships would pass through the Karimata
11
or Caspar Straits thence northward as described above.
A less used route lay from Singapore or Sunda north­
eastward between the Natuna Islands and Point Datu
11. The following give detailed information on routes 
used between India and China during the l8th and 19th 
centuries: Alexander Dalrymple, Memoir Concerning the Passage
15.
the westernmost tip of Borneo, then northward along 
the Borneo coast and through the Pawlawan passage *
Before the 18^0*s, the latter route was undoubtedly 
less frequented than the more westerly route for at 
the beginning of the southwest monsoon each spring, 
when numerous trading vessels would be setting out 
for China, Balanini and Illanun pirates lurked in 
wait off the southwest coast of Borneo and among 
the islands at the entrance to the South China Sea. 
Chinese junks and native trading vessels among the East 
Indies were among the main victims of piracy; but the 
Illanun and Balanini would also attack European ships. 
The Malays and Sea Dyaks of the several rivers in the 
vicinity of Sarawak engaged in this occupation and a 
European ship in distress, or so unlucky as to ground 
upon shoals along the coast, was an easy mark for the 
Malays. In the early iS^+O's, two English vessels, the 
Sultana and the Lord Melbourne, were w e  eked off Borneo. 
The Lascars in the crew were sold into slavery by the
to and from China. (London 1782), and Memoir Concerning 
the Passage at a late season from India to China (London 
1788)5 James Horsburgh. Directions for Sailing to and 
from the East Indies. China. New Holland. Cane of Good 
Hone, and the Interjacent Ports. VoijLi. (London 1811)
Malavs, who olundered the vessel, while the Europeans
12
were held for ransom.
After several naval actions against the pirates 
during the l8*+0fs and 1850!s and the acquisition of 
Labuan, the Borneo route became safer for the passage 
of commerce. But as late as 1862, the annual expedition 
of the Illanun and Balanini from Sulu around the whole 
island of Borneo was still considered a menace to
commercial vessels, especially during the southwest
12
monsoon..
and Indian Directory or Directions for Sailing .... . 8th 
ed, (London 186^^ Hors burgh’s later editions include 
directions for steamers as well as sailing vessels*
D.R. MacGregor in The China Bird: A History of Captain 
TCilllck and One Hundred Years of Bail and Steam.(London 
I96I).' p.105, notes that ‘the passage through the Gaspar 
Straits, was not looked forward to by many masters with 
much pleasure1. The author indicates in his end map an 
even more difficult passage, that by way of the Banka 
Straits . This route is mentioned by Peter Osbeck in 
A Voyage to China and the East Indies,(London 1771) Vol.ii, 
entry under date l6 Jan. 1752.
12. Authoritative descriptions of piracy can be found in 
L.A. Mills, British Malaya 1.8?H-I867. (Singapore 19^5) 
pp.21^-62; and Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, The History of 
Sarawak Under Its Two White Rajahs. (London 1909), Ch.iv. 
There is an eye witness account of a pirate attack in 
Henry Keppel, The Expedition to Borneo of HMS Dido.(London 
18U6). C.N. Parkinson in Trade in the Eastern Seas.
(London 1937)> PP*350-1, states that small ships of the 
coTintry trade were particularly vulnerable to attack by 
Malay pirates when on the west coast of Borneo.
13. Copy of Admiralty to Adm. Kuper, senior officer at 
Singapore, 8 Oct.1862, F0/12 30, describes a plan for an
Shins and Communications.
Before (discussing the main causal factors of 
British policy during the 19th century, the protection 
of commerce and the international rivalry in the South 
China Sea, a few words about shipping and communications 
between London, India, and China are in order. The 
first steamship on the route to the Far East appeared
Ik
in 1825. Because of the large quantities of coal 
consumed by the first paddle wheelers, the shorter 
Egyptian route was favoured. Coaling stations on this 
route were at more frequent intervals. In 1830, the 
East India Company commenced a regular steam service
15
between Bombay and Suez. Mail time between London
16
and Bombay was reduced from three to two months. The
expedition with the Dutch against the pirates and contains 
a map of the route of Sulu pirates around Borneo;
(Callaghan to FO, 10 Nov. 1862). Consul Callaghan suggests 
a plan of operation against the pirates while they are on 
the maurading expeditions. See also Stanton to Adm. 27 
Sept. 1862, on the character of Illanun pirates*
I1*. C.S. Carrington, The British Overseas (Cambridge 1950) 
P.H63* It was the Enterprise. ^70 tons.
15. Fay, op.cit.. p.^11.
16. Carrington, op.cit*. p.*+6U, states that after the 
establishment by East India House of the Overland Mail in 
1838, the average time of mail from London to Bombay was
7k days and from Bombay to Lopdon 6k days, and 50 days was 
the record for the shortest time run.
Peninsular and Oriental Company, in 18U0, started 
a service of steam packets between the Red Sea and
IZ
India. Five years later it was extended to 
Singapore and China.
While most passengers and cargo continued to 
travel by sail around the Cape throughout the middle 
decades of the century, the Mediterranean route was 
used by government officials and the mail. At mid­
century the pattern of communications between London 
and the east was: Steamships sailed twice monthly
from London to Alexandria; officials and mail then 
went overland to Suez and again by steam to Bombay, 
Ceylon, Calcutta, and Madras; regular steam packets 
left Bombay for China twice a month. By 1857? there 
was a weekly mail service between England and India.
Sail continued to dominate the commercial routes 
to China and the Far East until the l870fs when the 
Suez Canal and improvements in steam engineering
23
helped turn the advantage to steam ships. The great
17. Fay, op.cit. p.*+12. The service ran between Suez and 
Madras, Calcutta and Ceylon. Bombay continued to be 
served by the East India Company.
18. F.E. Hyde. Blue Funnell: A History of Alfred Holt
and Company of Liverpool from l865-lQlU. (LiverpooT 1956). 
p.25* Chapter-flgives interesting" information on the sail
19.
expansion of the China trade during the first half 
of the 19th century was accompanied by increasing 
competition between Britain and the United States 
in carrying the tea and for dominance in the trade.
While British traders continued to use the slow and 
Vw*- , ponderous indiaman, the Americans developed the fast, 
sleek clipper of two thousand tons which during the 
1850*s far outdistanced the British commercial fleet. 
British merchants soon began building clippers of teak 
which proved to be sturdier and faster than the American 
vessels. Cargoes were also better protected and arrived 
in better condition than in the lighter American clippers. 
Thffis development plus the American concentration on the 
civil war during the 1860's and westward expansion there­
after gave the dominance of the China trade.to the 
merchants out of Liverpool, London and Glasgow.
versus steam competition in the China trade.. See also 
G.S. Graham, 'The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship 1850-851 
in Economic History Review, ix, i, (Aug.1956) P*75* who 
points out that even after the opening of the Suez Canal 
a great amount of trade with India, the East Indies and 
Australia was carried by sail and that the canal 'was not 
a turning point in the life of sail',.
19. C.E. Fayle, A Short History of the World's Shipping 
Industry. (London 1933)5 pp.23V-3S. For detail of the ships 
routes and characteristics of the China trade during the 
middle decades of the 19th century see D.R. MacGregor,
The Tea Clipper (London 1952) and The China Bird, on.cit. 
Chs. 4 and 5- “ ----
The British navy adopted steam as early as the 
20
1820’s. Steam propulsion became auxiliary to sail
power and gave the advantage of great maneuverability
and movement independent of climatic conditions. The
Admiralty, however, did not finally give up sails
until I870. The warship equipped with paddle wheels
necessitated some changes in ship arrangements. The
paddle wheels were vulnerable and their location made
it necessary to rearrange gun placements. The great
quantity of coal which had to be stowed cut down on
the space for ammunition and supplies. In 18U5* “the
Navy adopted the screw propellor which proved to be a
21
far superior means of steam locomotion. The develop­
ment of steamships called for plentiful supplies of 
coal at frequent intervals. By mid-century Britain 
had coaling stations along the main trade routes.
20. W.L. Cowes, The Royal Navy (London 1901) , i, 19^-8.
In 1869 the Admiralty commenced the Devastation, the first 
British war ship without rigging. For years, however, war 
ships with sails and auxiliary steam continued to be used.
21. W.C.B. Tunstall, ’Imperial Defence, 1815-1870*, in 
The Cambridge History, ii, 821. See also Cowes, op.cit.
The challenge of French naval power during the l850*s 
and Palmerston’s pursuit of a progressive naval 
construction policy went far in assuring to Britain 
continued naval superiority.
The strategic concent of the South China Sea area.
The great increase in the value of the China 
trade and in the number of vessels involved in that 
trade during the second quarter of the 19th century 
underscored the importance to Britain of the South 
'China Sea area, through which most of the China trade 
passed. The main concern, of course, was the protec­
tion of the trade routes against piracy and an enemy 
during time of war. A corollary to it was the 
possession and maintenance of naval and coaling 
stations. Thus developed the concept of the strategic 
value of the lands flanking the South China Sea, and a 
concern for the activities of other western powers in 
the area.
After 1833 the increase in private free traders 
sailing under the British flag, to and from Canton, 
posed a major problem for the Admiralty. As long as 
the armed indiaman plied the South China Sea, the commerce
was relativelv safe with only the need of an occasional
22
vessel of the naval service. During wartime the 
indiamen usually travelled in convoys accompanied by 
one or more naval vessels. If a frigate or other 
naval craft was bound for India it protected the convoy 
throughout the trip. Otherwise the convoy was shepherded 
through the waters of the naval stations along the route. 
St. Helena, the Cape, and the East Indies squadrons 
furnished protection. When China ships made the long 
route by way of the roaring forties, almost to 
Australia, thence north through Sunda to Canton, a 
standing rule directed that a war vessel always accom­
pany the convoy. In 1835 us a result of petitions from 
the merchants of Singapore for protection against pirates, 
three warships and three gunboats were sent to patrol 
the shipping lanes off Singapore. In 1837 a permanent 
naval force consisting of two Royal Navy ships and 
five gunboats, and a small steamship, the Diana, were 
stationed on the Straites. After l8*+2 the Admiralty
allotted fifteen shins to the East Indies and China 
22
Station.
22. Parkinson, on. cit. p.30*+.
23. Mills, on.cit.. p.p.232-31 Admiralty instructions to
Rear Admiral Parker cm 
and Chinese Pirates, 1 _^___
Chapter III traces the development of the China "'station.
ited .m  Grace Fox, British Admirals 
( L o n d o n  1 d U n T t T ' t B - -----------------
The voyage from Singapore to Canton was a 
long haul; about 1,500 milesjwith no friendly port 
of call or refuge. The commerce on the route was 
particularly vulnerable to enemy attack during 
time of war with other European powers. It was 
this fact which drew the attention of Britain to 
the northwest coast of Borneo in the middle of 
the 19th century. But, as in the case of Francis 
Light at Penang and Stamford Raffles in Singapore, 
it was the persistence and efforts of one indiv­
idual Englishman which shaped the official attitude. 
Geography of Borneo.
Borneo is one of the larger islands of the 
world. It is slightly under 300,000 square miles 
in extent. It straddles the equator from 7° north 
latitude to *f° south latitude. The island is slightly 
pear shaped, with its stem end pointing in a north- 
northeasterly direction. Ranges of mountains extend
2*f. A.R. Wallace, The Malay Archipelago (London 1886), 
and John Crawford, A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian 
Islands and Ad ip cent Countries (London 1856V are still 
useful guides for the study of the geography of Borneo. 
More recent works worth noting are Owen Rutter, British 
North Borneo (London 1922) and Charles Robequain, Malaya. 
Indonesia.^ Borneo and the Pb 11 in-pine s« (London 195^)~*
roughly in a northeast - southwest direction, 
separating the south and eastern three-fourths 
of the island, which is Indonesian Kalimantan, 
from the British territories of Sarawak, Brunei, 
and North Borneo. An east-west range crosses the 
island at 1° north latitude. The British territories 
stretch the length of the northwest coast and around 
the northeast coast to the Efebodooe River at about *+° 
north latitude. The mountains divide Borneo into 
these two parts. They also divide the water-sheds 
of the rivers of Borneo. The rivers dominate 
political, social and economic life. The inhabitants 
of Kalimantan are orientated toward the Celebes and 
Java Seas; while in the British territories, the 
orientation is toward theSouth China Sea. The whole 
island is covered with jungle growth from dense rain 
forest to the semi-savannah of the coastal plains of 
North Borneo. Rivers form convenient transportation 
and communications systems. They extend from high in 
the mountain ranges through hundreds of miles of 
often meandering paths to enter the oceans by multiple 
mouths among the mangrove swamps along the coast. They
are navigable for many miles for those ocean vessels 
which are able to navigate the sand bars at the river 
mouth. In the British territories, the largest river, 
the Rajsng, is navigable for a distance of 80 miles.- 
In North Borneo, the Kinabatangan River is 350 miles 
long, 75 of which are navigable. Kapoeas, the largest 
of Borneo rivers, is 700 miles long and navigable 
for ^00 miles by small steamers.
Low lying coastal plans form a belt around the 
whole island from a few miles wide in the north to 
up to fifty miles in the south and east. Then come 
the low mountain ranges or hilly country and the high 
ranges culminating in peaks of nine to ten thousand 
feet in the centre of the. island. The highest moun­
tain, Kinabalu, 13?^ 55 feet, stands in a more or less 
isolated position in the far north of the island. 
Btbnoars.rhy
The people live along the rivers in small clearings 
or, as in Brunei Town, in villages built on stilts 
over the tidewater. So important is the river in the 
lives of Bornean people that the districts take their 
names from the rivers. In the mid-19th century, the 
point at which our study begins, the dominant political
erouu were Mohammedan Malays who occupied the river
25
mouths and lower river districts. In the northwest 
quarter of Borneo a number of tribes inhabited the 
upper river districts and the interior. In Sarawak,
Land Dyaks, a peaceful agricultural people, lived.
The Sea Dyaks occupied large areas in the Sekrang, 
Sarebas, and the Rejang districts. It was the Sekrang 
and Sarebas Dyaks who, led by Arab and Malay chiefs, 
were the scourge of the northwest coast before the 
l8Uo!s. In piratical ventures they were second only 
to the Illanuns and Balaninis for the ferocity and 
extent of their raids. After the great pirate battle 
of Batang Manau in I8k9, conducted by Sir James Brooke 
and Captain, later Admiral, Arthur Farquhar, the Sea 
Dyaks became peaceful and useful subjects of the white 
ra j a s.
Kayans occupied the upper reaches of such rivers 
as the Baram, the Limbang, Bintulu, and the upper Rajang. 
They \^ ere a warlike and powerful, but less travelled, 
tribe than the Sea. Dyaks* The Milanowes were a tribe
2% For detailed, information on the several tribes of 
Borneo, see H. Low, Sarawak. (London l8*+9); Charles Hose 
and William McDougel, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo (London 
1912) ; and H.L. Roth, The Natives of Sarawak and British 
North Borneo (London 1896) - the collection of h7 Brooke 
i7ov - '".Torftietly at the Sarawak Government Service.
which lived in villages around the mouth of the Rejang 
and other rivers south of Gape Sirik. They were more 
affected by Malay customs and adopted Malay ways. The 
Kad.ayan people lived in the vicinity of Brunei and also 
to a great extent adopted Malay customs and religion.
They were agricultural and were much oppressed by the 
Brunei rajas. They produced the pepper, beeswax, and 
camphor for the trade of Brunei. The Bajuas, or Sea 
Gypsies, lived along the northeast coast and were 
Mohammedans. The Muruts were a fierce tribe living 
mainly in the northeast of Brunei Bay.
26
At mid-century there were several thousand Chinese
in Sarawak, many of whom were occupied in the gold mining
kongsis. Chinese were in North Borneo and Brunei as
traders andj^apper planters prior to the arrival of
Europeans. When pepper planting declined in Brunei in
the 15th century, the Chinese all but disappeared* In
the early 1880*s, according to W.H. Treacher, there
21
were less than a hundred Chinese in Brunei.
26. For information on Chinese in Borneo, see Victor 
Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia. (London 1951) 3 
pp.Ul5-39.
27. W.H. Treacher, ’British Borneo: Sketches of Brunei,
Sarawak Labuan and North Borneo1 In JRASSB, V.20, l889,p.27.
The early history of Brunei*
In 18^0 the Malay state of Brunei claimed 
sovereignty over the whole of present day British
M
Borneo. Before 1500, Brunei had been a tributary to
Majapahit and China. But by 1500 the country was an
independent power. Islam spread to Brunei with the
success of Malacca. The l6th century saw Brunei
reach its greatest extent and glory. The sultan
ruled over all northern Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago
and part of the Philinnines. For a short time Manila
£2
paid annual tribute to Brunei. Pigafetta, the historian 
of Magellanrs voyage, among western travellers touching 
at Borneo, described the magnificence of the Sultan’s
30-
court in 1J21. At about this time also, Tomc.Pires 
noted that the Brunei peoule were traders in gold, wax,
31
honey, rice and sago with Malacca* A century later 
Brunei was still powerful enough to consider going to 
the aid of Pahang in a war with Jahore. In the 1630*s
28*- H. Low, 1 Selesilah1 (Book of the Descent) in JRASSB 
June I88O ; H.R. Hughes-Hallett, Sketch of the History of 
Brunei, in JR.ASMB, Aug. 19^0. Low’s information is taken 
from the family records of the Brunei rajas. (See Low to 
Derby, 6 July 1875? F012A1). Together these two sketches 
furnish most of what is knowh about Brunei before the 
19th century.
29., Low, on.cit. p.8.
30* The First Voyage Round the World bv Magelleon. ed.Lord 
Stanley" of 'AMerley (London '187^"'Hakluyt SocT," pVp.110-8 ..
Brunei and its Sulu allies attacked Spanish settle­
ments in the Philippines. The Spanish in revenge in 
16U5 sacked and burned Brunei. From the middle of 
the 17th century the decline of Brunei was steady.
By the mid-lPth century the sultan was no longer 
able to rule effectively beyond Brunei Town and 
immediate vicinity. His authority was nominal on 
the northwest coast with still some residual -respect 
for his title and leadership. Brunei had not, for 
many years, been able to control the Sea Dyaks of 
Sarebas and Sekang or the Kavans of Baram, Bintulu 
>h and the Rajang. It was only by threatening to invite 
the Kayans and the war-like Muruts to attack them that 
Brunei rajas were able to collect taxes and fines 
from the villages and more docile tribes along neigh­
bouring rivers. Brunei, like the Malav states of the 
jx peninsularjnoted by Mills, was decaying rapidly. The 
coast north of Brunei was controlled by the T1lanuns 
with a fortified town at Tampassuk and a stronghold at
Pandassan. Brunei was a pirate mart second only in 
^notoriety to Sulu. The Brunei rajas supported and
1 j/* 35
supplied the pirate fleets.
31. The Suma Oriental of TomePlres. ed.Armondo Cortesao 
(London IRHk), Hakluyt Soc., Vol. i, 137-3* This account 
was written in Malacca and India in 1512 to 1515*
The arrival, of .Tames Brooke
When James Brooke arrived in Sarawak in 1839
the Malays of that southernmost province of the sultanate
36
of Brunei were in rebellion. In l8*+0 and 18^1, Brooke 
son of an East India Company servant and himself a former 
officer of a Bengal regiment, aided the Brunei raja, Muda 
Hasim, in putting down the rebellion. As a part of the 
bargain, Sarawak was handed over to Brooke to rule. The 
sultan confirmed the transfer in I8U2..
Brooke was an English gentleman of private means, 
who had equipped his own expedition. Originally Brooke
32. Peter Floris: His Voyage to the East Indies in
the Globe 1611 to I6l5, ed. W.H. Moreland, (London 193*0 5
Hakluyt Soc. p.73*
33. Mills, op.cit. no. 171-2, 239* Mills notes that
only Johore was not in a state of anarchy.
3^. Ibid.
35* Ibid.. p.2U0.
36. The authoritative biographies of Brooke are:
Gertrude Jacob The Raja of Sarawak. (London 1876), and 
S.B. St.John. Life of Sir James Brooke. Rajah of Sarawak 
(Edinburgh 1879V. —
37* Brooke to JamesGardner, 10 Dec.lS1*!. F012/1; Brooke 
to F0, 31 March l8*+5? F012/3, enclosing a memo on the 
subject of piracy.
had no political interest in the area but had been led 
to Borneo by his curiosity about the eastern seas.
During the following years, Brooke, who took the title 
of raja, busied himself establishing a firm but bene­
volent government of natives supervised by Englishmen*
He succeeded also in establishing a strong British 
influence upon the northwest coast of Borneo* Sarawak 
prospered under Brooke rule. Brookefs arrival in Borneo 
coincided with a demand by merchants of Singapore for a 
British port on the northwest coast of Borneo. They 
felt this was necessary as a defence against pirates and 
for the promotion of trade* From l84l Brooke urged 
Britain to establish a naval station, colony, or 
protectorate on the coast of Borneo to forestall any
3Z
other power from doing so. Other interested persons
also warned the government to take notice of foreign
38
interests in Borneo.
In November 1844 the Admiralty sent Captain Drink- 
water Bethune to Borneo to look for a site for a naval
38. Copy of a letter of John Anderson to Indian News,
10 Oct.1844, F012/2; Anderson to Aberdeen, 1*4 July 1845*
F012/3; Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to Aberdeen, 21 May
1846; Glasgow East India Association to Aberdeen, 23 May
1846 , FHL2/3. Henry Wise, Brooke's London agent,
conducted a vigorous lobbying operation aimed at pursuading
Britain to acquit Labuan.. He was responsible for many 
letters and petitions to the government. John Anderson
station and specifically to investigate Labuan. The 
Foreign Office, which in 1845 appointed Brooke diplo­
matic agent to the Sultan of Brunei, now instructed
him to co-operate with Bethune in locating and acquiring
22 itQ
a suitable base. At the same time, Lord Aberdeen,
the foreign minister, in a letter to the sultan noted 
with pleasure the sultan's 'determination not to enter 
into any treaty engagements with foreign powers1 during 
the period while Labuan was under consideration as a
41
British base. This was reference to the offer by the 
sultan, at the instigation of Brooke, of the island of 
Labuan to Britain. Brooke supervised the transfer of 
Labuan to Britain as a colony and became its first 
governor in 1848. He was also appointed commissioner 
and consul general to the Sultan of Brunei after 
negotiating a treaty of friendship and commerce in 1847*
was a retired East India Company servant, who furnished 
Wise with information on the Far East.
39* Aberdeen to Brooke, 1 Nov. 1844. FO 12/2.
40. George Hamilton Gordon (1784-l8oO) 4th Earl of 
Aberdeen, foreign secretary, 1828-1830 and 1841-1846, 
Prime Minister 1852-1855.
4.1. Aberdeen to Sultan of Brunei, i Nov. 1844. FO 12/3. 
the United States had sought a treaty with the Sultan in 
1845. See below page 38
Western nations1 activities in the South China Sea.
Britain’s closest neighbours in the South China 
Sea before the l850’s were Soain in the Philippines 
and the Dutch in the archipelago. The threats from 
these powers against the security of the British route 
to China, however, were not strong. The Dutch 
frequently complained that Britain1s activities in 
Borneo were in violation o^ the 182b- treaty. Spain 
reacted sharply when Sir James Brooke, acting for 
Britain, negotiated a treaty in 18^9 with the sultan 
of Sulu whom Spain considered her vassal. The foreign 
office, however, under Lord Malmesbury in 1852, thought
hi
it was not worthwhile to press Spain on the point.
The Dutch were told that the treaty of 182*4 did not
apply to Borneo, and at no time were they enthusiastic — *
about challenging Britain over the Borneo issue.
During most of the 19th century, Britain’s chief complaint 
against both Spain and Holland in the Far East was not 
that either might appropriate strategic positions from 
which to threaten British sea power in time of war, but
*42. See below pp. 53-5^ James Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury 
foreign secretary Feb.1852 to Dec.18^2, and Feb.1858 to 
June 1859.
*+3. FO to British Min. (The Hague), 31 May l8*tl, noted in 
Palmerston to Elliot, 2*4 Oct 1850, FO Q7/2h9 . See also 
Aberdeen to Brooke, 1 Nov.l8h*4, FO 1 '/'■»   _
the highly restrictive commercial policies which both 
nations followed in their colonial possessions. As 
late as the l870rs Britain was more concerned with 
Spainrs restriction on trade in Sulu than by the 
strategic location of those islands and the Spanish 
claim of ownership, despite the fact that the Sulu 
Archipelago commanded the most direct trade route 
between China and Australia.
As in the Mediterranean and the Near East, so in 
the Far East after 1815 the main threats to British 
positions and aspirations were from France and Russia. 
Britain*s response to the Russian threat to her Far 
Eastern position involved the development of policy 
in the northwest Pacific. A discussion of it is outside 
the subject of our analysis. It was by naval war with 
France that Britain had become a dominant power in the 
Indian Ocean late in the 18th century. In the early 
l8Ho*s France was showing a renewed interest in the Far 
East and especially in the South China Sea area. Britain 
looked with some suspicion at French activities in 
Cochin China and the thought of France holding a
position in the South China Sea was distasteful.
In l8Ul, France sent an observation mission to the 
Far East to look into the political situation in 
China and to show the flag 1 in the midst of the 
British Far Eastern snuadron as a contribution to 
national prestige*. This mission turned out to be 
ineffective in gaining any specific ends for France 
because of the bickering among its members, their 
tendency to act independently of one another, and 
the machinations of French Catholic clerics who acted 
as interpreters to the mission.
Late in I8U3 a second mission was dispatched to 
China. This was an imposing delegation led by Theodose 
de Lagrene with a naval escort of two frigates of fiftv- 
two guns, three corvettes, and a small steam warship. 
While the main objects of the mission were advertised as 
commercial and. specifically to obtain a treaty with 
China similar in terms to the Anglo-Chinese treaty, 
secret instructions ordered the mission to seek and 
acquire a naval station on the route to China. The
U5. The Jancigny-Cecille mission to China is discussed at 
length in Cady, op.cit. pp.33-^2. John Cady, The Roots of 
French Imperialism in Eastern Asia , (Ithaca, 19^) ? p.75*
^6* The LaGrene mission negotiated the Franco-Chinese 
treaty of Whampoa.
/y  t 't
island of Basilan in the Sulu group northeast of Borneo
hi
was suggested. The mission veiled its intentions 
because of the scrutiny of the British in the area. 
Ostensibly, the French fleet was to be on hand to 
assist China in case Britain refused to evacuate the 
island of Chusan, according to the terms of the settle- 
ment of the first China War. Admirable Cecille, in 
command of one of the French frigates, forcibly annexed 
Basilon for France after a punitative expedition against 
the islanders following their capture of five members 
of the crew of the corvette La Sabine and the execution 
of two of them. The French agreed to pay the sultan of 
Sulu #100,000 within six months. The island was not 
garrisoned and the French fleet sailed away to Macao.
The upshot of the Basil'an incident was that Spain 
immediately protested against the French acti.vity so 
close to her possessions in the Philippines and involving 
an island over which she claimed suzerainty. The settle­
ment of the affair was made in Europe by a complete
k9
abrogation by France of the Basilan annexetion.
Cady, op.cit. pp.U^-5. 
k8„ Britain was perhaps justified in fearing that Chusan 
might fall into rival hands. See F0 to Davis, May 6 , Oct. 23^ 3 
1895, F0 17/96.
*+9* Cady, op.cit.. pp.58-59*
37.
Another power active in the Far East and which 
posed a potential threat to the British position on the 
route to China was the United States• As early as 178*4 
that country* s commercial vessels were operating in Far
5 0
Eastern waters. In 1830, Edmond. Roberts was dispatched 
to the Far East to secure treaties of friendship and 
commerce with Borneo, Siam, Cochin China, and Japan. He 
died at Canton before he was able to visit either Borneo
II
or Japan. In 18*4?, following the Anglo-Chinese treaty 
of Nanking, Caleb Cushing was appointed to Canton by 
the United States government to secure a most-favoured­
nation treaty with China and to visit Peking if possible. 
The treaty of Wang-hea followed on July 3, l8*4k.
American naval vessels frequented the Far East. 
Commodore Lawrence Kearny commanded the United States 
squadron in China during the first China war. In
October 18*42 he had preceeded Cushing to Canton and
52
obtained some concessions for American traders..
50. The United States initiated its Far Eastern trade 
when the Empress of China. Captain Green, left New York for 
Canton in Febrv»ary 178*4. See Werner Levi, !The Earliest 
Relations between the United States of America and 
Australiar in the Pacific Historical Review. Dec.19^3? P*35* 
5*. D.s. Special Missions, i, 73. Roberts was appointed 
"special agent .... for the purpose of examining in the 
Indian Ocean, the means of extending the commerce of the 
United States by commercial arrangements with the powers 
whose dominions border on those seas." For Roberts1 mLsssion 
in Siam see Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama ITT.... (New York,
Between 1838 and 18^2 an American naval exploring 
expedition under Captain Charles Wilkes operated in 
the Pacific and Far Eastern waters. In February 1.8^ 2 
Captain Wilkes concluded a treaty of friendship with 
the sultan of Sulu under the terms of which the sultan 
arreed to protect American shins and extend most-
31
favoured-nation treatment to United States citizens.
This treaty was the result of the sultan having previously 
asked the supercargo of an American commercial vessel for
3h.
a treaty to trade with the United States. An American 
warship, the USS Constitution.. Captain Percivall, called 
at Brunei during the summer of l8*+5 seeking a commercial
1957)5 p.122. While he failed to persuade Siam to accept 
the-most-favoured-nation principle he was able to get 
duties reduced. See also Virginia Thompson, Thailand the 
New Siam. (New York, 19*+1) , p..200.
52. P.H. Clyde, The Far East. (New York 19^8), p.130.
See also L. Battistini, The United States and Asia. (New 
York 1955)*
53. Treaties and other International Acts of the U.S.A.., 
ed. Hunter Miller, iv, 3*+9-6l. This work contains a 
facsimile reproduction of the agreement.
Charles Wilkes, Voyape Round the World. (New York, 
I85D 5 Ch.38* Wilkes had not a very high opinion of
Sultan Mohammed and his court: ’....  more cowardly
looking miscreants I never saw. They appeared ready 
either to trade with us, pick our pockets, or cut our 
throats, as an opportunity might offer1. See also Wilkes, 
Synopsis of the Cruise of the U.S. Exploring Expedition
treaty, concession of rights to the mining of 
coal, and offering protection to the sultan. The 
Americans were put off by the Brunei authorities 
because of the expected negotiations with England 
over the sultan1s offer of Labuan and closer ties
55
with Britain. But in 1850 the United States1 
diplomatic agent, Joseph Balesteir, negotiated a
5k
commercial treaty with Brunei. By this time, 
Britain was in a much stronger position in Borneo, 
having occupied Labuan and negotiated a treaty with 
Brunei in 1847* Balesteir was prepared to treat 
with Sarawak but the raja wanted first to confer
51
with the British Government. A convention was 
never concluded.
During the Years 1,838 to 1842, (Washington 18*+ 2) .
Wilkes was ordered to examine the Sulu Sea and to 
find a safe route through it which would shorten the 
passage of American ships to China. Wilkes reported 
that Balabac Straits was suitable. See also Wilkes, 
Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition (Washington 
"1842) , V, ch.9.
55. Brooke to Aberdeen, 28 June 1845, FO 12/3, a copy 
of a memorandum of Muda Rasim to Brooke in June 1845.
Muda Rasim, uncle of the sultan, was the effective head 
of the Brunei government and enjoyed the trust of Brooke 
and other British officials. He warned that the Americans 
had expressed a desire to monopolize the entire trade of 
Brunei. If Britain were ’unwilling to afford us assistance1 
he said, Brunei must ’solicit aid in another quarter’, 
although their inclination was toward Britain. See also 
Irwin, Nineteenth Century Borneo (The Hague 1955), p.110,
lK>.
But while the United States sought ways and 
means of extending commerce and protecting her traders 
she had no political ambitions in the South China Sea*
Nor did she desire territory beyond her own borders* 
Indeed, when Commodore Matthew Perry devised a plan 
for American control of the Pacific between California 
and Japan and the ocean south of Japan the government 
in Washington found the proposal embarrassing. Perry 
was told that the president did not approve of acquisition 
of territorv xdiich mi^ht need to be defended by force
IS
if challenged by China, Japan or a European power.
Some historians have noted an increase in American
interest in the Pacific following the acquisition of
California in 181+8 and date the development of an
59
official policy from that point. But a definite
Irwin feels that this threat of American interest in 
Borneo was significant in pursuading the British 
government to establish a footing on the northwest coast.
56* Scott to CO, 2 July, 1850, CO lMtA, and Palmerston 
to Brooke, 2k Oct, 1850, FO 12/8. Copy of the treaty is in 
Miller, Treaties, on.cit., v, 819-^3*
57* Ibid., p.835? and Brooke to Palmerston, 21 Dec*l850,
FO 1275". “
58. Earl Swisher, 'Commodore Perry's Imperialism in 
Relation to America's Present Day Position in the Pacific’ 
Pacific Historical Review, Feb. 19^7? p.*40,
policy did not emerge until later in the century
despite ambitions of officials such as Secretary of
State William Seward in the i860rs. The indifference
of Americans and their preoccupation with developing
60
the west prevented it.
Britain was aware of the activities of the
United States and European powers in the South China
Sea area. It was reminded frequently of the threats
inherent in French and American interests in the area.
Britain's acquisition of Labuan was instigated quite
as much by the movements of these two powers as by
the desire to protect British shipping from piracy
and to provide an additional source of coal in the 
61
Far East. In this sense it was a recognition by
Britain of the strategic value of the northwest coast
of Borneo. This had been Stamford Raffles's theme
when early in the 19th century he urged the East India
Company to establish. British hegemony in Borneo, In
the I8h0's it was an argument which James Brooke used
when he pressed for the annexation of Labuan as a
6?
naval station.
e". g. L.H. Battistini, The Rise of American Influence 
in Asia end the Pacific (East Lansing I960)'. This is a
widely h§ld potion which one reviewer feels needs reexamin- 
-tmn, ^ee O.D. Corpus in a review of Battistini's bock
Dutch reaction to Raja Brooke.
Following the revolution of 18U8 in Holland , the 
new government under Thorbecke withdrew its diplomatic 
protests against British activity in northwest Borneo*
But beginning around 18 50 the Dutch interest in Borneo 
increased. In that year all Dutch Indies possessions, 
except Java and Banka, were opened to private entre-
6U
preneurs for the purpose of exploiting mineral resources* 
The Dutch pushed the exploitation of coal but were soon 
disappointed in the quality and supplies found in 
southern Borneo. Friction with native rulers and 
Chinese settlers made for a difficult time for the 
Dutch* The Netherlands East Indian government commended
in Journal of Southeast Asian History* Sept.1962, pp.l66-70
60. Swisher, on.cit. See also D*E*Clark, TManifest 
Destiny and the Pacific1, Pacific H:stor1ca1 Review* I,i,
193?.
61* FO memo, 25 June 18U6; FO to Adm* , 2*+ July, 18V6,
FO 1?A.
62. J* Bastin, *Raffles and British Policy in the Indian 
Archipelago 1811-18161, JRASMB, May 1.95^ , pp. 8U-119;
Brooke to Gardner, 10 Dec. 18^ +1, FO 12/1.
6 3. For a study of Anglo-Dutch relations in Borneo at 
this time see Irwin, on.cit.
6*+. Ibid. p.l6o.
a policy of force in their relations with Malay
sultans and the Chinese, especially with regard to
smuggling and other illegal activities. By i860
the Dutch were involved in a full scale war with
the sultan of Banjermasin, which culminated in
the assumption of direct rule over that area.
¥hile theDutch forward movement in Borneo was a
part of a general plan for better control of the
outer islands, it was also very much a reaction to
British influence in the northwestern part of the
island. From the beginning, the Dutch were
suspicious of Raja BrookeTs activities.- In the
late iB^CPs, they had proceeded to strengthen
their position in Sambas and Pontianak, to prevent
the spread of Brooke1s influence southward and to
discourage any further adventures of the Brooke
type such as Erskine Murray had attempted in 18M+
6 B
on the east coast of Borneo.
65# Ibid. p.158. Murray had been killed while 
trying to negotiate with the people of the Koetai 
Hiver.
British traders and officials in Southeast 
Asia were quick to point out to the home govern­
ment any new moves by the Dutch, especially any 
activities which could be viewed as advancing 
Dutch hegemony. Indeed, British commercial circles 
invariably noted any Dutch advance as increasing 
the area of Dutch monopoly of commerce and of the 
subordinate of foreign traders to Dutch control.
In IBUS, Raja Brooke warned the Foreign Office
that the Dutch were about to establish a settle-
66
ment on the east coast. The following year, 
both Brooke and the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
notified the Government of a Dutch expedition to 
Sulu with the intention of forcing a treaty with 
the sultan and to acquire territory either in the 
Sulu Sea or in the Bornean territory claimed by
£Z
the sultan.
66. Brooke to FO, 31 Hay 18^8, FO 12/6.
67. Brooke to Palmerston, 17 April I8U9 , F012/7* 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce petition to FO, 1 May 
181+9, FO 12/7.
Throughout the l850*s the Dutch continued
their movement of consolidation and direct rule
over eastern and southern Borneo* In 1856, Spenser
St.John, who had succeeded Brooke as consul to
Brunei, reported a great increase in Dutch activity
68
in extending their authority in Borneo. This 
prompted the government of Lord Palmerston to 
instruct St.John to find out more details concern-
69
ing the extent of the claims of the Dutch.
There the matter rested to he picked up again hy 
St.John two years later.
But while the political questions between 
Holland and Britain in Borneo were more or less at 
rest there were economic problems in the area which, 
caused friction. Following her plan for control of 
the outer islands, Holland attempted to extend the 
commercial terms of the 182*+ treaty, applying to 
Java, to the other islands. In 18*495 she negotiated
68. St.John to FO, 12 Jan 1856, F012/23.
6 9. FO to St.John, 21 April 1856, FO 12/25.
70. See below p. 93
treaties which included exclusive commercial rights
with several native states. The treaty of 182*4 stipulated
that neither Holland nor England would prevent the free
intercourse and communication between the various
21
native states of the east and the other party. But
according to the Dutch view the ports of the native
states with whom she had treaties were no longer native
ports but Dutch ports and. subject to the terms of the
182*+ treaty. The Dutch minister of the colonies state
in the States-General that 'foreign flags remain
excluded from the coasting navigation' of the East
72
Indian possessions.
Britain received frequent protests against Dutch 
exclusive commercial policies from her traders and 
representatives in the east, as well as from commer­
cial interests at home. Among the petitioners were
71* Ibid. See also FO memo of 5 Oct.1850, and Palmerston 
to Schimmetpennick, 2k Oct.1850 F095/2*+9. (Also in 
Confidential Print, number 1737? p.27). The native 
states referred to in this instance were Bali and Lambok,
72. Singapore Chamber of Commerce to Palmerston, 25 July 
1850, FO 97/2U9.. For a fuller discus sion of commercial 
problems of the two countries, see N. Tarling, 'British 
Policv in the Malav Peninsula and Archipelago 18214-1871!? 
JRASMB. Oct.lQ57.
the East India Association of London, the Edinburgh
and Singapore Chambers of Commerce, and the East India
21
and China Association of Liverpool. Successive 
British foreign ministers passed on these protests 
in notes to the Dutch government. Palmerston in
Ih.
October 1850, informed the Dutch that Britain con­
sidered the restrictions upon British trade as infringe­
ments of the 182*+ treaty. The Dutch, replied, rather 
vaguely, that their treaties with the princes of Bali 
and Lombok, against which Britain protested, were not
23
intended to injure the trade of Britain. Lord 
21
Clarendon at the Foreign Office, in 1.855 and 1856,
also warned the Dutch following more complaints from
21
British traders in Surabaya and Singapore. The 
following year Consul St.John wrote to Clarendon that 
no attention had been paid to the protests of Lord
73. FO 97/21+9. passim. (Confidential Print 1737? passim) . 
7*+. Ibid. Palmerston to Schimmetpennick, op.cit.
75. Elliot to Palmerston, 26 Nov. 1850, FO 97/2*+9.
76. George William Frederick Villiers (1800-1872) - Earl 
of Clarendon, foreign secretary 1853-1858, 1865-1866 and
I868-I87O.
77* Clarendon to Abercrombie, 8 April and 2 Dec. 1856,
FO 97/2^9.
Palmerston in 1850. In 1857 and 1858, Britain 
again protested to Holland when that country in a 
treatv with the native state of Tanette in
2 8
Celebes included a stipulation which would prohibit
foreigners from residing in that part of elebes
without the permission of the Dutch government.-
In this instance, when the Dutch offered to 'intimate
to all the native princes .... that such stipulation
not apply to British subjects, who may be permitted
to reside in the ports or cities specially opened ....
to foreign trade', Lord Malmsbury again at the Foreign
80
Office, accepted the offer. Britain's resistance to
Dutch devices designed to restrict foreign traders
from the outer islands of the archipelago became
normal policy with British governments during the
81
mid-century decades.
78*. St.John to Clarendon, 28 May, 1857? FO 97/2*+9*
St.John urged the appointment of a commissioner to carry 
out investigations and hear complaints on the subject of 
the Anglo-Dutch activities in the archipelago* A commis­
sioner would succeed Brooke who held the post but was 
unable to fulfil the mission becaiise of his preoccupation 
with a commission of Inquiry into his activities. St.John 
offered his services.
22
79* Clarendon to Abercrombie, 11 Nov.1857? Malmsbury 
to Abercrombie, 2 March 1858, FO 97/2*+9.
*+9.
Spanish reaction to Britain in northern Borneo and Sulu.
While Holland was a minor irritant to the British
in Borneo during the early and middle parts of the
century, Spain became one soon after the British
acquisition of Labuan. Sooner or later Spanish
claims in Sulu and British interest in Borneo were
bound to clash. The friction came over the question
of the status of Sulu.
The Sulu Islands lie to the northeast of Borneo
and between that place and the Philippine island of
Mindanao, and stretch across one of the most frequently
82
used passages to the South China Seas. On the map, 
the Sulu Islands resemble stepping stones between the 
Philippines and northern Borneo and there is something 
to be said for the idea that this is how the Spanish
80. FO memo of lk June 1858, Malmsbury to Ward, (The 
Hague) PI June 1858, FO 97/^9• The Dutch insisted, 
however, that the treaty of 182k did not prevent the 
prohibition of foreigners residing in the interior.
Lord Malmsbury did not think Britain could insist on 
'unrestricted access' to the interior by British subjects.
81. For the implications for Malaya of the Dutch policy 
see C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya. (London 1961), 
pp.20-27. A fuller discussion of the Anglo-"Dutch diplomatic 
correspondence is given in Tarling, op.cit.
82. N. Saleeby, History of Sulu (Manila 1908) is the most 
complete history of Sulu in English.
Phillipine government viewed them at mid-century.
Since their first expedition to Sulu in 1578 the 
Spaniards periodically attempted to assert their 
authority over the islands. In 1763 a permanent 
Spanish garrison was established at the presidio 
in Zamboanga on Mindanao opposite the island of 
Basilan. By l81+7 the actual occupation of the area 
was still limited to the presidio of Zamboanga despite 
military expeditions of 1873 and 1827.
Several treaties between Sulu and foreign 
states attested to the effective sovereignty of the 
sultan, including several made at various intervals 
with Spain herself. The Spanish treaty of 1836, which 
was vague and susceptible to the interpretation of 
either an alliance or a treaty of Spanish protection, 
could not be said to indicate any diminution of Sulu 
sovereignty. Treaties with the United States in I8h2, 
France in 18U5, and with Brooke representing England 
in May 18^9 at least indicated that Sulu was considered 
an independent entity. In December 1850 the Spanish
83* See Above, np.3 6, 38 5 Cady, op.cit. p.58. Copies 
of the Treaties of 1836 and 1.8^ 9 are in P.P.1882, LXXXI 
pp. 536-39. Sale.eby dates the French-Sulu treaty 18^3* 
Cady's more detailed research placed it in January I8h5.
government of the Philippines, using steam powered 
war vessels recently arrived from Europe, sent a 
force to subdue and punish the Sulus for negotiating
8V
with James Brooke. The force under the Governor
General, the Marquis de la Solano, was successful
in destroying the Sultan’s capital. The Sultan
capitulated and sent a deputation to Manila asking
for protection and appealing on the basis of the
Spanish-Sulu treaty of 1836 to become subject to
85
Spanish sovereignty. Yet after submitting to Spain
in a new treaty, the sultan of Sulu was not apparently
sufficiently chastened for he made known to British
officials that he was still independent and seeking
86
British protection. This fact says something for
reported view of the Sulu people held by the Spanish
captain general of the Philippines that they were
82
’utterly worthless and faithless’.
8k. Brooke to Palmerston, 2k Jan.l8?l, FO 12/9; St.John 
to Palmerston, 12 July 18pi, FO 71/1; Farren to Palmerston, 
k May 1851, FO 71/1* See also D.P.Barrows, History of the 
Philippines (Chicago 192*4), pp.2*43-*4.
85. FO 71/1 op.cit. Irwin op.clt. p.196. Saleeby pp 89-112
8 6. St.John to Palmerston, 1*4 Oct. 1851* FO 71/1* A trader 
who had recently visited Sulu stated that the country was 
in a state of perfect anarchy.
87* Farren to Palmerston, *4 May 1851* FO 71/1*
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The action of the Spaniards in the Philippines
roused British officials in the east. While Consul
Farren in Manila reported the facts of the success
of the Spanish punitive action, St.John and others
were warning of grave consequences to Britain*s
position in Borneo. St.John wrote,
the annexation of Sulu to the Philippines 
will tend greatly to injure our interests 
in the seas .... the whole of that archi­
pelago and the coasts of Borneo to within 
70 or 80 miles north of Labuan may be com­
pletely closed against British commerce. 88
Admiral Charles Austen, senior officer in the Straits,
wrote to St.John in April 1851? !I cannot but look
with distrust on the recent operations carried on
On22
against Sulu by the Spanish government1• St.John 
was able to reply to Admiral Austen in June that 
the Spanish ’subjugation* of Sulu was not completely 
successful. Ee still hoped to go to Sulu to exchange 
the ratifications of the Brooke treaty of 18^9.
88. St.John to Palmerston, 12 July 1851* FO 71/1*
89. Adm. Austen to St.John, 30 April 1851, FO 71/1. 
See also Brooke to Palmerston 2k Jan, 1851* FO 12/9.
90. St.John to Adm. Austen, 22 June, 1851; St.John 
to Palmerston, 12 July 1851? FO 71/1*
The Foreign Office was adverse to any hasty 
action in putting the treaty into operation* 
Palmerston, considering the Spanish claim and 
seeking to find out the actual state of possession 
of Sulu by the Philinnines forces, wrote, Tthe 
matter may rest until we hear further1. The 
feeling at the foreign office seemed to be that
Suain’s claim to Sulu was founded only on the
22 22
recent Spanish successes. Lord Granville who
succeeded Palmerston at the foreign office in 
December for a short term, was also against too 
much haste in the Sulu question. He wrote to Sir 
James Brooke in January 1852 seeking the latterfs 
opinion. But he stated that it was his own belief 
that the ratifications of the Sulu treaty should
ob
not be exchanged. When Malmesbury took over the
91. Palmerston1s memos of 19 Sept. and 1 Oct, 1851, F071/1
92. FO memo of l*t Sept.1851, FO 71/I.
93. Granville George Leveson Gower, (1815-1891) 2nd Earl
Granville, colonial secretary 1868-1870, and 18865 foreign 
secretary 1851-1852, I870-I87I+, and 1880-1885.
91*. Granville to Brooke, 19 Jan. 1.852, FO 71/1*
Foreign Office with the advent of the Derby government
the following month, there followed a diplomatic
exchange between London and Madrid in which Malmesbury
attempted to feel out the Spanish on the extent of
their claims and their intentions. He expressed the
view that Sulu was an independent government with which
Sir James Brooke had rightfully negotiated upon explicit
22. ~
instructions from the British government. Lord Howden,
the British minister in Madrid, upon the request of the
undersecretary of the Spanish foreign ministry, suggested
to Malmesbury privately that it was not worth while to
press for the exchange of ratifications of the Sulu 
2 6
treaty. Lord Howden x^ rote that the matter * touched the
sensibilities of the Spanish cabinet1. France, he said,
21
had given up Basilan in a similar instance in l8*+5,
and would undoubtedly side with Spain against Britain.
28
Malmesbury agreed,that the matter should fsleepf.
95* FO memo of 23 April 1852; end Malmesbury to Lord. 
Howden (Madrid), 11 May 1852, FO 71/1.
98 . A. Rigise to Howden (private). 10 June; Howden to 
Malmesbury (private) n.d. Summer 1852, FO 71/1.
97* See above, pp.35-36#
98. Memo by Malmesbury, 26 August 1852, FO 71/1*
Thus the question was allowed to continue in an 
indefinite state*. The Foreign Office, however, 
continued to maintain the attitude that Sulu was 
a sovereign state*
While the ministers in London were content to 
allow the political question of Sulu to rest almost 
forgotten for the better part of a decade, two other 
vexing and related problems commanded the attention 
of British officials and traders in Borneo*. These 
problems, however, received only sporadic consid­
eration from the home government* They related to 
commerce and piracy. British trade with Sulu and 
northern Borneo was not extensive. It was carried 
on mainly in native boats which collected jungle 
products for trading in Labuan and Singapore. For 
various reasons the northwest coast of Borneo and 
the Sulu Sea had been relatively neglected by the
22
British navy during the latter part of the 1850* s.
Two things contributed to this neglect. The shunning 
of Sir James Brooke by the naval forces following the
99. St.John to Malmesbury, 10 Aug.1.859? FO 12/26; and 
see below pp.
56'.
commission of inquiry into his activities in Borneo
was one. The second was Britainfs preoccupation
with events in China which was, after all, the main
theatre of British interest in the Far East. This
neglect plus action on the part of theSpaniards in
destroying some of the pirate strongholds in Sulu
and southern Mindanao, led the Illanun and Balanini
uirates to increase their depredations along the
100
northern coast of Borneo. There they established 
new headquarters, St.John wrote to the foreign 
office in April 185^ that rthe devastation of native 
prahus and trade .... completely shut up some of the 
richest districts of Borneo, particularly those east­
ward of Marudu Bay*. He noted that the pirates had 
not attacked British commerce for five years but
that thev continually destroyed native trade on
101
which it depended.
The other problem in British-Sulu relations which 
tended adversely to effect British commerce was the 
Spanish restrictions on trade with the Sulu Islands.
100. St.John to F0, 2. April 18^6, F0 12/28.
101. Tbid.
Early in 1858 the Spanish Philippines government 
fitted out yet another expedition to pacify Sulu.
The force occupied the sultan1s city while he retired 
to the mountains. At intervals during the next few 
years he sent messages to British officials inform­
ing them that he was not submissive to the Snaniards
10?
and asking for British protection. The Spaniards
established a garrison and naval station on Balabac
Island from which they attempted to control Sulu
trade. The following year St.John wrote, 1Already
at Balabac (Spain) is showing her monopolizing spirit
by stopping every prahu that attempts to pass on its
way to Labuan and Brunei1. Later on he reported that
he was receiving constant complaints of the activities
of the Spanish gunboats which rappeared to be actuated
by no other desire than to prevent the trade that has
heen for years carried on between the western coast
101
and the countries to the eastward. 1
102, Sultan of Sulu to Gov,of Penang, 29 April 1859 and 
18 Oct. l86l, FO 71/1; Lt.de Cresuigney to Adm,, 18 Oct. 
1858, FO l?/?5. Sultan of Sulu to*F0, 2k Feb. 1859, FO 12/26
103. St.John to Malmesbury, k Feb. and 31 May 1859, FO '
12/26,
French forward movement in Indo-China.
missionaries were sent to Siam
lOU
nd half of the 17th century.
rted hy the French East India
tyose places, the French government was now encour­
aging, now hostile toward foreign missions during 
the next century and a half. But during the middle 
decades of the tPth century th^ desire of French 
rulers to improve French prestige stimulated an 
imperialist interest. The ministry of marine and 
the navy were in the forefront of this movement,
During the 1830fs and 18*40's the navy was conspicuous 
in its policy of granting protection and firm support 
to French missionaries in the Far East.
The rulers of Annam had not welcomed missionaries. 
Much of the time they were openly opposed to them. 
Frequent persecution including expulsion and imprison­
ment was the policy. Before 1857 the protection of 
missionaries was the chief activity of the French 
navy in the area. There was little in the way of 
commerce with China and the East Indies. French ships
10*4, Cady, or, clt, P. 10.
Vs >
p s -
r Company, which, wanted to extend its activities to
bombarded the port of Tourane end occasionally
carried out the rescue of persecuted missionaries
and succeeded in putting others safely ashore to
carry out their proselytizing activities among
the Annamese. French peaceful approaches to the
Annamite authorities were usually repulsed because
of the ha ret methods used hv the French, officials.
After one such incident in I8V7 , Britain sent her
representative in Chine, John F • Davis, to Annam
with a letter for the ruler, Thieu-Tri, in an
effort to discuss commercial relations and. the
negotiation of a treaty, Davis was not successful,
possibly because the French had left the Annamese
10 F
with some distaste for Europeans.-"*
France under Emperor Napoleon TIT pursued an 
imperialist policy in the Far Fast centred upon the
Indo-Chinese peninsula. Political pressures at
home, and French naval sympathies for Catholic 
missionaries, both played significant roles in the 
French intervention in Annam. A French foreign 
ministry plan to acquire a footing at Tourane was
105.Cady, op.cit., ro.7h-76. See also FO instructions 
Davis, 18 March 18MT, FO 17/108.
r
set aside in the mid-l850ts because of the
concentration on ^hina and the Crimean War. But, 
by 18575 the French empero^ was persuaded to use 
the forces already in the Far East in conjunction
Tourane was occupied infoo tho1d ir Annam,
with the Anglo-French effort, in China, to gain a
1858, only to be abandoned in i860 because of
difficulties of mounting an attack upon the capital 
Hue. Saigon, however, was occupied in 185? - a much 
easier task than in the case of Tourane - and became 
the centre from which French exnansion continued in
ioz
Indo-China.
We shall see in the next chapter that the 
French forward movement in Cochin China was a 
decisive factor in Britain*s policy in the north­
west coast of Borneo.
106. The British government was not unmindful of French 
ambitions. Consul St.John reported “There have been many 
rumours lately that, the French ^re about to form an 
establishment somewhere in these seas, and various spots 
have been indicated, such as an island off Cochin China 
in the direct track between Hong Kong and Singapore, and 
again on another not far from the entrance of the great 
river of Cambodia*. St*John to Lord Shelburne, nrivate,
3 August, 1857, FO 1P/PU.
107. Cady, >^p. cit. pp.207-°3, gives a detailed discussion 
of the activities in Tourane and Saigon at this time.
Brooke in Sarawak - 1850'*s.
With the aid of ships and officers of the 
British navy, Sir James Brooke carried on warfare 
against Bornean pirates. He directed the decisive 
blows which destroyed their power in the area. It 
was this action, plus his conflicting roles of raja 
of Sarawak, governor of Labuan, and consul in Brunei, 
which brought him into conflict with powerful inter­
ests in Britain. He had. made enemies of men who 
had hoped to exploit his rule in Borneo for the 
mineral and commercial wealth supposedly to be won 
there. When their hopes were frustrated by Brooke*s 
concern for the protection of the natives against 
fortune seekers, they tried to destroy the raja.
Henry Wise, Brooke*s former London agent, was one 
of these men. He convinced leading radicals, 
including Joseph Hume, MP for Montrose, and Richard 
Cobden, that Brooke slaughtered innocent natives on 
the excuse that they were pirates because they inter­
fered with his own aggrandizing plans. The Aborigines 
Protection Society and the Peace Society joined with
108
Brooke*s enemies in calling for a public inquiry.
A commission finalljr sat in Singapore in 1853* It
completely exonerated Brooke of all charges but his
reputation and prestige among the people of Borneo 
^  10 Q
was damaged. The commission of inquiry very 
strikingly pointed up the anomalous position of 
Brooke. By the duality of his position as a British 
official and as raja of Sarawak, Brooke had been 
able to use the prestige of the British government 
and the active participation of ships of the Royal 
Navy in establishing a viable administration in 
Sarawak and stamping his influence along the coast 
of Borneo. In. Borneo Brooke was a power to be dealt 
with.
Following the inquiry, Brooke resigned his 
offices of governor and consul. Naval officers 
were no longer enthusiastic about participating in 
activities on the northwest coast of Borneo. The
108. Irwin, on.cit.. pp.lk0-50. See report of the 
inquiry, P.P. 185k-5> xxix, pp.l-1+68.
109* Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, op.cit. pp.151-2, contend 
that the British government made no attempt to counter the 
bad impression. On the contrary, the government did make 
the attempt. In letters to the India government and to 
British officials in the east, Britain tried to alleviate 
the damage. The official attitude, however, never filtered 
down to msnv of the Bornean people* See FO to India Board
6 Au s.]B55;vFO 12/22.
Admiralty had in 1853 issued, instructions to its
officers to adhere strictly to an order of I8M 4
which prohibited attacks upon pirate vessels unless
it would be shown that they had first attacked a
British vessel. A standing order to naval as
well as civil officials was designed to prevent
interference in the political affairs of states
in the Indian Archipelago. Britain now reminded
its officials in Borneo of this order. These two
orders dampened the enthusiasm of naval officers
and were stimulated by the criticism which the navy
110
received from radicals in Britain. Indeed there
were very few outward manifestations of official
interest on the Bornean coast during the latter part
of the 18501 s. In 1.857 Consul St.John wrote from
Brunei, 1 It is now six years since a man-of-war or
111
steamer entered the city of Brunei1.
110. P.P. 185^5 ixxii, pp.33-3^; FO to Adm., 28 Nov.1855* 
and FO to St.John 6 Sept. and 30 Nov.1855, FO 12/22.
111. St.John to Clarendon, 11 May 1857? FO 12/2*+. See 
below pp. 9b-95.
The coolness of the British government toward
his regime did nothing to strengthen Brookefs shaky
financial and political position in Sarawak. He had
spent his fortune in maintaining the state hut funds
had not always been expended wisely. ’The weakness
112
of the Sarawak government,* said St.John in 1859) 
’perhaps arises'from its attempting too much with 
Its small means.1 Bv i860 the raja was deeply in 
debt. In 1857 Chinese gold miners in upper Sarawak 
attacked and burned Brooke’s capital at Kuching. 
Several Europeans were killed and public and private 
property was plundered. The attack was reportedly 
inspired by exagerated reports of the British with­
drawal from before Canton in January 1857* This was 
considered a Chinese victory by many overseas Chinese
in the Far Fast and it caused areat excitement among
111
their communities. The Chinese were also aware of
'11*+
Brooke’s loss of British support. The insurrection
112. St.John to Malmesbury, 10 Aug.18595 FO 12/265 and 
Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, on. cit.. pp.2*+l-*+3.
113. St.John to Clarendon, 23 April 1857) FO 12/2*+; and 
St.John, Life ..♦., pp.292-93*
11*+. Ibid; and Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, on. cit., p,.l89*
was soon put down and despite the losses Sarawak 
regained its feet. Erooke realized, however, that 
his rule was tenuous without the support of a strong 
power. Late in 1857 he returned to England, leaving 
the government in the hands of his nephew, Captain 
Brooke Johnson, who then took the surname ’Brooke1 
as the raja’s heir. Raja Brooke remained in England 
until late i860 directing negotiations with the 
British government for the support he felt he needed.
Britain’s mid-century position in Borneo,
Britain?s mid-century position in Borneo was not 
stable. It rested upon two bases: the possession of
Labuan near the entrance to Brunei Bay, and the l8*+7 
treaty with the weak and corrupt state of Brunei,
Labuan never flourished as a colony. It was acquired 
as a naval station and because it contained extensive 
coal deposits. It was seldom used as a base of 
operations by the navy and the exploitation of the 
coal deposits was impeded by a series of mis-managed 
companies. It was an entrepot of only minor importance 
serving the north coast of Borneo and the Sulu archioela
The l8*+7 treaty, which James Brooke negotiated with
the old sultan of Brunei, required the permission of
Her Majesty’s Government before any Brunei territory
could be ceded. The sultan was guided by the British
consul, who for a short time resided in Brunei Town.
Usually, however, the British consul resided at
Labuan where, after the transfer of St.John, the
post was combined with that of the governorship of
the colony. Prior to 1881, Britain had no position
in the area which later became the state of North
Borneo, with the execution of a rather dubious claim
to the area based on 18th century treaties between
115
the East India Company and the sultan of Sulu.
The area was claimed, by both Brunei and Sulu, but 
neither was able to extend effective control over it.
Southwest of Brunei, in the state of Sarawak, 
the British position was also tenuous. It was based 
on the fact that Sarawak was under the rule of 
Englishmen led by Sir James Brooke.
115. See below pp. 83-8*+,
During the late 1850’ s the pressure of several
forces calling upon Britain to establish a firm policy
in the South China Sea reached great intensity. The
Chinese rebellion in Sarawak in 1857 was a shock to
many observers. It was followed by the Indian mutiny
and by a Malay rising on the Rejang in 1.859* There
was also an increase in oiracy along the northwest
116
coast. Historians have observed that these incidents
were partly a result of the loss of prestige of the raja
following the inquiry and partly the result of the
neglect of the coast by the Royal Navy. Officials in
the east did not cease their warnings of Britain’s weak
position in Borneo. The resurgence of piracy and the
restrictive trade measures of Holland and Spain brought
pressure from British merchants and traders in Singapore
Traders were beginning to be disturbed by what seemed
like a gradual closure of the Indies and Indo-China to
free commerce and their expropriation by monopolist-
117
minded countries. Britain was urged to preserve
northern Borneo for her own exploitation.
116. e.g. Jacob, op.cit. pp.l83-*H Baring Gould and 
Bampfylde, on.cit.. pn.151-2 and 189; and Rutter, on.cit
p.113*
117* Cowan, on.cit. un.22-23; and J. Kennedy, A History 
of Malaya A.D.lUoo-1959,(London 1962) pp.155-6.
Another force was the increase in the expansionist 
tendencies of foreign powers in the area. Holland and 
Spain were pressing Borneo from the south and north. 
Britain was suspicious of American activities in the 
western Pacific. Above all, the beginning of the French 
forward move in Indo-China was seen as a challenge. At 
home, French naval construction and the expansion of 
naval facilities at Cherbourg plus an anti-British 
campaign In the French press did nothing to re-assure 
Britain concerning Frenc?i ambitions. They gave rise 
to doubts of British naval capabilities. Palmerston's 
naval construction programme was partly an answer. 
Beginning then at about i860, British government activity 
in regard to the South China Sea. area was motivated 
more and more by the discomforting thought that another 
power might take advantage of Britain's shaky position 
in Borneo and acquire a territorial footing on the north­
west coast. Such a footing would directly threaten the 
trade route to China. Britain set about strengthening 
her position in Borneo. Steps were taken toward more 
involvement in this strategic area in order to consolidate
and protect British commercial Interests. This was 
not a consciously thought out plan until the decade 
of the 1880Ts. However, most of the activities of 
British officials in Borneo during the three decades 
following i860 were aimed at establishing a firm 
British domination of the South China Sea. The 
process of strengthening the British position in 
Borneo reflected the hesitancy of foreign and colonial 
policy in London during the controversy between advo­
cates of the Manchester school and the growing number 
of imperial minded persons. But it also reflected 
the beginning of the movement away from the philosophy 
of the Manchester schooL, The beginning of British 
imperialism is often dated from the early l870fs. 
However, by the late l86ofs there seemed little doubt 
but that the strength of the Manchester school had 
waned and. was being replaced by the new influence.
Prior to i860, British policy in the Indian 
archipelago and the South China Sea, which aimed at 
securing the trade routes, was prompted by the implied 
threat of other powers. This study will attempt to 
show that the policies pursued by successive British
governments, beginning at about i860, had much in 
character with the imperialist activity usually 
assigned to the later decades of the century.
An outstanding aspect of this imperialism was the 
control of strategic areas and not merely the 
protection of British mercantile pursuits.
CHAPTER TI
BRITISH REACTION TO SPANISH. DUTCH. FRRNCH AFP 
AMRRIC.AN ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AREA
DURIHS THE 1^60* s'.
It was characteristic of British policy during
much of the 19th. century that questions of security
of the lines of empire were more often the subject
of dispatches and petitions from the field than of
1
government memoranda and decisions# Officials in 
London were usually occupied with affairs in Europe 
and the day to day operations of the government 
departments* They were seldom found in the fore­
front of those groups demanding firm action on 
colonial or defence problems in the South China 
Sea much before the l870fs. Consuls, colonial 
officials, and merchants in the east were the prodders* 
They were more and more aided during the latter part 
of the century by individuals and groups in Britain 
with interests in the east, chambers of commerce,
1* Thornton, on.cit** ch.l. discusses this point with 
some thoroughness.
trade associations and retired officials and merchants*
But the government could, and did, act decisively*
During the 1860's Britain’s reaction to foreign
activities in the South China Sea resulted in a more
effective and clearer uolicy in Borneo than is usually
2
ascribed to that period* Most narratives describe 
British neglect of the northwest coast and ignore the 
fact that during these years Britain initiated her 
forward policy in Borneo and established the necessary 
policy which led to British dominion. This reaction 
to foreign threats and its effects in Borneo is here 
discussed in detail. But before discussing the form 
and nature of the forward movement in Borneo, it will 
be worthwhile to describe in this chanter the activities 
of the powers in the South China Sea and Britain’s 
reaction to them during the decade of the i860’s.
In i860 Britain took firm steps toward making the 
northwest coast of Borneo a British sphere of interest 
for strategic reasons* The Spanish and Dutch pressures
2. e.g. Baring Gould and Bampfylde, or*cit.* pp.1^9-52; 
Irwin or* cit* p. 12. Jacob, or * cit* * p*^^; St.John, Life* 
pp.3*+0-369• ~~ But see Tarling, op.cit., pp.206-1*4 *
from north and south respectively were for the first
time treated in the light of French moves in Cochin
China, France was recognized as the greater potential
threat to Britain in the South China Sea area. As we
have seen, France had invaded Annam at Tourane in
1858 and in the following year at Saigon* Although
she had withdrawn from the former place, there was
every indication that she intended to stay in Saigon*
In i860 the small garrison at Saigon was bepdiged by
h
an Annamite army of 1 ,200, France withdrew some 3^000 
troops from her forces which had been committed to the 
Anglo-French effort in China and in l86l succeeded in 
relieving the Saigon garrison and scattering the Annamite
1
forces. As a result of the French moves in Cochin
6
China, Britain renewed her interest in Borneo,
British Policy Toward. Brain in Sn.ln,
1
The Foreign Office, under Lord Russell, gave its 
attention to the Spanish pressure on Borneo, The
3, See above, p.6o. 
k, Cady, op,cit, pp,268-70.
5. Ibid,
6. Memo by Wodehouse and Minute by Lord Russell 
8 Aug, i860, F0 12/28. See below p. 9 6.
7# Lord John Russe.ll, (1792-1.878) 1st Earl Russell,
colonial secretary 18393, May.to July 1856, foreign^ 
secretary 1855-1853* 1859-1865, prime minister loh6-l852, 
and 1866-1.866,
diplomatic exchange between London and Madrid over the
8
Sulu question was resumed in the summer of i860* On
July 2, Spain officially proclaimed Sulu her vassal
and reiterated her intention to exclude foreign trade
Q
from the Sulu territory. Later the same month, the
Spanish minister in London, Senor Isturitz, complained
that British vessels were trading illegally in munitions
with the island of Sulu in violation of the Spanish
10.
closure of that area of foreign commerce* In answerin
Lord Russell reminded Spain of the 1852 correspondence
on the question and of Britain’s refusal to recognize
11
Spanish claims to Sulu* His note continued, fHer
Majesty1s Government see no reason for disturbing the
decisions of their predecessors upon the question of
independence of the sultan of Sulu*1 And, said Lord
Russell, Spain had no right to obstruct British trade
with Sulu* The Spanish government now restated its 
12
claim to Sulu on the basis of the treaties of 1836
8. See above, p. 5^*
9. A copy of the proclamation is in FO 71/1 • See also 
India Office to FO, 15 Feb.1862*
10. Isturitz to Russell, 17 July i860, FO 71/1*
11. Russell to Isturitz,. 2 Aug.i860. FO 7-1/1*
12. Isturitz to Russell, 9 April I80I, FO 7l/l. (See al
memo by Alfred Green, July 1873 in Confidential Print
Number 2262).
12
and 18?1. But, vSenor Isturitz assured Lord Russell
that the prohibition against foreign commerce applied
only to traffic in munitions and that Spain welcomed
bona fide trade. That Spain’s definition of bona fide
trade was trade confined to the four ports specified
in the i860 declaration was to become apparent during
the next decade, when Britain came to grins with the
lU
commercial question. Lord Russellrs policy in i860
was basically a continuation of the 1852 policy of
non-recognition but with important differences. Lord
Malmsbury did not withdraw from his non-recognition
stand but he weakened it by not pursuing the question.
Upon the private request of the under secretary of the
Spanish Foreipn Ministry to Lord Howden, the British
15
minister in Madrid, the question was dropped. This
was Lord Malmsbury’s last word, to Spain on the subject.
The Foreign Office under Lord Russell was not only firm
on the subject of non-recopnition, but the i860 corres-
16
pondence set in motion an inquiry into Spanish claims.
13. See above, p.57«
l5. Ch.V, passim.
15. See above, p.5 .^
16. Hammond Minute on the Spanish note, 26 July i860, 
FO 71/1.
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Lord Wodehouse wrote:
The bad use which Spain makes of her colonial 
supremacy as a means of shutting out other 
nations from trade is an argument in favour of 
not acknowledging her intentions. On the other 
hand, we have, I should, think, very little 
interest in the independence of Sulu., But if 
we admit the right of Spain, we ought to know 
how far those rights extend and on what they 
are based.
The British consul in Manila, J.W. Farren, was
asked for a report on the Spanish-Sulu. treaty of 1851,
the extent of the Spanish claims, and the inclination 
18
of Sulu1. Early in 1862 the India Office queried the
19   —
Foreign Office on the status of Sulu. The governor
of Penang had received a letter from the sultan appealing
to Britain because Sue in had not fulfilled the treatv of 
20 * 2 1  
1851. After a long delay, acting Consul W.N. Webb
17. Wodehouse minute on the Spanish note, 27 July i860,
FO 71/1* John Wodehouse, (1826-1902) 3?d Lord Wodehouse,
1st Earl of Kimberley, parliamentary undersecretary at 
the foreign office 1852-185*+ and 1859-1861, colonial 
secretary 1870-187*+, secretary of state for India 1882-1885
1.886-and 189*+, foreign secretary 189*+-1895«
18. FO memo on Sulu, 22 March 1867, FO 12/33B.
19. India Office to FO, 15 Feb. 1862, FO 71/1, with 
enclosure, Sultan of Sulu to Governor of Penang, 18 Oct., 
1861.
20. Ibid.
21. No reason seems to have been given for a 3 to *+ year 
delay. In March 186*+, the consul was reminded that the FO 
was still awaiting information on the Spanish position in 
Sulu. See FO to Farren, 21 March 186b, FO 71/1*
reported from Manila in 186b that the sultan was 
fa tiaid military and political governor of a Spanish 
province1? that the 1 old Dattos are dead and salaries 
have not heen paid to their successors'. He added,
•the new sultan and chiefs, though naturally discon­
tented under the Snnnish voke, seem quietly to submit
21 *
to their fate.•
Although Spain had never been able to subjugate 
the Sulu people but only to chastise them from time 
to time, there was some feeling in the east that 
Britain tacitly recognized the validity of the Spanish- 
Sulu treaty of 1851. London had instructed the admiral 
on the station to susnend stens with regard to the treaty 
with Sir James Brooke. The navy had previously been 
asked to nrovide a ship when convenient to convev the
^  X  Cr
consul general to Sulu for the exchange of ratifications 
of the treaty. A ship was thus never provided. This 
feeling ^ af^tajn.iuBritish recognition was not allayed, by 
the govern^ in London. In the face of the
??♦ Webb to Murrav, summer 186b, 7 Oct. 186*15 Webb to 
Bussell 2k Oct. 186*+, FO 71/1.
?3* Webb to Bussell, 2k Oct. 186*+, Fo 71/1* See also 
Mal^sbury's 1.85? decision that the matter should •'sleep.'
78.
Spenish-Sulu treaty of 18?1 and consular reports 
that the Sulu rajas were resigned to *the Spanish 
yoke1 , and in the absence of any clear aSvSertion 
of their independence by Sulu, there seemed nothing 
further that Britain could do at this time short of 
a complete recognition of Spanish sovereignty over 
the archipelago. This they were not willing to do.
For as long as Spain had designs on the Borneo 
territory claimed by Sulu, Britain would not recog­
nize Spain1s claims in Sulu, Lord Clarendon, at 
the Foreign Office late in 1865 5 noted that nothing 
could be done except to rest on the decisions of 
previous foreign ministers.
Meanwhile, British commerce with. Sulu was
almost nil. It looked as though the prediction of
22
St.John in 1851 was to come true. In October 
1863 CTOvernor Cavenagh of the Straits Settlements wrote 
to the government of India at Fort William that trade 
between the Straits and the Sulu Islands had almost
2k. FO memo, 22 March 1867, FO 12/33B. 
25* Bee above p. 58.
79.
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ceased. The following year acting Consul TTebb reported
substantially the same, that the trade with Sulu ’which
before 1851 had been considerable’, was now an insig-
21
nificant traffic with Zamboanga only. Despite the. 
loss of trade, much of which had been the result of 
the depredations of the Illanun and Balanini pirates, 
and. not the direct result of the Spanish restrictions, 
there were Englishmen in the east who were sympathetic 
toward Spain’s attempts to conquer Sulu. It must be 
remembered that the Philippine southern islands were 
habitually attached and devastated by pirates. These 
pirates found a ready welcome in the Sulu Islands and 
they respected no nationality when choosing their 
victims. Some comfort must have been taken when the 
Spaniards began successfully ferreting out the pirates 
from their strongholds in the islands. If the Spaniards 
merely meant to subjugate the Sulu, suppressing piracy 
and. lawlessness on the way and no more, they would have 
been applauded in many quarters. This may have been 
the view of officers in the government of India when
26. Cavanagh to Fort William, 23 Oct, 1863, FO 71/1*
27, Webb to FO, summer 1.86k, FO 71/1-
they wrote that the Spaniards in Sulu were not
harmful to British, interests and that ‘control
of the Spanish g o v e r n m e n t  0Ver Sulu, as far as
it may nrove effective, is likely to prove bene- 
" 28 
ficial. 1
Despite the fears and suspicions of British 
traders and officials in the east, the Spanish 
hold over the area was tenuous. Their command 
of the waters around Sulu. and northern Borneo 
was ineffective. The 185$ expedition succeeded 
in establishing small military and naval stations 
at Balabae, Basilan, and Jolo Islands. Although 
ravaged by disease and by sporadic raids of theu  t/ V  X
Sulu people these bases were maintained and intact
in the mid-l86o ,s. Webb was able to report in 186H
Xthat in his opinion, however, Spanish sovereignty was 2£only nominal.
Conflicting: claims in northern Borneo.
As we have seen, Spain1s ambitions in Sulu 
were only mildly irritating to Britain. The real
28. India government to India Office, 31 Aug. 1865* 
FO 71/1.
29. TVebb to Russell, 2k Oct. 186*+, Fo 71/1.
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concern ley in the Spanish attitude toward the 
northern part of Borneo to which she might have 
some legitimate claim were her suzerainty over 
Sulu recognized* The sultans of Sulu had a claim 
to that area dating from the early 18th century. 
Sometime during the 17th century, two rivals for 
the throne of Brunei, Abul Mobin and Muaddin,
(both grandsons of Hasan the ninth sultan of 
Brunei and reportedly the fmost arbitrary, power-
10
ful, and magnificent of the sovereigns of Borneo1
who ruled around l6oo) were conducting a civil
war. After twelve years of desultory fighting the
Be tar a of Sulu arrived on the 9osne with five war
11
nrahus filled with warriors. Both cousins sought
the aid of the Sulu. But Muaddin, who apparently
22
had the more legitimate claim , was successful in 
bargaining with the Batara. He received his help 
by offering him Brunei territory in northeast Borneo 
from Pulau Sebatik on the east coast to Kimonis on r
Low, *Se7esilah (The Boot- of the Descent) 1 
in JRASSB. June 1880, p.26 .
11. Batara is Sanskrit title for a great ruler. This 
may ^ave been the sultan but more likely one of his rajas. 
32. Ibid, p.29*
22
the west coast# Muaddin, with the aid of the Sulu - 
some say the Brunei people looked on while the Sulu 
people did the fighting - supressed his rival and 
established his rule, without however, the royal 
regalia which Abdul Mobin, as a last defiant act,
2k
stuffed into cannon and fired out to sea# Thus
richer in territory by many times the area of Sulu,
the Batana sailed home# Apparently Sulu had little
success in establishing effective rule over their
22
Borneo possessions.
This was the state of things when Alexander 
Delrymple, representing the British East India 
Company arrived in Sulu late in 17&0# He was charged 
by the Madres government with the establishment of a 
factory in the Suly Seas in an attempt to exploit 
the trade of that area and to attract the traders 
from northern China, who frequented the islands.
33* Ibid# p.15* See also H#R# Hughes-Hallet, op#cit* 
p.33* Hughes-Hallet says it is not clear whether the 
area was granted or seized.
3*4. Ibid # and Low, op# cit#
32# Alexander Dalrymple, A Full and Clear Proof that 
the Spaniards can Have No Claim to Balambanaan# (London 
177^ '). Dalrymple puts the date of the Brunei cession to 
Sulu as 170*+#, p#3l*
36. V. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire# 
(London 1952)* PP*7C-97? gives a clear account of the 
East India Company’s Borneo adventure*
In 1761 Dalrymple entered into an understanding with 
the sultan of Sulu for the grant of a site for a 
station and be negotiated a treaty of friendship
2Z
and commerce, Be selected Balambangan Island as 
the nroper location for a company establishment.
The island was ceded to Britain in September of the
« following year. When Britain took over the Philip
nines from Spain Qoon after, Dalrymple was instru
mental in freeing the legitimate sultan of Sulu,
Alimudin, from Spanish imprisonment and
re-establishing him in the islands in olace of the
‘ 38
usurper with whom Dalrymple had treated. By the 
Sulu-British treaties in 1763 and 17^, not only 
were the former agreements confirmed but the sultan 
awarded to the East India Company his territory in 
northern Borneo from Fimanis River on the northwest 
coast to Trussan on the northeast side. The British 
also were granted the islands of Balambangan, Palawan,
37* Ibid.. the treaty of PO November 17^1, copy in P.P., 
188?, LXXXI, pp.530-31. See also India Board to Granville, 
11 ^eb.lBS0, FO 71/1* Dalrymple, on.cit.. p.3?? gives the 
date of the treaty as Jan. 1761* It. is probable that the 
agreement was negotiated in January and. the documents drawn 
up and signed in November.
38. Saleeby, The History of Sulu. pn.7?-7q.
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Banggi, Balabac, and Manak. This large cession
was confirmed and further defined by the sultan in
1769 when Captain Savage Trotter of the East India
Company visited Sulu. According to Captain Trotter,
the sultan was 1 extremely solicitous to have a
settlement of English absolutely effected in some
nart of his domain as a balance against the rower
ko
of the Dutch or Spaniards,1
39* Ibid., grant of 2 July 17&U; treaties of 23 Feb.
1763 and 2o Sept. I76H. See also India Board to 
Granville, 11 Feb. 1852, FO 7-1 A *  But see Dalrymple, 
or.cit., pp*29 end 335 Most accounts follow Saleeby. 
Dalrymple was not clear himself whether Sultan Alamudin I 
was in Manila 1 under restraint He noted, that the sultan 
was a professed Christian and thus could not hold the
* regal dignity1 in Sulu a Mohammedan state. He further 
said that .Alamudin had * abdicated1 but it is unclear 
whether this was a wilful act or an automatic result 
of his profession of Christianity. In any event a usurper, 
albeit of the royal line, Banteelan (called Mohammad 
Muizzud Din) , had ruled and granted Balambangan to the 
company. Later, according to Dalrymple, his son as 
Sultan Alamudin II, granted northern Borneo as well.
In June 176^ Alamudin I was reinstated f by the natives* 
and confirmed the grants on the condition that his son 
Data Saraphadin should govern the territories in Borneo 
on behalf of the company,
*+0. Copy of Capt,Trotter to Court of Directors, 2h Dec. 
17695 FO 71/1* The sultan then confirmed the cession 
 ^*from Kiminas on the west side, in a direct line to 
Towson Abia on the east side thereof with all the lands, 
places,~cDhc[ people within those limits and also all the 
islands to the northward of the said, island of Borneo as 
Balambangan, Palawan
The Company formed a factory on Balambangan in 
1773. It was destroyed by Sulus early in 1775* In 
18055 after Company officials in the east re-established 
a settlement, the island was abandoned on orders from
d  ii
the court of directors in London. In 18H5 Balambangan 
was recommended by Captain Bethune as a location for a 
British naval and coaling station. But partly because 
of the failure of the East India Company to establish 
a permanent factory there, Labuan was chosen instead.
At the time of the Spanish expedition of 1858, which 
established a garrison on Balabac Island, there were 
indications that Spain was about to move upon the main­
land of northern Borneo. Consul St.John wrote in 
January 1858 that Spain was determined to extend her 
territory and was anxious to appropriate the north of 
Borneo. He noted, *a fine seam of coal and a tin mine 
have lately been discovered in Marudu Bay, which partly
hi
explains this movement from. Manila . 1 Later in May, he 
reported to Lord Malmsbury the Spanish landing on
7+lT Hall, op. ci t. pp.1+27 and *431.
*+2. Bethune to Adm. 1 Oct.l8H5, FO 12/3; FO memo of 
25 June 18*46, FO 12/*4.
*+3* St.John to Clarendon, 8 Jan.1858, FO 12/25.
M 4
Balabac and of their ’meddling with the main land1.
The following summer he wrote, ’Senor Cuarteron (a 
Spanish missionary priest in Borneo) assures me 
that Spain fully intends to take possession of the 
east coast nf Borneo. I know not what authority he 
has for this statement, though the governor-general 
appears to be in correspondence with him and the priest
*4 5
may be indiscreet.’ At one point St.John suggested 
the formation of a convict settlement on the northwest
H 6
coast to implement British rights there. St.John, .a 
careful observer, continued his warnings in this vein
hi
until his appointment to Haiti in l8ol. He urged
f
Lord Malmsbury and later Lord Russell, to state to
' /
the Spaniards in definite terms that the entire north­
west coast of Borneo could be considered under British
*4*4. St.John to Malmsbury, 21 May 1858, FO 12/25*
*+5. St.John to Malmsbury, 17 Aug. 1858, FO 12/25*
*+6. St.John to Malmsbury, *4 Nov* 1858, FO 12/25*
*47. St.John to Malmsbury, h Feb., 31 May, 21 June 1859,
FO 12/26; St.John memo to FO, 9 Aug. i860, FO 12/27*
protection as a result of the Sulu cession in the
previous century* fiJere Spain informed that this
were the only view of the question that Britain could
alloTtf, it would urobably check her designs1, he wrote
in 1859* He continued,
It should not be forgotten that the French 
are occupying the western shores of the China 
Sea, and that should Spain be allowed to 
seize the north of Borneo, she will possess 
the eastern shore, besides commanding all 
the important eastern straits*
Later in the year, St.John predicted the gradual
extinction of British interests in Borneo unless
2+2
Britain took a firm stand.
Lord Puis sell rs note to Spain in August i860 
precluded a discussion of Borneo claims at this time 
by focussing upon the Sulu Islands themselves and 
stating firmly that Britain continued to recognize 
the independence of the sultan* Although this note 
was in answer to the Spanish announcement of the 
restriction of Sulu commerce and had the desired 
result of forcing the Spaniards to back d o ™  on this
1+8* St.John to Malmsbury, k Feb. 18595 FO 12/26* 
*+9« St.John to Malmsbury, 10 Aug. I8p0 , FO 12/26.
50. See above pp.7^-75•
51
issue, it reserved the settlement of the northern 
Borneo question for a later date. There is little 
doubt that Britain at this time considered northern 
Borneo to be within her sphere of predominance. At 
any rate, the fact is that Spain had her hands full 
in maintaining her small gains in the Sulu archipelago. 
She made no moves onto the mainland at this time, with 
the exception of a single foray on the shore of ^arudu
51
Bay,
The priest Cuarteron, of whom St.John speaks, 
was himself a subject of some speculation, and seemed to 
the British in Labuan to he but another indication of 
Spanish ambitions in northern Borneo. He had been a 
trader in the islands and had reportedly salvaged a 
fortune from a wrecked Spanish vessel - one of the 
many ships which plied between Mexico and the 
Philippines carrying silver dollars. In 1857? after 
some time spent in Rome, Father Cuarteron established
51. Madrid informed the British government in April 
1.861 that their closure of Sulu territory only applied 
to munitions and arms and not to general commerce, which 
they would encourage. See memo by Alfred Green, July
1873? FO 71/5.
5?. St.John to Malmsbury, 21 June 1859? FO 12/26.
himself in Borneo as a postolic prefect and the leader 
of a handful of Italian missionary-priests. Cuarteron
51
became an agent for the Spanish Philippine government.
The same year he is said to have surveyed the island of 
Balabac for the Spaniards, preparatory to their garrison­
ing that place in 1858. In the role of Spanish agent,
Cuarteron appears to have provided rumours and mis­
fit
information for the British officials in Labuan. In 
June 1859j he was in Manila and took the effort to write 
to St.John that the threatened occupation of northern 
Borneo by Spain was "simply a boast of the ministers 
at Madrid1. He said, 1 it is even in contemplation to 
withdraw their settlement from Balabac on account of 
the great sickness; five hundred trooos and others
is
having died in six months1. Cuarteron established a 
mission at Gaya Bay and according to St.John, did not 
conceal his intention of fortifying his village, 
collecting all the scattered Manila men scattered in 
the country, defying the local authorities, and gradually
53. Spencer St.John, Life in the Forests of the Far East, 
i 37°* Tregonning, op.cit., p.1 1: Rutter on.cit. p.339, 
Callaghan to F0,“7 May 1866," FO 12/33A; Usher to FO, 26 
May 1876, FO 71/7.
5*4. e*g. his remarks to St. John, above, p. 86.
55* St.John to Fitzgerald, 1.8 June 18595 FO 12/25*
90.
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making it the commercial depot of the coast. Owen 
Rutter states that Father Cuarteronts main purpose 
was to free Christian slaves of whom there were 
apparently great numbers along the northen coast of 
Borneo. His most valuable service to the Spanish 
authorities, however, was in furnishing intelligence 
on the movements of British and German trading vessels 
which in the late l860fs and 1870*s ran the Spanish 
blockade and traded with the Sulu Islands. Several 
of these shins were intercented by Spanish gunboats
is
as a result of Father Cuarteron1s timely intelligence.
In the mid-l86o ,s, therefore, two European powers 
and two East Indian governments each had some claim to 
the northern part of Borneo - north and east of Brunei 
and north, of the Dutch, east coast possessions. As for 
the sovereignty claims of Sulu and Brunei, neither was 
able to wield anything approaching effective control of 
the area. Datus and river chiefs owing nominal alleg­
iance held some areas along the northwest coast between
'56. St.John to Clarendon, 8 Jan. 1858, FO 12/25*
57* Rutter, on.cit. p.339*
58. Tregonning, or. cj1.. p.11;
Kimanis and Pandasan* For example, Mud a Damit, son 
of James Brooke's good friend Muda Hassim, held the
Putatan River district. But most of these local
chiefs considered themselves independent and were
so recognized later on when the British North Borneo
Company commenced buying these independent enclaves
and granting pensions to the rulers. From Pandasan
around the northern tip and eastward to opposite
the Sulu Islands, Sulu vessels controlled many rivers.
Owen Rutter maintained that the sultan of Sulu was
60
actually in possession of these lands. Although 
Illanun pirates who were in alliance with Sulu had 
occupied several locations in this area, such as 
Marudu Bay and Tunku, presumably with the consent 
of Sulu there is little evidence to support a notion 
that Sulu effectively ruled the territories. The 
possibility that Britain might claim northern Borneo 
on the strength of the Dalrymple treaties was doubtful* 
The area was officially ignored after the East India
59. Tregonning, on.cit. p.32; Rutter on.cit, p. 35*
60. Rutter, on.cit„ p.120.
Company finally abandoned Balambangan in 1805* As
a. matter of record, British officials were even
ignorant of the existence of the Dalrymple treaties
until 1852 when they were produced after much
searching at the India Office and in the archives
61
of the government of India at Bombay. Any 
pretension to the area may have been forfeited by the 
apparent abandonment or lack of continuous implemen­
tation of the 176k Sulu cession to the Company, 
although Consul St.John reported that as late as
I8U9 the sultan of Sulu considered the Palrvmple
6?
treaties in force. In 1852, said a Foreign Office 
memo, fit would apnear that the British government 
were of the same opinion1. The sultan himself 
reminded the Foreign Office of the 176k treaty early
6k
in 1859• Yet, in 1866 Sulu conveniently set aside 
any recognition of British ownership of northern 
Borneo when the sultan protested against the Brunei 
grant of Sulu territory to Americans.
61. FO memo, 10 Feb.1.852; India Board to Granville, 11
Feb.1852; Government of Bombay to Secret Committee,
3 Jan.1852, FO 71/1* Bombay attested to the treaties of 
Bov.20, 1761 and Sept.28, 176k, between Dalrymple and 
the sultan of Sulu.
62. St.John to Palmerston, 18 July 1851, FO 71/1*
63. FO memo of 1? Dec.1865, FO 12/32B.
6k. Sultan of Sulu to FO. 2k Feb.1859, FO 12/26. See 
also FO memo of 19 Dec.1865, FO 12/32B. r
65* Callaghan to Clarendon, 29 Jan.l866, FO 12/33A; Low
to FO, 11 Jan.1867, FO 12/333.
Both the Foreign Office and the India Board had 
been unwilling to admit the Spanish claim of sovereignty 
over Sulu in 185? becou.se of the undefined status of
Sulu*s relationship to northern Borneo. Lord Russell 
continued this policy in i860. By 1865 both privately 
admitted that Spain1s claims to the Sulu archipelago 
were strong from the standpoint of pro ‘nquity and
than a decade after 1865 no attempt was made to settle 
the status of Sulu. Then the question was taken up 
only after the entrance of Germany and the United 
States upon the scene required that British prepon­
derance in northern Borneo be further established.
The foreign office correspondence on Sulu ends abruptly
in August 1865 and there are no further entries until 
1871.
British nolicv toward Dutch Borneo.
1858 Consul St.John had warned the foreign 
office of the increasing Dutch pressure on the north­
west coast of Borneo. same year Sir James Brooke
66'. FO memo of 10 Feb..185?; India Board to FO, 11 Feb.. 
185?, FO 71/1.
67* India Government to India Office, 31 Aug.1865, FO 
see above, pp. 77-78.
6 8. St.John to Clarendon, 8 Jan. and to Malmesburv,
PI May, 1858, FO 1P/P5.
66
the apparent submission of the sultan. For more
68
in. England expressed his fear of Dutch intentions
with respect to Sarawak* He believed that the Dutch
looked forward to the acquisition of Sarawak after
his death. He so warned Lord Clarendon at the
6q
foreign office. He urged Britain to prevent
any Dutch encroachment beyond the Unit of the
territory they controlled. This move was the
beginning of what became a five year campaign for
British support of his Borneo venture and will be
discussed in a subsequent chapter. Here it is
only necessary to note that Brooke offered Sarawak
to Britain and received a cool reception at the
foreign office. Lord Clarendon had assumed an
attitude of aloofness toward Sarawak in 1855 and 
70
1856. Two years had not changed that attitude*
Brooke received little svmnathy but Parliamentary
21
Undersecretary Shelburne thought the matter worth
21
some attention. He wrote.
69. FO memo of a conversation with Brooke, lU Jan. 1858,
FO 17/75* Paradoxically, Brooke approached Holland with 
an offer of Sarawak the following year. See below p. 152.
70. See above pp. 62-63 •
71. Henry Petty Fitamorris, Earl of Shelburne, Parliamen­
tary Undersecretary. July 18 56 to Feb.1858.
77. FO memo .... l4 Jan.l858, FO 12/25*
9?.
I 60 not see any reason for being Jealous 
of Raja Brooke, and if British interests as 
a whole are better forewarded by backing him 
up ... he might be a better channel than any 
other we could find for carrying out some 
scheme which would virtually put at our 
disposal the advantages in question.
The advantages in question referred to the strategic
nosition of Sarawak and its coal resources, which
21
were reportedly extensive. But two years later a 
new foreign secretary, Lord Russell, and the French 
advance in Cochin China, became new elements in the 
Q . situation and influenced the mood of the foreign 
joffice. The subject was brought to the fore by 
Brooke’s friend and former secretary, Consul St.John. 
At home on leave, St.John submitted a memorandum to
2h.
W g t h e  foTPign office. He pointed out, that Sarawak 
was exposed to Dutch interference. He added,
A glance at the map will show the great value 
of the northwest coast of Borneo5 it commands 
the China Seas. It must be remembered that the 
French are strongly fortifying Saigon in the 
southern portion of the Cambodian peninsula 
a glance at their probable future would be 
interesting .... the Spaniards have all the 
Philippines and have lately extended their power 
to Balabac off the north of Borneo; with the
73. St.John to FO, 31 May and 28 Nov.l8 ?6 , FO 12/23. 
See also Borneo Company to Malmesbury, 22 Dec. 1.858, F01 
7*+. Memo by St.John, 9 Aug.i860, FO 12/27.
96.
French on one side, end the Spaniards on 
the other, the China Sea will be closed 
against us if we lose the northwest coast 
of Borneo.
According to St.John, dependence upon naval superiority
was a mistake. Britain should take possession of the
northwest coast, Commencing with Sarawak and gradually
acquiring by purchase the districts of the north. 1
While St.John’s memo was aimed, at supporting
Raja Brooke’s campaign, it had the effect of alerting
the government to the strategic position of Borneo,
vis a vis the French in Cochin China. The foreign
office was inclined to take a. less alarming view of
Dutch capabilities than Brooke or St.John. Dutch
colonial rule was an evil, wrote Lord ¥odehouse, the
parliamentary undersecretary, in commenting upon St.
21
John’s memo. But the evil had been much reduced.
’The Dutch are and must remain too weak to cause us 
any alarm,’ he added. But not so the French, Any 
extension of French rule to the archipelago would be 
a threat to India and Australia, and to British interests 
in the South China Sea. Lord Russell agreed with
75* Memo by Wodehouse, 1.8 Aug.i860, FO 12/28.
76, Ibid.
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Wodehouse*s analysis. The roreign Office clearly
favoured a week Holland in the archipelago, including
southern Borneo, rather than a strong France. But
while the Foreisn Office could not pursue St.John*s 
78 79*
suggestion to take over Sarawak., it was decided to
keep a close watch over the Borneo coast because of 
the growth of commerce and the probability that its 
strategic importance was increasing.
In 1866 when the Foreign Office considered 
negotiating a new treaty with Holland covering posses­
sions and trade, it decided not to include any change
in the status of Borneo or that would interfere with
8i
complete liberty of action with respect to Sarawak,
78. *Tbe disadvantages greatly predominate*, wrote
Lord Wodehouse in his memo of Aug,9#
79. Britain*s relations with Sarawak are the subject of
Ch.III.
80. FO to St.John, 17 Nov.i860, FO 12/27; FO to Callaghan, 
27 May,1861, FO 12/29, Lord Russell to Sir Kay Shuttle- 
worth, 22 Auv. 1.861, FO 12/29,
81. FO to CO, 20 Feb.1866. 273/7, The Colonial Office
concurred with the Foreign Office. See CO memo of 21 Feb, 
1866. N.Tarling, on.cit,, up,210-11, has suggested that 
the Admiralty*s declaration of the strategic importance 
of the northwest coast was the decisive factor. He cites 
Adm, to FO 13 Jan. 1886, FO 37/^50 (also in Corf.Print 
1737) • But. a close reading of the Admiralty letter 
reveals that the lords of the Admiralty, while acknowledgin 
the importance of the coast, felt that Britain could not 
reasonably oppose the formation of a French, Dutch or
As for Raja Brooke's fears. Consul Rickets
wrote in 186b- from Sarawak,
Notwithstanding the jealousy which is said 
to exist on the part of the. Dutch government 
toward English influence in these parts, the 
Dutch authorities at Sambas appear to always 
have manifested a spirit of friendship and 
cordiality toward the Raja's government.
American naval station in Borneo. rThey were 
adamant in feeling, however, that Uritain in 
any agreement with Holland should not be pre­
cluded from acquiring possession while other 
powers were free to do so. The Colonial Office 
advice in reference to Borneo is perhaps more 
to the point. See Rogers to Hammond, 5 Feb., 
1866, FO 37 A  50 (Conf.Print 1737)* Sir Frederick 
Rogers, the permanent Undersecretary at the 
Colonial Office, urged the Foreign Office not 
to 'fetter the future policy' of Britain as to 
policy to be pursued in runknown circumstances'. 
The Foreign Office then informed Holland in the 
same phrases used by Rogers, that Borneo was not 
to be included in any settlement. See Clarendon 
to Milbanke, 30 March 1866 , FO 37A 50 (Conf.
Print 1737)* The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 2 Nov. 
1871 (Sumatran treaty) omitted any mention of 
Borneo. See Hertslet, Treaties. xiii, 665-6.
82. Rickets to FO, 25 Sept., 186b, FO 12/32A
Ricketts then continued,
It has often been asserted that on the death 
of the Raja, the Dutch would take possession 
of Sarawak; but I do not imagine such a line 
of conduct, however much it may be desired by 
some, would meet with any chance of success..
The following year, Ricketts recorded that the
Netherlands Indies Government and Sarawak had
co-operated in settling a dispute between people
on the border of Sambas and Sarawak. He suggested
Bl
that thus the Dutch tacitly recognized Sarawak.
Sarawak did not fall into Dutch hands following 
Sir James1 death in 1868. Apparently all was peace­
ful there for when the governor of Labuan visited
Sambas and Pontianak in 186? he reported no evidence
8b
of an impending move toward Sarawak.
French Expansion in Cochin China and Cambodia.
While Britain would undoubtedly resist any 
French move to acquire a footing in the archipelago
8£
she was not prepared to obstruct France in Indo-China.
8 3 - Ricketts to FO, 15 May 1865, FO 12/32B.
8h. Pope-Hennessy to FO, 6 July 1869* FO l?/3*+B.
Governor Pope-Hennessy was impressed by the active and 
intelligent administration of the Netherlands government 
in Borneo»
85* B.L. Evans, 'The Attitudes and Policies of Gpeat 
Britain and China toward French expansion in Cochin China,
The French government1s attitude towards expansion 
in Indo-China was one of indifference from about 
l86l to 1873* It depended upon the vicissitudes 
of French affairs in European politics. Emperor 
Napolean III was involved in his Mexican adventure 
during the early years of this period. War with 
Prussia took up the latter years. Finally, the 
disruption and prostration brought on by defeat 
in war allowed very little time for the pursuit 
of a more vigorous Far Eastern policy before the 
mid-70's. After 1867* however, French commercial 
circles began to take a new interest in the economic 
prospects of Indo-China and to dream of an outlet 
for trade with western China. Doudart. de Lagree, 
Francis Garnier and Jean Dupuis explored the 
Mekong and Red rivers between 1366 and I872 seeking 
a route to Yunnan. As often happens, It was from 
the officials in the field that the stimulus for 
the forward movement in Indo-China came. Enthusiasm
Cambodia, Amman and Tonking 1868-1883*, (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis. University of London 1961), p*k 1* Evans 
cites an i860 memo. Evans and Cady, on.clt. have been 
followed in this discussion of French expansion.
for furtherance of French influence in the Far Fast 
was centred in the navy. We have already noted the 
prominent role which the French navy took in earlier 
ventures in Annam. It was the navy which wanted to 
recoup French prestige after the withdrawal from 
Tourane and a uoor showing in China. It was an
86
admiral who recommended the retention of Saigon.
Henceforth, the admirals ruled at Saigon with strong
support from the Ministry of Marine in Paris - the
one branch of the French state which continued a
8Z
fairly consistant interest in Indo-China. The 
attitude of the ^ egnorpr was inconsistent and his 
interest was elseitfhere. His Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was unwilling to take the lead in a strong 
forward policy in Indo-China. Indeed when Lord 
Russell inquired about French intentions in Saigon, 
Foreign Minister Thouvenel, not an enthusiastic 
imperialist, answered that it was contemplated to
8 6. Cady, op.cit., p.268, report of Adm.Page.
87. Cady, op.cit, pp.2695 279* In i860 Chasseloup- 
Laubat was appointed to the Ministry of Marine. It was 
he who pressed incessently for action in Indo-China until 
he was succeeded in 1867 by the equally enthusiastic 
Rigault de Genouillv. Admirals Charner and Bonard and
8 8
withdraw from Saigon* The navy then was inspired 
to spread the glory of France and French culture 
and they were especially eager for some practical 
achievements to help redress the imbalance when 
compared to the standing of the British in the east* 
Too often, thought naval officers, French forces had 
to suffer the ignominy' of operating under British 
naval dominance.
King Tu-Duc of Annam was finally forced to 
treat with France. The treaty of Saigon was signed 
in June 186? and reluctantly ratified by the king the 
following year. France was granted the three province 
in the vicinity of Saigon, and Pulau Condore. Threev 0 7
Annamite ports, including Tourane, were opened to 
foreign commerce* Annam agreed to make no grant to 
other foreign nations without French permission. The 
treaty contained some vague phrases about the possib­
ility of a future protectorate over Annam, and France
8Q
received an indemnity of *4 million Mexican dollars.
later dela Grandiere ruled successively in Saigon.
88. Cady, on.cit.. p.263; Evans, on.cit.. p.n.
Bo. Cadv, on.cit. pp.279-3; Evans, on.cit.. p.H-6 .
103.
In the meantime, French officials were pushing 
hard in the direction of Cambodia, and Siam* The 
admirals assumed for France suzerainty over Cam­
bodia, which had been claimed by the kings of Annam*
" " ' I " - — -
a/ They arranged a treaty with Cambodia bv which a 
*X ^  French resident was to reside at the Cambodian
U Court and Cemhodian foreign relations were to be
handled hv France from Saigon. The latter provision
included the right to recognize foreign consuls
within the country. France also assumed the
protection of Cambodia against Siamese pretensions,
00
to overlord ship. According to Cady, Napoleon TIT
showed some reluctance to approve the Cambodian
treaty 1 for fear that the move would offend the
English1 and unset plans for a joint Anglo- French
action in Mexico. The British did, in fact, protest
not against the protectorate over Cambodia but against
the nortions of the treaty which gave to France exclu-
91
sive rights in the country. They especially objected
90. Cady, on.cit. nn.276-6! Evans, on.cit, p.69,
91. Schomburgk to Russell, 29 Sept. 1863 5 FO 69/39.
A cony of the treaty is appended. See also Russell to 
Cowlev, I1 March 186U • Clarendon to Grev, 26 Nov. 1.866, 
FO 69/h. '
10*+.
to French control of Cambodian foreign relations.
The French Foreign Office under Drouvn de Lhuys
was hard pressed to defend a treaty which it
admittedly did not like, and which was a creature
of the admirals of Saigon and of the Ministry of 
22
Marine. After evasive explanations de Lhuys 
gave the British to understand that the objection­
able parts of the treaty would not be implemented 
and that the resident would hardly be more than 
an observer. Britain did not pursue the subject. 
Evans contends that Britain did not'press the 
French because they were too taken up with events
in Mexico and Chile at this time. British nrotests,
22
he states, died with Clarendon.
French approaches to .Siam x^ ere of much interest 
to the British. During the l86o fs, France succeeded 
in obtaining a treaty with King Mongkut confirming 
the French protectorate over Cambodia and granting 
to Siam the three western provinces of her alleged
92. Evans, on.cit. pp.7^-78
93. Ibid..
vassel J Mekong Battambang, and Angkor* The treaty 
was obtained, however, only after two stormy French 
missions had wrangled with the Siamese and after 
■Siam had attempted to draw Britain into the negot-
2k
iating arena* The first mission, led by Count 
Castelnau, failed in 1861. Castelnau*s undiplomatic 
behaviour in Bangkok was disavowed by the French 
Foreign Minister Thouvenal and the mission was
withdrawn. Gabriel Aubaret, the French consul 
in Bangkok, was only slightly more palatable to the 
sensitive Siamese officials in 1866, but the latter 
agreed to the treaty in 1867 having failed to receive 
any support from Britain. Britain in fact had been 
the silent member at the treaty negotiations* While 
Siam tried to attract her to a participating role, 
the French role was to increase their prestige in 
Siam to an equal basis with the British* Britain 
was fortunate in heaving able consuls in Bangkok in 
the persons of Sir Robert Schomburgk in l86l and
*9*+• FO IfV 39 5 pa s s im; and B.S.N. Murti, * Anglo- 
French Relations with Siam 1876-190WT, (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of London 1952, pp.127-9*)
95* Cowley to Russell, 31 Bec.l86l, and 20 March 
1862, FO 69/39.
officials while closely watching the Franco-Siamese 
proceedings refused under instructions to become 
involved and repeatedly announced Britain*s neut­
rality in the relations. It is probably not too 
far wrong to infer that the personalities of both 
the British and French officials in Bangkok tended 
to the British credit. For while Schombimgk and 
Knox refused to interferj and remained correctly 
aloof, the emotional outbursts and undiplomatic 
behavoir of Count Castelnau and Aubaret hurt French 
prestige.
British nolicy toward French exransion.
While Britain did not relish the French advance 
in Indo-China, her protests were only half-hearted.
At the time, to be sure, Britain was quite occupied 
by affairs in China and India. Britain’s reaction 
to the Cambodian treaty has already been noted.
Plenty of warnings of the danger to British interests 
inherent in the French advance had been sent to 
London by officials in the east. Even before the 
French capture of Saigon, while they were yet bogged
107
down in Tourane, the India Office urged Britain
to onen un trade with Cambodia from Saigon and Pulau 
96
Condors, This would prevent the closure of the 
area to British commorce and perhaps forestall any 
French move in that direction. There was a tendency 
to tolerate French domination over parts of Annam as 
long as it was within limits. That is, not in the 
direction of Laos and Siam, In 1861, on the arrival 
of Count Castelnau In Bangkok, Schomburgk wrote to
2 Z
the Foreign Office
!, with the sea coast of Cochin China,
and Cambodia in her possession, the trade 
between the British East Indies and the China 
Sea may be sadly embarrassed should differences 
unfortunately arise between Great Britain and 
France* *
Later, Consul Knox from 186H to 1867 kept London 
informed of the Franco-Siamese proceedings and was 
able to interpret the implication to Britain of the 
French moves. The British government approved the 
neutral, but observant, attitude of both Schomburgk 
and Knox. From this approval it can safely be inferred
96 • Evans, on/cit. , p.^ fl. Evans cites an Indian Office 
memo of August 1$^9*
97. Schomburgk to Russell, 26 Sept, l86l, FO 69/39.
10 P.
that Britain was not adamant in her opposition to 
France to the extent of excluding her from Cambodia
08
as long as the independence of Siam remained intact.
From the other side of the South China Sea, on
the northwest coast of Borneo, more warnings were
expressed to Britain concerning the bad effects
which the French gains in Indo-China would have
on British interests in the South China Sea. Consul
Ricketts in Sarawak and St.John in Brunei wrote of
99
the French menace. St.John returned to London
in i860 and in August submitted the memo to the
100.
t ^ . -foreign office which we have already noted.v~*'.... ...  ,
While St.John1s main purpose in the memorandum was 
to urge a protectorate over Sarawak, vet his warning 
of the French in Indo-China represented the most 
respected and reliable opinion among British offic­
ials in Borneo. From no less an official in the 
than Governor-General FIgin in India, who had 
recently dispatched Governor Cavanagh of Singapore
98  ^ Evans, on. ci t., pp.9U.-98. Both Lord Russel-1 and 
later Lord Stanley commended Consul Knox for ably 
representing the British posifcbn.
99* Gee esneciallv St.John to FO, 2 Jan. 1857* ^0 12/2U; 
St.John to FO, U Feb, 1859, FO 12/265 and Ricketts to F0. 
25 Sept. 1.86U, FO 12/22A.
100. See above pp.95-96.
to carry out a mission of investigation at Sarawak,
101
came a similar warning.
I am disrosed to think that the acquisitionM -X
of Saigon by the French and the persistent 
endeavour of the Diitch authorities to cripple 
British trade ...... give increased importance
to the preservation of the independence of 
Sarawak as a matter affecting British inter­
ests. I may observe on the former point, 
that in the event of war with France, the 
possession of this territory by a hostile 
power would tend to obstruct the Palawan 
passage and thus add. to the embarrassment 
to which British trade with China would 
inevitably in such a case be subjected.
After i860 no responsible official suggested
challenging France in Indo-China, and her position
of predominance there was considered a fait accomnli.
Yet the many warnings of the threat of the French
footing In Indo-China were not lost on the Foreign
Office. Always after this time, any suggestion of
a diminution of British influence in the South China
Sea was countered by the query, ’what would the
French do?1. To obstruct the French advance in
Indo-China was not practicable, for could Britain
deny to France what she herself was doing in Indiav
101. Lord Elgin to Lord Russell, 8 Jan. 1863* FO 12/35.
no.
Lord Wodehouse in commenting upon Consul St.John1 s
memorandum wrote
The jealousy of the French seems to be 
excessive - can we pretend to occupy the 
whole of southern Asia except Persia,Arabia 
and China; yet that is what we must do if 
we are to keep out French, Dutch, and 
Spaniards* 102
The Admiralty freely admitted that France in
Indo-China commanded, one of the great routes to
China. But it noted, that Borneo commanded the 
103
other. The India Office viewed the French in
Annam and Cochin China without anxiety or concern
IQtt
as long as Siam remained independent. Apparently
the new French position had to be lived with but 
watched closely by Britain. Hudson contends that 
the Anglo-French alliance in the Crimea and China 
in the l8?0 !s moderated, what mieht otherwise have
105
been a more vigorous opposition to France. He wrote.
102. Wodehouse memo 18 Aug. i860, FO 12/28.
103. Admiralty to CO, *4 Jan. 1867, FO 12/3?.
10H. Merevale to Hammond, 29 Sent. 1865, FO 69/39*
10 5* G.F. Hudson, The Far Fast in World Politics 
(London 1939) P*67.
Ill.
England was no longer in a mood to obstruct 
all French expansion in the east, and was 
prepared to allow France to acquire a new 
colonial possession provided that it was 
neither too close to India nor on the far 
side of Hongkong.
Evans, in his recent study, went so far as to say that
the British reaction to France in Cochin China and
106
Cambodia was almost non-existent. Thus, British 
policy toward France on this issue stood. But the 
British position in Borneo was more important than 
ever before and the following years, as we shall 
see, saw an increase in British interests and commit­
ments there due in no small measure to the presence 
of the French on the opposite side of the South China 
Sea.
American Activities in Borneo.
We must now look at United States activities in 
Borneo, during the i8601s. While that country never 
really challenged Britain in that area, the movements 
of some of her citizens in Borneo gave rise to some 
anxiety among British officials both on the spot and.
106. Evans, on,clt., p .10 B.
in London, 111 feeling between the United States
as a result of the latter1s southern sympathies
during the American Civil War, plus the harbouring
of Confederate agents in Canada, was cause enough
for the British government to view with suspicion
any American moves in the South China Sea* Indeed,
the action of American privateers during the years
i860 yo 1865 did nothing to allay British anxiety.
It will be remembered that Joseph Balestier on
behalf of the United States negotiated, a commercial
10ft
treaty with the sultan of Brunei In 1850. In July 
186k, President Lincoln upon the advice of the expan­
sionist minded secretary of state, William Seward,
nunointed C.L. Moses, a. Mew England wankee from.
109
Maine, to be United States consul at Brunei.
107• E.G. Tregonning, 1American Activity in North Borneo, 
I865 to 18811 in Pacific Historical Review* (Nov.l95^+)
PP*357-78 gives perhaps the best account of this brief 
enisode.
108. Above, p. 39*
109* Moses to Seward, b Jul.y 1R6H, Department of State 
Consular Archives (DS) Brunei, vol.I. Earlier in 1862, 
it had been decided, to appoint a consul and one Anson 
Francis was chosen. As the post was not salaried and 
Francis had no funds, he begged off. Moses had some 
experience as a trader In the Far East and as was common 
practice in those days, took on the unsalaried post in. 
addition to his own nrivate business ventures. Seward
113.
Moses arrived in Brunei from Singapore in July 1865 
a. bo a re? a British merchant vessel, He called at 
Labuan to armrise Governor Callaghan of his arrival.4- J. 01
The timing of Moses* arrival in Brunei was nronitious.
The China Steamship and Labuan Coal Company, which'
had. the lease of the coal fields of Muara at the
■ mouth of the Brunei river, had been in arrears in
payment of rent to the sultan for some time. Ho
had boon trying to collect, sending innumerable
reminders and complaints to the British consul. The
American consul thus made his appearance at a time
when the sultan had lost all hope of having his
claim settled. Consul Callaghan wrote later, fI
have no doubt that this was one of the chief reasons
which induced the government of Brunei to a ccede so
110
readily to the proposals of the American, 1
was a recognized exponent of the doctrine of manifest 
destiny. His opponents claimed that he was even in 
favour of annexing a part of China. Frederick Bancroft’s 
The Life of William H. Seward.., (Hew York 1900) , is an 
excellent study of the secretary. He refers to an 
interesting letter (Vol.II, p.*+71) written by Seward 
to Cassius Clay, American minister to St. Petersburg,
He wrote in 1861, "Russia and. the United States may 
remain good friends until, each having made a circut 
of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall 
meet and greet each other in. the region where civilization 
first began, and where, after so many ages, it has become 
rnw 1etharg1c and heIn1ess. 1
110, Callaghan to FO'", 7 May 1866, FO 12/33A.
Moses rroceed.ed to ingratiate himself with the
retentive sultan, Abdul Mumim, and arranged ^or the
cession cor ten years of a large tract of territory
in northern Borneo, In return, Moses agreed to pay
the sultan #*4200 annually and to pay his chief
111
minister Rumonggong #*4000. Moses further sought 
the rights to work coal, at Muara as the coal comnany
ll -) O V\Kj~< had ceased onerstions there and had no nlans to
112
return. To this the sultan would not agree. The 
American left Brunei for Hongkong almost immediately 
upon receiving the grant to raise capital and arrange 
for the exploitation of his territory. There was 
much enthusiasm for the American venture at the 
court of Brunei. No doubt the sultan and rajas, 
always short of money and feeling themselves the 
victim? of the ’ritish Goal domrany, saw in the 
American proposals a ne*r source of funds. Consul 
Callaghan wrote, ’I have ^enrd that Mr, Moses intends 
returning verv soon to emba^v extensivelv in trade. 1
111. Ricketts to Russell, 12 Oct.1865, FO 12/32B.
Cop37 of the g^ant i s in BNBCoP.
112. Callaghan to FO, 20 Oct.1865, FO 12/32B. Appended 
is a cony of the sultan's grant to Moses dated 11 * August
1865. ' ...
He added, 'Considerable hopes are entertained by
the Government of Brunei, that he will do a great
111
deal to develop the resources of the country, 1
In the meantime, the Bruneis erected a. large
wooden consulate building for Moses. The latter
noted in ?. dispatch, to Washington that the building
was to be forty feet square and to contain four
Ilk
rooms and an audience hall. It is quite clear 
that Moses considered the British his chief rivals 
in Borneo for he considered that the sultan’s gesture 
of friendship was ’being done to the reverse of 
Bnglish influence,1 He noted that the British con-
112
sulate was built at the expense of its own government. 
Moses was well satisfied with what he must have con-
r
sidered a fine yajskee trick, played under the eyes 
of the British officials.
Moses mission to Hongkong was successful. In 
November 1865 he transferred the territory and cession 
in northern Borneo to an American merchant, Joseph ¥.
113* Ibid..
Ilk. Moses to Seward, 10 Aug. 1.865, DS, Brunei. 
115. Ibid.
11.6.
Torney, and that gentleman with his associate,
Thomas B. Harris, formed the American Trading
Comnany of Borneo with financial backing from
116
Chinese merchants in Hongkong, Torrey was 
confirmed by the sultan and appointed fsupreme 
ruler and governor * with the title of Baja of 
Ambong and Marudu and with 1 all other powers and 
rights usually exercised by and belonging to,
2!Z
Sovereign rulers1. Torrey1s successors in 
the Company were to succeed to the titles in 
case of his death. According to the document 
of cession, the area transferred to the Americans 
comprised the rentire northern portion of the 
island of Borneo from Sulaman on the west to 
the river Pietan on the east and the states of 
Patan, Sugat, Bang-gayan, Labok, Bandakan, China 
Bantangan, Cagayan, Mumiang, Benomi, and Kimanis, 
together with the islands of Ba.rigu.ey, Palawan and 
Balabac,r In effect, the area covered almost
ll6 , Moses to Seward, 30 Nov.l86B? BS, Brunei. Moses 
enclosed a copy of the transfer document dated 28 November 
186$ and attested to by Moses as consul.,
117. Ihjd.
precisely the territory ceeded to the Sultan of Sulu
IIP
In 170*4 by the Brunei, sultan Muaddin. In January
1866, Callaghan wrote to Lord Clarendon at the
Foreign Office, !by this paper Mr. Torrey would
seem to be constituted supreme ruler of these places
and in virtue of this he has lately established a
119
colony at Kimanis.1
With capital furnished by the Chinese merchants, 
the settlement of Ellera on the Kimanis River 
commenced operations. One Joseph Wheelwright was 
lieutenant governor and Thomas Harris acted as chief 
secretary, while Torrey spent most of his time in 
Hongkong trying to raise funds and interest in the 
new project. Tregonning has told in some detail the 
the story of this colony and here I need only say 
that Ellena did not prosper. Some dozen American 
and three score Chinese comprised the original 
settlement. The colony built a stockade and started 
some experimental plantings of rice, sugar cane, and 
tobacco. Some trading operations were carried on 
with other rivers along the coast but sickness took
118. See above, p.81.
119. Callaghan to FO, 9 Jan.1866, FO 12/33A.
118.
its toll and there was much discontent among the
Chinese from not being paid regular wages. There
was also some friction between the Chinese financial
backers and the company administrators. When one
of the Chinese merchants demanded repayment of
120
his loan, he was turned out of the colony. Chief
Secretary Harris became cS victim of fever and died 
121
in May 1866. The whole establishment was with­
drawn the following November cand the Americans
122
returned to Hongkong.
British officials in Borneo viewed the intru­
sion of the Americans with some alarm. Consul
Ricketts in Sarawak, who was a warm advocate of
122
British protection of that country, thotight that 
while there might be certain beneficial results from 
the presence of an American settlement in Borneo-
12k
the danger to British interests was probably greater.
120. Tbid.
121. Tregonning, op.cit. p.7*
122. Hugh Low to Lord Stanley, 1 Dec. 1866, FO 12/33A.
123. Bee Ricketts first long consular report from 
Sarawak, 2? Sept. 186k, FO I2/3I+B.
12k. Ricketts to Russell, 30 July 1865, FO 12/323,
He noted that this was all the more reason why Britain 
should stabilize her position on the northwest coast 
and especially in Sarawak. In reporting the arrival 
of Consul Moses he wrote that because the Brunei 
government was 'weak and bickering1 it was likely 
to attract the attention of other European govern­
ments because of its beneficial location commercially 
with regard to the eastern archipelago and China.
He noted, 'there would appear to be no little scope 
for the intrigue of foreign agency1, He reminded 
the Foreign Office than an American resident agent 
in Brunei would be in a favourable position to damage 
British influence and that the sultan of Brunei was
subject to bribes and financial pressure. Later 
when Rickets learned of the sultan1s grant to the 
Americans, and their proposed establishment at 
Kimanis Bay, he suggested the necessity for fore­
stalling further encroachments by maintaining Brunei 
as a weak native power, 'more or less subject to the 
contro1 of Her Majesty's Government1 between Sarawak
IPO,
and the American territory* Thus, either alone or
with the United States, Britain should guarantee
126
the sultan’s territories. Ricketts noted that
while the cession to Moses end Torrey was only for
ten veers, ’once in the hands of a power like America,
121
it is almost tantamount to perpetual occupation.’
The great danger to British interests in the 
area from an American establishment was in time of 
war, said Ricketts. At the same time he recognized 
that in peacetime, ’the opening out of fresh cources 
of commerce can be but productive of general good.’
He wrote that the Americans held territory with 300 
miles of coastline, many fine harbours, and exten­
sive coal fields as large and possibly superior to, 
Labuan’s. The situation was ideal for a naval depot 
in the heart of the China Seas commanding the 
commencement of the Palawan Passage and the Sulu 
Sea. If, he argued, ’under United States policy we 
may expect to see the American fleet in the China 
Seas considerably augmented’, they could either alone
126. Ricketts to Russell, 12 Oct. 1865, FO 12/32B. 
127* Ibid*
121
or in comnanv -with France dispute the nassage of 
* " 128 
our China fleet to India and Europe. Moreover,
the American fleet and naval depot could he
reinforced via the north Pacific much easier than
the British fleet could be sustained via the Cape
of Good Hope. San Francisco to China, he noted,
was a distance of 7*500 miles, while from London
to China was almost twice that distance.
Governor Callaghan of Lahuan observed the
Americans with less alarm than did Ricketts.-
Rein? closer to the schene of the American activities,
Z I
he was better able to judge the significance and.
prospects of the .American Trading Company. As it
happened, he seemed not unduly distressed by their
prospects. He was even more dubious of their legal
claim to northern Borneo considering the restrictions
imposed upon the sultan by his treaty with Great
Britain and the fact that the cession was made without
12.9
the sanction of Britain. Callaghan had many interviews
128 • Ibid.1 See also * Report of the Secretary of the Navy1 
In Messages of the President of the United States to the 
Two Houses of Congress. (Washington I867) • The Navy Dept, 
contemplated increasing the Asiatic squadron with several 
small war vessels for pirate warfare. The squadron based
at Hongkong consisted of the flagship Hartford of 23 guns, 
three 10 gun vessels, and four lesser ships.
129. Callaghan to FO, 9 Jan.l866, FO 12/33A.
vath Hoses and Torrey, He considered the former an 
adventurer of boastful and swaggering manner whose 
demeanor to the sultan was now threatening, now 
ingratiating, while 'holding out extravagant hopes
130
to him of United States Government support,T In 
..Torrey, Callaghan found 'rather a good specimen' of 
a yankee who spoke sensibly and moderately, Torrey 
expressed his desire for the good washes of the 
government of Labuan upon the American settlement 
and. he hoped that the enterprise would be viewed 
favourably by Eritain. Torrey said he was avrare 
of the British restriction on the sultan with respect 
to cessions of territory. But as the cession of 
northern Borneo was for ten years and not in per­
petuity, as was Labuan, it wias not likely that the 
consent of Britain wrould be requested by the United 
States government. Despite this, Callaghan 
had misgivings. He wrote to Lord. Russell,
130. Callaghan to Clarendon, 29 Jan., 1866, FO 12/33^ 
It is clear that the sultan thought he was treating wi 
the United States government and Moses did little to 
allay that impression.
131* Ibid: Callaghan to FO, 9 Jan., i860, FO 12/33^*
123
It is probable, though some of the 
surrounding circumstances are ludicrous 
enough, that hr. Torrey may get up some 
company and get something for surrender­
ing- his rights. What is more certain is 
that he and his belongings are sure to
give us trouble here. 132
Although the British government was disturbed 
by the American activities, it clearly felt that it 
need not fear them to the degree that Ricketts ^ alarm­
ing dispatches urged. Britain noted that both Ricketts
and John Abel -Smith, K.P. , for Chichester  ^ a close friend
of Raja Brooke of Sarawak who had also written a letter
full of alarms and forebodings concerning the American 
133
project, were using the incident as an excuse for
a renewed appeal for a protectorate over Sarawak. Such
13U
a proposal had recently been rejected. Wliile the
Foreign Office sought more information from Callaghan
on the activities of all the foreign powers in the
area, a message was desnatched to the minister in
136
Washington, Sir Frederick Bruce. Clarendon asked
132. Ibid.
133* Smith to hurray, 13 Nov. 1865, FO 12/32B.. Smith* s 
letter contained so many inaccuracies and displayed such 
ignorance of the situation that it is probable that it 
had the opposite effect upon the Foreign Office than 
the one intended.
13^. Russell to Ricketts, 18 Jan.1865; FO memo of 1.6
Bruce to ascertain 1without putting any questions
to the United States government1 whether Moses was
acting in Borneo under instructions from Washington
and what designs were entertained by the yankees in
that quarter. If need be, the London government was
prepared to rely on two points In their favour. The
Foreign Office in a dispatch to Consul Callaghan
noted the restrictions imposed by treaty on the
sultan with regard to -'making land grants. In an
office memorandum it was noted that as late as 1852
Lord Derby1s government had considered the British
claim to northern Borneo on the basis of the Dalrymple
187
treaties was still viable. When Sir Frederick Bruce
informed the Foreign Office that the United States had
not authorized any attempts to form settlements in
Borneo, and that Moses1 grant was on his own resoon-
188
sibility, they so informed Consul Callaghan.
Nov. 1865, FO 12/32B.
135* Clarendon to Callaghan, 30 Jan. 1866, FO 12/33A-.
136. FO memo of 16 Nov.1865, FO 12/32B; Clarendon to 
Eruce, 18 Nov. 1885, FO 5/1012.
137* FO to Callaghan, 18 Nov.1865; FO nemo of 19 Dee. 
1865, FO 1?/3?E.
138. FO to Callaghan, 18 Sept.1866, FO 12/88A; Brnce to 
FO, 13 May 1867, CO lM+/?6.
Later when the settlement at Kimanis failed the British
government quietly dropped the whole matter.
In the east the visit of the United States war
vessel, Waclnuseth, to Ambong Bay in the spring of
1866 aroused some speculation that the American
government might back up the struggling colony.
A British trader reported to Callaghan that American
merchants in Manila viewed Torrey's company with
ridicule. He felt, however, that the visit of the
warship to northern Borneo Indicated that the United
1*40
States thought the matter worth looking into.
The United States was interested in having their own
coal supply in the area. When Moses reported that
coal at HImanis was superior to Labuan coal and
would render American shins independent of British
lbl
coaling stations, the State Department took note.
139. FO to Low, 2 April 1867, FO 12/33B.
lUo.- Callaghan to FO, 7 May, i860, FO 12/33A.
lUl. Moses to Seward, 31 Dec.^865? and comment 
thereon, DS - Brunei.
But in 1867 Bruce !s information was confirmed when 
Captain Carter of the visiting American warship 
Monocacy Informed acting Governor Low of Labuan 
that he did not think the United States contem-
1*42
plated the formation of a settlement on the coast.
The end. of this American adventure was as 
intriguing as its beginning. Torrey, apparently 
failed to make any payments to Moses for his rights 
to the grant. Moses asked the sultan to withdraw 
the grant from Torrev and sought to form a new 
company. Moses at one point aroused the interest 
of some Americans and Germans from Macao in a gold 
mining venture. When their ship grounded at the 
entrance to the Brunei River, the adventurers became 
disenchanted. They were even more disannointed in 
the colony at Kimanis and soon returned to Macao.
The American consulate in Brunei burned down under 
circumstances which pointed to Moses having set it 
afire. He invented a story about an attack upon his
lH?. Low to Stanley, ?3 March 1867, FO 12/33B.
1^ +3. Torrey to Callaghan, 8 May 1866: Sultan of Brunei 
to Rear Admiral H.H. Bell, ?1 March 1867, FO 1P/33A.
consulate and himself by Brunei people. His claims 
against the sultan were investigated after the sultan 
had complained of Moses to the admiral of the American 
Asiatic squadron. The sultan had sent a letter to 
President Johnson requesting him to Tnut a good
Ikk
consul in the city of Brunei, 1 Admiral Bell
sent Captain Carter of the TTSS Monocacy once again
and the latter absolved the sultan of any resnonsib-
lj+5 .
ility for the consulate fire. Soon after. Consul
Moses was suspended from duty by Secretary of State
Seward, His successor, O.F. Bradford, made peace
with the sultan and assured him that the consulate
fire was the work of Moses and that the United States
1*46
wanted to be on good terms with the sultan. Consul
ikk. Ibid: Sultan of Brunei to Pres.Johnson, Aug.l866.
FO 12/33A7 Low to FO, 11 May 1867, FO 12/33B.
l*+5. See 'Report of the Sec. of the Navy, 1867', p. 7*
Hugh Low contribiited considerably to a peaceful settle­
ment of the Moses affair. In transmitting the sultan*s 
protest to Admiral Bell the acting governor requested 
Admiral Kennel, command, er of the British China squadron, 
to advise his American counterpart to conduct an inquiry 
before any hasty action was taken. Low shared the sultan*s 
fear that American naval forces would seek reprisal against 
Brunei for the destruction of the consulate. See Low to CO 
11 May I867, CO 1M+/26.
lU6 . Moses to Seward, 13 Nov. 1.867, DS-Brunei: Inche 
Mahomet, British consular writer, Brunei, to Hennessy, 
k March 1868, FO 12/3UA.
Bradford discontinued the consulate at Brunei on
T.l+7
March 5th, 1868.
While the American adventure in Borneo did not 
succeed and was at no time apparently a serious 
threat to British interests on the island , yet it 
did point up the danger to Britain of her unstable 
position in Borneo. Coming at the same time as 
the increased pressure of Spanish claims in the 
north and the Dutch pressure in the south, it 
proved significant when in the next decade the 
clamour for British control of northern Borneo 
became intense. In the 1870*s Torrey*s claim to 
Northern Borneo formed the basis for the possession 
of that area by the British North Borneo Company.
1*47- Bradford to Hennessy, 5 March 1868, FO 12/3*+A; 
Bradford to Seward, 16 March 1868, DS-Brunei: Bruce
to FO, 13 May 1867, CO 1M+/26, Although Secretary 
Seward assured Bruce that the United states had 
decided to have nothing to do with Moses1 grant 
in Borneo, and in fact that Moses was to be recalled, 
Bruce noted that Moses name still appeared some time 
later on the diplomatic list as consul in Borneo.
Bee also Moses to Seward, 13 Nov. 1867; and Bradford, 
to Seward, 16 March. 1868, DS-Brunei.
He have now traced Britain’s reaction to the 
foreign threats to her position in the South China 
Sea during the middle decades of the 1.9th century. 
This reaction motivated the forward movement which, 
in turn led to the complete domination of northern 
Borneo by Great Britain, We now move to an analysi. 
of the form and. nature of that forward movement.
CTTAPTFP ITT
SAP AWAK: RELATION S WITH
BRITAIN. 18*8-1^70"
In the present study of Sarawak it is not 
intended to deal with internal developments rer se*
Nor is it intended to assess the administration of 
the government by the Brooke dynasty* We are 
primarily interested, in those aspects of Sarawak’s 
19th century history which shed light on her rela­
tions with Britain, and which led to the protec­
torate agreement of 1888,
British noltov toward Sarawak and Reia Brooke before 
 ..
Soon after becoming raja James Brooke applied
to the British government for protection. In A Letter
1 " -----------
from Borneo in l8*+2 - a letter intended for the eyes
of the government and the public - Brooke outlined
1* James Brooke, A Letter From Borneo (London l8*+2) 
Copy in FO 12/1.
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his proposals for establishing a. British footing 
in Borneo. He asked for British support in 
developing Sarawak by the residence of a few 
Englishmen wording with the native rulers. He 
asked for a steamboat of 100 tons, manned and 
armed, to keep'open the communications between 
Chinn and Singapore and to survey the coasts of 
Borneo. There was no favourable response at 
this time from government officials. For two 
decades no fimn support for Brooke was forth­
coming from the British government. The navy 
co-operated with him in suppressing piracy. In 
several instances it acted, to promote British 
influence and. Brooke* s rule in Borneo. For example 
Admiral Thomas Cockrane, commander of the East 
Indies squadron, and Captain Rodney Mundy with 
Ra2a. Brooke captured Brunei and humbled the 
sultan in July 18U6. They were at Brunei with 
a fleet of eight ships to investigate the murder 
of Raja Muda Passim and other friendly nengerans 
at the Brunei court. When the force was fired
upon from Prune! forts the ships proceeded to 
destrov the batteries and capture the town. Thez
sultan fled into the jungle. But naval support 
for Brooke was more the result of on the spot 
decisions by friendly naval officers such as«/ t»
Cockrane, Mundy and Henry Kennel rather than from
any clearly defined policy enunciated from London.
Such support could usually be justified under the
heading of warfare against piracy.
From time to time ministers spoke favourably
of Raja Brookefs work. Lord Aberdeen, foreign
secretary in I8k5, defended Brookefs settlement
against Dutch protests that it infringed the 182k 
1
treaty, in l8k6 Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston 
commended Brooke for his 'civilizing work1 and 
offered naval support for pirate warfare. Palmer­
ston recognized a flag for Sarawak. But the Foreign 
Office held to the view that 1 •... it is not the
2. Church (Resident Councillor, Singapore) to 
Henry Wise, 30 June lRk6 , FO 12/k; Horace St.John?
the Indian Archipelago (London 1853) ii* 295 ff•? gives 
a detailed account of Abmiral Cockrane's operations in 
Borneo.
3. Dedel to Aberdeen, 2. Dec.l8k5, Aberdeen to Dedel,
10 Dec.18k5, CO lkb/1.
nol i cy of For ManestvTs Government that Britishj. * ■* "" %J
subjects should possess territory on the mainland 
k
of Borneo,* Four years later the British govern­
ment saw no reason why Brooke should not make a 
treaty with the United States even though the 
Foreign Office was not clear as to his status 
at Sarawak or whether his relationship to the
Sultan of Brunei entitled him to negotiate a
1
treaty with a foreign power
As the attack of the radicals on Brooke 
grew more persistent during the early l8F0 !s 
the government drew back to the official attit­
ude of non-support. In 1853 when the raja took 
issue with a Foreign Office statement which held
that Sarawak was not independent Lord Clarendon 
6
noted/"
h. Aberdeen to Brooke, 1 Uov.lBkk, FO 12/2; and 
FO to Adm. 5 2k July I8k6 , FO 12/k.
5. Palmerston to Brooke, 2k Oct. 1850, FO 12/8,
6* Brooke to FO, 27 Bent, 1853 and Clarendon^s ijiinute 
thereon, FO 12/13.
It seems to me that the various documents 
tend to prove how cautiously the govern­
ment abstained from recognizing his 
(Brooke's) independence although in various 
ways the anomalous character of his position 
has been admitted,
Spencer St.John succeeded Brooke as consul-general i.
1855, He suggested that Britain recognize Sarawak a
1
independent and accredit the consul to Brooke. The 
raja had previously insisted that the consul must 
receive his eyeouutnr from him in order to act in
— *-t
Sarawak territory. Such a procedure would render
the desired recognition. After consulting the law
officers Lord Clarendon wrote to St.John that elthou
it was legally possible for the Cueen to permit one
of her subjects to assume the sovereignty of a
foreign state and. to recognize him it ought to be
done only in excentional circumstances. Brooke
o
could not be recognized.-"
Lord Clarendon's letter to St.John on this 
occasion is worth quoting at length for it does 
not stop at non-recognition. Clarendon noted that
7. St.John to Clarendon, 3 Nov.' 1855, FO 12/22.
8 . Brooke to St.John, 25 Oct.1855, FO 12/22.
9. FO to St.John, 9 April 1856, FO 12/23.
135.
the government would not pronounce an opinion as
to the precise' relationship between Brooke and the
sultan of Brunei , nor would it formally recognize
Brooke as an independent sovereign. The letter 
10
goes on,
Her Majesty1? Government entirely agree 
with you in thinking that British interests 
in Borneo are so closely interwoven with 
the prosperity of Sarawak that whatever 
injuriously effects the latter must also 
be injurious to the former* Therefore 
Her Majesty1s Government hardly believe 
that Sir James Brooke will place himself 
in direct antagonism to Her Majesty1s 
Government by refusing to allow you to act 
within the territory which is subject to 
his rule, and thereby compel Her Majestyrs 
Government to make known to the natives 
that no British subject can exercise 
sovereign authority without the permission 
of his sovereign, which permission has not 
been obtained by him, and that consequently 
he is acting against the lav; of England; 
whereas if he avoids insisting upon a recog­
nition of his independent sovereignty which 
is inconsistent with his position as a 
British subject, his supreme authority at 
Sarawak upon whatever basis it may rest, 
whether upon the grant of the Sultan or 
the choice of the people, will remain 
und i sturbed a nd. unque stioned •
This nosed the question that for the next thirty 
years confused government officials in their policy 
toward Sarawak and Brunei* Hhat exactly was the
10. Ibid.
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status of 3^ra.wl(? Under Clarendon the foreign 
office recognised the involvement of British 
interests in Sarawak. But it refused to take any 
responsibility for their protection or exploit­
ation - indeed the implication in Clarendon1s 
instructions to St.John was that Brooke would
11
be restrained if he pursued an obstinate course.
, C- ,’ The foreign^secretary ended by wishing Brooke
success in pushing his civilizing influence.
Palmerston, the Prime Minister, disagreed
with Clarendon on the question of Brooke’s inde-
12
pendence. He wrote later the same year,
The question seems to be rather between the 
sultan of Borneo and the raja of Sarawak 
than between the latter and. the sovereign 
of England. But as far as we are concerned 
there does not seem to be any strong reason 
why we should not deal with Sarawak as an 
independent state, and if it is so, we might 
ask for an exequatur from the powers that be.
This memorandum, by Palmerston, was written
after Lord Clarendon again said that exceptional
11.. St.John wrote years later, ’There can be no doubt, 
however, that our government behaved in a most shabby 
manner to the Raja . 1 St.John, Life, p.278.
12. Palmerston memorandum, 6 Aug. 1856, FO 12/23.
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circumstances did not exist for the recognition
of Brooke1s ‘sovereignty. A note from St.John
that both the United States and France were about
to negotiate with. Brooke as indenendent sovereign
13
of Sarawak apparently head no effect. St.John
had received his instructions from the foreign
office and in August, 1.8% he took up his residence
in Brunei. He tried to persuade Rain Brooke that
the annointment was really a mark of friendship 
Ik
toward him. St.John had been for seven years 
Brooke1s secretary and advisor.
Brookefs proposals for British surnort, and Lord
Derby1 s •policy.
The Chinese insurrection of 1857 and its after
math marked the beginning of more hopeful moves on
the part of Britain toward Sarawak. For one thing
the public and some officials were shocked at the
sudden attack of the Chinese goldminers under the
13. Lord Clarendon memorandum., k Aug. 18%; St.John 
to Clarendon, 31 May 18%, FO 12/23.
Ik. St.John, Life p.278.
influence of the Sam-Tian-Kinn Hu.eh. This secret
society wes renortedlv associated with the "Heaven
21
and Earth Society" of Singapore. Secondly, the 
"raja’s friends in England, aroused at the .shrinese 
attack, made known their disgust with the govern­
ments neglect of Sarawak and the northwest coast 
of Borneo. The government received numerous 
memorials from groups in support of Brooke, deman­
ding that Britain extend protection to Sarawak or 
take it as a colony. The Times and provincial
newsnaners nub!ished letters and articles to the 
12
same effect.
Britain’s change of attitude toward Sarawak 
in the early l86ofs can he traced from. Brooke’s 
approach to the Foreign Office in 1858. Brooke 
arrived, in England late in 1857* Soon the first
15* Baring Gould and -Bampfylde, pp.l8 6, 202;
St.John, Life .... p.292.
16. Times, 1 Dec. 1.8 58.
17* e.g. petition from Manchester people, Times, 30 April 
1858, p.12; (reprint from Manchester Guardian of 29 April) 
petition of companies of the City of London, Times, 12 Aug 
1858, p. 12; article from, the Leeds Mercury, Times, 18 Aur. 
1858; article from Norwich Chronicle, Times, 20 Sept.lB^S.
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hints of s. change of feeling occurred, Brooke told 
Undersecretary Shelburne at the Foreign Office that 
he hoped Britain would take note of the strategic 
position of Borneo between India and China. He 
spoke also of the advantage of coal supplies avail­
able at Sarawak, and the uossible encroachment of
18 .
the Butch. Shelburne wrote of his conversation
IP
with the raja,
I think myself, that assuming the reports 
about the coal fields to be correct, the 
subject is worth attending to. Our own 
augmenting interests in those seas and 
the increasing establishments of Russia 
to the north, seem to be strong arguments 
in favour of acquiring at all events the 
use of all coaling stations within reach; 
especially as these stations and coal 
fields may fall fde facto1 if not ’do jure* 
into the possession of others •■...»
Brooke submitted proposals with respect to 
Sarawak. He first suggested ceding the country to 
Britain as a colony. Britain must guarantee, how­
ever, that the religion, laws and customs of the 
people be respected. He asked that some compen­
sation be awarded to him in lieu of the private
18. FO memo., lk Jan. 1858, FO'12/25.
19. Tbid.
fortune which he had spent on the country, and
in nlace of the loss to the Brookes of future
20
revenues. When Lord Grey advised Brooke that 
a colony was almost surely out of the question 
and that a less formal connection would have
more chance of acceptance, the raja proposed, a
21 22 
protectorate. Some sources contend, that the
government offered Brooke a protectorate at this 
time. This is not substantiated by Foreign 
Office documents. Bo memorandum or letter 
mentions such an offer. Undoubtedly the conten­
tion arose from Lord Grey’s intimation to Brooke.
But Lord Grey was not a member of the government.
He was a friend of the raja and it was only natural 
that he should give him a little friendly advice.
Unfortunately for Brookefs proposals, Lord 
Palmerston’s government was shortly replaced by
Lord Derby’s second ministry, with Lord Malmesbury
22
at the Foreign Office and Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton
20. Henry George Grey, Viscount Howick, 3rd Earl Grey
(1802-189^)5 parliamentary undersecretary at the Colonial 
Office 1830-1833; Colonial secretary July l8H6-Feb.l8H2.
21. Jacob, ii, 2.66,
22. e.g. Ibid , Rumman, p. 13 5; and St.John, p. 321.
23. Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton (1803-1873) 5 novelist.5
colonial secretary in Lord Derby’s second administration 
from. May 1.858 to June 1.859*
1*+1.
at the Colonial Office. Derby and Malmesbury seemed 
less inclined toward acquiring more responsibilities 
in Borneo than was Palmerston. During the life of 
this government Brooke received little encouragement,
A delegation representing industrial and commercial 
interests of Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow, and 
members of Parliament, net Lord Derby and urged him 
to grant a protectorate over Sarawak to keep it from 
falling to another power. Lord Derby argued that as 
long as Britain maintained naval superiority in the 
China Sea she could command the trade and commerce 
of 'those districts' and there was nothing to fear 
from an adversary in time of war. Notwithstanding 
the lack of encouragement from Lord Derby's govern­
ment the question remained alive and was the subject 
of further study at the Colonial and Foreign Offices.
The records of the Foreign Office covering the 
various negotiations between the government and Brooke 
and his partisans are incomplete. Much went on in 
private conversations between ministers and Brooke's
2h. The Times. 1 Dec.1858
supporters, John Abel Smith, M.P. , and Thomas 
Fair bairn, both London businessmen with interests 
in the east, and Spencer St*John. These conver­
sations are not recorded in memoranda* But from 
correspondence collected by Jacob, St.John and 
Rutter, and from, first hand accounts by St.John 
the documents of the Foreign Office take on more 
meaning. It is thus possible to ascertain the 
feelings in government circles toward Sarawak 
and Brooke rule. Brookeks activity in 1858 was 
the beginning of a five year campaign to persuade 
the British government to support Sarawak. It 
achieved the limited success of a formal recog­
nition. For the first time ministers were willing 
to give serious consideration to proposals to 
increase British influence on the northwest coast 
of Borneo. Previously Britain had been content 
to claim an offshore island for a naval and coalin 
station.
Lord Derby’s public ’no* to any form of 
protectorate or colonial status for Sarawak, as 
reported by the Times must be understood within
1^3.
the context of his complete remarks to the pro-Brooke 
deputation, in order to understand subsequent Foreign 
Office moves. Like any responsible official, Derby 
would not commit the-government to a policy on an 
issue still under consideration by an unqualified 
yes or no. The fact was that the question of support 
for Sarawak was still in the mill. No decision had 
been made nor was likely to be forthcoming soon.
Lord Derby left a negative impression which
25
he later attempted to moderate. His remarks were 
to the effect that the government would study any 
proposals closely but that
...under the present circumstances it seemed 
doubtful whether it would be for the inter­
ests of the government to take unto their 
hands (Sarawak), multiplying and increasing 
the colonial dependencies of the country 
which were already too numerous .*>•••
If the deputation pressed him for an immediate decision,
as they seemed to be doing, he was not at that moment
prepared to say that the government would accept Sarawak
as a colony or nrotectorate. Moreover, he thought it
2kvery unlikely.
25* In. a letter to Brooke, b Pec, 1858, quoted in 
Jacob, ii, 299*
96. Times, op.cit.
3M.
At this noint Raja Brooke end friends took the
27
government’s answer to be no. There was some question
28
of pressing the question in parliament. But the 
government had not made its decision. Raja Brooke 
in a letter to Lord Derby on December 29? designed 
to elicit an official, rejection and thus end the
22
uncertainty, once again proposed a protectorate.
To Brooke’s surprise the answer came back that a
90
protectorate for Sarawak was under consideration,
Brooke thought that this was a change in the govern­
ment’s attitude, and was caused by differences in the
91.
Cabinet* That the matter was still being invest­
igated and no final decision made is shown by the 
fact that the Admiralty had meanwhile received a 
favourable renort on the condition of Sarawak which 
had been requested by Lord Derby. It was this report 
which triggered the difference of opinion in the Cabinet, 
and not Lord Derby’s remarks to the deputation on 29 Nov.,
27. Brooke to Lord Derby, b Dec, 1858, FO 12/35*
28, Jacob, ii, p.300.
2R. Brooke to Derby, 20 Dec,1858, FO 12/35*
30. Derby to Brooke, 11 Jan, 1853, FO 12/35,
31, Jacob ii, p,306.
92, Cmdr. Cresswell of H*M.S. Surmise to Admiralty 
28 Oct. 1858, FO 12/35* This report reached London 
in December.
i3+5.
for almost immediately the Admiralty was asked for
more information. The hydrographer, Captain John
Washington, was asked to submit a report on the
can abilities of Sarawak for coaling and naval 
22
facilities.
The government*s real reason for continued 
consideration of Brookefs proposals was Holland. 
Although Derby in his remarks to the deputation 
had brushed aside the idea that the Dutch night
ii
ultimately claim Sarawak, dispatches from the
British minister in The Hague indicated that
Holland took an unusual amount of interest in
21
the status of Sarawak. The Dutch watched the
progress of Brooke’s proposals. The minister of
colonies stated in the States-Deneral that he
felt Britain would not seriously consider taking
Sarawak for it would give rise to collision between
22.
the two governments. The Dutch had recently been 
busy making land grants and erecting forts and
33* Jacob, ii, pp.30^-7? quotes a letter of the 
raja to Thomas Fairbairn.
3**. Times, on. cit.
35. e.g. Ward to Malmesbury, 31 Dec..1.858, FO 37/3^6.
3o.. Ward to Malmesbury, P.9 Nov.1858, FO IP/35.
1H6.
2Z
and stations in areas close to Sarawak. Charles 
Rice of the Foreign Office, armed with the Hague 
dispatches and Commander Cressvell’s report drew 
up a long memorandum. He favoured the cession of 
Sarawak to Britain. Sarawak, he said, should replace 
Labuan as a British denendency because of its
32
commercial and naval advantages. Lord Malmesbur}/’ 
recommended Rice’s memorandum to the Prime Minister, 
and the Colonial Office, with a note stating that 
the conduct of Holland had induced, him to look
ko
further into the question.
Meanwhile Captain Washington with the help of
old Eastern hands such as Admirals Mundy, Keppell
and Cochrane, all friends of the raja, prodxiced a
glowing renort on Sarawak and recommended a moderate
111
protectorate. The report stated,
..... all that it (Sarawak) asks is that the 
government should extend to it the protection 
of a consular flag and a gunboat. British 
enterprise will do the rest.
37* Rice memo, 7 Jan, 1859. FO 12/35*
38. Hon. Thomas Charles Spring Rice, senior clerk at
Foreign Office, 1857-1869$ appointed assistant under­
secretary 1869.
30. Rice memorandum, 7 Jan.1859> FO 12/35* Britain in
1858 had considered the abandonment of Labuan because of
the failure of the coal company. But the company was 
reorganized and the colony given a new lease of life. See 
FO 12/35? FO to India Board, 19 April 1858: FO to CO, same 
date:, and CO to FO 30 April 1858."
hO. Malmesbury memorandum, 7 Jan. 1.859* E0 12/35* Lord
1>7.
At the Colonial Office the undersecretaries, Lord
hz
Carnarvon and Herman Merivale thought that a 
colony would be too expensive. They reluctantly
hi
accepted the solution of a protectorate. Sir
Edward Bulwer Lytton, the colonial secretary, also
bb
assented, to a protectorate. He wrote,
Sarawak would not be a desirable possession, 
but like many possessions we hold at present, 
it may not be desirable for us, but we had 
better hold it than allow another to hold 
it ... the Dutch must not have it, to that 
I agree.
Derby in the House of Lords said some "new facts” had 
been brought before the government. See Times, 11 March 
185?5 P*6.
Ul, Admiralty to the F0,22 Jan.1859? enclosing the report*
"Notes on Sarawak as a Naval Station” , FO 12/35.
b? m Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, bth Earl of Carnarvon, 
(1831-1890) , parliamentary undersecretary at the Colonial 
Office Feb.1858- June 1859; colonial secretary July 1866- 
March 1867, Feb, 187^-Feb.1878. Herman Merivale (1806- 
187^) , professor of political economy, Oxford 1837-18^ 2-5 
permanent undersecretary, colonial office 18^7-18595 
permanent undersecretary India Office 1859-187U.
*+3. Merivale Memo, 7 Feb.1859 FO 12/35; Lord Carnarvon
memo of 9 Feb.1859, FO 12/35.
M+.. Lytton minute, u.d, Feb. 1859* FO 12/35*
lb-8
Furthermore, Sir Edward thought there would he no 
trouble with, parliament if it was decided to accept 
Sarawak under the proposals made by Raja Brooke,
Thus the colonial secretary joined Carnarvon and. 
Merivale in support of the lesser evil, a protec­
torate* But it was a move to keep Sarawak out of 
foreign hands for all agreed that it was not a 
valuable addition of itself. The Colonial Office 
view although not enthusiastic was not a rejection•wi o  .
hS.
of Brooke’s proposal as one historian has inferred.* 
Sir Edward’s lack of enthusiasm for possessing 
Sarawak would seem to have stemmed from an able
k6
memorandum produced by T.F. Elliot, assistant
hi
undersecretary at the Colonial Office. Despite 
the Admiralty's favourable reports, Elliot pointed 
out that the coal mines in Sarawak were about to be 
abandoned on the advice of their own engineer, and 
that. Labuan was to be retained and a new coal company
Taffling , op.cit., p.207* 
b o « T. Frederick Elliot, assistant undersecretarv,
18W7-1868.
b?. Elliot memo, lb Feb*1859? FO 12/35*
^8 . Raja Brooke had been disappointed, with the coal 
mines at Sad ong when he inspected them in 1857* See 
St.John, Td_fe, p. 3-19*
l*+9
given an opportunity of nroducing coal in the colony.
Furthermore, said Hlliot, Brooke had not heen able to
moke Sarawak pay its way* Fow then could Britain with
an expensive establishment, do so? He added, fa
protectorate has generally been found a weak and
clumsy expedient,1 More correspondence with Raja
Brooke now took dace with reference to Brooke1 s
kg
demand for a monetary settlement.
The whole cuestion was submitted, in March to 
Lord Derby. Later that month he asked, the Cabinet 
Office and the Admiralty for their further views
52
before making fhe decision.
From the foregoing it seems quite likely that had 
Lord Derby1s government remained in power, a protec­
torate would have been offered to Raja Brooke, The 
sentiment of the ministers most directly concerned 
was that it should, be held to prevent it from falling 
eventually to the Dutch, although they were not too 
sanguine as to its desirability as a naval station 
or as a source of coal, Irbuan could yet serve this 
end. The ministers were unhappy with the prospect
Uq, FO to Brooke, 17 March 1859: Brooke to F O , 2b March 
1859, FO 12/33.
50. Lord. Derby1 s memo of March 1859 ? FO 12/35*
150*
that Brooke might offer Sarawak to Holland. There 
were other foreign dangers to consider .... France 
in Indo-Chin? for instance. St. John’s reports from 
Brunei were full of the Spanish moves toward Borneo 
from the north. Naval officers in the east were not 
happy to see Spain moving into -Sulu and northern 
Borneo waters.
As so often happened in Brooke’s relations 
with the British government a change of ministries 
caused an interruption in the consideration of the 
Sarawak question. Parliament having heen dissolved 
in April, Lord Derby’s government retired in June 
without deciding the Sarawak question. Palmerston 
again became prime minister and Lord Russell took 
over the Foreign Office. The Duke of Newcastle 
became colonial minister.
Navel sur^ort m l i c v .
Captain Brooke Brooke, the Raja’s nephew and 
heir, approached the new government. He wrote to 
Lord Bussell at his uncle’s behest to ask formal
2L
recognition of the independence of Sarawak.
51. Cant, Brooke to Russell, 1.9 Sept. 1859? BO 12/35*
151.
This was an attempt to feel out the government and 
to remind it that the question of Sarawak was still 
pending. Lord Russell declined a formal recognition 
and would not be drawn on the protectorate question- 52 
Then took place a series of communications between 
Raja Brooke and the Foreign Office, which were petty 
and argumentative and showed neither party at its 
best. Brooke •broke off1 relations with Britain 
because of the latter1s refusal to recognize the
S3
independence of Sarawak- Undersecretary Wodehouse 
called Brooke’s action ’ridiculous*, noting that the 
only relations that existed were the British govern­
ment’s feelings of sympathy for the prosperity of
ah
Sarawak- Lord Russell wrote that Sarawak was 
’welcome to any independence they can achieve and 
maintain’- But he warned Brooke that a British 
subject cannot throw off his allegiance to his own
si
country ’at pleasure.' Another angry letter from 
Brooke was followed by one from the Foreign Office,
5k
terminating the correspondence. St.John wrote
52- Russell to Capt.Brooke, 7 0ct.l859? FO 12/35-
53. Brooke to Russell, 26 Nov.1859, FO 12/35.
54. Foreign Office memo, 28 Nov.1859* FO 12/35 
55* Russell to Brooke, 2 Dec. 1859? FO 12/35- 
56- Foreign Office memo, 28 Nov. 1859? FO 12/35- 
Brooke to FO, 12 Dec; FO memo, 14 Dec.; and FO to 
Brooke, 17 Dec, 1859, FO 12/35.
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later, ’The Raja’s correspondence during this year 
with Her Majesty’s government was not pleasant, and
57.
ended, apparently, in complete estrangement. 1
While the government decided to leave Sarawak 
in its anomalous state, there was no intention of 
ignoring British interests. The government ordered 
the Navy to make regular calls at Sarawak and watch 
over British subjects* After years of neglect the 
Navy ordered frequent tours of the Borneo coast
SSL
following the 1857 insurrection*
It was during this period that Raja Brooke 
approached Holland and France with a view to obtain­
ing protection. In 1859 Captain Brooke opened
21
negotiations with the Dutch minister in London*
Irwin states that he was unable to find a record of
Brooke’s approach in the Dutch Foreign Office archives,
and he surmised that the offer was made privately as 
60
a'feeler. Captain Brooke admitted having sounded
IPTZ St.John. Life. p*327.
58* Russell memo, 28 Nov. 1859; FO 12/35*- 
59** St.John, Life. p*332.
60. Irwin, on*cit.. p*l85n*
61* J. Brooke Brooke;, A Statement Regarding Sarawak. 
p*12., copy in FO 12/31.
62* Owen Rutter, Rajah Brooke and Baroness Burdett Coutts. 
(London 1935) > pp*69-72, Raja to Coutts, March 2, 21 and 26, 
1859? and Coutts to Lord Elgin, 5 April, i860.
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the Dutch Minister, Baron Bentin^k, on the subject#
He wrote, * that minister, after reference to his
6l
government, courteously declined the negotiation#* 
France was next approached following the jpaja*s 
unpleasant correspondence with the British govern- 
ment. St#John wrote that France was unwilling to
63
accept Sarawak because of British displeasure# St.
John may be correct* Nonetheless it was Raja Brooke 
and, indirectly, Captain Brooke who interrupted the 
plan.< Raja Brooke broke off the negotiations because 
his nephew and heir, Captain Brooke, interfered and 
was not then^jprepared to acquiesce in a foreign 
protectorate”  The £aja referred to his interrup­
tion of the French negotiations in private corres­
pondence. To Bishop Wilberforce he cited the altered
65
relations between Britain and France. To Fairbajinn
he noted 1 political affairs would not warrant pressing
66
negotiations further*. One feels that the political 
affairs* were between the raja and nephew and not
63- St. John, Life * p-33*+*
61*., Rutter, op.cit. * pp*73> 83-*+, Raja to Capt^Brooke, 
and 8 Aug,, i860; and copy of Capt.Brookej 1A Statement 
regarding Sarawak  ^p#-20 FO 12/31 »
557 Rutter, op.cit., p.75* Brooke to Wilberforce, 9 April 
I960.
66.* Jacob, ii, p-321, Brooke to Fairbairn, 6 April,i860.
67.. *The mistrust here of French designs is very great ... 
wrote Lord Russell to Henry Elliot on 9 Jan.i860. See The 
Later_Correspondence of Lord John Russell 18^0-1878. edT 
G.P.Gooch (London 1925) i, 253. ---------
15H.
between Britain and Franee. It will be remembered, 
however, that during the late 1850’s and early 1860*5  
Anglo-French relations were strained at times by what
6z
were considered threats of invasion by France*. For
some years the Xaja toyed with the idea of resuming
68
the French negotiations*
Captain Brooke had not been enthusiastic about
62
turning to Holland* Early in i860 he had written
privately to Lord Russell asking that the settlement
at Sarawak not be neglected. He asked that Her
Majesty’s naval officers in the east be directed to
watch over it, !as far as the exigencies of the service
22
will permit.1. Undersecretary Wodehouse replied that
21
such instructions had already been given to the Navy* 
Captain Brooke was thus satisfied, that if Britain 
would not grant a protectorate at least her naval 
protection wouldbe sufficient for Sarawak to continue 
independently..
6$.. See esp. Rutter, op*cit... pp*158-9* Brooke to Coutts, 
Jan.l6 and 1 9* 1863*
69- St*John, Life. p*332*
70* Capt.Brooke to Russell, lU Feb* i860. FO 12/35*
71• Wodehouse to Capt. Brooke, 22 Feb.l8o0, FO 12/35-
According to one of Raja Brooke*s biographers his
petulent and argumentative attitude during this period
was caused by anxiety for Sarawak and its fate after 
21
his death. He had suffered a slight stroke in 1858 
which slowed him down. He was not sure of the constancy 
of his nephew. Captain Brooke seemed to vacillate, 
now wanting British or European protection, now not. 
Charles Johnson, his other nephew, was untried but 
seemed close to his brother. The memory of the Chinese 
insurrection was still fresh. In 1859 the murder of 
two Sarawak officers and a plot to exterminate the 
Europeans in Kuching caused further anxiety.. From the 
raja’s viewpoint the British government seemed indec­
isive, unable to give a yes or no to his proposals. 
Brooke wanted to establish stability for Sarawak in 
his lifetime. Since the Chinese insurrection the 
country had been in tight financial straits. Raja
Brooke often used intemperate language and manner
21
with officials who could have helped his cause.
.This partly explains Brooke’s estrangement from 
the British government and his turning to Holland and 
France. But his friends, Fairbairn, St.John and Angela
72. Rutter, op.„cit., pp.71-2, Coutts to Lord Elgin,
5 April, l8b(3T^--
73. e.g. Life. Brooke to Derby, k Dec.1858; Brooke to 
Russell, 26 Nov.18595 Brooke to ¥odehouse, 12 Dec.1859» 
FO 12/35..
Burdett Coutts, a well known philanthropist, were 
convinced that any measure of British support was 
better than accepting a foreign protectorate. They 
now took over the bulk of the lobbying work with the 
British government. They also arranged for the 
financial relief of the Eaja and his country. Brooke 
was only too happy to let his friends take over. He 
wrote that 1.... every arrangement political or personal 
which I attempted is at an end*. He agreed not to 
pursue foreign protection until all attempts to persuade
2h.
Britain had failed. Brooke’s friends were able to
restore friendly contact with the government during
i860, but little more. Bishop Wilberforce of Oxford
approached Lord Palmerston privately at the behest of
. his friend Miss Coutts, and found thejgrimejminister
friendly* He reported that Palmerston was willing to
send naval vessels for the support of Raja Brooktwhen-
21
ever they were needed* The suggestion was also made 
that Lord Elgin, governor-general of India, should be
7^ f. Rutter, op.cit., pp*83-H, Raja to Capt.Brooke,
8 Aug. i860; p./9. Raja to Coutts, 6 June, i860*
75. St.John, Life. p*336, Wilberforce to Brooke, k April 
i860*
commissioned to investigate and report on Sarawak.
The Colonial Office, however, said that Lord Elgin
71
was too busy, and Lord Russell concurred.
Consul St.John, home on leave during i860, joined
the campaign* He submitted the memorandum to the
Foreign Office, already noted, recommending a protec- 
28
torate. It received considerable attention from 
Undersecretary Wodehouse and Lord Russell* He asked 
that the Union Jack be quartered in the Sarawak flag 
as a protection against European and American inter­
ference. He noted,
***.. the mistake we committed in returning 
Java to the Dutch may be partially remedied 
by taking possession of the northwest coast 
of Borneo, commencing with Sarawak and grad­
ually acquiring by purchase the districts 6f 
the north. 22
St.John clearly thought that a limited protectorate
was only the first step toward British dominion over
the non-Dutch portions of Borneo.
76. Rutter, op.cit., pp.71-2, Coutts to Lord Elgin,
5 Apfil', 1860; CO to FO 30 April, i860, FO 12/28.
77* Ibid., and FO to CO, 5 May, i860, FO 12/28.
78. See above pp. 95-96.
79* St.John memorandum, 9 Aug, i860; Wodehouse 
memo and Lord Russell minute, 18 Aug. JLQ$0 . FO 12/26* 
St.John foreshadowed a policy which was carried out with 
considerable success by Raja Charles Brooke some years 
later. See below Ch.V.
158.
Further than acknowledging British interests in
Sarawak and agreeing to grant it naval protection when
needed the government was not prepared to go at this
time. Certainly this degree of British involvement
in Sarawak was a step in the direction Britain was
later to take. It represented a change of policy
80
from that enunciated by Lord Clarendon in 1856..
It quite clearly evolved from Lord Derby*s reconsid­
eration of St.John*s warning of French and Spanish
81
pressures in the South China Sea. The government 
was following the well worn custom of going only so 
far as was necessary in its support of Sarawak. Inter­
national pressures were not then great enough to warrant 
going beyond naval protection. One might argue that 
this was not so much a change of the policy as a 
restoration of the relations existing in the days of 
the great pirate battles, before the inquiry. It was 
a change of policy, for in the l8U0 *s naval support 
was granted to Brooke in his capacity as a British 
official, and to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of
80. See above, p.p.13^-6.
81. See above, p.p.86-87-
82. St.John, Life, p.32^.
182^ which called on Britain to fight piracy. Under 
Palmerston and Russell in i860 naval support was 
promised for British interests in Sarawak, not against 
pirates, but against the threat of other powers.
Britain had gone far in recognizing its interests 
in Sarawak. Would it now go another step and grant 
a formal recognition of independence, and the sovereign 
rule of Raja Brooke?
The Mucah River incident.
Events during i860 and l86l pointed up the 
difficulties which British officials no less than 
Sarawak officials faced because of the undefined 
relationship between Sarawak and Britain. For many 
years Sarawak traders had been dealing with the people
p jt,
the so-called sago rivers - Mukahj Oya, Igan, Matu 
and Nipa - in Brunei territory, buying sago for ship­
ment to Kuching and Singapore. The traders had 
complained that some of the river chiefs had been 
interfering with Sarawak trade by attacking ships 
and exacting heavy duties. St.John has pointed out 
that the Sarawak traders were partly to blame for any 
unpleasantness in the sago rivers, for they wanted a 
monopoly of the trade, and expected the same liberal 
treatment in Brunei territory that they were accustomed 
to in Sarawak. Coupled with this trouble there was a
160.
feud going on between two Brunei nobles in the Mukah 
river.
In 1857 Raja Brooke had received the Sultan1s
permission to try to settle the trouble in the sago 
82
rivers. Both Captain Brooke, in 1858, and Charles 
Johnson, in 1859* when they were in charge of the 
government of Sarawak, levied fines against subjects 
of the Sultan in Mukah. one of whom was an agent of 
V the Sultan. Both kept the fines rather than turning
them over to Brunei, the suzerain state*. The Sultan
took this as an insult.
When in the summer of i860 Sarawak traders were
/
denied entry to theJMuka River and the Sarawak flag 
was fired upon, Captain Brooke and Charles Johnson 
went in force for a showdown* The river chiefs were 
acting under the influence of Sarawak*s old enemy, 
Musahor, a Brunei pengeran who had instigated the 
murder of the two Sarawak officials in 1859* At this 
point Governor George Edwardes of Labuan interfered in 
^ his capacity as acting consul general* Sir John was on
83* St.John, Life, p.320.
home leave in Britain. Edwardes thought Captain
Brooke was wrong in attacking subjects of Brunei
in Brunei territory. He felt it his duty to restrain
these British subjects of Sarawak from complicating
British - Bornean relations. Governor Edwardes felt
also that Sarawak by its constant pressure on Brunei,
and the ever widening activity of its traders, was
8h
imperiling the colony of Labuan. He wrote later
I fully felt the embarrassing anomaly of the 
Sarawak government, but the interests of this 
colony demand a clear definition of its state.
I was forced to act or to peril the safety of 
this colony. • • •». the colony must be better 
prepared to meet the hostility I conscientiously 
feel will greatly impede its progress if not 
endanger its safety.
With the blessing of the Sultan Edwardes went 
to Mukah in the last India Company steamer Victoria 
and ordered the Sarawak forces to withdraw. They did 
so under protest. The reaction was immediate. The 
sentiment of British people in the east was overwhel­
mingly against Edwardes1 action. They felt that such 
interference, causing the disgrace of Sarawak in 
native eyes, struck a blow at British influence in 
Borneo, and could lead to more native attacks upon
85* Edwardes to luke of Newcastle (CO) 26 Dec.i860,
FO 12/35.
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Europeans, and a further decline in trade. Coming
after the Indian mutiny, the Chinese insurrection,
and the plot against the Europeans of Sarawak, this
seemed further confirmation of the danger to Europeans
in the east. It was in such an atmosphere that
Edwardes1 action was viewed as nothing short of
irresponsible. Musahor, having received the support
of Governor Edwardes action, sent a spear around the
86
tribes - the symbol of calling out the warriors.
St.John later reported that the Brunei court thought
that Britain was about to move all her subjects from
8Z
Sarawak and turn it back to Brunei.
Edwardes, as did the Sultan, disregarded the 
fact that the Sarawak government had received permis­
sion of the Sultan in 1857 to settle things in the 
sago rivers and protect traders. Thus Edwardes was 
out of order despite the Sultan1s vacillation. The 
outcome was that St.John returned to his post. Edwardes 
was relieved as Governor and Britain sent naval vessels 
to transport St.John on a mission to the Sultan and
85- See Traders of Sarawak memorial to Lord Russell, 23 Aug 
i860; Brooke to Russell, 25 Oct.i860; Singapore Chamber of 
Commerce to Russell, 5 Oct,i860; FO 12/26. Articles from 
Singapore Free Press. 23 Aug. and 6 Sept.i860.
86. RutterV op. cit." p.9*+. quotes Chalmers (a Missionary) 
to Bishop MacDougall.
87* St.John, Life, pp.3^1-2.
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chiefs to show Her Majesty’s displeasure with Edwardes1 
action, and to lend, in effect, practical support to 
Ra;ja. Brooke. The Sultan soon after ceded the sago 
rivers to Sarawak.
This incident is important for it dramatised the 
confused relationship between Sarawak and Britain, 
even in the eyes of British officials. It is doubt­
ful whether the natives of Borneo ever distinguished
between British subjects in Sarawak and the British 
88
government. It lent weight to the efforts of 
Brooke’s friends to gain official support for Sarawak. 
It motivated Lord Russell to a reconsideration of the 
Sarawak question*
The question of recognition.
Despite Brooke’s estrangement from the Foreign
Office, some members of the government remained sympa-
82
thetic. Lord de Grey Parliamentary Undersecretary 
for India, interceded on behalf of Raja Brooke. He 
discussed Sarawak with the Duke of Newcastle, the 
colonial minister. Even though Governor Edwardes
88* Uodehouse memo, 18 Aug. i860. FO 12/28.
89* George Frederick Robinson, Earl de Grey and Ripon, 
1st Marquis of Ripon (1827-1909)? parliamentary under­
secretary of state for India, Jan. to July l86l; sec. 
of state for India Feb. to July 1866; governor-general 
of India, 1880-1881*.
16k
was rebuked the Duke did not feel inclined to support
Raja Brooke. He thought it unwise to thwart him,
20
however* On his friends advice the raja now agreed
2k
to an intermediate step. He wrote to Miss Coutts,
fWe shall make no overture to any nation, and try
only to gain recognition without definite protection,
21
paving the way for future intimacy if needed.1
When in i860 Miss Coutts loaned him money for the
purchase of a gunboat for Sarawak the tfajars immediate
fears for the security of his kingdom were relieved*
Hence he agreed to refrain from seeking foreign 
21
protection. Sarawak could now await the pleasure 
of Her Majesty^ Government for a time. The raja, 
however, noted to Fairbairn that while he did not 
relish the idea of foreign protection it might, never­
theless, be necessary in the end. He wrote, !It would 
be a crime to her (Sarawakrs) people to expose them to 
the evils of anarchy or unconditional surrender to 
Holland1, but Sarawak 1 isolated and outcast1, could
90. Rutter, op.cit.. p*110, Earl Grey to Coutts, 12 March 
1861*
91. Jacob, ii, p.351*
92. Rutter, op.cit.« pp*117-8, Brooke to Coutts, 13 April 
1861.
93* Ibid.. and Jacob, ii, pp*329-30. Raja to Fairbairn,
28 May and 10 July, 1861.
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not stand alone* If Britain finally closed the door
it would become necessary to obtain protection from
another nation.
Britain kept her foot in the door* Because of
the Mukah River incident the question of Sarawak again
became of some concern at the Foreign Office. Before
he left for the east to relieve Governor Edwardes of
his consular duties in the fall of i860 St.John had
recommended that the offices of governor of Labuan
and consul general be combined in one person, as they
22
had been under Sir James Brooke. St.John was consid­
ered for the post but the Foreign Office objected 
because St.John was too close to Raja Brooke and 
Labuan it was thought, might tend to become subordinate
2k
to Sarawak* The appointment went to T.F. Callaghan, 
the chief magistrate of Hong Kong. He was instructed, 
as St.John had been, not to interfere between the 
sultan and the raja. He was further told to maintain 
the most friendly relations with the English settlement
at Sarawak, lin the welfare of which Her Majestyfs
/ 1 SZsl
<1 'government continue to take such interest.
9*+. Ibid.
95. This had previously been suggested by Governor Edwardes 
and the Colonial Office. See Edwardes to CO 2k Dec. 1859>
CO 1*+Vl6 ; and CO to FO, 5 April i860 CO l W l ? 0 .  It is not
known that Mr. Edwardes coveted the dual post.
9o. FO memo., 21 March 1861, FO 12/29*
97. FO to Callaghan, 27 May, 1861, FO 12/29.
The government, indeed, took much interest in
Sarawak. While the Foreign Office repeatedly stated
that Britain could not grant protection other than
naval support it was edging toward recognition. Lord
Wodehouse wrote in June 1861 following the Mukah
River incident,
.....it must be borne in mind that Sarawak 
is in a state of quasi-independence.... As 
to our naval support we do give occasional 
naval protection the demand for which is 
scarcely consistent with the independence 
of Sarawak; and it cannot be for our inter­
est to support Sir James Brooke’s warlike 
demonstrations against the Sultan unless we 
are prepared to establish a permanent British 
dominion over the west coast of Borneo. This 
is what Sir James Brooke wants and what it has 
been decided not to do.. sa.
legal questions concerning Sarawak which had to be 
considered. Firstly, the government felt that even 
limited recognition could not be granted, much less 
formal protection, until it was known whether Sarawak 
was really independent or a vassal state of Brunei. 
Secondly, was it possible to recognize a British 
subject as the ruler of an independent state? Lord
98. Seeesp. Russell to Sir J. Shuttleworth, 22 Aug.l86l, 
FO 12/29.
99* Wodehouse memo, J Jhine, 1861, FO 12/29. The ’warlike 
demonstrations’ presumably referred to Sarawak’s activities 
in Muka/u
22
From the government’s point of view
Palmerston had pointed out these two difficulties to
100
Bishop Wilberforce in i860. The first question was
most complicated.. The original grant of Sarawak, from
point Dutu to the mouth of the Samarahan River, was
101
dated 2 Aug. 18H6. From 18*41 when Brooke assumed
the government he had paid an annual tribute of # 2,550
10 2
to the Sultan and Rajas of Brunei. By the 18*46 
agreement this tribute ceased. But the stipulation 
that on the death of the Raja and the accession of 
his heir a payment of #*4000 be paid the Sultan, 
remained. Two later cessions of territory in 1853 
and l86l added 200 miles of coastline to Brooke!s 
kingdom. For these Brooke paid the Sultan annual 
tribute of #6000. There was also the requirement 
that should the Sultan be in danger people from these
103
areas must heed a Brunei call to service. With
10*4
few exceptions British ministers held the opinion
100* St.John, Life, p*336, Wilberforce to Brooke,
*4 April, i860.
101. W.G. Maxwell and W.S. Gibson, Treaties and Engage- 
ments ..... (London 192^) *Grant by Sultan Omar Ali...1 
It was confirmed by Sultan Mumin in 1853*
102. Maxwell and Gibson, P.P.18H-6.
103. St.John to Russell, 2 Oct. l86l, F0 12/29.
10^. Notably Lord Palmerston; see above p*13o and 
Palmerston memo, 6 Aug.1856, F0 12/23. Palmerston 
would recognize Brookefs independence but did not feel 
his sovereignty was absolute. Later he considered the 
obstacles to Brookefs complete independence insignificant.
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that Sarawak was not completely independent of Brunei; 
that Raja Brooke owed duties to the Sultan which con­
stituted the latter suzerain of the former. Thus it 
was thought Brooke could not legally sell or cede his
rights, and Britain could not take his place as the
105.
vassal of the Sultan. As to the second difficulty,
the law Officers had already said in 1856 that a
subject of the Queen could become the sovereign of
an independent country with permission of the Crown,
106
in exceptional circumstances. Lord Clarendon, the
same year, decided that the exceptional circumstances
107.
did not exist in Brooke's case. Brooke contended
that he was not the Sultan's vassal but that the grant
of Sarawak was complete. Furthermore, he said, his
title was derived from the will and support of a free 
108
people. Brooke might have said that Sarawak was his 
by right of conquest as well. In l8*+l after directing 
the suppression of the rebellion of the Sarawak Malays 
against their Brunei masters he gained the trust and
105*. Times. op.cit. i F0 to St.John, 6 Sept. 1855; F0 
memo, l O u l y ,  lS55, F0 12/22.
106. See above p.p.133-5and F0 12/23, Clarendon memo, 
k Aug, 1856.
107* Clarendon memo, 2 Feb. 1856, FO 12/23.
108. 185^-5. xxix, p.231. Brookers statement to the
Commission. 6 Rov. lo5*+; FO 12/13, Brooke to Clarendon, 
27 Sept, 1853; St.John, Life. pp.57> 70; Jacob ii, p.190 
Brooke to Templer, 6 March, 1855*
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affection of Malays and Dyaks alike by insisting
102
on their benevolent treatment in the peace terms.
Yet, Sarawak was not finally handed over to him until
Brooke made a show of force. The tfhief people, namely
the Malay chiefs and Pengerans, then did "choose”
Brooke. The opportune arrival of an East India
110
Company warship helped.
Support for Brooke*s view came from an unexpected
source. In July l86l Lord Russell asked St.John if
it was true that the Sultan of Brunei considered
Sarawak independent. He had been told that the
111
Sultan saluted the xiaja with twenty-one guns. St.
John replied that the Sultan did indeed consider
Sarawak independent and that it had been customary
since 1853 to honour the tfaja with a twenty-one gun 
112
salute. If the Sultan considered Sarawak indepen­
dent there seemed an opening for British recognition.
109. St.John, Life, pp.^7-8
110. Ibid. pp J ^ 7 .
111. Russell to St.John, July 10, l86l, F0 12/29.
112., St.John to Russell, 2 Oct, l86l, F0 12/29.
Malay officials in Sarawak considered the country 
independent. See St.John memo of a conversation 
with Malay members of the Sarawak Council, 25 Oct. 
1855, F0 12/22.
governor Cavanagh's mission.
While Brooke was in Sarawak during most of 1861
his friends at home were busy on his behalf. They
reminded the government that the Raja would be forced
to again seek the protection of another country if
Britain failed him. Lord Russell noted on a letter
from one of these friends in August, 1861, 'We
cannot recognize him (Brooke) as an independent
prince, but the settlement of Sarawak may be of
1 1 1-
great importance to our trade.' The following
month papers concerning the various proposals for
Sarawak were being prepared for Lord Elgin, the new
Ilk
Governor-General of India. The government had 
decided to have him undertake an investigation of 
the condition of Sarawak.
The Foreign Office now received a proposal for 
a limited protectorate of Sarawak consisting of 
the Union Jack quartered in the Sarawak flag, and
112 116
the support of a gunboat. Layard Under-
113* Russell minute on memo of Sir J.K. Shuttleworth 
which was submitted to the Foreign Office, Aug.l86l,
FO 12/29.
11*+.. FO memo, Sept. l86l, FO 12/29*
115. Layard memo, 2 Jan. 1862, FO 12/35* This was 
similar to St.John's suggestion in i860. See above 
pp.156-7*
116. Sir Austin Henry Layard, served as attache in 
Constantinople, 18H7-1852; parliamentary yndersecretar 
at the Foreign Office, Feb.1852 and 1861-56: minister 
Spain 1869-77; ambassador to Turkey, 1877-80; elected
171*
secretary at the Foreign Office, wrote that the
consideration of previous proposals had been marked
with 'some misconception of Sir James Brooke's
views and motives on the one side, and by some
117
unnecessary irritation on the other'. He thought 
that sufficient consideration had not been shown to 
Brooke and his proposals. On the other hand the 
government had never been furnished with the 
necessary information about Sarawak to formulate 
a 'just and exact* opinion on Brooke's proposals, 
and such information was still not in its possession. 
Britain had always refused to recognize Brooke's 
independence, but the Sultan had saluted Brooke's 
flag. Layard suggested that Lord Elgin appoint the 
Governor of Singapore or a special commissioner to 
go to Sarawak for first hand information. He added 
that previous governments had declined Brooke's 
offer of a cession of Sarawak because it was thought 
to be not of sufficient political and commercial value 
and Brooke's title was not clear. A protectorate was
lord rector of Aberdeen University, 1855*
117.- Ibid.
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declined because of the inconvenience it would cause
in relations with the Dutch. Layard concluded it
would be best to
incur the certain outlay in taking it, to 
the uncertain of allowing it to fall into 
the possession of a rival nation .... The 
Dutch have been watching with a jealous 
eye our proceedings in Sarawak, and if it 
were found desirable to obtain a complete 
cession from the Sultan of the territory - 
dependencies near might be found to prevent 
it. 118
Layard advised a cautious investigation*
Lord Russell, on the same day, addressed a letter
to Lord Elgin formally asking him to handle the inves- 
119 120 
tigation. Lord Elgin sent Colonel Cavenagh
governor of the Straits Settlements, to Sarawak.
Colonel Cavanaghfs investigation was not quite
121
satisfactory to some of Brookefs friends who felt
that the governor was not thorough enough. He gave
an accurate summary of conditions in Sarawak, however,
and suggested making Sarawak and Labuan lieutenant-
122
governorships under Singapore* Lord Elgin commen­
ted, upon submitting Cavanagh’s report to the Foreign 
123
Office,
THT. Ibid.
119* Russell to Elgin, 2 Jan.1862, Russell minute, same 
date, FO 12/35.
120. Orfeur Cavenagh, governor of the Straits settlements, 
1859-1867; later knighted and a general in the Indian Army*
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I am disposed to think: that the acquisition 
of Saigon by the French and the persistent 
endeavour of the Dutch authorities to cripple 
British trade *.* give enhanced importance to 
the preservation of the independence of Sara­
wak as a matter affecting British interests*
British recognition
The report satisfied Lord Russell that Sarawak
was a stable and well run governments J.A. Smith
informed Raja Brooke in February that he was
authorized to say that Lord Russell was ready to
12k
propose recognition to the Cabinet* Smith may 
have inferred too much from Russell’s words, or 
the foreign secretary may have had second thoughts. 
In April when Smith pressed the foreign secretary
to make good his promise of recognition, Lord Russell
reportedly said, ’What I promised to do was to send
out a consul to Sarawak, and ask for an exequatur*
12g
that I am now prepared to do.1 Lord Russell had
previously asked the law officers to advise on the
126
question of an exequatur* They replied that there
121. St.John, Life* p*363*
122. Cavanagh’s report, 21 Nov.1862, FO 12/35* See also 
Orfear Cavenagh, Reminiscences of an Indian Official 
(London 188*+) pp.327-31*.
123* Elgin to Russell, 8 Jan.1863, FO 12/35*
12*+. St.John, Life. p*363* Smith to Brooke, 2*+ Feb.1863*
125* St.John, Life, p.36*+, Smith to Brooke. 2k April,1863
Smith had asked Lord Russell in September I062 to appoint
a consul. See Smith to Russell !*+ Sept. 1862, FO 12/30»
126. Russell memo, 8 Sept.1862, FO 12/30.
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were no grounds for not asking the exequatur of the 
127
Raja. Thereupon the Cabinet approved a consul 
for Sarawak ’as the most direct and least formal
128
method of recognizing it as an independent state.1
The Foreign Office appointed G.T. Ricketts the acting
consul in Belgrade. He was instructed to procure his
   * 1 2 2
official recognition by the !local authorities1.
Thus the anomalous status of Sarawak in governmental
eyes remained. One historian has pointed cut that
it was an ever cautious Foreign Office staff who
issued the instructions to Ricketts to ask the
exequatur of the 1local authorities1 rather than
from the sovereign of Sarawak. It provided an opening
/ ( / <
for a subsequent undersecretary to declare that Brooke jQ'C
130
had not been recognized. j
I
127* Law Offices to F0 , Oct.1862; F0 memo, 12 Sept.
1863, F0 12/30.
128. St.John, Life, p.367. Smith to Brooke, 17 Aug.1863,
Smith quoted Layard; FO memo, 20 Oct.l863, FO 12/31.
129. FO to Ricketts, 27 Feb.186^, FO 12/32A.
130. Irwin, op.cit.. p.189; FO memo by Sir J. Pauncefote,
2 Jan, 1877, FO 12/43.
131. See above, p.136 and St.John, Life, p*36l, Smith to 
Brooke, 30 June, 1862, p.336, Wilberforce to Brooke k April 
i860.
132. St.John, Life, pp.36^-5, Smith to Brooke, 2k April 
1863. Russell reportedly said, ’I suppose Lord Palmerston 
will be favourable to Sir James Brooke.1
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Lord Palmerston had been consistently sympathetic
131
toward Sarawak. Difficulties such as recognition
of a subject as an independent ruler, he thought, 
could be solved. He did not feel that the ’immed­
iate assumption of Sarawak with the colonial system* 
was possible, however, because of the opposition of 
Gladstone and others who felt that the territorial
responsibilities of Britain should not be increased. 
He told J.A. Smith, during an interview in June 1862, 
that he would do what he could to ’foreward’ British
support for Brooke in Sarawak. Lord Russell had some 
132
reservations. Thus he, in whose department the
question was pending, decided on the less formal
type of recognition of Brooke. Still, this was a
step beyond mere naval protection. From every side
came warnings of foreign interests in Sarawak, from
Brooke’s own contacts with Holland and France to a
133
more recent overture from Belgium* In the fall 
of 1861 the Duke of Brabant, heir to the Belgian 
throne, opened negotiations with Brooke for the
133* Capt. Brooke, fA Statement Regarding Sarawak’
FO 12/31; St.John, Life. p.359s Smith to Raja, JO June 
1862; Rutter, p.p.12^-^, Raja to Capt. Brooke, p Sept.l86l, 
p-127, Raja to Coutts, 12 Jan.1862, pp. 136-7 , Coutts to 
Raja, 20 Feb.1862.
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cession of protection of Sarawak. The British govern­
ment probably did not fear f so inoffensive a govern­
ment as Belgium1, but it was yet another indication 
of foreign interest in Sarawak. Undersecretary 
Layard*s memorandum had been full of misgivings 
concerning Dutch interests, and Lord Elgin emphasized 
the danger from France in Indo-China at this time.
The British government was determined to protect 
its interests in Sarawak, and showed it early in 
1863# Captain Brooke, administering the government 
of Sarawak, had attempted a policy in defiance of 
the raja and the latter had gone to the east to 
depose his nephew. A British naval vessel was put 
at the rajafs disposal in Singapore, and no less
13k
than seven warships appeared in the Sarawak River.
m
Lord Russell ordered this naval protection. His 
decision to recognize Sarawak went further. For the 
first time the British government officially made 
known their great interest in Sarawak. Consul Ricketts
13^. Capt.Corbett (HMS Scout) to Admiralty, k March 
I863, FO 12/31; St.John, Life, p.356* The naval vessels 
in Sarawak waters Ostensibly to look for pirates1.
135* FO to Admiralty, 17 Jan. I863, FO 12/31.
was instructed ’to afford that moral support to the 
Ruling Authorities which it is the desire of Her
136
Majesty’s Government to give them
Further support considered, and a sphere of influence* 
Brooke's friends, especially J.A. Snith, continued 
to labour for a protectorate* But during the remainder 
of the Liberal government’s tenure no further decisions 
were taken in that direction* The question was twice 
proposed for discussion by the Cabinet, however* In 
March 1865 Brooke wrote to Miss Coutts that the Cabinet
I3Z
had again decided to have nothing to do with Sarawak*
Again, after the death of Palmerston and when Clarendon
succeeded to the Foreign Office in the place of Russell
who became Prime Minister, the Cabinet discussed 
138
Sarawak* Undersecretary Layard had again written a 
long memorandum detailing some of the foreign threats 
and noting especially that the question was connected
139
with the encroachments of the Americans in the archipelago*.
136. FO to Ricketts, 27 Feb. 186H, FO 12/32A*.
137* Rutter, on.cit* * p.2Mt* Brooke to Coutts, 21 March 186 
138* Clarendon memo, 9 Feb.l866, FO 12/35*
139* FO memo, 26 Dec.l865, FO 12/35* Smith used the 
’lever* of the Sultan's grant to U.S. Consul Moses to 
move the British government.
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Lord Clarendon minuted that Ehrawak would always be
a difficulty* Parliament would not approve of its
acquisition, ’yet the public would complain if on the
1^ -0
Raja’s death the Americans got possession of it*?
One more attempt was made by Sir James Brooke 
to induce a larger British role in Sarawak* In 
November 1866 he offered to cede Sarawak to Britain 
in return for British payment or guarantee of the
i*q 2k£
state debt of £75*000* Lord Stanley, foreign
minister in the Derby government which took office
in July 1866, was contacted by Brooke’s friends, and
proved sympathetic. The government now considered
the offer thoroughly* Due consideration was given
to the threats of Dutch and Spanish moves in Borneo,
to France and Indo-China, and to the American threat
l¥t
in Northern Borneo. The dispatches of both consuls, 
Ricketts in Sarawak and Callaghan in Labuan, were full
1^ -0. Clarendon1s minute on Layard memo, 26 Dec.1865,
FO 12/35*
1*+1* Brooke to FO, 3 Nov.1866 FO 12/35- Some historians, 
notably St.John, page. 372, and Rutter, p.282, have said 
that Brooke now gave up all monetary claim* Since the 
greater part of the state debt was owed to him, this 
contention does not stand.
l*+2. Edward Henry Stanley, Lord Stanley of Bickerstaffe, 
15th Earl of Derby (1826-1893); parliamentary undersecretary 
at theForeign Office, March-Dec.1852; colonial secretary 
Feb.-May 1858 and 1822-1885; first secretary of state for 
India 1858-1859; foreign secretary 1866-1868 and 187^-1878. 
Derby was a conservative until 1880 when.he left the party 
and became a liberal, serving as colonial secretary in
Gladstone’s second administration. In 1886 he' joined the 
liberal unionists*
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of the American venture in Brunei and their grant of 
territory in northern Borneo.. The Foreign Office took 
note. Despite the United States governments declaration 
to Ambassador Bruce that it had nothing to do with the 
grants to Consul Moses, the British government consid­
ered Brooke's proposals within the framework of these
142.
new developments.
As usual opinions differed as to the value of
Sarawak. Earl Carnarvon at the Colonial Office said
a colony would be a financial burden and that Sarawak
was of little commercial value. As to its strategic
value, the Colonial Office thought the security of the
existing colonies and the trade routes depended upon
146
the command of the sea* The Admiralty, however, felt 
that Sarawak*s chief importance was its strategic
143* Rutter, op.cit.. pp*271-3> Coutts to Fairbairn,
Sept.1866; p.275? Brooke to Coutts, 20 Sept.1866; Brooke 
said, f.... the fact of Lord Stanley agreeing with us on 
the question as to the importance of Sarawak is a great 
thing.' p.278, Brooke to Mrs. Brown, 22 Sept. 1866.
144* FO memo, 22 Nov.l866, FO 12/35*
145* See above, pp.124-5 and FO memo, 22 Nov. 1866, FO 12/32
146. -CCD to FO, 21 Jan. 1867, FO 12/35.
147* Admiralty to CO, 4 Jan.1867, FO 12/35*
148.. FO memo, 5 Feb.1867, FO 12/35* The Raja was very
ill, having recently suffered a second stroke.
149. Low to Stanley, 1 Dec.l866, FO 12/33A. This dispatch 
was received 30 Jan, 1867.
150* Rutter, op.cit., p.292. Efforts were made to interest 
the Italian government and Italian capitalists to support 
such a company.
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position. 'It commands one of the great routes to
China, while the French establishment at Saigon
commands the other.' Further, the Admiralty thought
that at Sir James Brooke's death Sarawak would be a
'great temptation' to France, the United States and 
lk7.
Holland. But the Colonial Office would have to
administer Sarawak if it were taken and officials
there were cool to the offer. Mr. Fairbairn, acting
for Raja Brooke, agreed to let the matter drop when
informed by Lord Stanley on February 5 that the reply
of the government to his offer of Sarawak was likely
lH8
to be unfavourable. It is significant, however,
that acting Consul Low's dispatch from Labuan telling
of the failure and withdrawal of the American colony
in Borneo was received at the Foreign Office Just a
11+2
few days before this. According to Rutter, Lord 
Stanley offered to give to Fairbairn a 'certificate* 
stating that Brooke had offered to cede Sarawak and 
the government had rejected the offer. This, it was 
thought, would be sufficient Justification if Brooke 
were to offer Sarawak to a foreign country. Brooke's 
friends, including the foreign minister, were in favour
iio
of an association or company to take over Sarawak.
Sir James Brooke died in June 1868 and his 
nephew Charles Johnson Brooke was proclaimed raja 
in August. Soon after, the British government told 
him what it was to repeat many times during the next 
decade. Raja Charles had asked British permission 
to acquire another slice of Brunei territory, the 
Baram River district. The raja was informed that 
'Her Majesty's Government have no desire to see any 
change in the present state of territorial possessions
151
in the island of Borneo.' Britain reserved the 
right to interfere in any matter tending to invalidate 
Anglo-Bornean treaty relations. In effect the Disraeli 
government was continuing the policy of quasi-recog­
nition but declaring at the same time the great 
importance of British interests in Sarawak, as had 
Lord Russell on two occasions. This pronouncement, 
however, was somewhat stronger than Lord Russell's 
declarations of naval protection and moral support.
Its implication was that the northwest coast of Borneo 
was a British sphere. For how else could the statement 
be interpreted. Britain was so cognizant of the impor-
151. FO to Hennessy, 2 Dec.1868. FO 12/3^.
tance of the northwest coast that she could undertake
to dictate its political arrangement. It was another
step in committing Britain to a dominant position in
northern Borneo. The sphere of influence principle
dictated Britain's interference in Bornean political
affairs after 1868.
In 1869 Raja Charles Brooke renewed the offer of
a protectorate, in a modified form. He said Brooke
rule should remain. Britain should act as advisor
and protector in Sarawak's foreign relations, except
those with the Dutch East Indies government and native
governments of the archipelago, concerning local and
112
trivial questions. But even after considering the 
potential danger from the presence of strong rivals 
in the South China Sea area Gladstone, now prime 
minister, and Clarendon, the foreign secretary, were 
reluctant to extend British responsibilities. The
151
Foreign Office declined the offer.
152. C. Brooke to FO, 28 April 1869, FO 12/35 
153- FO to C. Broole, 10 June 1869, FO 12/35*
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Summary.
From almost total abandonment in the eighteen- 
fifties, step by step, Britain was brought to admit 
her special interests in Sarawak by 1869* We have 
seen that an unstable situation existed in Sarawak 
as a result of native plots and the Chinese insur­
rection; that Sarawak seemed an easy prey for 
other powers; that Raja Brooke wanted British 
support, but short of that he sought Dutch, then 
French and Belgian protection.. Successive British 
governments were faced with the dilemma of not 
wanting to extend colonial responsibilities further, 
yet not wanting Sarawak to fall to another power - 
possibly a rival. There was a strong feeling that 
Parliament would not approve of the acquisition of 
Sarawak nor vote funds for an establishment. But 
any government which allowed Sarawak to fall to 
another power would be blamed. Lord Derby in 18^9 
might have accepted a protectorate had his government 
remained in office. The government under Palmerston 
and Russell recognized the great British interests
iQk
and granted outright naval support to Sarawak# Lord 
Russell even expressed the government’s great inoral
support1 for Raja Brooke’s settlement# He was
’A O  /  j) persuaded to recognize the independence of Sarawak ti*
) 1 . . ■— ■— ■ -----------------------
1 > by appointing a consul. Finally Disraeli’s first
government, in 1868 pronounced what amounted to a
1  ^\ British sphere of influence on the northwest coast
\ '
* ‘ of Borneo#
Brooke was pessimistic about Sarawak’s ability
to stand alone# Britain’s policy of support and
protection developed slowly and with each step it
went only so far as was felt absolutely necessary,
and acceptable to Parliament# There was much truth
in a remark of one of Brooke’s friends# ’The English
government' said John Abel Smith,
is quite alive to the importance of Sarawak 
to British interests, but as long as Raja 
Brooke governs it so well and cheaply for 
them, they will do nothing for him or Sarawak.
15^- Rutter, op#cit#, p#272# Coutts to Fairbarn, early 
September 1866. Miss Coutts quotes Smith.
CHAPTER IV 
BRITISH POLICY IN BRUNEI 1868 - 1878
The death of Raja Brooke in 1868 and the 
succession of his nephew Charles Johnson Brooke 
marked a change of emphasis in British policy 
in Borneo# In this respect two factors were at 
play# Firstly, the improved economic condition 
of Sarawak convinced Raja Charles that the country 
could continue independently. There seemed little 
hope of a British protectorate in the immediate 
future, and Brooke was not inclined, as his uncle 
had been, to seek a foreign protector. Secondly, 
and partly motivated by the stability of Sarawak, 
the centre of attention now moved up the coast to 
Brunei# Indeed the centre of attention which 
called for British action throughout our period 
moved from south to north - from Sarawak in the 
l86o*s to Brunei during the late l86ofs and most 
of the 1870’s, thence to North Borneo# The emphasis
186 •
of British concern changed in location and, as we 
shall see presently, changed also in substance, 
while the underlying idea remained, the British 
dominance of the coast. We shall deal with these 
two factors in order*
Sarawak under the new Ua.ia.
The personality of the old itaja and that of
Raja Charles Brooke had a profound effect upon
Sarawak; According to his biographers Raja James
was a warm and personable man, but given to
extremes of emotion - great and terrible anger,
and sincere compassion. He commanded the affec-
1
tion of natives and Europeans. He is pictured
as something of a father figure, fitted to be the
chief and rallying point of a new country, and
the benevolent and understanding friend of his
people. Raja Charles, on the other hand we are
told, was colder and more aloof and always con-
2
scious of the dignity of his position* He was
1* Spencer St.John, (Life. p*p*320-321) and A.R.
Wallace (The Malay Archipelago.i.l^-H?. and My Life. 
/London, 190.5/, p.p. 182-183) are among those who 
have left accounts attesting to these most human 
qualities of Raja James..
2. Margaret Brooke, Good Morning and Good Night, passim; 
Sylvia Brooke, Sylvia of Sarawak^ p.p.125-6: St.John.
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eager to make Sarawak respectable among nations* He 
was the great friend and leader of the Dyaks among 
whom he spent much of the time during his first 
years in Borneo. He was not so popular among the 
Malays as his uncle had been* Charles, however, was 
an administrator where James had no head for figures 
nor heart for the day to day administrative routine*
Where James had commanded affection and devotion 
Raja Charles was respected and trusted for his fair­
ness and strict adherence to orderliness and routine*
Each made his contribution to the state at a time 
when, seemingly, the very qualities embodied by 
each were most needed* Raja James created a new 
state; Raja Charles made it work effectively*.
From 1863 when Charles took over the government
3
the economic condition improved. This was partly 
because of the nature of the times rather than a 
change of administration. For the year 1863 Sarawak’s
OP.cit.. pp.27^-276. 328; Ussher to CO, 25 July, 1877 
CO l^l+/48, contain descriptions of Raja Charles and his
administration of government*
3* Ricketts memo on Sarawak, 3 Nov* 186H, FO 12/3*+A.
^  P«P»« 1865* LIII (Consul’s Trade Report), p.336;
871, LXV’. p. 19o; Bulwer to FO enclosing ’Sarawak Revenue 
Return I06J-I87O’ FO 12/37$ and B.A.S. Hepburn, The Hand- 
Book of Sarawak* p*92*
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total exports were worth #386,^39* and imports
#i4l1+,75&« In 1869 the total value of trade reached
#3*262,500. In 1867 and 1869 the country1 s revenue
exceeded expenditure by between #5000 and #9000.
In 1865, 1866, 1868 and I87O there were deficits
of from #1000 to #8000. After 1870 there was
generally a surplus." The prosperous condition of
Sarawak meant stability, and Raja Charles saw no
need to seek a protectorate from another European
country if Britain refused it. Britain declined
a protectorate in 1869 and again in 187^• Yet
there was never any question of his not ruling his
country. He sought a protectorate for the greater
security of the British position on the northwest 
6
coast. He did not seek to turn Sarawak into a 
British colony. He never once contemplated retiring 
from the country. Although he was proud of Sarawak^ 
independence he laboured on behalf of a strong British
5. See above pp. 1825 F0 12/^2, F0 memorandum, n.,d. 
187*+, and F0 to Brooke, 10 May, 1875* Brooke had asked 
for a British protectorate over Brunei, or if declined, 
that Sarawak be allowed to form a protectorate. From 
the memorandum it is evident that the Foreign Office 
considered it a request for British protection of 
Sarawak as well, and so treated it*
6 .. Brooke to F0 , 16 July 187*+* and Brooke memo 17 July 
I87U, F0 12A2.
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position on the coast. Where ever the Sarawak flag
was planted the interests of Great Britain were
1
paramount, he declared in 187^.
From the British governments point of view also 
Sarawak looked prosperous and stable. The country 
had passed, with the death of Raja James, to the new 
administration without falling to a foreign power 
as so many had feared. In fact the actual change 
of administration had occurred five years before 
Sir James* death, in 1863, when Charles Brooke for 
all practical purposes became the ruler. At that 
time a government crisis, involving the deposition 
of Captain Brooke Brooke, for reasons of insubor­
dination, and the establishment of Charles had 
occurred. This crisis raised some fears at the
Foreign Office and a naval force was sent to support
10
the peaceful transfer of the government.
With Sarawak stable and British in character,
and increasingly concerned with internal adminis-
11
trative developments under the new Raja, the
7* Ibid.
8* FO memorandum, 22 Nov.l866, FO 12/35. St.John 
considered Sarawak economically sound.
9. e.g. Raja James, St.John, Lord Elgin, Lord 
Malmesbury, Layard, above pp.97-9} 1^5 and 171-2.
But note Consul*s Rickett*s report, p.98.
10. See above p.p.176-7.
11. Baring Gould and Baipfylde, on. cit.. Ch.XII, passim.
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immediate attention of the British government where 
it concerned Borneo was centred further up the coast*,
Britain1^  relations with Brunei* 1868
Britain’s relations with Brunei in 1868 were
12
still based on the 18^7 treaty. In a practical 
way, however, Britain’s position depended upon a 
single provision of that treaty, article X, the 
clause which restricted the Sultan from ceding 
territory to a foreign nation or subjects of a 
foreign nation without British consent* After 
providing for the cession of Labuan the article 
states,
*.... .in order to avoid occasions of difference 
which might otherwise arise, His Highness the 
Sultan engages not to make any similar cession 
either of an island, or of any settlement on 
the mainland, in any part of his dominions, to 
any other nation, or to the subjects or citi­
zens thereof, without the consent of Her 
Britannic Majesty*
British influence in Brunei, and ironically, also
the weakness of the British position based upon
article X, was evidenced by several incidents during
12* A copy is to be found in Maxwell and Gibson 
Treaties, p.p. 11+3-1^7*
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the i860*s. Two instances involved the coal operations* 
Coal rights at Muara, near Brunei on the mainland, had 
been leased from the sultan by the Eastern Archipelago 
Company and its successor the China Steam Ship and 
Labuan Coal Company. The coal was worked only for short 
periods and the companies gave most of their attention 
to the mines on Labuan. But the leases were held to 
keep them from falling to a competitor. The coal 
companies were frequently in arrears of payment of 
rent to the sultan. In 1862 Governor Callaghan warned 
the British government that the sultan would look for 
another tenant if the Labuan Coal Company continued 
in arrears. He wrote that British interests would be 
injured if the Muara rights should fall to a company 
formed under the auspices of a foreign power.
/
Although officials in London felt they could not 
interfere between the sultan and the company they 
asked the company what it intended to do. Corres­
pondence with the company revealed that in i860 a 
French firm had offered to purchase the Muara coal
13* Callaghan to Duke of Newcastle, 20 Sept., 1862,
CO lkk/21; Callaghan to Russell, 22 Sept., 1862 FO 12/30.
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2h
rights from the British company* The company said
it wanted support from the government to induce the
sultan to make a lease of other mineral rights. Sueh
a lease, said the company, was necessary to
prevent complications to Her Majesty*s 
Government which would certainly arise 
should any other foreign power gain a 
footing on the mainland of Borneo by 
obtaining a grant for the minerals in 
question. 15
The government would not agree to the company*s request* 
It instructed Callaghan, however, to\atch closely any 
new agreement which the company made with the sultan 
and to prevent absolute rights over territory being 
acquired by the company. The Foreign Office feared 
that in the event of the failure of the company the 
land would be transferred to tparties hostile to 
British interests*. In July 1863 the company paid
AZ
up three years of rent in arrears. No new agreement 
was made. The relations between the company and the 
sultan, however, were put on a friendlier basis for 
the time being.
1 4 . Labuan Coal Company to Russell, 28 Jan.1863, FO 12/31.
15. Ibid.
16. Russell To Callaghan, 5 March, 1863, CO 1^4/22.
17. Low to Newcastle, 1 Sept., l8o3, CO lkk/22+
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In 1865 the company was again in arrears in
payments to Brunei. Again the threat of a foreign
power appeared. American Consul C.L. Moses was
granted territory in northern Borneo. He asked
18
the sultan also for the Muara coal fields. In
the event the sultan refused to grant Muara to the
American* There is little doubt, however, that the
sultan was chagrined with the coal company and with
the British government for not compelling the company
to make its payments to Brunei. Callaghan thought
the Americans arrived at a favourable time when
the sultan had given up all hope of a settlement
12
with the coal company. The presence of the British
consul and his influence, however, prevented the
sultan from taking the drastic step of cancelling
the grant of the British company and substituting
20
an American company in its place.
If anything the Brunei government was weaker and 
more d/rrupt in 1868 than it had been at mid-century.
18* Callaghan to Russell, 20 Oct., 1865* FO 12/32B*
19., Callaghan to Clarendon, 7 May, i8 60, FO 12/33A.
20.. Low to Derby, 6 Dec. 1875, FO 12/U8. Low said the 
sultan always desired to keep the mining rights of 
Muara in the hands of the British.
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Although disagreeing as to the degree of anarchy
and corruption among the rulers of Brunei most
observers were impressed by the weakness and poverty
of the sultan1s government. A Sarawak Gazette article
of April 1872 noted that Sultan Mumin was avaricious 
21
and grasping.
The sultanfs one object is gain: the means
he employs for this end are matters of no 
consequence to him. His energy is entirely 
directed toward the hoarding of wealth; and 
his steamer, if she runs for six months will 
only be a new instrument for squeezing his 
unfortunate subjects.
Governor Bulwer noted the weakness of the sultan1s
government but thought that Sarawak exagerated the
22
conditions in its description of affairs. Hugh
Low, who was acting governor of Labuan on several
from
occasions wrote that/a European viewpoint all the 
nobles of Brunei with the exception of the sultan 
and the chief minister, the T? emenggong, were of 
fvery feeble character*. *They can be easily led by
21., Sarawak Gazette. 26 April 1872. One observer 
described the sultan as fhaving the soul of a huckster* 
see Baring Gould and Bampfylde, on.cit.. p*327*
22* Bulwer to Granville, 18 June, I872, FO 12/38.
23. Low to Derby, 6 July, 1875, FO 12/41.
one who possesses their confidence1. They did not
resemble the rajas of Malaya in either vitality or
courage, he said. Mumin had even less control over
his government than had his predecessor, Omar Ali.
The consul general to Brunei had frequently to remind
the Sultan of his obligations under the treaty with
Great Britain, and several times had to deal sternly
24
with the Brunei government. Because of the weakness
of the Brunei government British policy depended
largely upon the action of the consul general in
sustaining article X.
The occasion which drew British attention to
centre upon Brunei in the 1870*s did not involve
another European power.. It was Raja Brooke*s attempt
to acquire more Brunei territory and push his rule
northward along the coast to Baram Point. His first
21
request to the sultan to cede Baram was in 1868*
At that time, as we have seen, the Disraeli govern­
ment in thwarting Brooke*s move northward pronounced
24. e.g. Ussher to Derby, 3 Nov., 1876, FO 12/43. The 
governor had to remonstrate with the sultan because of 
crimes committed by the Brunei nobles against the 
Chinese traders, British subjects, of Labuan. See also 
the traders* petition to Gov.Ussher, 13 Oct.1876*
25. Hennessy to Stanley, 23 April, 1868; Raja Brooke 
to Stanley, 30 April, 1868, FO 12/34A.
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a British sphere of influence unon the northwest
26
coast of Borneo. Britain wanted no change in the
territorial boundaries and was prepared to interfere
with any attempt to invalidate Brunei treaty relations
with Britain. It would seem that where article X was
concerned the Foreign Office considered Sarawak a
foreign power. Such a policy was later enunciated
at the Foreign Office on the basis of Brooke’s
22
assertion of his independence. However there was 
much confusion over Sarawak’s status and we shall 
„ see that a policy of expediency ruled Foreign Office 
w action during this period.
\f>
Had it been merely a question of the extension
of Brooke rule over more Brunei territory the British
government probably would not have objected. Brooke’s
northward movement, however, would have brought
Sarawak into commercial competition with the colony
of Labuan, and its governor into closer competition
28
with Brooke for influence at the sultan’s court.
2b.Stanley to Hennessy, 2 Dec., 1868, FO 12/3^-A.
27. FO memorandum, 12 May, 1876, FO 12/h3.
28. This is precisely what occurred between I878
and 1888. See Ch. V and VI.
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Because of the position of Labuan on the coast of 
Borneo, and because after 1861 the British consul 
general to Borneo was also governor of Labuan, it 
is necessary to investigate the bearing which that 
colony had upon British policy*
Labuan.
The colony was established in 18^8 as a naval
22
and coaling station* It was hoped by some that
it would become an entrepot for the Borneo coast
.20
and the Sulu Archipelago* Some optimistic persons
2k
compared it to Singapore in this respect. As a 
station Labuan was seldom used by ships of the 
Royal Navy* To be sure coaling facilities were 
provided at the port of Victoria. Kuching in 
Sarawak however, was usually favoured by naval 
officers for a stopping point in Borneo as it was 
more attractive and offered the refreshment of a 
larger English community. More than one governor
29. FO to Admiralty, 30 May and 2h July, 18^6, FO 12A*
30. FO 12A, passim: Anderson to Indian News. 10 Oct, 18M+. 
FO 12/2; CO minute, 16 Feb, 1859 CO 144/16, Bulwer memo,
12 July 1875, CO l A A 5 ,  CO minute, 13 Nov., 1873, CO ikh/kl 
31* Gov.Ord to CO,1 Sept, 1873, CO lVtAl.
32. Admiralty to FO, 22 Jan., 1859, FO 12/35.
of Labuan complained that the colony was ignored 
in favour of Kuching. In 1886 the coal station
3k
was closed by the navy because of disuse. For
35
long periods the supply of coal was not dependable.
3£
The island had rich sources of coal but the coal 
companies failed one after another. To a great 
extent the shortage of willing labour was the reason.
3Z
Borneo Malays were found to be unreliable workers. 
Sufficient numbers of Chinese labourers could not 
be attracted to the mines even with the co-operation
38
of the island government in encouraging immigration. 
For short periods convict labour was used with some 
success but in the end this failed because the men
32
would not work underground. Another reason for 
failure of coal operations was the poor management
33* Edwardes to CO, 26 Dec.i860, CO lM-f/17; Hennessy to 
CO, 11 April, 1870, CO lMt/31.
3H. Admiralty to CO, 2 Feb.. 1886, CO lM-f/62.
35. Bulwer to CO, 3 Feb., 1872, CO 1 W 3 6 .
36. CO lMf/32, passim.
37* Hatton, F. North Borneo, p.122;
38. Callaghan to CO, ik Jan., 1861+, Labuan Coal Co. to 
CO, 10 July, 186U, CO lkk/23^ Hennessy to CO, 25 Nov., 
1867, CO 1 W 2 6 .
39* Hennessy to CO, 8 Jan., 1869, CO 1^4/29.
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Ho
of the companies* Managers were often eager to show
up the inefficiency of a predecessor by a great effort
at exploiting the surface coal - a practice which
kl
showed immediate and impressive progress. The
longer and more tedious effort to win the deep veins
2
was neglected.
Had these two serious problems been dealt with 
energetically much might have been accomplished.
Yet there remained another basic ailment- the lack 
of long-term capital. As early as 185*+ Lieutenant 
Governor Scott complained that the Eastern Archipelago 
Company was lax in its efforts to provide coal. He 
reported that the company was not investing the 
necessary capital to sink shafts for the deeper coal,
hi
but was skimming the surface deposits. The companies 
were directed from London by directors who were often 
sparing in their capital outlay and impatient to achieve
Uo. Scott to CO, 6 March, 18 A ,  CO lA/11; Bulwer to CO, 
25 Feb., 1873, CO lMtAo.
*+l.. CO lM+Ao, passim: FO 12A8, passim.
k2.. Bulwer to CO, 10 Jan., 1873, CO l A A O .
*+3. Scott to :03, 6 March, 185h , CO minute, June 185^,
CO l W l l .
A .  FO memo, 15 Feb., 1879, FO 12A 8.
k<?. They were: Eastern Archipelago Co., 18^7-58; Labuan
Coal Co., 1860-66; China Steamship and Labuan Coal Co.,
1866-68; and the Oriental Coal Co., 1868-78.
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hk
immediate and large profits. When profits were 
not forthcoming investors withdrew and the project 
failed. The company then reorganized or a new one 
was formed. During the period from l8*+7 to 1880 four
hi
companies operated, one after the other. With each 
new company came renewed hope that Labuan coal would 
be produced in such quantities as to make it cheaper 
than coal shipped out from Britain, or from other
k6
eastern sources. With each failure disappointment
hi
with the colony grew. The failures gave Labuan
M3
coal a poor reputation. It made more difficult
the task of finding investors to back a coal company*
There was no confidence that the project to exploit
the coal of Labuan would ever show a profit., Each
of the first three companies lost in the vicinity of
50.
£100,000. The Oriental Coal Company lost £150,000.
. CO memo, Jan*1856, CO lA/13; Callaghan to E0
l1! Jan.l86H, CO 14^/23; Hennessy to CO, 8 Jan., 1869, 
CO lMt/29; Bulwer to CO, 25 Feb., 1871*, CO 1 ^ A 2 .
^7- CO memo, 16 Feb., 1859? CO 1M+/16; CO memo 8 May,
1878, CO 1M+/50; CO memo 26 Aug., 1879? CO 1M+/52.
H8* Bulwer to CO, 3 Feb.. 1872, CO l W /365 Bulwer to 
F0 18 March,1875, F0 12A8*
^9* CO memo, 27 Aug*, 1867? CO lMt/31*
50* CO memo, 16 June, 1882, CO 1M+/56.
In 1878 the coal works were abandoned. A visitor to 
the site at Coal Point in 1881 reported thousands of 
pounds worth of machinery and equipment rusting and 
decaying with ferns and weeds growing out of boilers
is
and disused cylinders.
A fair amount of the commerce of Borneo and Sulu 
was attracted to Labuan where a small community of 
Chinese and Indian traders handled sago and jungle
52
products. There are no reliable figures for the 
Borneo and Sulu trade. In i860 Labuan imports were 
worth £37,8*12, and exports, £12,603* By 1865 the 
value was £10*+,190 for imports, and £58,536 for 
exports, and in 1875? the figures were, £119,362 
and £11*4,332, respectively* Most traders, however, 
found it convenient to by-pass Labuan because of the 
failure of the coal companies and the virtual abandon­
ment by the navy. They traded directly with Singapore 
from Borneo and Sulu. In 1872 Captain John Ross of 
Singapore was operating the only regular commercial 
service between Labuan and Singapore. He operated two
51* W*H* Treacher, rBritish Borneor in JRASSB, v.21, 1890 
p.*+5* Eleven years later stili another company, the Central 
Borneo Company, undertook coal operations. It was succeeded 
in 1893 by the Labuan and Borneo Company which in turn gave 
way to the Labuan Coalfields Company, Limited, in 1902*
The mines were again abandoned in 1911- See Colonial Office 
List, 1939, P.397.
202.
large sailing vessels and a small steamer, the
11
Cleator*
The colonial establishment of Labuan was always 
a modest one. From the beginning, in l8*+8, the
1i . I tendency of the Colonial Office was to cut back
 -------
administrative expenditure of the colony by reducing 
the number of officials* Sir James Brooke, the first 
governor, was told in 1852 that the colony did not
Ik
warrant a large establishment.- There were nine 
in the civil establishment. Over the years the 
staff was reduced. Officials were often not replaced 
when their tour of duty was completed, and the remain­
ing officers took over their duties. Under Governor 
John Pope Hennessy there was a temporary reversal of 
this trend. When he was appointed in 1867 he badgered 
the Colonial Office for a full staff, including a
Frank Hutton. North Borneo: Explorations and 
Adventures on the Equator. p*128'.
53* Capt.McClure to Adm* Seymour, 1 March, 1859? CO lbb/21; 
Callaghan to FO, 23 April, 1862, FO 12/30; Hennessy to FO 
21 April, 1870, FO 12/36. CO lkb/bl.
5*+* Colonial Office List 186H, I87I, 1880;/Bulwer memo, 8 
Nov, 1873. When the fall in value of money and the rise in 
prices as a result of the financial crisis in Europe during 
the middle and late l860fs is considered, this 1 increase* 
in trade does not seem so great. See J.H. Clapham, An 
Economic History of Modern Britain, (Cambridge, l932T7ii*
J7V-80;
55* Bulwer to CO, 9 Nov. and 5 Bee. 1872, FO 1M+/38, iii*
private secretary and an aide-de-camp* The Colonial 
Office demurred but Hennessy was able to ring some 
concessions from London after he began showing 
impressive results from his administration of the 
colony* He got his private secretary.
In 1869 there were twelve Europeans in the estab­
lishment. By 1881 it had been reduced to five and 
was a completely make-shift arrangement. A former 
colonial surgeon was acting governor and was also 
colonial secretary, auditor and police magistrate.
The posts of treasurer, surveyor-general, superinten­
dent of convicts and harbour master were combined in 
one man.- There was a colonial surgeon and an apothecary* 
The fifth European was W.H. Treacher, chief superinten­
dent of the British North Borneo Company, and a resident 
of Labuan. He was a member of the Legislative Council
38
and a judge of the General Court.
 _________________  CO Ikb/kl
5 5 7 Pakington to Brooke, 6 Nov.1852/ Tarling (‘British 
Policy in the Malay Peninsular and Archipelago1 in JRASMB 
Oct.1957? p*203*) is inaccurate when he states that Raja 
Brooke was dismissed by the Colonial Office. The Raja 
asked to be relieved. See Brooke to Pakington, 8 Nov.1852
CO 1W 1 0.
57* CO lbb/26, passim.
58., Colonial Office List. 1882, p.106; Treacher, op»cit. 
pp. 1+6-67.
59* Hennessy speech to Legislative Council, 25 March 1869
co 1A / 29*
60. Bulwer to CO, 10 April 1872, CO lkk/36. There were 
actually deficits for the years 1869, 1870 and I871.
20*f*.
Governor Hennessy in 1869 achieved the remarkable
feat of making Labuan pay for itself, despite the
22
temporarily increased establishments Hennessy*s 
* success* was exposed in I872 when his successor,
H.E. Bulwer, reported that Hennessy*s remarkable 
financial management was the result of applying 
surpluses accumulated in previous years from imperial
60
grants against current expenditure.
Governor Ord of Singapore reported on the
financial condition of Labuan after Governor
6l
Henness^s tenure. Ord considered Hennessy*s 
methods of raising revenue too monopolistic and 
his taxes too burdensome to the traders and inhab­
itants of the colony. However, from 1869 no more
imperial grants were sanctioned for Labuan and the
62
reduced establishment struggled along on its own.
Britain* s attitude toward Labuan alternated
6^
between a desire to abandon the place because of
ZT. Ord to CO, 1 Sept., 1873, CO lkk/kl.
62. Acting Gov. Leys (1881-1888) did not receive the 
compensation of a governor. He received a small amount 
as a colonial medical officer and £300 as Consul General 
to Borneo from the Foreign Office. See CO to FO, 18 Jan. 
and FO to CO, 7 Feb. 1882, FO 12/57.
63. Lord Derby*s statement in Times. 1 Dec., 1858; FO to 
India Board, 29 April, 1858, CO to FO 30 April, 1858, and 
Elliot memo, in- Feb. 1859? FO 12/35? CO memo, 28 Jan. i860 
CO lMt/18; India Office memo, 2 Sept. 186H, CO l A / 2 3.
CO to FO, 18 Jan. 1882, FO 12/57.
its failures, and hope for its eventual success.
The fact is that Labuan could not be abandoned for
6b
fear of some other power taking it. The abandon­
ment of Labuan would have undermined Britain1s 
influence in Brunei and hence her position on the 
coast. For the sultan would have looked upon the 
withdrawal from Labuan as a sign that Britain was 
losing interest in Borneo. He depended upon the 
British as his defenders, and as support for that 
small authority which he continued to hold. If 
the British were to leave Borneo it would behove 
the sultan to look elsewhere for support. So because 
Britain could not abandon Labuan she wanted very much 
to believe in the success of the colony. In this she 
was aided by the governors who were anxious to raise 
the standing of Labuan.
6b. Admiralty to FO, 22 Jan, 1859, FO 12/35; CO 
minute, 20 July, 1875, CO l¥+/*+5; CO memo, 10 Dec. 
1886, CO lbb/6l.
65. Sultan to Low, 28 March, 1867, CO lA/26; Low 
to FO, 11 May, 1867, FO 12/333; Hennessy to FO, 10 
March, I87I 5 FO 12/37; Low to FO, 6 Dec.1875; FO 12/H8 
Treacher to FO, A  May, 188*+, FO 12/61.
66. e.g. Russell minute on FO memo of 16 Aug, 1861,
FO 12/28; and CO lA/18, Edwardes to Co, 26 Dec.i860.
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Most of the governors beginning with Edwardes in
1856 were hostile to Sarawak and jealous of Raja
66
Brooke!s rule. T-F. Callaghan who succeeded 
Edwardes in 1861, opposed colonial status for 
Sarawak. He thought it would be a liability because 
'like all Borneo it suffered from want of population
62
and cultivation.1 His rather disdainful solution
was the mass immigration of Chinese who in 200 years,
he thought, would bring Borne© into civilization.
Governor Hennessy had no liking for Sarawak or Raja
Brooke. Brooke he considered a vassal of the Sultan
68
of Brunei, and Sarawak a delusion., Although he 
professed considerable respect for Sir James Brooke 
and had even ordered official mourning at Labuan
£2
upon his death, Hennessy did not trust Raja Charles.
He looked upon Brooke’s desire to annex Baram as a
20
challenge to Labuan and to his own prestige at Brunei. 
His dispatches to both the Colonial Office and the 
Foreign Office were full of Brooke’s 'high handed*
W l  Callaghan to FO, 11 Nov., 1862, FO 12/30. His rather
disdainful solution: mass immigration of Chinese who in
200 years would bring Borneo into civilization-
68., Hennessy to F0, 10 March, 1871, F0 12/37*
6 9. Memo by Hertslet, 29 Dec. 1876, F0 12/^2.
70. Hennessy to F0, 23 April, 1868, F0 12/3^.
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methods in dealing with the sultan. It was Hennessy 
who first warned the British government of the danger 
of allowing Brooke to annex more territory* For 
Hennessy thought Brooke being independent could 
and probably would in turn grant territorial conces­
sions to a foreign power or seek a protectorate from 
another European nation*
Governor Bulwer, succeeding Hennessy in I87I,
21
was even more opposed to Sarawakrs expansion.
Governors H.T. Ussher (1875) and C.C. Lees (1879)
21
were more friendly to Sarawak and Raja Brooke,
But the friendly climate was interrupted by W.H.
Treacher who was acting governor and consul general
22l
at intervals from 1877 to 1885* He became an 
enthusiastic supported of the project of Baron 
Overbeck and Alfred Dent which was the fore-runner
2 !+
of the British North Borneo Company. Treacher 
opposed Raja Brooke*s power in Brunei for all the
71* Bulwer to CO, 16 Dec., 1871** CO lkk/k3•
72. Ussher to CO, July 1877, CO 1M+A8; Lees to 
CO, 26 May 1881, CO 1 W 5 5 *
73*- Herbert minute 15 July, Hicks Beach minute 19 
July, 1878, CO lA/51.
7*+. Treacher to FO, 2 Jan., and 22 Jan., 1878, FO 12/53*
reasons put forward by previous governors but mainly
because Sarawak opposed the company in North Borneo
26
of which Treacher became governor in 1881.
The British government relied upon their repres­
entative in Borneo for information on conditions 
there. Always conscious of article X of the Brunei 
treaty British policy and practice relied upon the 
dominance of British influence on the northwest 
coast. This meant to a large degree the influence 
which their representative had with the sultan1s 
government. Throughout the remainder of our period 
the strength of the British position in Borneo could 
be measured by the degree to which the consul and 
governor could hold a weak sultan in the British
XL
camp.
Britain*s refusal to allow Sarawak to annex the 
coast as far as Baram Point was an attempt to prevent 
Sarawak from undercutting Labuan*s position. Britain 
could not allow such competition so close to Labuan 
and Brunei. She could not allow an increase in the
^aja's influence at Brunei at the expense of the
75* Treacher to FO, 1*+ April and 10 May, I878, FO 12/52.
76. FO memo, 15 Spril, 1885, FO 12/66.
77* e.g. Callaghan to FO, 7 May. 1866, FO 12/33A; 
Treacher to Maxwell, 22 Jan.. 1885* FO 12/62; Treacher 
to FO, 19 March 1885, FO 12/64.
78. Ussher to FO, l4 June, 1876, FO 12/43.
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prestige of the governor of Labuan. British policy, 
then, followed closely the attitudes adopted by the 
various governors. At no time was this more in 
evidence than during the ten years from 1868 to 
I878. We shall now analyse the questions which had 
the attention of Britain during these years and 
attempt to learn how British policy operated.
.The Baram issue.
The Baram question was the more important of 
two issues which led to British involvement in 
Brunei's political affairs between 1868 and 1878.
The second issue dealing with the succession to 
the throne of Brunei will be discussed later.
Sarawak people and Brune subjects intermingled 
in the area of the upper reaches of the Baram and 
Rajang rivers* Friction often occurred between them, 
C .especially between Sarawak traders and Brunei malays.
[A
It was difficult to settle these disputes or for 
the innocent parties to receive redress because 
of the lack of control by the sultan over his people. 
Raja Brooke wanted Baram because he saw nothing but 
unrest and continual friction in a rich trading area
210.
as long as a weak sultan held nominal rule. Brunei
ceded territory to Sarawak in 1853 and 1861. In
neither instance was the consent of the British
government requested nor reference made to article
22
X of the I8H7 treaty. To be sure in 1853 there 
had been no crisis or issue of importance to attract 
the attention of the British government to Sarawak's 
acquisition of the coast as far as the Rajang river. 
The 1861 annexation of the sago rivers was the 
natural outcome of the troubled situation there 
when Governor Edwardes interfered with Sarawak's 
efforts to defend her sago trade, and the Palmerston 
government recalled Edwardes and disapproved his 
action. But in 1863 had come a measure of British 
recognition of the independence of Sarawak, and 
five years later came the government's refusal to 
sanction Brooke's annexation of Baram. If Sarawak 
was independent it would seem that the restrictive 
dause of the treaty applied to that country, despite 
the fact that the raja and his European officers were 
British subjects. Technically British subjects were
79. CO to FO, 29 Oct, 187*+; Bulwer to FO, 16 Dec.l87*+; 
and memo by Alfred Green, 22 Sept. 187*+* FO 12/^2.
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80
not affected by the restrictive article.. At first 
glance, therefore, there is a logical connection 
between the recognition and the refusal to sanction 
the annexation. But this contention does not bear 
up under closer study. The circumstances of the two 
actions indicate that it was not quite so simple.
For one thing it was a liberal government, under 
Palmerston, which recognized Sarawak while it was 
Disraeli's first conservative ministry which pro­
hibited the annexation. Furthermore to argue that 
Britain's refusal to allow Brooke to annex north­
ward was a direct consequence of recognition is to 
ignore the part played by the various governors of 
Labuan in their dual role of governor and consul..
It was unfortunate for Brooke that his first 
attempts to annex Baram occurred during the tenure 
of Governor Hennessy. It is doubtful if the British 
government would have objected to Brooke's move north 
had not the issue been raised and cultivated by the 
governor. The precedents of the earlier cessions 
were obvious. Since the inquiry into Sir James
80. See above, p.189/90.
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Brooke's activities the Foreign Office had followed
a policy of non-interference between the raja and
the sultan, in spite of the increasing official
81
interest in Sarawak. In 1855 and 1856 in instruc­
tions to Consul St.John on the subject Lord Clarendon 
urged him to take no part in internal affairs in 
Borneo except to offer advice. Her Majesty's 
Government, said Clarendon, were not prepared to
define the 'precise relations' between the sultan 
82
and the raja. The policy was reiterated following 
Governor Edwardes' intervention on the Mukah river 
in i860. Each new consul was given similar
8k
instructions upon his appointment. The Colonial
Office, too, instructed each appointee in his
capacity as governor to remain aloof from the
85
political affairs of Borneo* Governor Hennessy
81.. Chapter 3? passim.
82. FO to St.John, 30 Nov, 1855, FO 12/22; FO to St.John, 
9 April, 1856, FO 12/23.
83. FO to St.John, 17 Nov., i860, FO 12/27.
84., e.g. FO to Callighan, 27 May, 1861, FO 12/29;
FO to Ricketts, 27 Feb., 1864, FO 12/32A.
85*‘ e.g. CO to Hennessy, 7 Aug., 1868, CO 144/28;
CO minute, 8 Feb., 1870, CO 144/33*
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advised the British government of Brookefs attempts
86
to annex Baram. He urged the Disraeli government
to resist Sarawak on the grounds of the restrictive 
8Z
clause. At the same time Raja Brooke protested
to both Hennessy and the Foreign Office against the
88
governor's interference* The Foreign Office saw
82
no basis for Brooke's protest. They acted on
Hennessy1s suggestion and for the first time applied
20
the principle of article X to British subjects.
Hennessy convinced the Foreign Office that Sarawak 
was independent enough to be classed as a foreign 
power for the purpose. The governor also mentioned 
that Sarawak was in a position to dispose of territory 
to a foreign power. The Foreign Office listened to 
their consul's warning. Raja James Brooke's approaches 
to Holland and France were remembered too well to look 
with much enthusiasm upon Sarawak's attempts to expand 
northward.
86. Hennessy to FO, April 23, 1868, FO 12/3^.
87. Hennessy to C*Brooke, 23 April, 1868, and Hennessy 
to FO, 30 Sept. 1868, FO 12/3*+A..
88. C.Brooke to Hennessy, 30 April, 1868, and Brooke 
to FO, same date, FO 12/3hA..
89* FO memo, 5 June, 1868, FO 12/3HA.
90. Minutes by Hammond and Lord Stanley, 25 Nov., 1868, 
and FO to Hennessy, 2 Dec.^868, FO 12/3*+A.
21*+.
The Foreign Office shared Governor Hennessy1s
91
distrust of Charles Brooke. Clarendon had said
in 1868 when the Sarawak protectorate question was
pending that he did not relish protecting a petty
ruler who wanted support but would not be controlled.
22
Britain disliked Brooke1s tactics with the sultan. 
Hennessy complained in March 1871 that Raja Brooke, 
that fill tempered vassal1 used threats to compel 
the sultan to accede to his demands. The sultan, 
Hennessy said, was a good and true friend of Britain 
and had done more for the cause of justice on the 
coast than all the well meaning officials of Sarawak 
had achieved in thirty years. The Foreign Office 
clearly disliked Brooke1s treatment of the sultan, 
and this was another reason why they did not wish to 
support Brookers request for Baram against the sultan*s 
wishes.
91. Clarendon minute of 20 Jan., 1870 on a letter 
from Raja Brooke, FO 12/*+2 *The tone of this letter*, he 
wrote, *is not such as to give grounds for hoping for 
much good from the reign of the new Raja.*
92. FO to Hennessy, 2 Dec., 1868, FO 12/3^.
93*- Hennessy to Ado Russell, 10 March, 1871> FO 12/37*
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The Foreign Office, as we have seen, developed 
their case one step further and declared the whole 
northwest coast within the British sphere of interest. 
They were disturbed by indications of foreign interest
2k
in the area, and saw no reason to arouse the suspicions
31
of other powers by sponsoring territorial changes, 
Sarawak could not annex Baram*
The Colonial Office nolicv and preoccupation with Labuan.
The Colonial Office was in agreement with the Foreign 
Office on the Baram issue at this point. Officials there 
were opposed to Sarawak’s expansion not because of foreign 
threats but because of the supposed competition with 
Labuan. The Colonial Office was dependent for its infor­
mation upon the governor’s reports in the same way that 
the Foreign Office relied on the consular dispatches. 
Labuan had not prospered but Governor Hennessy in 1868 
was thought to be making progress in reforming the fiscal
si
administration of the colony* The Colonial Office felt
that Labuan had brighter prospects in spite of some doubt
21
by permanent undersecretary Rogers concerning Governor 
Hennessy*s reports of the favourable commercial position
9^ +7 FO memoranda, 22 Nov, 1866 and 6 May 1869, FO 12/3?.
95. e-g* Holland.
96* CO minute, 10 April, 1868, CO lUl+/27.
97* Frederick Rogers, succeeded Herman Merivals as 
permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office in May i860;
served until 1871.
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28
in the colony.
By 1872 the Colonial Office was again having doubts 
about the wisdom of retaining Labuan as a colony. Two 
factors brought this about. Firstly there were changes
31
in the permanent staff at the Colonial Office in 1870
and 1871 which brought fresh thinking to colonial problems.
100
R.G.W- Herbert succeeded Rogers as permanent under-
101
secretary and R.H. Meade became an assistant under- 
102
secretary- Both Herbert and Meade were liberals and 
took over at the Colonial Office during the first Gladstone 
ministry. But neither adhered to the philosophy of 
restricting colonial responsibilities which had so long 
prevailed at the Colonial Office. Secondly, and more 
important for its bearing upon Sarawak affairs, the 
failure of Labuan was dramatically pointed up when 
Governor Hennessy*s financial maladministration of the
m
colony was exposed by the new Governor, Bulwer.
98- Rogers minute of 14 April, 1868, on Hennessy to CO,
10 Feb. 1868, CO lkk/27- See also C.B. Adderley, Review of 
the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell*s Administration 
by Earl Grey. 1&5V.
99- Recent authors have noted and adequately described the 
personnel changes at the Colonial Office in the early eightaan 
seventies, and the * beginning of a new era* which those 
changes helped to bring about- See: C.B.Cowan, Nineteenth 
Century Malaya. Ch. passim: David M.L.Farr, The Colonial j 
Office and Canada, !8o7-l887 (Toronto. 1955), Ch.2, passim: 
and W.D. McIntyre, ^British Policy in West Africa, the Malay; 
Peninsula and the South Pacific During the Colonial j 
Secretaryships of Lord Kimberley and Lord Carnarvon, 1870- 
I876* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1959)> 
Ch.l, passim-
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The mood in the Colonial Office was one of 
disappointment. There was sentiment in favour of a 
change for the colony. Meade suggested Labuan might 
be made a penal settlement for the eastern colonies 
in order to keep it afloat without a resumption of
10k
imperial grants. The suggestion was not acted 
upon but it was clear that some more realistic 
status for Labuan was desirable. In the end it was 
decided to ask Governor Harry Ord of Singapore to 
go to Labuan and investigate the condition of the 
colony.
Upon his transfer from Labuan in 1871 Governor 
Hennessy had suggested in a memorandum to Lord Kimberley
10?
that Labuan should be joined to the Straits Settlements.
100. Robert G.W. Herbert, one time private secretary to 
Gladstone, prime minister of Queensland l860-6 g, became 
assistant undersecretary at the Colonial Office in February 
1870, permanent undersecretary 1871-92.
101., Robert H. Meade, private secretary to Granville, 
assistant undersecretary at Colonial Office, 1871-92, 
permanent undersecretary 1892-7 * '
102. Rogers was a declared opponent of colonial expansion 
although'he did not advocate giving up colonies. After 
his retirement he argued strongly against imperialism of 
the eighteen seventies and eighties, e.g. his articles 
on South Africa in Edinburgh Review. April 1877* and 
Nineteenth Century. March 1879.
103*’ CO minutes, 22, 25 and 26 June, 1872. CO IM+/36.
104. Meade minute, 25 June, 1872, CO 144/36.
105^ Hennessy to Kimberley, 7 Feb., I87I* CO 144/34.
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Kimberley thought it would be a good thing to have
Governor Ord investigate the feasibility of Hennessy*s
suggestion.. Ord went to Labuan in April 1873* In the
meantime discussion respecting Labuan*s condition
continued. Late in the year when Italy proposed to
establish a convict settlement and commercial post
106
on the northwest coast of Borneo officials at the
Colonial Office said Britain could not object merely
107
to safeguard the trading interests of Labuan►
Herbert wrote, *.... the condition of Labuan must be
critical if she depends upon exclusive trade and under-
108
developed coal mines entirely.’ Governor Bulwer
argued against the Italian project because of its
nuisance value and its commercial competition with 
102
Labuan. Herbert thought such a view would lead to 
British opposition to all development of the resources 
and trade of Borneo except that which would benefit 
Labuan. This he thought undesirable.
Later when a German trader, Captain Schick, with 
the reputed support of his government, established a
106. See below, pp.2^7-8.
107. CO memo, 3 Jan. 1873, GO lkk/38 (III)
108. Herbert minute, 15 Jan. 1873, GO lkk/k0m
109. Bulwer to CO, 12 Nov. 1872, CO l A / 38.
110. Bulwer to FO, 9 Aug., 1873, CO ibk/kl5 and see
below, p.250.
111. CO to F0, 11 Oct., 1873, CO Ikk/kl.
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110
trading post in Sandakan Bay Lord Kimberley saw
111
no grounds for opposition to the project. Indeed
the secretary had already declared that Labuan should
not be allowed to stand in the way of the commercial
112
development of other parts of Borneo.
While any decision on the future status of Labuan 
awaited Governor 0rd*s findings it was clear that 
among the permanent officials at the Colonial Office, 
at least, disenchantment with the colony was strong.
The policy of opposing any commercial ventures on the 
coast of Borneo in order to protect Labuan from 
competition was becoming more and more untenable if 
not already doomed.
Governor 0rdfs report which was received late in 
1873 confirmed Bulwer1s assertions of Governor Hennessy*s 
maladministration and the past inefficiency of the coal
ill
mining operations. Ord thought any formal union of 
Labuan with the Straits Settlements however, would be 
detrimental to the latter colony and of little benefit
112. CO minute, 22 Sept., 1872 CO lA/39*- One official 
declared that the German venture was *a first rate thing 
on the whole* although it was bad for Labuan. Meade 
pointed out that much of the trade which the Germans 
created would benefit British merchants in one way or 
another. CO minute of 2 Oct. and Meade minute of 3 Oct.,
1872. (CO l A A l ) .
113. Gov.Ord to CO, 1 Sept., 1873, CO lkk/k2~
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to the former because of the distance from Singapore.. 
Ord recommended instead a limited connection in which 
Labuan would have a lieutenant governor nominally 
under the governor of the Straits Settlements, but 
subject only to his advice and assistance. In time 
Ord envisaged a situation whereby heads of depart­
ments in the civil establishment at Singapore would
offer advice and assistance in administration and
Ilk
law to their counterparts in Labuan. Labuan, he
said, might become a small Singapore attracting the
commerce of Borneo and Sulu, but it would be wise to
reduce some of Hennessy*s more burdensome taxes in
order to stimulate trade. There was reason to believe,
Ord thought, that the Oriental Coal Company would win
the deep veins of coal. If this happened perhaps 200
tons a day could be produced and Labuan would then be
relatively prosperous.
The Colonial Office decided to postpone any action
on 0rd*s report until the end of 1875 when the results
115
of the coal operations would be known. Any material
Ilk. Kimberley had suggested a similar loose connection 
with the Straits Settlements in a memorandum of 28 April, 
1871 (CO lkk/3k.)
115. CO minutes, 29 Nov., and 12 Dec., 1873, CO lkk/k2.
2 2 1 .
improvement in the state of the colony depended upon
the coal. No union with the Straits Settlements would
be considered until Labuan could pay its share of
116
operational costs. Lord Kimberley thought that
the taxes inaugurated by Governor Hennessy should
remain until some improvement in the financial con-
117
dition of the colony was seen. As to the coal
operations he was not optimistic. He noted that
there was some increase in the trade of Labuan and
H 8
that a sago industry might prove valuable. By
   careful cheese paring Kimberley thought the colony
could continue unaided but that it would always be 
close to fthat fearful catastrophe*, a request to 
the Treasury for funds.
Ra.ia Brooke* s proposals.
/ &  Having postponed action on Ord*s report the
status of Labuan became once again the responsibility 
of a Conservative government when the change of admin-
116. Herbert minute, lk Jan. 187*+* CO lkk/k2.
117. Kimberley minute, 17 Jan. 187*+, CO lkk/k2.
118.- Fairfield memo, 13 Nov. 1873, CO ikk/kl.
Governor Bulwer sent the Colonial Office an exhaustive 
review of the commercial position of Labuan from 18H8 
to 1872, showing a general improvement in trade during 
the l860*s and continuing through 1872.
2 2 2 .
istration took place early in 187 •^ Lord Carnarvon, 
the Colonial Minister, repeated his stand of 1868 
during this ministry and supported the Foreign Office 
in opposing Raja Brooke's designs on Brunei territory. 
The raja had proposed, in a long memorandum to the new 
foreign minister, Lord Derby, in July 187*+, that Brunei
should be taken under the protection of Great Britain. 
The proposed protectorate would stretch from Sarawak 
territory at Baram Point to the northern most point
a second memorandum Brooke asked that Sarawak be allowed 
to assume the protection of Brunei if Britain declined it. 
Brooke was worried lest foreigners occupy the territories 
of Brunei If northern Borneo was lost to Britain along
with Sulu it would affect British commerce in the east.
government would not now increase its responsibilities in 
Borneo, Sarawak was prepared to extend its 1liberal and
119. Brooke to Derby, 16 July, 187^, FO 12/k2.
120. Ibid.
121. Brooke to Derby, 17 July, 187^, FO 12/k2.
122. Spain’s campaign in Sulu which began in 1872 seemed 
to be successful in its goal of subduing the sultan and 
there was a strong belief in the east that these islands 
would at last come under Spanish sovereignty and become 
subject to Spain's restrictive trade practices.
112
of Borneo. Brooke did not of course hold the coast as
120
far as Baram but was still hoping to annex it. In
122
Britain's position at Labuan was not enough and if the
223.
enlightened government’ over Brunei and develop it
commercially. The raja wrote,
I feel sure it would much benefit trade, as 
well as be of great advantage to the sultan 
and all the native communities, and it is 
needless for me to say that where the Sarawak 
flag flies British interests are paramount. 1 123
Alfred Green, a Foreign Office librarian, prepared
an interesting memorandum on BrookeTs proposals. He
reviewed the history of Britain’s position in Borneo
and Sarawak’s previous proposals for increasing British
12b-
hegemony on the northwest coast. As for article X 
of the l8b7 treaty Green said it did not apply to 
pRaja Brooke because he was a British subject. Further- 
more Green poin ed out that the original grant of 
Sarawak to James Brooke predated the treaty. All 
Brooke was asking he wrote was an extention of those 
rights of government over the rest of Brunei territory.
123. It would be interesting to know of Raja Brooke was
influenced by the negotiations for the annexation of Fiji.
Brooke’s second memorandum was written on the very day that
Lord Carnarvon announced to Parliament his belief that the
cession of Fiji to the Crown should be accepted. (Hansard,(3nd
Series) ccxxjj 17 July, 187b, 179-87*) Brooke was in England
and the subject of Fiji had been in the press frequently.
It is especially interesting that the heavy financial
obligations which Britain assumed in Fiji frere emphasized.
(Times, 9 April, 16 May, 16 June^ and b July, 187b). Brooke
suggested an initial outlay of £b0,000 if Britain agreed to
annex Brunei. (FO 12/b2, Brooke memo, 16 July, 187b.)
12b. Green memo, 22 Sept., 187b, FO 12/b2.
125. Brooke received the grant in l8b6 ; he held the 
governing power from l8b2.
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Such a proceeding can hardly be considered 
in the light of a cession to any other nation, 
as stated in the treaty, it being only an 
extension of the rights already enjoyed by a 
British subject. 12o
This is an interesting interpretation of Brookefs 
case and if it had proved correct then the cessions of 
1853 and l86l could also be claimed to be merely exten­
sions of Brooke1s rights. No one at either the Foreign 
Office or Colonial Office was prepared at the moment to 
refute Green1s argument. Neither did he attract support 
and nothing more was heard of his unusual interpretation^. 
C-reen was curiously silent on the one point which was at 
issue - Brooke* s status as a^subjej^.jaf the Queen and 
whether he was an independent prince (and hence,, n. foreign 
M power under the terms of the treaty) or a vassal of the
r\ '
Sultan of Brunei.
However, Green was the only official to give any
*\ lengthy or original thought to the questiohV the
( time and his memorandum was circulated at bo tiff the Colonial 
and Foreign Offices. There was no urge in 187^ to pursue
1257 FO 12/1+2. on. cit.
127* But the Foreign Office did not refuse to consider 
the proposals as Runciman (op.cit., p.178) contends.
Foreign Minister Derby brought them to the attention of 
the Colonial Office and the Cabinet. For ten months the 
question was considered before a negative answer was 
returned to Brooke. See FO 12/^2,- passim: CO lkk/k^i passim.
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the question of Brooke*s status. That would come 
later. It could not be denied that Brooke was a 
subject of the Queen^ and indeed Permanent Under­
secretary Tenterden told Brooke that he thought
129
that article X did not apply to him. But the
Foreign Office had to protect the prestige of their
chief representative in Borneo, and the Colonial
Office was awaiting the results of the coal company*s
deep drilling before deciding on the future of Labuan*
In the event there was no desire to establish a formal
protectorate over Brunei nor to permit Sarawak to
extend its authority northward.
Undersecretary Herbert thought that the sad
experience with Labuan should forestall any extension
130
of British obligation in Borneo* A British resident 
in Brunei should, he thought, be the extent of any 
British protection, and would satisfy the present 
demand of British interests in Brunei. Further, he 
held that a Sarawak protectorate of Brunei should be 
objected to, although he was not at all certain how 
far Britain had a right to interfere between Sarawak
125. C.S.A. Abbott, Lord Tenterden, assistant undersecretary 
at the Foreign Office, 1871-1873; permanent undersecretary, 
1873-1882.
129* Tenterden minute on Brooke memo of 16 July,187^ F&2/V2-
130.. Herbert minute, 8 Oct, 187^5 CO 1M+/43.
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m
and Brunei.
Lord Carnarvon agreed with Herbert. He noted,
232
'we have quite enough already on our hands. 1 Later 
in the year Governor Bulwer reported that Raja Brooke 
was again asking for Baram. It cannot, he wrote, 'be
133
a matter of indifference to the government of Labuan.'
12k
The Colonial Office supported the governor's views, 
and Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Foreign Office that 
it was undesirable that Raja Brooke should acquire
m
more Brunei territory*
The Foreign Office felt that British interests 
in Brunei were adequately protected by the consul 
without a protectorate. They were not convinced of 
the wisdom of allowing Brooke to annex northward nor 
to himself establish a protectorate over Brund. Green 
had questioned the expediency of allowing 'a British 
subject in such juxtaposition to a British possession 
to enjoy such extensive rights of sovereignty*• More­
over, the possibility of foreign interference in Borneo
131. Herbert to Lister, 29 Oct. 187*+, FO 12A2*.
132. Carnarvon minute, 8 Oct., 187^, CO 1 A A 3 *
133. Bulwer to FO, 16 Dec. 187k, CO 1M+A2.
13V. CO minute, 30 Jan., 1875, CO 1V+A3.
135. CO to FO, 5 Feb., 1875, CO l A A 3 .
136. See below pp,2H/-5l»
137* Anderson minute, 13 Aug., 1871*, FO 12A2. 
138* Herbert to Lister, 29 Oct., 18A ,  FO 12A2.
227*
1^6
was present at all times. If a political change 
occurred in Borneo would not this rouse other powers 
to take more notice of the northwest coast? Anderson, 
a senior clerk, had noted on Brooke's memorandum that 
if his proposals were accepted a Dutch protest would
I3Z
have to be dealt with. Lord Carnarvon had also
advised Lord Derby that change in Borneo would cause
138
difficulties with other European powers.
As for Brunei, there was some evidence that it
needed protection against Raja Brooke. Consul Bulwer
wrote that the raja and his officers acted in a threat-
139
ening manner toward the sultan.
On 21 April the Cabinet considered Brooke's proposals,
including his latest request for Baram. Without bringing
up the question of Sarawak's status the government
JMO
decided to reject them. But because of the refusal 
to take up the status question the reasons for declining 
were expressed in vague terms. As noted, the Colonial 
Office was definite in not wanting Brooke to move north­
ward because of lingering hopes that Lab'uan would prove
139*' Bulwer to FO, 16 Dec., 187*+, FO 12/^2.
1^0. Derby minute, 21 April, 1875, Derby to Brooke, 
10 May, 1875, FO 12/1*2.
valuable, but they questioned the government's right 
to interfere between sultan and raja. The Foreign 
Office referred to the decision of 1868 and told the 
raja that they still desired to see no change in
l*4l
Borneo* But they did not specifically invoke the 
restrictive clause of the treaty. The question of 
Brooke's anomalous situation was thus avoided and
awaited a future consideration.
The following year Brooke was given the same 
1*42
answer, when he requested that article X be waived 
A 3
in his case. Assistant Undersecretary Lister was 
one of the few Foreign Office officials who favoured
1A
Brooke's expansion. He noted that the Sarawak
government was a much better one than the sultan's
and was likely to encourage commerce and civilization*
He was over-ruled by Tenterden who gave as the chief
1*45
reason for opposing Brooke the arguments of Consul 
Bulwer in his dispatch of 16 December, 187*4. Labuan 
would be menaced, he thought, the consul's prestige
mi. Derby to Brooke, 10 May, 1875} FO 12/*42
1**2. Derby to Brooke, 12 June, I876, FO 12/k3
1*43. Brooke to Derby, 20 March, 1876, FO 12/*43«
1*4*4. Lister minute, 5 May, 1876, FO 12/*43.
l*+5. Tenterden minute, 12 May, 1876, FO 12/*43.
at Brunei would be undermined. Moreover the Brunei
nobles reportedly were not in favour of Brooke's
l*f6
annexation. Lord Carnarvon concurred.
Reversal of policy at the Colonial Office.
This was the last time that a colonial minister 
used Labuan as a pretext for opposing the expansion 
of Sarawak. A change of attitude toward Sarawak was 
beginning at the Colonial Office. It is first seen 
in Herbert's doubts about Britain's 'right1 to inter­
fere between Brunei and Sarawak. Among the permanent 
officials Labuan was already, as we have seen, all 
but written off as a failure. This sentiment was 
enhanced by the exposure of Governor Hennessy's 
financial manipulations. It was confirmed when the 
Oriental Coal Company, the fourth company to operate 
in Labuan, showed no more success than its predecessors*
Much hope had been placed on the effojts^to reach the 
deep coal. By mid 1875 it was evident that the company 
had failed. Governor Bulwer, on leave in London, 
defended the commercial position of Labuan viz-a-viz
2kl
Borneo in a memorandum to the Colonial Office. He
l W . Malcolm to Tenterden (CO to FO) 1 June, 1876, FO 12/53 
l1*/* Bulwer memo, 12 July, 1875> CO lH^f/^.
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said that the role of the coal operations in the
colony and the shortcomings of Labuan respiting from
failure of the coal companies had been over-emphasized.
The government, he said, had been too indulgent with
the coal companies, and this contributed to the
failures. The governor contended that Labuan had
commercial and strategic possibilities which were
more important than the coal. Assistant undersecretary
lb8 '
Meade disagreed with this doctrine. Labuan1s 
potential value consisted in its coal mines and in 
nothing else, he wrote. It was recognized, however,
1i+2
that Labuan could not be abandoned.
The permanent officials at the Colonial Office, 
lead by Herbert and Meade showed no hesitation in 
viewing Labuan realistically* From their first 
experience of Labuan*s problems they were willing 
in practice to allow the colony every opportunity 
to prove itself, while holding doubts as to its 
success. Their recommendations were generally accepted 
by both Carnarvon and Kimberley. But the governor of
1^8. Meade minute, 20 July, 1875, CO l^/Mt. 
1^9. Ibid.
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Labuan and the information which he furnished to the 
Colonial Office still stood between the colony and 
the officials in London.
When the failure of Labuan was at last recognized 
the basis for opposition to Raja Brooke was removed* 
The Colonial Office rapprochement with the raja came 
about largely through the efforts of Governor Ussher 
who succeeded Bulwer in 1875* It partly substantiates 
the contention in this chapter that the Colonial 
Office attitude towards Borneo was dependent upon, 
and usually followed the sentiments of the Labuan 
governors.
To be sure, Governor Ussher's first concern was
for Labuan. In the summer of 1876 he warned, as had
governors before him, that Sarawak1s extension north-
150
ward would injure Labuan trade and prestige.
However admirable and praiseworthy the results 
obtained by the late Sir James Brooke and the 
present raja the extention of that rule would 
tend to reduce Labuan to isolation.
Although deploring the 'high handed' proceedings of
Sarawak officials toward Brunei he recognized that
Sarawak had legitimate complaints. Sarawak had
150. Ussher to FO, Ik June, 1876, FO 12A3*
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difficulty in obtaining from Brunei debts owed to the
151
raja’s subjects. Ussher carried out British policy 
by reminding the Sultan that Britain would not sanction
152
any cession of territory to Brooke.
But Governor Ussher took the effort to establish
friendly communication with Raja Brooke. His first 
contact resulted in rather cautious praise of the 
raja’s ’firm and just’ rule which had saved ’some of 
the finest provinces in Borneo from anarchy and blood-
isa
shed.* In the summer of 1877 the governor and the
15U
raja exchanged visits. The opportunity thus afforded 
for a closer look at Sarawak and conversation with
Brooke respecting Brunei caused Ussher to reverse his
251
opinion of the raja.
During my stay with the raja I saw reason 
considerably to modify certain views which 
had been instilled into my mind respecting 
him 156
Ussher became convinced of the raja’s sincere attempts 
to bring good government to the Borneo coast, and he was
151. Ussher to FO, 15 Sept., 1876, FO 12/43.
152. . Ibid.
153. Ussher to Derby, 11 April, 1877* FO 12/42
15*+* Ussher to Derby, 14 June, I877* FO 12/4-4
155. A fact to which Ussher attested in a letter to the
raja in January 1879 (Baring Gould and Banpfyide, op.cit. 
P*>339»)> and which was noted at the Colonial Office,
Cox minute, 11 Oct, 1877, CO 144/48.
156.- Ussher to Derby, 2 June, 1877, FO 12/42.
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impressed by Sarawak’s success. He wrote a long and
157
complimentary report on Sarawak which Charles Cox, 
chief clerk at the Colonial Office, thought should be
158
suppressed because it suggested the desirability
of allowing Sarawak to absorb Brunei territory - a
sentiment which was not in accord with Lord Carnarvon’s 
159 160 
views. Both Herbert and Meade praised the report,
however, and from this time onward the Colonial Office’s
suspicion of Raja Brooke diminished.
The reversal of attitude was complete in 1878 and
was greatly influenced by Ussher’s report and subsequent
advice. It coincided with another development in Borneo
which influenced a favourable attitude toward Raja Brooke.
That development was the grant by the sultans of Brunei
and Sulu of northern Borneo to Baron Gustav von Over beck,
the Austrian consul in Hong Kong, and Alfred Dent, of
161
the London trading firm of Dent and Company. This 
grant which led to the founding of the State of North 
Borneo will be discussed in detail in a subsequent 
chapter. Only a few remarks concerning it need be 
made here.
15>7* Enclosed in Ussher to Carnarvon. 25 July, 1877> C O l A A
158. Cox minute on above, 11 Oct., lo77* CO Ih^AS.
159. Presumably as expressed on the last occasion of the 
government’s refusal of Brooke’s request for Baram (CO to 
FO. 1 June, 1876, FO 12A3.)
160. Herbert and Meade minutes, 11 Oct, I8 77, CO 1 A A 8 .
161. Treacher to Derby, 2 Jan. and 22 Jan, I878, FO 12/53.
23*4.
Baron Overbeck1s visit to Brunei and Sulu in the 
winter of 1877-78 found Ussher on sick-leave in England, 
and William H. Treacher acting for him as governor and 
consul general* Ussher was in contact with the govern­
ment, however, and warned of the danger to the British
position in Borneo from the grant obtained by Overbeck 
162
and Dent. They were, he said, adventurers in the
project for profit and would sell their rights to the
highest bidder, possibly a foreign power.
Raja Brooke who had been trying to annex Brunei
territory for ten years past was incensed that so large
an area should be obtained so easily by strangers. He
complained, with some justification as we shall see, that
162
acting Consul Treacher supported Overbeck1s project.
He reminded the Foreign Office of its policy of opposing 
territorial changes on the northwest coast of Borneo.
Governor Ussher and Raja Brooke joined in opposing 
the Dent-Overbeck scheme and succeeded in gaining the
16U=
sympathy of the Colonial Office. But British policy
1&21 Ussher to CO, 15 March, 1878. CO 12/53.
163* Brooke to Derby, 11 April, 1878 and Pauncefote!s 
minute, 24 May, 1878, FO 12/53*
164. Hicks Beach minute, 19 July, 1878, CO 144/51*
165. Meade minute, 15 July, 1878, CO 144/51, commenting 
upon Salisbury's letter to Raja Brooke of 3 June, 1878,
a copy of which was sent to the Colonial Office (FO to CO, 
11 July, I878).
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toward the Dent-Overbeck project was to be decided 
at the Foreign Office. The Colonial Office in 1878 
could do nothing more constructive toward a Borneo 
policy than support Brooke1s annexation of Baram.
Meade noted that the extension of Sarawak could no 
longer be opposed as the Foreign Office seemed to 
favour the Dent-Overbeck cession because of the 
English investors in it and ignored the fact that
165
Overbeck was a foreigner. Hicks Beach who 
succeeded Carnarvon at the Colonial Office when the 
latter resigned, minuted that the raja had more claim
166
for British support than had Baron Overbeck. He
too noted the inconsistency of the Foreign Office in
applying article X to Raja Brooke but ignoring it in
the case of Dent and Overbeck. In July Hicks Beach
informed Lord Salisbury that Sarawak1s request for
Baram should be favoured if any territorial changes
16Z
in Brunei were contemplated. The following January,
168
after talks with Raja Brooke and Governor Ussher the
165,. Minute of 19 July, 1878, CO l¥+/5l-
167. Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 22 July, 1878, CO lMt/5l.
168. Ussher was highly pleased with his interview and was 
assured that the Colonial Office agreed to allow the raja 
and sultan to arrive at their own terms for the cession of 
Baram as long as the sultan was a rfree agent1. Ussher 
thought Lord Salisbury would follow the Colonial Office on 
this matter. See Ussher to Raja Brooke, quoted in Baring 
Gould and Bampfylde, on.cit.. pp.339-^0.
colonial secretary declared that he was ready to
support the raja whenever the Foreign Office arrived
at a decision with respect to the Dent-Overbeck cession.
Indeed, Undersecretary Herbert suggested giving Raja
Brooke Labuan as well as Baram. !For Baram1 he wrote,
fwill bring Sarawak close up to our important island -
170
failed in coal and failing in coin1.
The Foreign Office defines its policy toward Sarawak.
We have seen that the officials at the Foreign 
Office were steadfast in their opposition to Raja 
Brooke1s annexation of Baram. In so doing they were 
strongly supporting their consul. Distrust of Raja 
Brooke made it impossible to approve his scheme for 
annexation of territory. It was pointed out that he
!Zi
already had a vast territory to develop in Sarawak.
His reasons for wanting Baram, it was thought, must 
therefore be political. Some of the raja!s statements 
and activities seemed to support this contention. His
169* Herbert minute, 17 Jan. 1879, CO lW?2.,
170. Minute of 26 Aug, 1879, CO lbk/52.
171. Hennessy to Stanley, 30 Sept., 1868, FO 12/3*+A.
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proposal in 187^ - to establish a Sarawak protectorate
172
over Brunei was viewed with suspicion* An article 
by the raja in the Sarawak Gazette in 1872 which 
suggested pensioning the sultan and establishing a 
stable government in Brunei, was noted at the Foreign
iZ2
Office. Consul Bulwer on this occasion considered 
the raja's sentiments unfriendly. Undersecretary 
Tenterden in opposing Brooke's request for Baram in 
1876 thought the raja had no philanthropic motives
17b
of bringing good government to the northwest coast*
He wanted, wrote Tenterden, to be in a more advan­
tageous position when he offered to sell his rights 
to Britain.*
Not all of the officials were suspicious of Brooke*
Assistant undersecretary Lister thought well of Raja
Brooke's rule and said Sarawak should be allowed to
acquire more Brunei territory provided the law officers
found no impediment to such a move in the 18^7 treaty,
175
and it did not involve British protection*. At no
172. See especially, Green memo, 22 Sept., 187^ FO 12/U2, 
and Tenterden minute of 12 May, I876 on Brooke letter of 
20 March, 1876, FO 12A3.
173. Copy in Bulwer to Granville, 18 June, I872, FO 12/38; 
Sarawak Gazette of 26 April, I872.
175. Tenterden minute, 12 May, 1876, FO 12A3.
175. Lister minute of 5 May, I876, FO 12/*+3.
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time did the Foreign Office tell the raja that article
X was the de jure reason for their opposition for they
were not certain that Sarawak was an independent state
1Z6
and how far article X could be made to apply. They
ignored the fact that Brooke as a British subject did
177
not dome under the terms of the treaty. The question 
of Brooke’s status as a subject and ruler was not 
investigated until 1876. But the consuls used article 
X in their opposition to Brooke. The sultan was under
1
the impression that it applied. Raja Brooke himself
128
assumed that the restrictive clause covered Sarawak.
He accepted that Britain had recognized the indepen­
dence of Sarawak and its ruler during the Palmerston
179
ministry in 1863. Yet there was an unwillingness
180
among later ministers to acknowledge this fact and 
eventually to deny it upon a technicality. Not the
176. As we have seen (page 225) the confusion carried 
over into the Colonial Office.
177* Tenterden thought so 'at first glance' when he 
received Brooke's proposals. (Tenterden minute l6 July,
1874, FO 12/42). Alfred Green was of this opinion*
(FO 12/42, Green memo, .22 Sept. , 1874) •
178* Baring Gould and Banpfylde, op.cit. p*335*
179. cf. Palmerston minute, 6 Aug. I856, FO 12/23; FO 12/3. 
Russell minute, 22 Aug. 1863; FO to Treasury, 28 Aug. 1863;/ 
St.John, Life, pp.359-68. St.John quotes Undersecretary 
Layard as saying that in the appointment of a consul
to Sarawak the Cabinet recognized Brooke by the most 
direct and least formal' method.
180. e.g. Clarendon to Brooke. 26 May, 1869* FO 12/35;
CO to FO, l4 April, 187*+, FO 12/42; Lister and Derby minutes
least reason for this unwillingness was the awkwardness
of the subject of the Queen being also a brother prince.
Officials considered the point from time to time. Thus
in 1869 and again in I871* the propriety of presenting
Brooke at court as raja of Sarawak was considered. On
181
the first occasion Clarendon refused but in 187*+
182
permission was granted. The Foreign Office informed
the lord chamberlain that the raja was an independent 
182
sover^gn.
In May 1876 Senior Clerk Victor Buckley pointed
out that Brooke as a subject was not barred from 
I8*t
article X. But undersecretary Tenterden and Lord
Derby in a novel opinion decided, upon the advice of
185
Consul Bulwer, that because the raja 'asserted1 his
Sept.11, 187 ,^ on Admiralty to FO, 9 Sept. 1875? FO 12/bl. 
It sometimes reached absurd proportions, as when Lister and 
Derby considered whether the loan of a naval officer to 
sail a gunboat to Sarawak under salary of that government 
involved recognition of the raja as an independent power.
181. Clarendon to Brooke, 26 May, 1869? FO 12/35*
182. Hertslet memo, 29 Dec. 1876, FO 12/^2.
183. ibid.. Hertslet quotes FO to Lord Chamberlain,
April 187^.
18H. Buckley minute of 5 May, 1876, on Brooke to Derby,
20 March 1876, FO 12/^3• Buckley thought Brooke ought not 
to be told this ras we don't encourage him in his projects.' 
Lord Derby agreed.
185* Bulwer to Derby, 16 Dec. 187*+? FO 12/^2.
240
independence he was a foreign pox^er within the
186
meaning of article X. The confusion of the
Foreign Office policy increased when in late 1876
steps were taken to define the raja’s status. The
sultan of Brunei had asked the British government
if Brooke was still a subject of the Queen, and
187
if so to restrain him from pressing for Baram.
The sultan’s real grievance was that Raja Brooke
deducted from his annual payments the debts owed
by the sultan’s subjects to Sarawak people. Sarawak
traders were unable to collect through more normal
channels because of the breakdown of government
authority in the Brunei territories. The sultan
wanted Britain to force Brooke to desist from this
practice. Assistant Undersecretary Julian Pauncefote
188
decided to pursue the question, although he thought 
that the government could not intervene between sultan 
and raja.
186. Tenterden and Derby minutes, 12 May, on Brooke to 
Derby, 20 March, 1876, FO 12/43.
187. Ussher to Derby, 1? Sept., 1876, FO 12/43.
188. Pauncefote minute, 4 Dec. 1876, FO 12/43. Sir Julian ■ 
Pauncefote, Baron Pauncefote (1899)5 attorney general of Hong 
Kong 1866-74; assistant undersecretary, Colonial Office 1874- 
765 assistant undersecretary, Foreign Office 1876-1882; 
permanent undersecretary, Foreign Office 1882-1893; minister 
and ambassador to the U.S., 1893-1902.
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In due course it was discovered that the law
Officers in 1856 and. again in 1862 had said that
Raj a James Brooke could be permitted to assume the
189
sovereignty of a foreign state, and that Brooke 
had been recognized by the Palmerston government. 
Whereupon Pauncefote, with the concurrence of Tenterden 
and Derby, decided that Raja Brooke was entitled to 
fall the rights and privileges .... of an indepen-
120 * 121
dent sovereign prince1. But Buckley had doubts
and Pauncefote agreed to a further search of the
records. It was then discovered that no document
could be found to show that Brooke had received
permission from the crown to assume the sovereignty 
192
of Sarawak. It is not certain what type of docu­
mentation was sought, whether an order-in-council or 
a cabinet decision. Apparently the Foreign Office 
letter to Lord Chamberlain or the record of Brooke!s 
recognition at court were unacceptable. Furthermore 
a technical ’error* had occurred in the Palmerston 
government’s recognition. Consul Ricketts’ commission
189. Hertslet memo, 15- Dec., 1876, FO 12/k3*
190. Pauncefote minute, 29 Dec.. lo7*+* FO 12/*+3•
191. Buckley minute, 30 Dec., I076, FO 12/*+3.
192. Hertslet memo, 29 Dec, 1876, FO 12/*+3-
U ,ly^ '^U 1—r>v ’ ^ S k<7
2^2.
had instructed him to apply for acceptance as consul
from the ‘local authorities’ instead of from the
sovereign ruler. Irwin contends that the ’error1
was deliberate on the part of the Foreign Office 
193
staff. If so then the staff was guilty of insub­
ordination in not carrying out precisely the inten­
tions of the cabinet as expressed by both Palmerston 
and Russell. In PauncefoteTs legal opinion this 
clearly showed that Raja James Brooke had never 
been formally recognized as a sovereign. He wrote,
Raja Brooke has not forfeited his claims of 
British nationality by accepting the position 
of ruler of Sarawak and as a matter of con­
stitutional law it is competent to Her Majesty 
to recognize him as a sovereign prince but no 
such recognition has yet taken place.19^
Under the doctrine enunciated by Pauncefote the
whole question remained obscure. For if the Foreign
Office now decided that Brooke was not a sovereign
ruler he must therefore be a vassal of the sultan*
If so then the question to which the Colonial Office
alluded arises - did Britain have the right to interfere
193* Irwin, Nineteenth Century Borneo, p.189*
19*+. Pauncefote minute, 2 Jan. 1877? FO 12/*+3* (Pauncefote 
mistakenly dated it 2 Jan. 1876) , Italics added.
between the sultan and one of his rajas? Buckley
contended that the sultan should be told that Brooke
was not recognized and that Britain could not inter-
121
vene between the sultan and his vassal* Lister 
196
agreed. But Pauncefote argued that it was only
necessary to answer the sultan's questions with
respect to Brooke's nationality, although the
Colonial Office and the consul general should be
told of the Foreign Office decision regarding
197
Brooke's status. Finally with the concurrence
of Lord Derby and the Colonial Office a dispatch
198
went off to Ussher. He was instructed to tell 
the sultan that the tribute owed to him was a Sarawak 
state debt for which Brooke was not personally respon­
sible, and therefore, while the raja was a British
subject, Britain could not intervene between 'two
199
foreign states.'
195. Buckley minute, 22 Jan., 1877* FO 12/*+3«
19d. Lister minute, 22 Jan., 1877* FO 12/*+3.
197* Pauncefote minute, N.D. FO 12/*+3* but follows 
Lister's above*
198. Derby to Ussher, 29 Sept., 1877* FO 12/*+*f. The 
Colonial Office caused several months delay in the dispatch 
by mislaying the correspondence with the Foreign Office.
This caused no worry on the part of anyone at either 
office and perhaps shows how minor was the issue of 
Borneo.
199. The following year Sarawak was again referred to as
a foreign state. Salisbury to Brooke, 3 June 1878, FO 12/53
So while maintaining by implication that Sarawak
was a foreign power, and hence subject to article X
the government held the opinion, based on a minor
legal point, that Brooke had never been recognized.
What was gained by this policy? Had the Foreign
Office followed Buckley's advice and announced that
Britain considered the raja a vassal of the sultan
it could not easily have prevented Brooke from
taking under his governance more of his 'suzerain's'
territory. Moreover, had the Foreign Office moved
for an interpretation of article X it would have
been shown that Brooke was exempt from its terms.
He could have acquired Baram without British permission.
Raja Brooke's status was indeed anomalous. He
was by the terms of the treaty exempt from control
and was at the same time an independent power - a
contingency which the government was loath to admit
and which Pauncefote, the Foreign Office legal adviser,
200
surely grasped. The ambiguity of policy was deliberate.
Runciman (on.cit.. p.176) is in error when he contends 
that the Foreign Office refused to pronounce Brooke 
independent of the sultan.
200. Brooke may have been purposely exempted by the wording 
of the treaty, for the Palmerston government of l8*+6 which 
drafted it was sympathetic to Raja James Brooke and his 
Borneo project.
21*5.,
For if article X were to operate as the basis of
British dominance it must be made to apply to Sarawak.
Otherwise a large section of the coast would be
annexed by the raja and come under the less well
defined 'protection1 accorded Sarawak.
If he knew of his position the raja nevertheless
did not move to oppose Britain’s Borneo policy.
Brooke assured governor Ussher that he would not
'attempt to oppose the expressed desires of Her
201
Majesty's government.' It is to the raja's 
credit that he restrained his impatience with the 
government's confusion and lack of candor.
As for the Dent-Overbeck cession, Pauncefote 
disagreed with the Colonial Office view of the 
project and their support of Raja Brooke. He dec­
lared that the Colonial Office was influenced by
202
Ussher who had a pro-Brooke bias. Furthermore, 
he said, Ussher's advice was based upon wrong 
premises. 'I am', he wrote, 'personally acquainted
201* Ussher to Derby, Ik June, 1877> FO 12/kk.
202. Pauncefote minute of 7 May, I878, FO 12/53*
with the promoters of the scheme and with its real 
features.'
The scheme for North Borneo was the vehicle
which finally moved the Foreign Office from their
opposition to Brooke's acquisition of more Brunei
territory. We shall see in a subsequent chapter
how a compromise was arranged between Sarawak and
North Borneo. But for Pauncefote*s opposition
Sarawak might have annexed Baram long before
permission was finally granted in 1882. For the
Pauncefote doctrine rested on a false base, and
some officials were beginning to take a more
203
tolerant attitude toward Raja Brooke. The 
annexation would have been allowed for practical 
reasons, as Sarawak was a proven quantity.
It must be said, also, that had Brooke and 
Ussher been more adroit in handling their end of 
the Baram question the annexation might have occurred 
earlier. The raja could have given an understanding 
that he would not cede territory to a foreign power 
without British consent, thus granting the govern­
ment more control over Sarawak and allaying some of
203. e.g. Centerden (minute of 16 July, 187^> FO 12/k2) 
and Lister (minute of 5 May, I876, FO I2/U3.)
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suspicion of the rajafs motives at the Foreign Office*
Undoubtedly such a promise would have been welcomed during
20*+
the 1870's as it was only a few years later*
Italian. German and Austrian interest in Borneo*
The threats of foreign intervention on the northwest 
coast of Borneo during the l870!s were apparent to the 
Foreign Office* They studied each one closely* Several 
nations showed an unusual amount of interest in the place. 
Powers which had hitherto shown little interest in colonial 
ventures made tentative moves* These moves amounted 
to little but were an indication to Britain that 
other powers were willing to establish a footing 
in Borneo should she retire from the field* Italy 
in 1870 asked the sultan of Brunei for a grant of
205
territory for a penal colony and a trading station.
At the time the British government raised no objec­
tions to a trading station although the idea of a
20*+. FO to Leys, 2 Nov., 1881, FO 12/?2.
205** Capt* Bacchia to Hennessy, 18 Feb., I87O; Hennessy 
to Clarendon, 21 April I87O, FO 12/36. Captain Racchia 
of the Royal Italian Navy had set out from Italy in 1869 
for a cruise In the Far East* He was commissioned to 
seek suitable sites for naval stations which might also 
be developed into colonies* Vincenzo Pizziconnella, "La 
Politica del Regno d 1Italia in Estremo Oriente nel Secolo 
Diciannivesimo", (unpublished thesis of the University 
of Rome, Faculty of Political Science, 1961) Ch. 2. passim..
2*+8 .
206
penal colony so close to Labuan was opposed.
When in 1872 the Italian minister in London asked
Britain to allow the sultan to make the grant the
207
Foreign Office, on the advice of Consul Bulwer,
replied that it could not permit a penal settlement 
208
in Borneo. Upon this the Italian government
209
abandoned the idea.
Germany began to take an interest in Borneo
during the eighteen seventies. Her traders had
been in the Pacific for years and had built up a
210
valuable commerce. German ships in the carrying
211
trade were familiar sights. Fresh from victory
206. Rogers1 minute, 1 Sept., I87O; Kimberley minute,
11 Sept.. 1870, CO l41+/31. Granville to Hennessy, 26 
Sept., 1870, F0 12/36.
207. Bulwer to Kimberley, 1 Jan, 1873, CO lM+AO.
Bulwer advised against a convict colony but thought 
that an !Italian settlement1 under the liberal patron­
age of Italy would be an element of strength on the 
northwest coast.
208. Hammond to Herbert, k Jan. 1873; Granville to
A. Paget (British Minister in Rome), 30 Dec. I872, and 21 
April, 1873, CO lkk/k0. .
209* Paget to Granville, 29 April, 1873 CO l A A O .  
Runciman (on.cit. p.180) states that British protests 
were not needed. The correspondence between London and. 
Rome indicates otherwise.
210. See e3> Report of the Secretary of the Navy (U.S) 
I866-6 7, p.6 ; and M.E. Townsend, Origins of Modern German 
Colonialism. (New York 1921), Ch.Ill, passim: The House of 
Godeffroy of Hamburg had trading posts in the Pacific in 
1857.
211. Hennessy to CO. 11 Aug., 1870, CO lM-f/32; Gov.Hong 
Kong to CO, 2 Oct, 1&73, F0 71/3.
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over France her commercial and industrial leaders were
seeking to increase their business in the east and the
German government were being pressed to grant some
£12
measure of support and protection. In 1872 and
1873 several German vessels were stopped and captured
213
by the Spanish blockaders of the Sulu islands.
Britain, which had also experienced trouble with the
Spanish blockade joined Germany in protesting to Spain..
The outcome was the 1877 protocol, signed by the three
2lh
nations, freeing commerce in the Sulu Archipelago*
More direct German interest in Borneo occurred.
In March 1873 a Captain von Blanc commanding the
North German ship of war Nymph arrived in Borneo to
215
investigate the Spanish-Sulu dispute. The previous 
year the sultan of Sulu had entrusted a letter for the 
German Chancellor Bismarck to a German trader, Captain 
Schuck* The sultan appealed for help against the 
Spanish who in 1872 had once again mounted a campaign
212. Townsend, op.cit., pp.1+3-l+l+; Odo Russell to FO,
11 Dec., 1877, CO lkk/k9.
213. FO 71/3* passim.
2lU. See belowr pp.299-301.
215* Bulwer to Granville, 22 March, 1873* FO 71/3
216. The sultan had appealed several times to Britain 
without obtaining, the desired results. See above, p.57«
216
against the Sulu Islands. The following month 
Bulwer reported that von Blanc had returned from 
Sulu and displayed great interest in the commer­
cial and strategic potential of Sulu and northern
21Z
Borneo.
An inquiry at Berlin by F.O. Adams, British
charge"* d ’affaires^ was met with the rather ambiguous
reply by Herr von Philipsborn at the Foreign Ministry
that he thought some sort of proposition was made to
a visiting ship captain by the saltan of Sulu, but
he didn’t think it had aroused much interest in 
218
Berlin^-
BulwerTs warning of German interest had basis 
in fact, for later in the year Captain Schick was 
granted land on Sandakan Bay and was promised a
219
monopoly of the rattan trade of the north coast. 
Furthermore Captain Schuck informed Bulwer that he 
had the support of his government with whom he was
217. Bulwer to Granville, Lo April, 1873? FO 71/3* Bulwer 
thought von Blanc had negotiated a cession of the island 
of Bongao. At/any rate the German felt, said Bulwer, that 
Bongao which commanded the passage between Tawi Tawi and 
Borneo should be in the hands of a European power.
218. Adams to Granville, 16 Aug, 1873? CO I h k / k l .
219. Bulwer to Granville, 9 Aug., 1873? FO 71/3*
251.
in communication. Another approach to the German
government was made. Minister von Bulow the Foreign
Minister, told British Minister Odo Russell that the
sultan had asked for a German protectorate. Captain
von Blanc had been sent to the east to say that
Germany could not help him. There was no wish or
intention, according to von Bulow, to acquire
possessions in the Sulu Archipelago or any other
220
part of the world. The Foreign Office was satis­
fied that Germany planned no territorial acquis­
itions in Borneo. Britain was more interested in
getting German co-operation for a joint protest to
221
Spain relative to the Spanish blockade.
In 1875 the Austrian consul, Baron Overbeck,
launched his Borneo project by purchasing the rights
of the American Trading Company from its president,
222
Joseph Torrey. Torrey had accompanied Overbeck
to Brunei to obtain a ten year renewal of his lease.
220., Russell to Granville, 21 Nov. 1873? FO 71/3* A 
more important reason for von Blanc’s mission seems to 
have been the investigation of the Spanish blockade.,
221. FO 71/3? passim; see below, p.287.
222., See above, pp.115-8. Torrey had made no payments to 
the sultan and had been unable to raise capital to resume 
the company’s activities so disastrously terminated on the 
Kimanis River in 1866. In 1878 Torrey became American vice 
consul at Bangkok.
223. Low to Derby, 6 July, 1875, FO 12/kl.
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Overbeck was a speculator and was out for profit. 
The Foreign Office was informed that he approached
22k
both Austria and Germany. Austria had shown
enough interest in Borneo to send a warship, the
corvette, Friedrich. Captain Oesterrecher, to
Brunei to investigate the prospect of the American
225
Trading Company. The captain informed acting 
Consul Low that some businessmen in Vienna were 
interested and had applied to the imperial govern­
ment for information. He was satisfied, he said,
that there was no such company operating on the 
226
coast. In 1878 the presence of Alfred Dent
in the Overbeck venture was reassuring to the
227
Foreign Office.
The succession issue.
The other issue which led to British involve­
ment in Brunei politics during the 1870*s was the
22*+. J.Ross to CO (to FO), 9 Aug, 1878; C. Dilke to 
R. Bourke (Pari.Undersec., FO) 27 June, 1878, FO 12/53* 
225. Low to Derby, 1 June, 1875, FO 12/kl..
22o. Some seven years previously an Austrian naval 
expedition had operated in the Far East and Hennessy 
had been asked to watch it. See Hennessy to CO,
8 Jan., 1869, CO 1M+/29.
227. Pauncefote minute, 7 May, 1878, FO 12/53*
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question of the succession to the throne of Brunei. 
The succession issue illustrated just how much 
British policy depended upon the consul's relation­
ship with the sultan's government. It also demon­
strates the weakness of that policy. Sultan Abdul 
228
Mumin , already past middle age when he succeeded 
Omar Ali Saifudin in 1852, was a very old man,
said to be over 90 years old. Power in Brunei was
with whichever of the several pen££ja«lrans surrounding
the sultan could hold his attention. That power was
to a great extent only nominal and depended on the 
obedience which could be called forth by invoking 
the sultan's name. This procedure was ineffective 
for several of the peoples living on the Brunei 
rivers were in a more or less constant state of 
rebellion against the excesses of the various Brunei 
pengerans who invoked the sultan's name in their
^29
extortionary demands. The Kayan people, for 
example, carried on open warfare against the Brunei
228. Brother to the murdered Raja Muda Hasim, friend 
of James Brooke, was himself placed in position as Omar 
Ali's successor by the efforts of the first raja; see
G.R. Mundy , Narrative of Events in Borneo. (London 18^8) ii 
llf-6.
229. Low to Derby, 26 April, 1875? FO 12/Ul, above p.191*. 
and Baring Gould and Bamffylde, op.cit..„ pp*333-336.
' imlays during much of the latter part of the
230
nineteenth century.
The sultan had appointed no heir and according 
to Brunei law it was not necessary because each 
sultan was chosen by the leading pengerans and
231
chiefs. But by custom each sultan designated 
his successor and installed him as heir before 
his death. Should the aged Sultan Mumin die 
without naming an heir the resulting struggle 
of the claimants could prove bloody and bitter..
So thought British officials in Borneo. Hugh Low 
was the British official who during the 1870's 
first recognized the danger to Britain*s position 
in Borneo by the continued anarchy and weakness
232
of the Brunei government. Low was acting 
governor and consul between the departure of 
Governor Bulwer in 1875 and the arrival of Governor 
Ussher, a little over a year later. He took the 
occasion to inform London of the details of the 
Brunei political schene, the history of the sultanate
230. Baring Gould and Bampfylde, op.cit., p.335> ff-j 
passim.
231.* Hugh Low, 'Book of the Descent of the Sultans of 
Brunei*, op.cit., and Baring Could and Bampfylde, op.cit,
W . r  Low to Derby,26 ^rii , 1875, FO 12Al.
255*
233
and something about the leading personalities*
He noted that the preservation of peace in Brunei
was of great importance to the colony of Labuan,
which was left defenceless during the intervals
23**
between visits of naval vessels. Britain could
do much, he thought, towards stabilizing the
Brunei government. In this he was echoing senti-
235
ments expounded by Raja James Brooke, Governor 
236
Pope Hennessy and by Raja Charles Brooke as
237
recently as the previous year. Each in his 
way had wanted to ensure British dominance on 
the coast by intervening to strengthen the govern­
ment and bring order to Brunei.
Low first suggested something akin to a 
resident system by which the sultan could be advised
233* Low to Derby, 6 July , 1875? FO 12Al. Low 
later published his study of the Brunei rulers in 
JRASSB as the article cited above, N.2J/.
23V. Low to Derby, 1*+ Jan., I876, FO 12/!+3.
235.- St.John, op..citl , passim..
23o. Hennessy to FO, 23 April, 1868, FO 12/3*+A.; 
and Hennessy to FO, Lo March, 1871, FO 12/36.
237* See above, p.,223.^
238. Low to Derby, 26 April. 1875? FO 12/*fl.
239. Low to Derby, 6 Dec. 1875? FO 12/1+1
2*+0. Low to Derby, 6 July, 1875, FO 12/*tl.
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238
on better governmental procedures. But of more
immediate importance was the danger inherent in
the refusal of the sultan to name a successor. He
reportedly wanted to leave the government to his
wife, Raja Istori, because he thought none of the
239
claimants had the good of the country at heart.
Low thought the situation dangerous because of the
weakness of government at Brunei and because of
240
recent threats of foreign interest in Brunei.
The raja of Sarawak was also eager to annex north­
ward. When early in 1876 the sultan's wife died 
Low warned Lord Derby that a successor to the 
sultan should be named immediately as the sultan's
death 'may have a disturbing effect' on Brunei 
2*+l
politics. The sultan reportedly felt the death 
very deeply and was quite incapacitated for business.
There were three obvious candidates. The pengerans 
Pamancha and Temenggong, half brothers, either of whom, 
Low thought capable of ruling. The third pengeran 
Anak Chu Chu was reportedly a dissipated young man 
who was of the royal line but had, according to Low,
24l. Low to Derby, 14 Jan, 1876, FO 12/1+3* The sultan 
remarried within six months, for 'state reasons'. - the 
bride being the widow of one of his pengerans. (Ussher 
to Derby, 15 July, 1876, FO 12/43.)
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'no disposition for business.'
Upon his arrival in Labuan Governor Ussher agreed 
with Low as to the danger to the British position 
posed by the unsettled conditions in Brunei. But 
the disturbing element, according to Ussher, was 
Raja Brooke's influence at Brunei. The raja repor­
tedly favoured Anak Chu Chu as the sultan's successor. 
If he became sultan, said Ussher, Sarawak's probable
increase in territory and power would injure Labuan's
244
trade and prestige. Ussher, thinking Ra.ia brooke
was a Brunei raja, even suggested that he might
245
have some claim to becoming sultan.
The portent of both Low's and Ussher's warnings 
was the same. Britain should intervene and hasten 
the selection of a successor to the sultan. In the 
meantime Ussher asked for and was promised a warship 
for his use in the event that peace was threatened on
,24*2.. Low to Derby, 6 Dec., 1875? FO 12/41. Pamancha was 
older by a few days than/3Jeraenggong and had reportedly 
waived his claims to the throne some years before. But 
there was some doubt about it. Both were nephews and 
adopted sons of Sultan Mumin and were sons of Sultan Omar 
Ali, although there was some question as to the legitimacy 
of Temenggong* Anak Chu Chu was the son of Raja Muda Hasim, 
the friend of James Brooke, who was murdered by Omar Ali in 
1846.
243. Ussher to Derby, 15 June, 1876, FO 12/43.
244. Ibid.
245. Ussher to Derby, 15 Nov., 1876, FO 12/43. Brooke's 
status was shortlv under consideration at the Foreign Office
(above pp.24fl-245X
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the coast of Borneo. He wrote,
In case of the Sultan*s death my presence 
at Brunei with a ship of war would probably 
avert actual violence, and enable me to 
assist any rival claimants to settle their 
difficulties in a peaceful and orderly manner.
The granting of naval supporttothe consul in this
instance was a clear decision on the part of Britain
to intervene in Brunei, if necessary, and influence
the selection of a new sultan, despite the Colonial
Office1 s diplomatic language on the subject.. Herbert
minuted,
Lord Carnarvon thinks it would be a wise 
precaution if a ship of war were within 
easy reach of Mr. Ussher to render him 
assistance if necessary from the present 
time until affairs become established and 
settled in Brunei after the death of the 
old and the succession of the new Sultan.
At this point the Colonial Office assumed as much
initiative in the succession issue as did the Foreign
Office. There had been much conferring on the subject.
Lord Derby in seeking the advice of the Colonial Office
remarked, somewhat inaccurately, that Brunei politics
were interesting to Britain chiefly from a colonial
2b6 + Ibid; and FO to CO, 2b Aug.. and 21 Sept., 1876, 
CO 1M+A7; CO to FO, 8 Sept., 1876, FO 12/1+3.
21+7. minute of 27 Aug., I876, CO 11+1+/1+7*
258.
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point of view. But article X and the ability of
the sultan to honour it was a concern of the Foreign
Office. A weak sultan meant also a weakening of
British policy based upon the treaty rights. We
might ask here if this remark by Derby was an
attempt to shift responsibility for the succession
issue onto the Colonial Office. There is no question
that the Colonial Office was quite as active in the
matter as the Foreign Office. Chief Clerk Charles
2^9
Cox of the Colonial Office wrote,
It appears to me very desirable not only 
for the interests of Labuan. but for 
imperial interests that we should have a 
friendly Sultan on the throne of Brunei.
I am at a loss to suggest, as apparently 
the Foreign Office are, how this end would 
be best attained.
Cox thought, however, that the sultan might be 
induced to name a successor if *we had one in mind 
most likely to favour British interests1. He thought 
Hugh Low with thirty years of experience in Borneo
250
knew most about the subject and should be consulted.
2W. Derby to CO, 21 Sept.. 1876, CO l A A 7 *
2^9. minute of 26 Sept., 1876, CO 1 A A 7  (Italics added). 
250. The Colonial Office noted that the succession issue 
might *be another case of Perak so far as the badness of 
all claimants are concerned1 (CO Minute, 23 Sept., 1876,
CO 1 A A 7 )  • The succession issue in Perak in 1873 should 
not, however, be too closely likened to the Brunei case.
But when Hugh Low arrived in Perak in 1878 he faced there 
the problem of seeking an able Malay ruler as he had sought 
an able successor to the sultan in Bruno. For the Perak 
case see Cowan, op.cit.« pp.77-79? 99-101 and 252-25^.
It was Assistant Undersecretary Meade who 
interviewed Hugh Low, when he returned to London 
on leave, and drew from him an outline for a policy
25k
on the succession problem. Low recommended and 
Meade agreed that the choice of successor should be 
between the pengerans Pamancha and Temenggong. They 
thought this should be the theme which the consul 
1might endeavour to promote should he see a favour­
able opportunity1. No instructions were sent to 
Ussher at this time. The Foreign Office apparently 
felt that giving the consul naval support to back
252
his prestige was all that was presently necessary.
They reminded the Admiralty a gain in early 1877 of •
their desire to have warships conveniently within
call of Consul Ussher. The Admiralty promised to send
253
ships to Labuan as frequently as possible.
251* Meade minute of 9 Oct., 1876, CO ikk/bj*
252. The Foreign Office was frequently accused during 
erby’s tenure of neglecting decision-making, and 
certainly the Colonial Office on several occasions 
complained of a laxness and lack of vitality at the 
Foreign Office, e.g. CO minutes of 11 and 23 Dec., on 
FO to CO of 27 Nov, I876, CO I A / H 7 , Meade minute 
6 Sept., 1875, CO l A / A ;  and CO minute of 30 Oct., 1878, 
CO 1 W 5 1 .
253* FO to Admiralty, 16 Feb. 1877? Admiralty to FO,
21 Feb. 1877, FO 12/A.
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But the urging of Consul Ussher moved the Foreign 
Office to a more active policy. In April Ussher
2 f t
recommended direct intervention. The sultan was
so weak and the country so chaotic, he wrote,that
A proper pressure exercised at the right time 
by the government of Labuan or the British 
consul may in reality strengthen the sultan1s 
hands and enable him to fulfill his treaty 
engagements.
Ussher was worried that Raja Brooke’s supposed candidate,
Anak Chu Chu, would become sultan, in which case the
255
raja would fvirtually rule Brunei.1 Later, Ussher’s
visit to Sarawak which we have noted previously,
£56
allayed his fears of the raja’s intentions. He 
reported that Brooke did not favour Anak Chu Chu, 
and would not oppose Britain’s policy in Brunei. At 
the same time Ussher announced that death had removed
251
one of the claimants, pengeran Pamancha. The sultan, 
he noted, seemed to be approaching imbecility and the 
0 < other malays were unfriendly. He urged the Foreign 
Office to push the candidacy of pengeran Teaenggong.
25*+• Ussher to Derby, 11 April, 1877? FO 12/A.
255. Ussher to Derby, 15 Nov., 1876, FO 12/H3.
256. Ussher to Derby, 1h June, 1877? FO 12/A.
257* Ussher to Derby (to CO), lb June, 1877? CO 1A A 8.
261.
The Foreign Office, following their usual procedure
in this question, asked the Colonial Office for an 
298
opinion. At this point the Colonial Office came
forward with a memorandum outlining the policy recom-
222
mended the previous year by Hugh Low. Now that one 
of the claimants was dead, the memo stated, Lord 
Carnarvon thought the Pengeran Temenggong was the 
most satisfactory candidate. The Foreign Office
26o
agreed and a dispatch was sent off to Ussher
instructing him to urge the sultan to nominate the 
261
Temenggong.
.....you will be especially careful 
not to proceed in any way that could be 
understood as dictating to the Sultan 
the person he should nominate as 
successor.
But with naval force to back up the mission of 
the consul the meaning of the British government was 
obvious to the sultan. By the time the dispatch 
reached Labuan Ussher was travelling home on sick leave 
and it devolved upon Acting Consul Treacher to carry
258. FO to CO, 27 Aug., 1877, FO 12/M+*
259. CO to FO, 25 Sept.. 1877, FO 12/kk.
260. FO to CO, 9 Oct. 1877, FO 12/kk.
261. FO to Ussher, 18 Oct, 1877, FO 12/kk.
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out the Foreign Officers instructions. Early in
I878 Treacher reported that the sultan had selected
the Temenggong as heir to the throne, and that
262
Raja Brooke also favoured him.
Thus the British government thought the succes­
sion question settled satisfactorily* But the Brunei 
Malays were often unpredictable, and three years 
later the sultan had still not officially installed
263
his heir. By this time the Dent-Overbeck project
was well under way. There was a rumour that Mr.
Everett, the Dent-Overbeck agent, was planning to
support a rival candidate for the throne in return
for a reduction of the annual payments for the north
26*+
Borneo cession* Upon hearing this Consul Charles 
Lees, who succeeded Ussher in December 1879* went 
to Brunei in a man-of-war and induced the Sultan
265
to instal the Pengeran whom he had named his successor.
266
The Foreign Office dispatched their approval.
262* Treacher to Derby, 5 Jan., 1878, FO 12A5*
263« Lees to Granville, 31 Jan., 1881, FO 12/51.
26b. Ibid.
265. Ibid., and Lees to Sultan, 11 Feb., Sultan to 
Lees, 13 Feb., and Sultan to Raja Brook, 21 Feb., 1881, 
FO 12/51.
For the second time a British official inter­
vened to influence the selection of a sultan for 
the Brunei throne - a sultan whom it was expected 
would be friendly to Britain. The important differ 
ence between the two was that in 1877 the interven­
tion was a carefully formulated plan directed from 
London while in 18^ +6 Raja James Brooke1 s selection 
of Abdul Mumin was a free lance and emergency 
effort to strengthen the British influence at 
Brunei. With her intervention between raja and 
sultan over the Baram issue, the intervention for 
the selection of the sultans successor meant that 
Britain was committed to arrange political affairs 
on mainland Borneo to suit her role as the dominant 
power of the northwest coast. It was the practical 
application of the Disraeli governments sphere of 
influence policy, modified to satisfy the supposed 
requirements of the colony of Labuan, and enhanced 
by fear of foreign interest on the coast and by 
the vitality of British commercial interests in 
the area*
266. FO to Lees, 2 May, 1881, FO 12/51.
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Summary*
After 1868 Britain1s attention to Borneo matters 
moved northward and centred on Brunei. Her policy 
was based upon the restrictive article of the Brunei 
treaty of I8H7. Because of the weakness of the 
Brunei government and its dependence upon British 
support and advice, and because at least twice during 
the 1870*s the sultan broke his treaty with Britain, 
the implementation of British policy depended to a 
great extent upon the representative at Brunei, the 
consul-general, and his influence at the Brunei court. 
The consul was also the governor of Labuan, and the 
possession of that colony influenced British relations 
with Brunei. The governors were often overly concerned 
with the position of Labuan and their own prestige at 
Brunei.
Raja Brooke of Sarawak was in competition with the
governors for influence at Brunei. Brooke1 s desire to
v L, '
annex more Brunei territory was opposed by succeeding 
governors. They thought that by moving northward 
Sarawak would compete commercially with Labuan, and 
that the raja*s prestige at the sultan1s court would 
increase. Both would, it was thought, undercut the 
British position.
265
The British government followed closely the 
recommendations of their representative. They 
interfered in Brunei affairs to prevent Brooke from 
annexing Baram on the basis of the restrictive 
clause. Thereby they seemed to support the view 
that Sarawak was independent and, moreover, a 
foreign state. Britain interfered again to streng­
then the sultan1s government by urging upon the 
sultan^£hej^  choice for. successor to the throne.
He was duly installed.
The weakness of British policy was in the fact 
that it was too dependent upon the consul and his 
influence. The sultan could not be trusted to 
uphold the restrictive article in his treaty with 
Britain. The Foreign Office supported the consul* 
As firm as that support was during the l86o*s and 
lSyo^ the application of British policy was 
ineffective. It had not prevented foreigners from 
wringing concessions from the sultan who merely on 
the whim of the moment and the size of the expected 
payment decided whether or not to honour his treaty 
obligations with Britain. Yet the Foreign Office 
clung to the policy, applying it in the case of
Raja Brooke, and ignoring it in the case of Dent 
and Overbeck. Part of the answer to this incon­
sistency is attributable to the personalities 
involved* Raja Brooke was distrusted while the 
Dent and Overbeck had strong adherents among 
British officials.
Borneo policy at the Foreign Office never 
seemed quite so simple either in its formulation 
or application, as it was at the Colonial Office* 
The Colonial Office in contributing their efforts 
toward British dominance of the northwest coast 
merely had to protect Labuan. The prosperity and 
success of Labuan as a source of coal and as a 
commercial entrepot was found to be a will-o*-the- 
wisp*- When the Colonial Office became convinced of 
the colony1s failure they gave their support, with 
the prodding of Governor Ussher, to the only other 
effective British effort on the coast, Sarawak*.
By this time the question of British support for 
the north Borneo project was an issue. The Foreign 
Office decided to postpone a decision on Brooke*s 
annexation of Baram until the charter issue was 
settled.
Why did not the Foreign Office correct the 
obvious weakness in their Borneo policy? The 
answer seems to be that until 1878 no issue or 
challenge to the policy became of sufficient 
importance to move officials in London to streng­
then their position in Borneo* In the two major 
instances when British policy failed fortunate 
circumstances arose which favoured British interests* 
In the case of the American company the United States 
government refused to take advantage of its conces­
sions and the company1s efforts at Kimanis failed 
within a year* In the case of Baron Overbeck a 
respected British commercial firm soon became the 
Baron’s partner in the scheme and presently bought 
up his rights.
Had there been a serious and sustained threat 
to the British position in Borneo article X could 
not have been relied upon. Undoubtedly interven­
tion backed by naval power would have been resorted 
to* The intervention over the succession issue 
indicated Britain’s determination to maintain her 
dominance on the coast. Other powers were aware of 
Britain’s dominance not only because of her presence
in Labuan, but because of her immediate diplomatic 
response to any threats of a foreign footing on the 
coast. This contributed to the lack of any serious 
challenge to the British position.
Britain’s policy may have been weak and the 
direction of it hesitant, yet by intervening she 
had committed herself in Borneo more deeply than 
before. During the 1870’s her interests in the 
area had intensified. During the 1880’s her 
position was to become de .jure as well as de facto.
CHAPTER V .
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
STATE OF NORTH BORNEO
British policy in Borneo during the 1860’s 
and l870!s has now been examined through the eyes 
of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, the two 
departments of government most concerned with the 
British interest in the area. We have traced the 
development of the main issues confronting the 
policy makers and have concluded that the policy 
was weak and ineffective although no strong 
challenge had arisen to test the British position. 
British intervention was necessary because of the 
failure of policy. We now come to a point in 
Anglo-Bornean relations, around the year 1878, 
when it became evident that British policy would 
have to be placed on a more reliable basis or the 
government would have to be prepared to see a 
diminution of British influence in the island, 
probably matched by an increase in the attention
of other powers. There was little desire to see 
the latter process occur, in either government 
circles or among those people, mainly businessmen^ 
who were interested in the east*
Attention focused in 1878 on the cession which 
Dent and Overbeck had obtained in northern Borneo 
and their application for British government support. 
But, before examining the nature of the cession and 
considering the official response to the request, 
we must discuss other forces which had a bearing 
upon the question of Britain’s continued dominance 
of the Borneo flank of the South China Sea* These 
forces complicated the problem which Britain faced 
in deciding the Dent-Overbeck question.
In a sense the Baram issue, arising from the 
efforts of Sarawak to extend northward, to be seen 
in its proper perspective, must be considered one 
of these forces. Had the raja not pressed north­
ward, the north Borneo problem would have been 
easier for the government to resolve. Yet, Sarawak 
was British in nature and it could be argued that 
had British policy been based on a wholehearted 
support of Sarawak, rather than on Brunei, it would
271.
not in 1878 be in a weakened and ineffective condition. 
For Sarawak was a viable and influential state, the 
healthiest state in the area, and the raja was 
experienced at ruling native people in Borneo,
Baram has been fully discussed. The final settle­
ment awaited the governments decision on the Dent- 
Overbeck question. A second and potentially more 
dangerous force was the power rivalry which during 
the 18701s was developing in and around the Sulu 
Archipelago and northern Borneo. To examine this 
force it is now necessary to digress to 1871 and 
analyse the nature of the Spanish activities in 
these areas.
It will be remembered from Chapter HI that 
following the Spanish expedition against Sulu in 
1858, Spain proclaimed the Sulu Archipelago closed
i
to foreign commercial vessels,”" and established a 
garrison and naval station on Balabac Island. In 
a note to Spain in August 186.0 , Britain had refused 
to recognize Spanish sovereignty in Sulu and her
1~. Proclamation of 2 July, i860, copy enclosed in India 
Office to FO, 15 Feb., 1862. FO 71/1. See also P.P.1882 
LXXH, 326-7.
right to prevent trade* In 1871 a series of
incidents occurred which had far reaching effects
upon British-Bornean policy* The Spanish govern-
2
ment protested to Britain in July that traders 
from Labuan and Singapore were operating in Sulu 
in defiance of the proclamation of 2 July, i860. 
The Spanish minister asked Lord Granville to 
again remind commercial circles of the restriction 
on trade with Sulu.
Spain was quite accurate in her opinion of 
Labuan trade, for Hennessy reported in August 
that trade with Sulu for the past three years was 
in no way checked by the Spanish authorities, and
H
that it was an increasing and valuable trade.
In a moment of absent-mindedness which it was 
later to regret, the Foreign Office agreed to
5.
publicise the Spanish circular of i860., It read 
in part:
2. Spanish Min. (London) To Granville, 18 July, I87I, 
FO 71/2.
3* The proclamation of i860 had been publicised•in 
the Straits' Government Gazette. See Cavehagh to 
Cortez, 10 Sept., i860, in P.P. on.cit. p.326. 
k. Hennessy to FO, 15 Aug., 1871, FO 12/37«
5. FO to Board of Trade, 31 July, 1871; FO to Spanish 
Min.. 31 July. 1871. FO 71/2: and London Gazette, 
k Aug., 1871.
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Owing to repeated infractions of the Custom 
House regulations enforced in the Philippines 
by foreign vessels which have carried to the 
Island of Sulu illicit merchandise, ammunition, 
and stores of war ... the ports of Manila, Sual,
Iloilo, and Zamboanga, alone being open to 
foreign trade, no direct traffic will be permit­
ted under a foreign flag, with Sulu and its 
dependencies, which according to the capitulation 
of 30 th of April 1851'* form an integral part of 
the Philippine Archipelago.
It was apparent that the Spanish move was in
preparation for a renewed attempt to bring Sulu under
6
Spanish control. Preparations began in Manila for 
an expedition of five warships and several gunboats 
with an armed force to garrison military posts in
1
the main islands.
The reason for Spain’s desire to achieve a de facto 
control over Sulu had not changed over the years, 
although the desire had grown more intense with the 
blow to Spanish prestige by the refusal of Sulu to 
remain quietly under Spanish sovereignty despite the 
capitulations of 1836 and 1851. The Philippine govern­
ment allegedly desired to extirpate piracy around her
southern islands - Sulu being the main resort of
8
Illanun and Balanini pirates. But the real reason
TT. Ricketts to Granville, 15 Oct., 1871, FO 71/2*
7. Ibid.: and Bulwer to Granville, 29 Dec., 1871* F012/37*
8. In the summer of 1872 Commander Chimno of HMS Nassau 
on hydrographic survey work in the Sulu Sea destroyed 
three Balanini prahus which had attacked a party from his
See IJulwer to Granville, 29 Dec., 1871* and 12 June,
remained Spain1s jealousy of foreign influence in
Sulu and the desire to exclude foreign vessels
from the trade of the islands. In the words of the
Spanish Captain-General* Tto ensure the indisputable
and complete dominance of Spain in the south of the 
2
Archipelago*. One Manila newspaper declared that
the Spanish monopoly of trade at Sulu was the main
12
object of the expedition. Indeed, this would seem 
so from the emphasis placed upon the reissue of the 
circular of i860, and the protest from British 
commercial circles when that proclamation was
11
published in the Singapore papers late in the year* 
Consul Ricketts pointed out that the piracy issue 
was merely the excuse for the expedition, for the 
possession of Sulu was not necessary to exterminate 
piracy* Ricketts suggested that Britain recognize 
Spanish claims in Sulu only if British trade continued 
unhampered.
The Spanish squadron began the bombardment of 
Sulu in October 1871* In December, reports of the
9« Ricketts to Granville, 11, 1*+ and 15 Oct., 1871*
FO 71/2.
10. Bulwer to Granville, 29 Dec., 1871* FO 12/37.
11. Straits Times, Nov.18, 1871, and Straits Observer
8 Dec.", 1871. ~ .
12. Ricketts* Oct. dispatches; Bulwer*s disp. of 
29 Dec., I87I ; Adm. to FO. 7 Dec., I87I? and Gov. of 
Hong Kong to CO, 7 Nov., 18/1, FO 71/2.
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vigour and seriousness of this latest Spanish attempt
IE
to subdue Sulu reached London from several sources.
Consuls Ricketts in Manila and Bulwer in Borneo kept
the Foreign Office informed of Spanish moves. Closer
to the scene Commander Chimno of HMS Nassau reported
to the Admiralty. All agreed that British trade with
Sulu was endangered.
The Foreign Office now decided to look into the
question of Britainfs political relations with Sulu..
The most recent information was found in memoranda
12
and correspondence with the India Office in 1865*
At that time the Palmerston-Russell government refused 
to pursue the subject except to reiterate Britain*s 
non-recognition of Spanish sovereignty. Now in I87I 
Lord Granville decided that Britain could not inter-
I k
fere between Spain and Sulu, and merely warned Spain 
of the necessity of safeguarding British commerce in
1 5
Sulu. This was a mild warning in light of the 
publication in the London Gazette of the Spanish 
prohibition of direct trade with Sulu and is only
13. See above, p.93*
1*+. Hertslet memo, 11 Dec.. 1871, FO 71/2.
15- Granville to Layard, 18 Dec., I871, FO 71/2.
explained by the fact that the officials in the
political department at the Foreign Office had no
knowledge of the July correspondence with Spain
and the insertion in the Gazette of August. This
matter had been handled in the commercial department
as a Spanish trade matter and for some reason the
correspondence had not been registered in the
16
political department. Hertslet noted it first
H
in his memorandum of k May, 1872.
Nevertheless the Spanish minister assured Mr.
Layard that the Captain-Generalrs activity in Sulu
in preventing legitimate trade was not approved.
18
Britain*s trade would not be hampered.
The Foreign Office first became aware that
Spain1s latest campaign in Sulu was of serious concern
to British interests early in I872 with the arrival
12
of Consul Bulwer*s dispatch of 29 December. Bulwer
16. Green "memo, 18 Feb., J-87^, FO 71/5.
17. Hertslet memo, k May, 1872, FO 71/2.
18. Layard to Granville, 18 Jan., 1872, FO 71/2.
19. Hertslet memo, 12 Feb., 1872, FO 71/2.
20. Bulwer to Granville, 27 April, I872, FO 71/2.
21. Adm. to FO, 2 Aug., 1872, enclosing Chimno to Adm.,
1 March, 1872, FO 71/2.
22. Granville to French, 9 and 31 August, 1872, FO 71/2.
sent a copy of the Captain-General1s circular which
had appeared in the Singapore papers in November and
December along with the adverse reaction of Singapore
commercial interests. But more important was a
20
dispatch from Bulwer of 27 April. The Spaniards, 
said Bulwer, had bombarded and blockaded Sulu contin­
uously for over five months and had increased their 
naval force from five to thirty-five ships of varying 
sizes. There had been no trade or communication 
between Labuan and Sulu during the first three months 
of 1872. On top of this came the news that Commander
Chimnofs surveying work had been interfered with
21
despite Spanish promises of co-operation. The
vigour of the Spanish campaign in Sulu coupled with
the trade prohibition was obviously a more serious
matter than a mere expedition to subdue the sultan.
Spain was indeed bent on closing the Sulu Archipelago
to British traders.
In August the Foreign Office addressed two notes,
protesting against Spanish interference with British
22
shipping and surveying, to the Spanish government.
How, asked Britain, did Spain explain this interference 
in view of the assurances given in the Spanish note of
January* Spain, said Granville, had re-issued the
proclamation of i860, but in 1861 had assured Britain
that the prohibition only applied to munitions of war
and not to general trade which Spain wanted to encourage.
To Commander Chimnofs complaint Spain replied that the
presence of M S  Nassau had an unsettling effect upon
the minds of the rebellious Sulu people and it had
2k
therefore been necessary to ask Chimno to leave.
As to interference with British trade Spain said no 
trade was allowed with Sulu. The Spanish Government 
were taking a much firmer stand than they had expressed 
in their note of January. The press in Madrid took up 
a similar theme. News articles accused the British of
15
giving material aid to Sulu. Indeed, there was some
basis for this opinion, on the surface at least, for
late in the year the sultan addressed letters to the
British government saying that he refused to capitulate
26
and asking for British support. Noting the presence
2 3 * Hertslet memo, k May 1872, FO 71/2. Hertslet quotes 
Spanish minister to FO, April, l86l..
2h . Spanish Foreign Min. to Layard, 20 Sept., 1872,
FO 71/2.
25. Layard to Granville, 16 Dec., 1872, FO 71/2.
26. CO to FO, 17 Oct., 1872, FO 71/2. The sultan had 
entrusted his letters to Commander Chimno who sent them 
to Governor Ord of Singapore for transmittal to London.
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in Sulu waters of the survey ship Nassau and the
friendly intercourse between her commander and the
sultan the logical conclusion to the casual observer
was that Britain was indeed answering the sultan1s
call for help. Undoubtedly the Spanish fears of a
foreign footing in the Sulu-Archipelago were aroused
by the movements of the Nassau. Commander Chimno wrote,
1....  from the time of my arrival in the Philippines
to survey the Sulu Islands, the Spanish authorities
could not understand why we were going to survey these.
27
islands if not to take possession of them.r There
matters stood at the close of 1872.
In 1873 a new element was introduced into the
Sulu issue. The sultan of Sulu had appealed to Germany
for protection and aid against the Spaniards and Captain
von Blanc in the German ship of war Nymnh had arrived
28
in the area to investigate. Some German traders as 
well as British had been getting through the blockade 
to Sulu, and one of these had been granted permission 
by the sultan to establish a trading station at Sandakan
27. Chimno to Adm., 2k Feb., 1872. FO 71/3. The 
surveying work extended from mid-1870 to mid-1872. See 
Navy List. June 1870 and Sept.1872.
28.. See above pp.249-250,
12
Bay. These moves by the Germans alarmed Consul
Bulwer who saw a danger to the British position in
yet another nation showing interest in Borneo. The
immediate reaction at the Foreign Office was a wait
and see attitude. One official noted and Lord Granville 
30
agreed that it remained to be seen whether Germany 
would protect her traders, and in any case Britain 
must claim equal privilege with any German venture 
where Spain was concerned. The British minister in 
Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, was asked to report on the
II
German governments position.,
In the meantime the Spaniards intensified their
Sulu blockade by another notice in the Singapore papers.
Henceforth, said the Spanish Consul, Spanish warships
<^\would vigourously enforce the prohibition of foreign 
/  11
vessels in Sulu. At the same time Governor Ord warned
the Colonial Office that the Spanish moves in Sulu
11
were antagonizing Singapore traders. Granville told
29. Ibid, and Bulwer to Granville, 9 Aug., 1873? FO 71/3*
30. Senior Clerk William Wylde and Granville minutes 
of 30 Sept., 1873, FO 71/3.
31. Granville minute. 27 May, 1873? FO 71/3? and Charge 
Adams to Granville, 16 Aug., 1873? and FO to CO, 27 Aug.,
1873? CO ikk/kl.
32. CO to FO, 1 May, 1873 enclosing copy of notice by 
Spanish Consul Mencarini in Straits Times. 22 Feb., 1873, 
FO 71/3.
33. Ord to CO, 13 March, 1873? FO 71/3.
Kimberley that Britain had no grounds for objecting
&
to the notice. Even when Admiral Shadwell, comman­
ding the China station, reported that the Sulu Sea 
was closed to British ships, the foreign secretary
25
minuted, *1 do not think we can interfere.1
Despite the fact that Granville was constant 
in his belief that Britain ought not to extend her 
colonial responsibilities, this does not completely 
explain his lack of vitality in pursuing, this 
obvious challenge to a long held British policy of 
freedom of trade with the Sulu Archipelago. It can 
only be explained by noting Foreign Office reliance 
upon the protests already made to Spain, and the 
belief that the Spanish closure only applied to 
ships trading in arms. Both Tenterden and Granville 
referred to this when considering the Colonial
36
Office fs letter of 1 May. But officials at the 
Colonial Office were not satisfied with what they 
considered negligence on the part of the Foreign Office
3*+. Granville to Kimberley, 12 May, 1873? FO 71/3*
35. Adm. to FO, 13 May, 1873? enclosing a letter from 
Adm.Shadwell; Granville’s minute of 15 May, 1873 and 
FO to Adm, 17 May, 1873? FO 71/3.
36. Tenterden and Granville minutes of 2 May, 1873 with 
reference to Hertslet memo of h May, 1871? Granville to 
Layard, 20 Oct. 1873? FO 71/3.
in pressing the Sulu issue. Meade wrote to Tenterden
that the trade of Sulu was vital to Labuan. ’Does
Spain’, he asked, ’have actual jurisdiction over 
22
Sulu?’
Up to this point the Foreign Office accepted the 
conclusions of the l86l+-65 review of the Sulu sover­
eignty issue as still policy.. It will be remembered 
that at that time Consul Webb in Manila reported 
that Sulu seemed to submit to Spanish sovereignty.
The India Office saw no disadvantage to Spain’s 
occupation of the archipelago and the Foreign Office 
refused to pursue the question although refusing to 
recognize Spanish sovereignty. Now upon receipt of
Meade's letter Assistant Undersecretary Lister decided
28
to review the Spanish claims. The law officers
were consulted on the bearing of various treaties on 
22
the subject. But before the law officers could 
return a report events occurred which greatly com­
plicated the question.
37* Meade to Tenterden, 19 May, 1873? FO 71/3* It 
will be remembered that the Colonial Office at this 
time although disillusioned with Labuan was neverthe­
less giving the colony all the lee-way for proving 
itself.
38. Lister minute of 23 May, 1873? FO 71/3*
39. These treaties included the East India Company treaties 
of 1763? 176^ and 1769? the Brooke treaty of lc&9? and the 
Spanish Sulu treaties of 1836 and 1851.
In September a petition from Chinese traders in 
Singapore asking for British action against the
4o
Spanish blockade of Sulu-confirmed the view of 
the Colonial Office that trade with Sulu was
ki
suffering severely. In the same month an incident
took place which was sooner or later inevitable if
the Spanish were at all serious in their blockade.
The Spaniards seized a German ship, the Marie Louise.
which was under charter to an alleged British firm
42
in Hong Kong, Augustus Head and Company. The 
agent of the company, Mr. J.B. Field, a British 
subject, was on board. The Marie Louise, although 
ostensibly on a voyage from Hong Kong to Singapore, 
was acting suspiciously when captured and was undoub- 
tedly selling arms to Sulu. Field and one other 
British subject were imprisoned on the ship and were 
not permitted to contact the British consul in Manila. 
Field later escaped from the ship to the British
4 0 . Meade to Tenterden, 2 Sept., 1873? enclosing the 
petition. FO 71/3*
Hi.. Meade to Tenterden, 3 Sept., 1873? FO 71/3*
42. Herbert to Tenterden, 9 Oct, 1873 enclosing a 
telegram from Gov.Kennedy of Hong Kong, FO 71/3* A 
second brig, Gazelle was detained but later released 
after the Manila prize court had confiscated the contra­
band portion of her cargo. See Layard to FO, 23 March, 
187^ *? FO 71/3; and Carvajal (Spanish Foreign Min.) to 
German Minister von Canitz, 22 Dec, 1873, P.P. oo.cit.
pp.330-1 . - —
^3. Ibid.
Consulate and then from the Philippines altogether*
He was reportedly under indictment for a previous 
case of smuggling into the Philippines.
Before the incident was over the consul at Manila 
twice called for a British warship, M S  Kestrel being 
sent. When finally the courts in Madrid set aside 
the decision of a hastily summoned prize court in 
Manila and the Marie Louise was returned to her owners 
she was found in a badly deteriorated state, having 
been used in the interim as a transport by the Spanish 
authorities. The owner sued for restitution. After 
years of correspondence with Madrid over the confis­
cation of the cargo it was discovered that Augustus 
Head and Company was an American and not a British 
firm, therefore Britainfs interests only involved the 
detention of the British subjects.
\
The case of the Marie Louise is interesting to us 
for it, firstly, brought Britain and Germany together 
for joint action against Spain which led to the 
protocols of 1877 and 1885, and secondly, it furnished 
the spark for the challenge to the Spanish blockade 
and prohibition of foreign commerce in the Sulu
kb* CO to FO, 18 June, 1877, FO 71/12.
Archipelago. Under pressure from the Colonial 
Office and Admiralty, Granville made a strong
hi
protest to Spain. While again specifically 
refraining from recognizing Spanish sovereignty 
in Sulu he asked that Spain confine her prohibition 
to those ships engaged in *ille^Lr traffic. At 
the time the details of the capture of the Marie 
Louise were not known in London, the Colonial 
Office having received only a telegram from 
Governor Kennedy. Thus when Count Munster, the 
German Minister in London, inquired what infor­
mation Britain had about the ships Granville
M
could only reply that he had no reliable details. 
But it is noteworthy that from this point British- 
German co-operation on the Sulu issue commenced. 
Granville promised to confer with Munster when 
more information was received. It must also be 
noted that the British reaction to the entrance 
of Germany in the Sulu issue was a distrust of her 
intentions Lord Kimberley thought that the Germans
Granville to Layard, 20 Oct., 1873, Layard to 
Spanish Foreign Minister, 8 Nov., 1873, FO 71/3*
■^6. Granville to Munster, 15 Nov., 1873, FO 71/3«
should be watched closely although he could see
hi
no grounds for obstructing their traders in Borneo. 
But Tenterden and Granville were more suspicious of 
German aims, and asked Odo Russell in Berlin to 
report any German move to gain possessions in the
8
area or to interfere in the Sulu-Spanish affair. 
Granville noted that Count Munster!s inquiry was 
significant in the light of Bulwer*s dispatches 
warning of German interest in Borneo. The Foreign 
Minister itemized the German activities; Sulu had 
asked for German protection; Germany sent the war­
ship Nymph to investigate the Sulu-Spanish dispute; 
the German trader Captain Schuck was granted land 
at Sandakan ’commanding the entrance to the bay1.
The capture of German ships and the possibility 
that Germany would treat with Sulu, Granville thought
it2-
would bring her into collision with Spain* Britain 
interest in the case not only concerned the freedom 
of trade in Sulu but the fact that the route of the 
growing commerce between Australia and China lay
io
through the Sulu Archipelago.
kj. Kimberley to Granville, 11 Oct., 1873} CO lMt/Ul 
*+8. Granville to Russell, 15 Nov., 1873} FO 71/3*
^9. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
British distrust was somewhat allayed when 
German Foreign Minister von Bulow assured Russell 
that his country had no wish to acquire territory
5k
in Sulu or indeed in any other place.
German-British co-operation soon became evident* 
When the details of the Marie Louise case arrived
in a dispatch from Governor Kennedy of Hong Kong
51
in late November and there had been no answer
from Spain to the British note, all the papers
52l
regarding the Sulu issue were sent to Germany.
Germany protested in Madrid against the blockade
St
and the capture of her ships. Later Layard was
instructed to co-operate with his German colleague
12
in the matter. Soon Germany proposed, and the 
Foreign Office agreed, to continue co-operating
5L
over the issue of the sovereignty of Sulu.
5l. Russell to Granville, 21 Nov., 1873, FO 71/3*
52.. Kennedy to CO, 2 Oct., 1873, FO 71/3*
53. Tenterden minute, 27 Nov., 1873, FO 71/3* See also 
Munster to Granville, 11 Dec., 1873; and Granville minute 
of 29 Dec., 1873, FO 7lA.
Layard to FO, 8 Dec., 1873, FO 71/*+.
55* Layard to Granville, 5 Jan., 18A ,  FO 71/5-
56. Munster to Granville, 19 Jan., 18A; and Tenterden
minute of 21 Jan., 1871+, FO 71/5.
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In the meantime rumours of the seizure of British
ships and the details of the Marie Louise case gave 
fresh impetus for stronger action. The Foreign
Office considered sending ships to Sulu to protect
21
British trade. However, it was decided to await
the Spanish answer to the note and to ask the lav/
officers to pronounce on both the Spanish claim of
58
sovereignty and the validity of the blockade. 
Tenterden minuted that the issue had assumed too
important an aspect for a mere reminder to Spain to 
answer the note. The Spanish answer came early in
23
December. It was found to be unsatisfactory, for 
it contained in principle the assumption of Spanish 
sovereignty in Sulu. Carvajal, the Spanish Foreign 
Minister, repeated that the prohibition of trade 
applied to all Philippine ports except Manila, Sual,
Iloilo and Zamboanga. He inferred that it behoved
— -----------------
the British government to protest for the notice of
the prohibition had been published in the London
Gazette in 1871 with the apparent approval of Lord
Granville himself. No other government, said Carvajal,
against
had seen fit to protest/the notice.
5?7« Elliott minutes of 21 and 26 Nov., 1873? FO 71/3* 
58. Tenterden minute, 27 Nov., 1873> FO 71/3*
59* Carvajal to Layard, 2 Dec., in Layard to Granville 
8 Dec. , 1873, FO 71 A .
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The Foreign Office were caught in their own
error. They had indeed ordered the publication of
the Spanish notice. But in due course they told
Spain that they did not consider the publication of
the notice in the London Gazette as a recognition of
60
Spanish sovereignty in Sulu. Layard was instructed
to say that Britain was 1 inadvertently led to imaginer
that the notice published in 1871 and which had also
been printed in Singapore in February 1873 was solely
for the suppression of piracy. If it were known that
the notice was identical to the one issued in i860
Her Majesty1s Government, said the instructions,
would have refuted Spain1s claim of sovereignty over
Sulu. This was a rather weak explanation of what
61
Lister called ran unlucky oversight1, and the
blunder was not lost on the Colonial Office which
was impatient of what they considered the Foreign
62
Officefs indifference to the Sulu-Spanish issue.- 
Indeed it is inconceivable that the Spanish ministers
60., Layard to Sagasta (new Spanish foreign min.).
17 Feb., 187*+, in Layard to Granville, 18 Feb., 187*4 FO 71/5
61. Lister minute of 29 Dec.. 1873, FO 71/5.
62. Meade minute, 12 Aug., 187*4, CO lkk/k2+
should accept such an explanation in view of the fact 
that the Spanish note of 18 July, 1871 requesting the 
publication of the notice had specifically referred 
to its having been first issued in i860. But much 
of the weakness of the explanation in this new note 
to Spain was covered by the maig. content being a 
protest of the illegal blockade and the ill-treat­
ment of British subjects. While the question of 
Spanish sovereignty and the blockade were being 
considered the Admiralty was instructed to watch
the Sulu-Spanish situation and send a warship to
6k
the area when necessary*
At this time there was a change in government 
in London, The Liberals who had been much blamed 
for inactivity in international and imperial 
questions during Gladstone's ministry were replaced 
by the Conservatives under Disraeli in February 187k* 
The latter had much to say and propose in the way of 
greater British involvement in the political affairs
63• The Foreign Office reasoned that to be recognized 
a blockade must involve two belligerents and be so 
proclaimed* A state of war was never proclaimed in 
Sulu, and assuming it had been no proper proclamation 
of blockade had been issued until 2 8 Oct*, one month 
after the seizure of the Marie Louise*
6k* Tenterden to Adm*, k Feb*, 1&7^> FO 71/5*
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in Europe, and the extension of imperial respon­
sibilities was to be solicited rather than shunned*
vigoi/rous prosecution of foreign policy was fore
cast*
Granville had left the Sulu question in a very 
unfortunate condition, for the note to Spain had 
admitted an error in the governments handling of 
the issue.. Hertslet declared that he for one was 
at a loss to know what to do - the blockade notice
had not been withdrawn and the sovereignty question
65
was still being considered by the law offices.
Tenterden, and Derby, who now returned to the Foreign
Office, decided to do nothing until the law officers
66
report was received.
6Z
The report was received in May. It stated 
that since Britain had allowed Spain to act under 
her claim of sovereignty in Sulu by proclaiming the 
prohibition of trade she could not now object to
5^. Herts 1 et minute, 2^ Feb., 187*+, FO 71/5*
60. Minutes of Tenterden and Derby, 2h Feb., 187^5 FO 71/5 
67. LO to FO, 26 May; FO to CO, 1 Aug., 187*+, the law 
officers first returned the Sulu papers on 22 April without 
a report. Tenterden was irritated for the law officers 
had received a steady flow of documents, and why no report 
was prepared is not known. Perhaps no formal request for 
one was made. If so it was just one more example of the 
inept handling of the Sulu-Spanish question. See Tenterden 
minute 23 April, 187^; and Tenterden to LO, same date,
FO 71/5.
Spanish sovereignty. However, Derby decided that it
was not necessary to announce this to Spain unless
questioned. He told Layard that the Spanish claim
was of doubtful validity but that Britain was not
68
in a position to protest against it.
The Colonial Office pressed for action. They had 
received a constant stream of protests of Spanish 
cruelty and atrocities in Sulu and of the closure
69
of the Sulu Sea to traders in Singapore and Labuan.
22.
Trade continued to suffer. Permanent officials at
the Colonial Office were already initated by the
Foreign Office error in allowing the Spanish notice
21
to be published. Aside from the 1 theoretical1 
question of sovereignty they felt Lord Derby ought 
to take strong action in Madrid and bring Spain to 
her responsibilities in the conduct of her Eastern
a U  natioas *ith i n t e r n s  
there. They urged as a„ first step the sending of a
88". Derby minute, 26 May„ 187^5 FO 71/5-
69.- In August 1873 the Philippine authorities announced 
that strong measures would be taken against the Sulu 
rebels: Sulu vessels were to be destroyed; armed native 
vessels would be treated as pirates and their crews 
condemned to forced labour. See Report in the Straits 
Times, n.d. August, 1873 of article in Diario de Manila.
2 Aug., 1873. 
70. Bulwer to CO, I k  Jan., 9 May, 187*+; CO to FO, 3 July 
187*+, FO 71/5.
warship to observe and report on conditions in Sulu. 
Lord Derby agreed to this and Admiral Shadwell sent
23
HMS Frolic under Captain Buckle. But in view of 
the law officers1 report opposition to Spanish 
sovereignty was a difficult problem. Lister took
2k
on the task of formulating a stand. He reasoned 
that despite the fact that Spain had been unable to 
establish herself in the Sulu Islands the law offices
considered that prohibition of trade with Sulu was an 
act of sovereignty. But in l86l Spain had assured 
Britain that the prohibition, originally proclaimed 
in July i860, applied only to munitions. As the 
circular of 1871 was merely a reissue of the i860 
document, said Lister, Britain could hold Spain to 
this. As for the blockade, Spain had not properly 
given notice of it and she had never declared Sulu 
in a state of belligerency. In effect this was a 
slightly more refined version of the view taken by
71. CO Minute, 12 Aug., 1874, CO 144/43.
72. CO to FO, 11 Sept., 1871*, FO 71/5.
73. Derby minute, 19 Sept.; FO to Adm., 2 Oct.; and 
Adm. to FO, Ik Dec., 1874, FO 71/5.
7*+. Lister memo, 21 Sept., 1874 5 FO 71/5-
75. Meade to Bourke, 3 Feb., 1874, FO 71/6.
the 'Foreign Office in their previous note to Spain 
in February 1874. It was an attempt to repair some 
of the damage done by the publication of the Spanish 
notice*
Lord Derby agreed with Lister1s argument and pending 
Captain Buckle’s report this was the line taken.
In the meantime the short-lived Spanish Republic 
was replaced by a monarchy in January 1875* In 
February the Foreign Office at the insistence of the
Z5
Colonial Office addressed a mild note of protest to 
the new Spanish government over the reported severe
Ik
naval' activitiy against.the Sulu Islands.
Much of the difficulty in handling the Sulu issue 
stemmed from the Spanish government’s slowness in 
answering British notes and in its correspondence 
with Manila. Much doubt existed in London that 
Madrid was able to control the government in Manila.
The Philippine government seemed to follow an independent
76. Elliot minute, 10 Feb., 1875* FO 71/6. Spain’s 
response to this protest, however, was not to be made 
a condition of the recognition of the monarchy by the 
Foreign Office. See Tenterden minute of 8 Feb.1875*
295.
XL
course. Difficulties were also encountered by the
British in Manila. Ricketts complained of the
* dilatory and haphazard attention to affairsf of
the officials, and of the inability to even get a
28
letter acknowledged much less answered. It is
not surprising that the condition of her colonial
administration reflected the instability of Spain’s
domestic politics at this time.
Captain Buckle’s report of February 1875^
confirmed much of what was already known. The
Spanish occupation of the Sulu Archipelago was slight.
The treaty of 1851 was broken on both sides, but by
Spain in the first instance. The blockade though
80
interrupting normal trade was ineffective. Buckle
77. Elliot minute, 12 Dec., 1873, FO 71 A .  Spain 
admitted later that Manila was independent in financial 
matters, and evidently considered that trade and customs 
came under this heading. See Layard to FO, 7 Nov., I876 
FO 71/8* There was to be more friction between Britain 
and Spain in this matter. See West to FO, 9 Oct., 1878,
FO 71/1*+5 West to FO, Ik June, 1879, FO 71/15.
78. Ricketts to FO, 6 Feb., 1875, FO 71/6.
79. Buckle to V.Adm.Ryder, sent to Adm., 28 Feb., 1875,
co 1A A 5.
80. Ibid. W.C. Cowie and J.D* Ross, in partnership i-kLth 
Karl Schomburg of Singapore in the Labuan Trading Company, 
regularly ran the Sulu blockade. In one periodof fourteen 
months Cowie !s vessel Tony made twenty-one trips betwTeen 
Sandakan and Sulu.
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thought Spain had her eye on Sandakan Bay and northeast
Borneo, and suggested that Britain take immediate steps
to safeguard her trade.
The Colonial Office urged the use of warships to
81
force the blockade and ensure the freedom of trade,
but the Foreign Office continued to send the documents
on the subject to the law offices for advice on the
sovereignty issue. More reports of captured ships 
82
arrived. A new and more formidable Spanish
&
expedition to Sulu was being organized in Manila.
It was reported that the Sultan of Sulu agreed to 
submit to Spain if he was allowed to trade and not
8J+
forced to disarm. Meed, it seemed to the Foreign 
Office that Sulu and Spain were about to come to terms 
for Consul Ricketts in a series of private letters 
to the Foreign Office in 1875 reported that secret
85
talks were going on between Sulu and Spanish agents.
FIT CO “to FO, 10 July, 1875, FO 71/6.
82. Gov.Clarke to Carnarvon, 19 April; Low to CO, 15 
July, 1875) FO 71/6. Report of the capture of the 
British ship Nil Desperundum proved false, but the yacht 
of the Sultan of Brunei, Sultana, on charter to British 
traders, was seized. Of this seizure Meade minuted, TLet 
us hope that the Spaniards may at last kick the Foreign
■^Office into doing something a little more vigourous than 
^consuling the law offices.1 (minute of 6 Sept., 1875?
83. Ricketts (telegram) to FO, 25 April, 187*+; and
dispatch of 5 July, 1875, FO 71/6.
8*u' Low to FO, 12 Aug., 1875, FO 71/6.
85. Ricketts to FO 25 Hay, 16 June, 5 July and 18 Aug.,
1875. FO 71/6.
Finally early in 1876 Britain and Germany
agreed to a joint protest at Madrid to bring Spain
86
to a settlement of the trade question, Germany 
wanted to combine the trade and sovereignty issues 
and tell Spain that the 1836 and 1851 treaties 
would only be recognized if Spain removed the 
trade restrictions, Germany, like Britain, 
refused to admit Spanish sovereignty in Sulu
because of Spain’s failure to attain de facto
88
control. The Colonial Office also believed
that trade would not be secure until Spain gave
82
up her pretensions to sovereignty. But the
Foreign Office because of the law officers’ report,
was not ready to dispute the sovereignty claim. In
Arch therefore Germany and Britain sent identical
notes to Madrid protesting j fehe trade restrictions
but carefully avoiding recognition of Spanish
20
sovereignty over the islands.
86. Derby minute, 16 Jan., 1876; FO to Russell, 17 Jan. 
1876; Munster to FO, 10 Feb., 1876, FO 71/7. Another 
German ship, the Minna, had been seized by Spanish war­
ships in 1875*
87. Bulow to Munster, 2k Feb., I876, FO 71/7*
88. Ibid.
89. CO to FO, 28 March, 1876, FO 71/7.
90. FO to Russell, 10 June, 1876, FO 71/7.
In the meantime Layard asked the Spanish foreign 
minister about the new expedition to Sulu. He 
replied that its purpose was to enforce the 1836 
and 1851 treaties. The blockade, he said, would 
be raised and not re-established. The expedition 
of thirty-two ships and 6,000 to 8,000 men bombarded
2 3
and occupied Sulu on 29 February. Harassment by 
the Sulu people prevented a campaign into the 
interior of the islands. Sulu was garrisoned with
2k
2,000 men and in April the expedition withdrew.
But it was a hollow victory for the sultan set up 
his capital in another part of the island and refused 
to submit. The Minister of Colonies at Madrid, however, 
announced that Sulu was re-established as a Spanish
25
dominion..
91. F0 to Layard, 15 Feb., I8 76, F0 71/7.
92. Layard to F0, 20 Feb., 1 876, F0 71/7.
93. Low to F0, 2k March, 1876, F0 71/7* Low reported 
a rumour that a French warship accompanied the Spanish 
flotilla.
9*+. Ricketts to F0, 2k March and 10 April, I876, F0 71/7. 
Ricketts said 18 men-of-war and 7>000 men were involved. 
See also Consul Ussher to F0, 26 May, 1876. Cauteron, the 
missionary-priest, was suspected of urging the Spanish- 
Sulu warfare of the 1870’s to put an end to trade of 
other nations with Sulu.
95* Walsham to F0, 27 May, I8 76, F0 7/7 .
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Continued pressure on Spain by Germany and Britain
2£
brought assurances that the blockade would be lifted.
2Z
In June reports from Ricketts said this had occurred.
But in October Ussher said the blockade was still in
effect, and that Sulu was to be declared a port for the
28
coasting trade and thus closed to foreign vessels*
It was obvious to the Foreign Office that Spain by
restricting trade was trying to draw out a recognition
22
of her sovereignty. This Britain refused. But Spain
retreated somewhat in lifting the blockade, and was
slowly settling the claims arising out of the case of
ICO
the Marie Louise. The Foreign Office thus devised
a basis on which a settlement was to be arranged. So .
long as Spain did not interfere with foreign trade in
the Archipelago Britain, although not recognizing
Spanish sovereignty would not interfere with the
101
proceedings of Spain in Sulu. Later the Spanish
96. FO to Russell, 10 June; Layard to FO, 7 Nov., 1876, 
FO 71/7.
97'. Ricketts to FO, 6 and Ik June, 1876, FO 71/7.
98. Ussher to FO, 7 Oct., 1876, FO 71/8.
99- FO memo, lk Nov., I876, FO 71/8.
100. Layard to FO, 2 3 April, 187h-; Russell to FO,
12 Sept., 187S FO 71/5.
101. F0 memo, lk Nov., I876, F0 71/8.
102. Layard to Derby. 3 Jan., 1877, F0 71/10.
103. Copy in IVP., 1882, LXXXI, p.5l+5; and Hertslet, 
Treaties .....  XIV. 513-6.
foreign minister stated to Layard that Spanish
claims of sovereignty were limited to Sulu and that
102
Spain had no designs on Borneo.
The convention which was signed in Madrid on
11 March, 1877, embodied all that Germany and Britain
desired - freedom from interference to trade with 
103
Sulu. Britain and Germany agreed not to inter­
fere with Spanish attempts to occupy the islands 
and to establish customs houses on those actually 
occupied. Any reference to Spanish sovereignty was 
carefully omitted.
Earlier in the year suspicion of German intentions 
in Sulu were again brought up at the Foreign Office.
Layard from Madrid and Consul Palgrave from Manila
10*4
reported that Germany wanted a footing in Sulu.
The Foreign Office was informed that Germany was
105
sending a warship to Sulu to protect its trade,
106
and had so warned the Spanish government. Germany 
asked Britain to send warships for the same purpose. 
The Foreign Office showed some wariness of this
10*4. Layard to F0, 17 Jan. , and Palgrave to F0, 
2*4 Jan., 1877, F0 71/10.
105. F0 memo, 12 Jan., 1877, F0 71/10.
106. Layard to F0, 17 Jan., 1877, F0 71/10.
suggestion. There was a feeling that perhaps
Germany was going too far. Suspicion of Germany
was not allayed when the German minister in Madrid
told Layard that Bismarck might not want the Sulu
107
issue settled. Some credence was given to this
idea when Bismark objected to the stipulation in
the draft protocol allowing Spain to set up customs
houses in islands which she might in the future 
108
occupy. But upon representations from Britain
Bismarck withdrew his objection. Following the
protocol Germany indicated her desire for continued
110
collaboration on Sulu questions.
The significance of the negotiations leading 
up to the protocol of 1877 to the present study is 
that they show clearly that Britain considered northern 
Borneo within her sphere. In this matter Lord Derby
111
followed the line propounded by Lord Russell in i860.
In refusing to recognize Spanish claims of sovereignty 
in Sulu Derby was safeguarding northern Borneo and
107. Layard to FO, 17 Jan., 1877, FO 71/10.
108. Munster to F0, 16 Feb., 1877, F0 7}/ll.
109. F0 to Russell, 21 Feb., 1877, F0 71/11.
110.. F0 to Russell. 13 March, 1877, F0 71/11.
111. See above, p.87*
preventing it falling to another power. The sover­
eignty question was relegated to a future time and 
Britain again went only so far as the immediate 
issue warranted.
The negotiation, however, gave a legal base to 
Germany’s interests in the area and for the next 
decade Germany’s intentions were the subject of 
much official concern in Britain, as we shall see*
Of immediate benefits to Borneo and Labuan was the 
restoration of normal trade with Sulu. Spanish
authorities in the Philippines showed some reluc-
112
tance to comply with the protocol but Ussher 
reported in August that the terms were being strictly
113
observed.
The Dent-Overbeck cession.
With these events in Sulu and Raja Brooke’s pressure 
northitfard forming a background the Foreign Office received
112. Ussher to CO, 2 June 1877; Ussher to Palgrave,
20 June, 1877; and Walsham to FO, 25 June 1877, FO 71/12. 
Madrid explained that the slowness of communicating the 
protocol to Manila caused a misinterpretation of verbal 
instructions previously given to the new Governor-General 
Mariones. The confusion was soon corrected. See 
Palgrave to FO, 11 June, 1877* FO 71/12.
113. Ussher to FO, 23 Aug, 1877, FO 71/12.
the first reports of the cessions by the sultans of 
Brunei and Sulu of north Borneo to an international
iiit
syndicate headed by Baron Overbeck and Alfred Dent*
Overbeck became interested in the grant held by
Joseph Torrey and the American Trading Company of
115
Borneo in I87O. While in Europe in 187k the Baron
induced the secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy
in London, Count Montgelas, and one A*B.Mitford to go
116
in with him on the venture. Back in the east, 
Overbeck agreed to purchase Torreyfs title to north
117
Borneo for £15,000 if he could procure its renewal..
118
The sultan refused a renewal on advice of Hugh Low
but the heir to the throne, Pengeran Temenggong
112
complied on 21 June, 1875*
See above p.233-^* The syndicate consisted of Dent 
holding 27 out of k8 shares in the venture, and Overbeck 
in association with Montgelas, and Mitford, holding 21 
shares. Dent subsequently brought in his brother Edward 
partner with him in the City firm of Dent Brothers 
Company, and Overbeck sold four shares to John Dent, 
Edward’s son. See in British North Borneo Company 
Papers (BNBCoP.) the following agreements:HJuly,187^ 
between Overbeck, Montgelas and Mitford; 27 March, 1877 
between Overbeck and A. Dent; 10 Dec. 1877, between A. 
Dent and E.Dent; and 2k March 1879 between Overbeck,
A.Dent and J.Dent.
115* Tregonning, on.cit., p.9.
116. Agreement of 11 July, 187k, BNBCoP.
117. Agreement of 19 Jan., 1875, between Overbeck'and 
Torrey BNBCoP. This was only an option to buy Torrey*s 
lease. Tregonning, on.cit. p.9, erroneously stated that 
the purchase price was $1 5,000.
118. Low toDerby, 6 July, 1875, CO Ikk/kk.
119. ’Renewal of Lease’, 21 June, 1875, BNBCoP.
As we have seen Overbeck aroused the interests
of Vienna businessmen while in Europe in 187k with
120
a plan to sell his Borneo grants, once secured.
When they were advised by the Austrian government
against the project on the grounds that the American
company was unreliable Overbeck negotiated with
Alfred Dent. The Baron had by this time secured
his option agreement with Torrey.
A two part plan was agreed upon by the two
promoters of the syndicate: firstly, to negotiate
a new cession with Brunei and take possession of
the territory; and secondly, to sell it on the best
121
terms available. Dent held the controlling finan­
cial interest and was to promote the second part of 
the plan. Overbeck was named Chief Manager of the 
project in the east and agreed to carry out the 
first part.
Acting Consul Treacher of Labuan advised the Sultan 
and Overbeck to insert in the new cession agreement 
stipulations that the area would not be transferred 
without the British government’s consent, and that the
120• See above, p.252.
121. Overbeck to Dent, 2 Dec., 1879; Dent-Overbeck 
Agreement of 27 March, 1877, BNBCoP.
whole cession would be subject to the approval of
123
the Foreign Office. Treacher, however, was not 
present during the final negotiations and Overbeck 
persuaded the sultan to sign an unrestricted lease.
The sultan agreed reportedly because Overbeck con­
vinced him that he was a free agent to do with his 
territory as he pleased. The British, Overbeck said, 
had done nothing to develop the country and, moreover, 
the British-owned Oriental Coal Company were in arrears 
in the payment of rent on their mainland leases. An 
attempt by Treacher to get the restrictions inserted 
was too late. Treacher then followed Overbeck to 
Sulu in HMS Hart which happened to be on a routine 
visit to Labuan, where a similar cession was obtained. 
The sultan of Sulu and Overbeck agreed to the restric-
12k
tive clause in this lease. The cession from Sulu
was necessary because Sulu claimed most of northern
Borneo and maintained some authority over the north- 
125
east coast.
123. Treacher to Derby, 2 Jan.,1878, FO 12/53; Lease 
by the Sultan of Brunei, 29 Dec., 1877, BNBCoP.
12k. Treacher to Derby, 22 Jan., I8 78, FO 12/53; 
Lease by Sultan of Sulu, 22 Jan, 1878, BNBCoP.
125. See above, pp.' 81-82.
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On the return trip Overbeck established r-esidencies
at Sandakan, under W.B. Pryer, at Tampassuk, under
William Pretyman and at Papar, under H.L. Leicester.
Thus actual possession of the territory was established.
Treacher appointed Pryer to the post of consular agent
at Sandakan.
The presence of Treacher at Sulu in a British
warship gave rise to Spanish complaints that the
acting consul actually aided Overbeck in obtaining 
126
the cession. It is doubtful that the sultan of
Sulu needed much coaxing to lease the territory as
Sulu had been trying unsuccessfully for years, as
we have seen, to get either Britain or Germany to
127
grant some measure of aid to him. Having a 
British settlement nearby under the protection of 
a consular agent and the British flag was undoubtedly 
comforting. So also must have been the added protec­
tion afforded by the restrictive stipulations in the
v L.
 ^ treaty, attesting to British official interest-
/ h 4
'"s 126~, Spanish Consul, Singapore to Colonial Secretary
of the Straits Settlements, 22 Feb., 1878, FO 12/53*
127* ¥.B. Pryer, 1 Notes* attached to Ada Pryers manuscript
of Ten Years in North Borneo, in BNBCoP. One other consid­
er a^tlon^nayTave^moTiTTheSul tan. A rebellious chieftan, 
Datu Haroun al Raschid, later to be a puppet Spanish sultan 
had agreed with the Spaniards to set up as Governor of 
Sandakan. When Overbeck arrived with an offer to lease the
The patriotism of Treacher in encouraging legitimate
British enterprise, as was his consular duty, is not in
doubt. Once his suspicion of Overbeck was removed by
the prospects of the whole territory being organized
128
under a British company the fact that Overbeck was
not British did not overly worry him. He had a promise
from the Baron that the whole area could be placed
under the direct control of Britain whenever the govern- 
129
ment chose.
What did not seem compatible with his official
position, however, was Treacher!s wholehearted support
for this experiment on the one hand and his opposition
to Sarawak on the other. Raja BrookeTs state was a well
established and prosperous British undertaking. Treacher
maintained as late as April 1878 that its extension to
the Baram river would hurt Labuan and ought not to be 
130
tolerated. Yet three months earlier he had remarked 
that Labuan ought not to stand in the way of the Dent-
area, the sultan was able to forestall Datu Haroun and the 
Spanish by accepting the offer.
128. See Treacher!s dispatches of 2 and 22 Jan., I878,
FO 12/53.
129. Overbeck to Treacher, 1 Jan., I8 78, FO 12/53.
130. Treacher to Derby, l4 April, I878, FO 12/52.
131. Treacher to Derby, 22 Jan., I878, FO 12/53.
132. Herbert to Pauncefote, 2h April, I878; Treacher
to FO, 5 Feb., 1878, FO 12/53.
Overbeck venture, in territory even closer orientated
131
to the colony- His appointment of a Dent-Overbeck
employee as a consular agent, with the prestige such
132
an appointment gave to the project, was in contrast
to his strong hint to the sultan of Brunei against
ceding Baram to the raja from 1 the very little
133
territory left to you1. Treacher loaned the 
services of his Malay writer to Overbeck as an inter­
preter and assistant. A few months later, however, 
he carefully assigned leave to the writer for the 
period spent with Overbeck, at the same time explaining, 
lI saw no necessity to prevent him thus passing his
i n
leave.1
There are two possible explanations of Treacher*s 
strong support for the Dent-Overbeck venture. Firstly, 
a combination of considerations may have moved Treacher. 
These were: the consular duty to encourage British
enterprise; a patriotic desire to see northern Borneo 
under British influence especially as Germany andthe 
United States as well as Spain had made moves in that
133* Treacher to Sultan of Brunei, 18 Aug.. I878.FO 12/^5* 
13^. Treacher to Hicks Beach, 8 April, I878, FO 12/53*
309.
/vt- ! direction: and a react ion/of/ Raj a Brooke rs
^
opposition to the cessions. This explanation 
is the weaker because it does not account for the 
risk Treacher assumed in arousing the displeasure 
of the Foreign Office for such obvious interfer­
ence in support of Overbeck, and for the appoint­
ment of a consular agent without prior instructions. 
Secondly, and the more probable explanation is that 
certain officials in London, aware of the Dent- 
Overbeck scheme when it was planned, intimated 
their favourable views to Treacher through Overbeck.
A reading of the relevant Foreign Office and British 
North Borneo Company documents reveals quite clearly 
a number of circumstances supporting this contention* 
It is noted, for example, that Alfred Dent and 
Assistant Undersecretary Pauncefote were, if not 
friends, at least acquaintances from their Hong
135. See below pp. 319-20.
136
Kong days. Overbeck introduced himself to
Treacher as the agent of Dent. He produced
personal letters from 1 gentlemen holding high
official appointments at home1, and who had
access to previous Foreign Office correspon-
137
dence on the subject of North Borneo. During 
and after the organisation of the project there 
was frequent private contact between Dent and 
Pauncefote.
In the face of seeming official approval 
and lack of official instructions Treacher 
supported the project.
136- Pauncefote minute, 7 May, 1878, FO 12/53*
Alfred Dent was associated with the trading firm of 
Dent and Company of Hong Kong until the early 1870*s. 
Julian Pauncefote commenced his government service 
as attorney-general of Hong Kong. He was appointed 
legal adviser at the Foreign Office in 1876, becoming 
at the same time an assistant undersecretary. He 
succeeded Tenterden as permanent undersecretary in 
1882. As undersecretary he frequently acted in place 
of Tenterden who was in poor health.
137* Treacher to Salisbury, 15 July 1878, FO 12/53- 
See also Cowie, North Borneo and How it Became British 
p . C o w i e  says that the Baron convinced him he was 
supported by rpeople of very great influence1 in the 
government.
138. e.g. Dent to R.B. Read, 30 July, 10 Sept., 13 Nov 
1880, and 11 March, 1881, BNBCoP. Dent often referred 
to ’our friends1 in the Foreign Office.
I considered therefore that my duty would be 
to watch proceedings and report fully to your 
Lordship, and not to oppose altogether a 
scheme undertaken with the knowledge of and 
apparently without opposition from Her 
Majesty’s Government .... 139.
The evidence indicates that Pauncefote was one
of the officials who provided Overbeck with private
1*40
letters conveying his views to Treacher. Before 
any official communication passed between Dent and 
the Foreign Office Pauncefote was aware of the move­
ments of both Dent and Overbeck. As early as March 
1878 he advised the deferment of consideration of 
all matters connected with the project until the
return of Dent and Overbeck from the east to place
1*41
their plans before the government. In the face
l*t2
of Colonial Office opposition to the scheme and
139. Treacher to Salisbury, 15 July, 1878, FO 12/53*
1*40. Tregonning, on.cit. p.21, has suggested that the 
idea of a chartered company to develop North Borneo 
was originated by Pauncefote, and that he pressed it 
upon Dent and Sir Rutherford Alcock. However no docu­
ments in the Foreign Office correspondence nor in the 
British North Borneo Company Papers specifically 
support this although it seems quite probable. Alcock 
was another old China hand and friend of Pauncefote 
who became interested in the project and later became 
chairman of the company.
1*41. Pauncefote minute, 12 March, 1878, FO 12/53. The 
first letter from the Dent interests was dated 16 May, 1878 
from Edward Dent on behalf of his brother.,
1*42. Herbert to Pauncefote, 2b April, 1878. FO 12/53.
protests from Consul Ussher, Raja Brooke and Governor
Robinson of Singapore Pauncefote argued for British
support for the project. It was, he said, truly
a British undertaking and should be encouraged.
Salisbury agreed to await the return of the two
lbb
promoters of the venture. His minute on this
occasion indicated a favourable attitude toward the
project if British treaty rights with Brunei were
’not prejudiced* and if no more foreigners were
involved in the undertaking. Thus when the Foreign
Office received on 18 May the first official letter,
from Edward Dent, announcing the project Pauncefote
litS
was ready with a not unfavourable reply, saying 
the government awaited his brother’s return.
Although both Lister and Tenterden hesitated 
to give their complete support to the project and
1V6
to approve Treacher’s action, Pauncefote prevailed.
l*+3. Robinson to Carnarvon, 27 Feb., 1878; Pauncefote 
minute of 7 May, 1878, FO 12/53*
lbb. Salisbury minute, n.d. but follows Pauncefote 
minute of 7 May, FO 12/53.
lb5. E.Dent to Salisbury, 16 May, 1878; Pauncefote 
to E.Dent, 3 June, I878, FO 12/53. See also Hansard 
(3rd..), CCXL, 21 May, 1878, 358.
l*i6. Lister minute of 11 July; Tenterden minute of 2 
1878, FO 12/53.
He felt that the opposition of the Colonial Office 
stemmed from their reliance upon Consul Ussher who
2hl
was influenced by Raja Brooke* Treacher was 
warmly commended by the Foreign Office for his 
activities in support of the British venture as 
acting consul general, while the Colonial Office 
warned him in his capacity as acting governor of 
Labuan to keep himself and his staff aloof from
H+8
the Dent-Overbeck undertaking*
In answer to a question by Charles Dilke, Robert 
Bourke, the parliamentary undersecretary, rather 
naively stated that the appointment of Mr. Pryer 
as consular agent at Sandakan and the use of the
British flag in the Dent-Overbeck territory should
I ^ \I cause no misconception* That such misconception
! had already occurred was evident from reports from
the- east which held that British support was proved
lk7. Pauncefote minute of 29 Aug., 1878, FO 12/53*
1^8* Salisbury to Treacher, k Sept., 1878; Hicks
Beach to Treacher, 12 June, 1878, FO 12/53*
1^9* Hansard, (3rd)., CCXL, 20 June, 1878, 1881.
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150
by TreacherTs activities* Indeed Dent and Overbeck
did not hesitate to use the consular appointment to
impress the natives and Spaniards alike with the
blessing of Britain upon the project. Overbeck
instructed Pryer to fly the British flag side by
151
side with the Dent company flag. Later when 
Pryer received a permanent appointment Dent instruc­
ted him to ’make what political capital you can* of 
the appointment. Dent wrote, ’You will no doubt 
take full advantage of the consular flag and of 
your position in all matters’. Pryer was ordered 
by Dent to send copies of all his consular dispat- 
ches to the company in London* The most revealing
incident, however, was when Treacher himself withdrew
15*4
Pryer’s appointment rather than complicate relations
with the Spanish authorities in the Philippines who 
against 155
now protested/the cession. They too noted what
appeared to be British support of the project.
Treacher had to admit that the conflict of interest
in Pryerrs case was too obvious*
150. e.g. J.D. Ross to CO, 9 Aug, 1878; Treacher to, 
Salisbury 15 July, 1878 FO 12/53, with reference to 
opposition from the Straits Times and the Straits Chronicle; 
Robinson to Carnarvon, 27 Feb., 1878.
151. Overbeck to Pryer, 26 Aug., 1878, BNBCoP.
152. Dent to Pryer, 19 March, I080, BNBCoP.
153. Dent to Pryer, k Feb., 1881, BNBCoP.
15*4. Treacher to Derby, 1*4 May, 1&7&, FO 12/5.3*
155. Palgrave to Derby, 5 April 187o, enclosing articles
from Diario de Manila of 22 March and 27 March 1878, F012/53
Following the protocol of 1877 Spain continued
156
her efforts to extend control over Sulu. She held 
a precarious square mile footing on the Island of 
Sulu and was constantly harrassed by Sulu guerillas. 
But part of the population were friendly and through­
out 1877 she tried a policy of conciliation. This 
culminated on 5 February with the signing of a new
treaty only two weeks after the sultanfs cession to
157
Dent and Overbeck. Although the agreement was 
liberal toward Sulu inasmuch as the sultan was 
allowed to fly his own flag and receive a pension, 
it granted Spain the sovereignty of Sulu.
There is no doubt of the sultan’s reluctance to 
give in to Spain for he considered the Spanish request 
for a treaty an ultimatum and he was unable longer to 
resist Spanish pressure. Indeed, he made an effort 
before signing to gain British support by offering
156. Palgrave to FO, 12 June, 1877? FO 71/12.
157* Walsham (Madrid) to FO, 12 March, 18785 Treacher to 
FO, 20 April, 1878, enclosing copy of the treaty FO 71/13; 
and Palgrave to Derby 5 April, 1878 FO 12/53* Spain tried 
to keep the treaty secret until after ratification. Even 
Consul Palgrave had no knowledge of it as late as 22 
March, I878. See dispatch of that date in FO 71/13*
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to cede all of the Sulu Archipelago except two small
islands to Dent and Overbeck if the British government 
158
approved. Before ratification of the treaty the 
sultan requested British and German mediation between
152
Sulu and Spain. But while Britain and Germany were
discussing joint action the Manila authorities
prevailed upon the sultan to sign an unconditional
cession of Sulu and all its dependencies to Spain.
This he did on 22 July, 1878, being no longer able
to wait for the long desired British-German inter- 
160.
vention.’
The Spanish Philippine authorities immediately
applied this to North Borneo, as constituting a
Sulu dependency. They repeatedly compelled the
sultan to write a letter to Baron Overbeck cancelling 
l6l
his cession. But the sultan had foreseen such a 
contingency and had informed the Baron that if he 
received such a letter in the Sulu language rather
158. Gov.Robinson (telegram) to CO, 22 Feb., I878.FO 71/13
159. Treacher to FO, 20 April and 31 May, I878, FO 71/13
160. Treacher to FO, 5 Aug., I878, FO Jl/lk; Treaty 
of July 22, 187 8, copy in FVP. 1882, LXXXI, p.3*+7.
161. Sultan to Overbeck, 23 July, 1878, FO 71/1^.
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than Malay or which was improperly sealed he could
consider it as worthless, having been dictated by
162
the Spaniards. There followed a correspondence
between Overbeck and the Spanish Governor of Sulu,
Carlos Martines, in which the Baron maintained that
he represented British interests and that the Spanish
treaty could not possibly supersede the sultan’s
cession of North Borneo made six months previously.
The Spaniards followed this up with the visit
of a naval vessel to Sandakan where they threatened
16.3
to forcibly oust Pryer from his Residency. Spanish
/ Js* •» 3 ^ ^  T IsV^ AK
ships also appeared at Malludu and 'Tampassuk and 
urged the Sulu people and natives of those places 
to raise the Spanish flag. It is noteworthy that
16*4
the people refused to comply with the Spanish demand.
Pryer surrounded himself with a loyal group and resisted
the efforts of the captain of the £1 Dorado to unseat
161 ------------
him. Fortunately W.C. Cowie i^ as in Sandakan and
placed his steamer, the Far East, flying the British
162. Treacher to FO. 2^ Aug. 1878, FO 71/lb; Sultan to 
Overbeck. 22 July, 1878, BNBCoP; and Treacher to F O , 25 
April, 1879, FO 71/15.
183. Treacher to FO, 2k Sept., 1878; Mackenzie (Manila) 
to F C , 2k Oct., 1878 FO 71/1^5 Prver|s Diary, 3 Sept.,1878; 
Overbeck to Pryer, 8 Nov., 1878, BNBCoP.
16^. Treacher to FO, 2k Sept., 1878, FO 12/53.
l65. PryerTs Diary, on.cit: Ada Pryer, op.cit.
flag, between the Spanish ship and the settlement.
The El Dorado relented rather than initiate more
l66
serious Anglo-Spanish complications.
When Spain was queried on the Sandakan incident
the Spanish foreign minister replied that it was
all a mistake - Spain had no designs on North 
167
Borneo. This was to be another example, however, 
of policy made in Madrid not being implemented by 
the authorities in the Philippines, for several 
more attempts were made in the next three years
168
to establish a footing upon the northeast coast.
For practical purposes the Dent-Overbeck possession 
of North Borneo was established and the syndicate 
relied upon the Foreign Office, where they had 
influential friends, to deal with Spain-
Before considering the governments handling 
of the Dent-Overbeck cession and the charter issue 
we must note the opposition of Raja Brooke to the 
venture. We have already seen that the r.aja was
166. W.C. Cowie, op.cit. gives an interesting account 
of his part in this episode.
167. West (Madrid) to FO, 9 Oct., I878, FO 71/lb. The
Foreign Office had already received a copy of the July 22 
treaty from Spain. See West to FO, 18 Sept., 1878,
FO 71/1^-
168. e.g. Mackenzie to FO, 2k Oct., 1878, FO 71/1*+.
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angered by the cession as he had repeatedly 
been informed that Britain opposed any terri­
torial changes on the northwest coast of Borneo.
That his own aim was eventually to acquire the 
government of Brunei either as a protectorate
with the blessing of Britain or by gradual
169
cession there can be little doubt. We have 
noted his concern with the weakness and corrup­
tion of Brunei and his proposals of 187^.
When, therefore, the Dent-Overbeck syndicate 
arrived in Borneo looking very much like a 
commercial enterprise and with a foreigner as 
its chief representative, Brooke looked upon 
it as an obstacle to his plans for Borneo.
Both he and his uncle had always assumed a 
protective attitude toward Borneo, when it
iZO
seemed,to be threatened by commercial exploiters.
He sized up the new venture as a profit-making 
scheme and immediately challenged it. He accused 
Treacher of misuse of his cmsular office and a
,169. Chapter 3? passim.
170. Runciman, op.cit.. p.197> and Book III, passim 
and Usher to CO, 2? July, 1877, FO 1M + A 8.
171
warship in aiding Overbeck, He particularly
disliked Treacher !s use of M S  Hart in allegedly
pressing for the cession of Brunei in defiance
of the treaty of l8*+7* Pauncefote, however,
minuted that it ill-behoved the raja to complain
when Sarawak had herself obtained cessions * in
172
defiance of the treaty*• Brooke pointed out
that the North Borneo cession covered several
territories on the northwest coast which were
independent of the sultan and acknowledged by 
173
him to be so. The chiefs of these rivers, he 
said, had not been consulted and he would rignore 
the cession* unless Britain approved it, and do 
his best to protect the people from the * unjust­
ifiable adventure* of Overbeck.
171. Brooke to Derby, 11 April, 1878, FO 12/53*
172, Pauncefote minute of 2k May, I878, FO 12/53* 
Pauncefote was in error for the treaty specifically 
exempted British subjects such as Brooke but applied
to foreigners such as Overbeck. See above p.*-----
173* Brooke to Tenterden, 6 April, 1878, FO 12/53*
These enclaves became the subject of much negotiation
before finally coming under chartered company rule.
17*+• Brooke to Treacher, 9 April, 1878, FO 12/53*
175* Brooke to FO, 6 May, I878, enclosing letter from
Treacher of 16 April, I878. FO 12/53*
176. Minute of 2 July, I878, FO 12/53.
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The raja sailed up the coast advising some of 
the chiefs of their 'rights* and urging them to
17k
protest to Brunei. He kept Treacher informed 
of his action, and the correspondence took on a 
personal note when each accused the other of 
insulting behaviour. Pauncefote sided with
I Z 5
Treacher and would have encouraged further
animosity had not Undersecretary Bourke, Tenterden
and Lister cautioned restraint in answering Brooke's 
177
charges. The Foreign Office simply acknowledged
*
Brooke's letter and the raja turned to Consul
Ussher and the Colonial Office where he met with
128
a more sympathetic reception, as we have noted*
In London late in 1878 Dent and Overbeck 
initiated the second part of their plan - to 
translate their cession into profit. Overbeck's 
hopes of selling to a Vienna syndicate had failed. 
Moreover the restrictive clause in the Sulu lease 
and assurances which Dent and Overbeck had given
177 • Bourke, Tenterden and Lister minutes of 11 July; 
Lister minute of 7 July, 1878, FO 12/53. Lister felt 
v\ c ' treacher had been 'studiously offensive' to the raja 
'“''and would do well to try and conciliate Brooke if his 
aim was to diminish opposition to the Dent-Overbeck 
project.
178. See above p.233*
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179 180 
to British officials both in London and the east
that the project would be British, although not binding
181
made a transfer to a foreign company difficult.
Despite this news of the project in the German press
182
was duly noted at the Foreign Office.
The partners decided to sell their enterprise 
to a British company to be formed for the purpose 
of opening up North Borneo to traders and planters.
Thus they would make a profit on their initial invest­
ment and, by associating themselves with the company, 
would share in any future dividends. To gain the
greater protection of the British government they
183
sought a charter. they proposed that the company 
would always be British in character, and promised 
not to establish or allox/ trade monopolies. The 
charter, they contended, would give Britain control 
over the project without sovereign responsibilities.
179^ E.Dent to Pauncefote, 16 May, I8 78, F0 12/53*
180. Overbeck to Treacher, 1 Jan., 1878, F0 12/53*
C/i 181. Treyonning, op.cit., p.20, cites a letter from 
q Alfred to Edward Dent of 13 Feb., 1878 stating that 
Treacherrs insistence on the restrictive clause made 
a sale to a foreign country impossible.
182. C.Dilke to Bourke, 27 June, 1878, F0 12/53*
183. Dent to Salisbury, 10 Oct., and 2 Dec., 1878.
F0 12/53* Dent desired recognition and government 
support and a charter was thought the most feasible 
way short of an outright protectorate.
The government could supervise the foreign 
relations of the territory, including those 
with the sultans and|oi) Sarawak, approve the 
appointment of the governor and judicial 
officials, and prevent or approve any transfer 
of territory.
Pending action by the government on the 
request for a charter Dent and Overbeck propag­
andized their plan among a select group of 
businessmen and professional men, including 
several old far eastern hands such as Admiral 
Keppel and Rutherford Alcock, a former minister 
to China. Enthusiastic support was given to 
the project at a meeting at the Westminster 
Palace Hotel in March 1879 and Lord Salisbury
was asked to receive a deputation of Dent*s 
l§if
supporters. But although Lord Salisbury 
had spoken favourably of the cession he felt 
he could not yet publicly discuss British 
rcolonization*1 in an area apparently claimed 
by Spain and at a time when the government was
l8*t. Alcock to Salisbury, 31 March, 1879, FO 12/^k
working with Germany on a joint policy toward 
185
Spain. When Dilke raised a question in 
parliament about the cessions Undersecretary 
Bourke replied that Spain’s claim was receiving 
attention and it was imnossible to make public
186
the details of the cession question at the time* 
Indeed the Spanish Philippine authorities 
were pressing their claims on the basis of the 
Sulu treaty of July 1878 so strongly with gun­
boats and pressure on the natives that the Foreign 
Office was obliged to act to uphold their policy 
of the non-recognition of Spanish sovereignty
in Sulu. The Colonial Office had been continually
182
urging action. It was clear also that there 
was a strong desire to prevent Spain from occupy­
ing northeast Borneo because of its assumed
188
strategical importance. Moreover, under the
185. Salisbury minute, 5 April, 1879; FO to Alcock,
7 April, 1879, FO 12/54. When the protest to Spain
was made Pauncefote suggested that the public interest
such a deputation showed would strengthen the govern­
ment's position viz-a-viz Spain. Salisbury disagreed. 
See Pauncefote and Salisbury minutes, 9 June, 1879,
FO 12/54.
186. Hansard (3rd), CCXLVI, 12 June, 1879, 1698-9.
See also Dilke to Bourke, 10 April, and FO minute o.f
12 June, 1879', FO 12/54.
187. FO memo, 5 Oct., 1873, FO 71/lb.
188. FO to CO, 27 Feb., 1879, FO 12/54.
r
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urging of Pauncefote, Salisbury had decided to
189
support the Dent-Overbeck project.
In January the law officers had been consulted
120
on the sovereignty issue.. Their advice was
that Britain was not justified in objecting to
Spanish sovereignty in the Sulu Archipelago nor
191
to the Spanish-Sulu treaty of July 1878. The 
East India Company treaties with Sulu of 17&1,
176*+ and 1769 could not support a British protest
for they were fobserved or not as it suited the
purpose of the English in those seas1. Moreover, 
the Brooke treaty of 18*49 was not valid as ratif­
ication had not been completed. If, said the law 
j\ officers, the northeast coast of^Borneo was consid-
| ered a Sulu dependency, it too passed under Spanish
ji
sovereignty and the Dent cession would have to be 
I confirmed by Spain.,
F.S. Reilly, a legal adviser loaned to the 
Foreign Office by the law officers, suggested that
189. Ibid.
190. Pauncefote to law officers, 1*4 Jan., 1879, FO 71/15*
191. L0 to FO, 3 Feb., 1879, FO 71/15.
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a compromise with Spain should be worked out.
Britain should recognize Spanish sovereignty in 
the Sulu Archipelago in return for Spain*s aban­
donment of any claim on mainland Borneo. But 
Pauncefote was anxious to make a strong protest
to Madrid on the whole sovereignty issue first,
193
'whether it be legally sustainable or not*.
This would, he said, give room for negotiation
and the Reilly compromise might well be the, end
result. Pauncefote also suggested that the Spanish-
Sulu treaty was inconsistent with the spirit of
the protocol of 1877*
It was Tenterden who suggested that German
19*+
support for the protest should be sought. Germany
had requested continued collaboration on the Sulu
question when the protocol was signed and moreover
she was now questioning the legality of Spanish claims
and activities in the archipelago on the basis of the 
125
protocol. With the concurrence of the Colonial
192. Memo of 20 Feb., 1879, FO 71/1?,
193. Pauncefote minute, 2k Feb., 1879, FO 71/15* 
19^. Tenterden minute, 25 Feb., 1879, FO 71/15*
195. Ibid.
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Office and Germany the Foreign Office protested 
198
to Spain: firstly, that the Spanish-Sulu treaty of
I878 was not in accord with the spirit of the 1877 
protocol and secondly, that the northeast coast of 
Borneo did not come under Spanish sovereignty by the 
terms of the treaty, the treaty being merely, with that 
of 18519 a resubmission of Sulu on the basis of the 
I836 treaty which expressly excluded the Borneo 
dependencies of Sulu. Moreover, said the Foreign 
Office, if North Borneo were to be claimed by any 
European power, Britain had a prior claim under the 
East India Company treaty with Sulu of 1769* lu view 
of Spain1s assurances that she had no designs on 
North Borneo Britain urged her to disavow the aggresive 
activities of her Philippine government.
While the protest was being prepared reports 
of fresh attempts by the Philippine authorities to 
coerce the natives on the northeast coast to raise
196. Herbert to Tenterden, 7 April, 1879? FO 71/1?.
197. Munster to Salisbury, 12 May, 1879? FO 71/15*
198. FO to West, 20 May, 1879? FO 71/15- The protest,
in two parts, was delivered to the Spanish Foreign
Minister on 12 and 15 June in conjunction with similar 
protests by the German minister in Madrid. See West to
Salisbury, 12 and 15 June; West to Due de Tetuan, 12 June,
1879, FO 71/15.
192
the Spanish flag were received. Dent asked the
Foreign Office for permission to raise the British
flag over North Borneo and Pauncefote supported his 
200
request. Pauncefote also urged the sending of a 
man-of-war to Sandakan to report on the Spanish act­
ivities, and the re-appointment of Pryer as consular 
agent. While Pauncefote was for all out support of 
the Dent interests, Tenterden was more reserved.
He agreed to send::- a ship if the Admiralty knew
of one in the neighbourhood under a captain who
201
would give a fgood and impartial* report.
These Sulu affairs and this question of Messrs. 
Dent concession in Borneo are rather obscured 
by the personal interests of the people whose 
accounts we are receiving and an independent 
report would, I have no doubt, throw much 
light on these matters.
Both Tenterden and Salisbury thought that Germany
should be induced to co-operate or at the least be
202
kept informed of British action. To this Hicks
199. A. Dent to Salisbury, 28 Feb., 1879? FO 12/5)+.
200. Ibid., and Pauncefote minute of same date.
201. Tenterden minute, 3 March, 1879? F0 12/5*+.
202. Tenterden and Salisbury minutes, 3 March, 1879 
F0 12/54.
203. Herbert to Tenterden, 21 March, 1879? F0 12/54.
204. Pauncefote to Admiralty, 29 March, 1879? F0 71/15*
205. Late in the year, however, the Admiralty sent 
IMS Midge. Cmdr. Salman, to Sulu and North Borneo for 
information on Spanish activities. See Adm.Coote to Adm. 
3 Nov., 1879? F0 12/50.
Beach, the Colonial Minister, added his approval,
and he insisted that the warshipTs mission be
strictly to make an impartial report and not for
203
the support of the Dent-Overbeck establishment.
The Colonial Office believed that no decision on
the cession could take place until the Spanish
claim was challenged. The question of the flag,
they thought, should be discussed by the Cabinet.
On 29 M.arch the Foreign Office asked the Admiralty
to send a ship to Sandakan to protestfvkhe Spanish
attempt to raise her flag in Borneo. No mention
2 0 5
was made of an impartial investigation and at
206
the insistence of Pauncefote on 31 March Treacher
accompanied the warship and apparently assumed
207
direction of the mission.
It is interesting to note the way in which 
Pauncefoters handling of the details of this mission 
gave it the outward aspect of a naval force in 
support of the North Borneo settlement while it 
remained scrupulously aloof from official contact 
with officers of the company in North Borneo.
206. Pauncefote minute, 31 March, 1879, FO 71/15*
207. Treacher to CO, 25 April, I8 79, FO 71/15.
Following the Foreign Office request of 29 March
the Admiralty telegraphed instructions to Singapore
and HMS Modeste, under Captain J.G. Mead, set off
  ^ 208
for Borneo arriving at Labuan 011 6 April, It
departed for Sandakan on 11 April. The telegraphic
instructions to Treacher to accompany the mission
were not sent until 5 April. M S  Kestral, Captain
Edwards, was dispatched to carry these instructions
to Treacher, arriving in Labuan, of course, after
the Modeste1s departure. Treacher sailed in the
Kestral for Sandakan and reached there only one day
after the arrival of the Modeste but before Captain
Head had commenced his mission.
The presence of two British war vessels in
apparent support of the Dent interests in North
209
Borneo was not lost on the Spaniards. The Dent
210
company was glad to have naval support and Dent 
informed Pauncefote that the ships have arrived just 
in time to forestall another Spanish attempt at
208. Ibid.
209. Spanish Minister to Salisbury, 20 Oct, , 1879* FO 12
210. Overbeck to Pryer, k April, 1879) BNBCoP. Overbeck 
told Pryer that M S  Modeste went !as a result of our 
request to the Foreign Office.*
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Sandakan. In September after an urgent request by
*  212
Dent for protection against an expected attack from
some Sulu people in alliance with Spaniards the Admiralty
was again ordered to have war vessels visit northeast 
212-
Borneo.
As usual the Spanish response to the latest protest
was slow in coming. At the time the Spanish foreign
minister declared total ignorance of attempts to plant
21*4
the Spanish flag in Borneo.. He stated that Spain
had no intention of occupying North Borneo, upon which
Lord Salisbury noted that Spain did not, however,
2-15
disavow their claim. The Spanish reply to the
216
protest in October was to this effect. No occup­
ation was planned but Spain refused to renounce her 
sovereignty over Sulu dependencies including north­
east Borneo.
As has been suggested the lines of control by 
Madrid over the Philippines government were unreliable
211. Pauncefote minute, 15 June, 1879) FO 12/54. See
also Overbeck to Pryer, k April, 1879» BNBCoP.
212. Dent to Salisbury, 23 Sept., 1879, FO 12/5*+.
213. FO memo, 6 Oct., 1879) Pauncefote to Dent, 3 Oct.,
1879) FO 12/54. (^e also in PAP. 1882, LXXXI, p.489.)
214. West to FO, l4 June, 1879) FO 71/15.
215. Salisbury minute, 14 June, 1879) FO 71/15*
216. Wyndham to FO, lo Sept., 1879; and Due de Tetuan 
to Marquis de Casa Laiglesia, 20 Oct., 1879, FO 71/15.
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for Spanish assurances were not followed up by
corresponding action in the east. Consul Pauli in
Manila, however, assured the Foreign Office that the
Philippine government were well under the control of 
217
Madrid. Spain, he said, found it convenient that 
officials at Manila asserted the right to hoist the 
flag in North Borneo, and Spain could support or 
repudiate such action according to the opposition 
from other countries. That Spain found it convenient 
also to conceal the degree of her control over Manila, 
as we have seen, supports Pauli’s contention. However
V the attempts to raise the Spanish flag in Borneo were
r r" tt
r ’" 'ln K / jl not inconsistent with the assurances by Spain that
1 _} M fjA/-'" f
ji she planned no occupation of the territory, and were
i
quite apart from attempts to occupy. Indeed there is 
every reason to believe that the frequent use of 
British war vessels in support of British policy effec 
tively cancelled out any plans Spain may have had to 
occupy points on the northeast coast* It is a fact 
that the attempt of the El Dorado in September 1878 
to take over Sandakan was not repeated*
Although correspondence and negotiations with 
Spain and Germany continued until 188? the protest
217. Pauli to FO, 7 Aug., 1879, FO 71/1?.
and the use of naval force effectively answered the
Spanish threat to obstruct the Dent-Overbeck project.
Settlement of the question by protocol in 1885 will
be discussed subsequently.
Pauncefote had been urging the Foreign Minister
to consider the Dent-Overbeck proposals but Lord
Salisbury felt it necessary first to arrange, with
218
Germany, the joint protest to Spain. In October
Salisbury gave his attention to the proposals. In
a memorandum on 11 October he noted that Dent was
219
asking for four things: a charter of incorporation;
consular authority for his Residents; the countenance
and protection of British consular, naval and colonial
authorities; and British support for the control of
foreigners in North Borneo. This memorandum reads
more as a justification for a mind already made up
than as a listing of the relevancies preparatory to
making a decision. The question was already decided
at the Foreign Office for the Colonial Office had been
220
told that Lord Salisbury favoured the project, and
218. Paun c e f o t e mi nut e s, 1 April and 9 June, 1879; 
Salisbury minutes, 5 April, 9 June and 21 Oct., 1879;
See also Pauncefote (private) to Alcock, 9 June, 1879, and 
Alcock (private) to Pauncefote, Ik June, 1879, (FO 12/5*4).
219. memo of 11 Oct., 1879, FO 12/5*+. (All requests were 
itained in Dent to Salisbury, 2 Dec., 1878).
'• FO to CO, 27 Feb., 1879, FO 12/5*4. See above p. 325.
Pauncefote had intimated privately to Dent the Foreign
221
Minister’s support. As for the charter, Salisbury
thought that the opportunity of opening up trade with
the interior of Borneo through an English company was
justification enough. There would be difficulties
but these could be overcome. For instance, Raja
Brooke’s ’superior claim’ might be settled by a
compromise over any disputed territory. The Spanish
claim, he thought, was not serious nor dangerous, but
needed more attention. Certainly Labuan ought not to
be put in the way of impeding the development of North
Borneo. Moreover, company government in the area
would probably cost no more in demands on the naval
222
forces than did Sarawak.
But Salisbury’s greatest concern was the strategic 
value of North Borneo. Some of Dent’s associates, 
primarily Alcock and Admiral Keppel, argued strongly
221. See above p. 250
22. A point that Gladstone made later when defending 
the charter in the House of Commons. See Hansard (3rd) 
CCLXVII, 17 March, 1882.
that the coast of North Borneo ought to be in British
hands for it commanded both the passage through the
223
Sulu Sea and the Palawan passage. Salisbury agreed:
The attention of all other countries is at 
the present time so much toward the accep­
tance of important strategic positions in 
the Pacific that if this opportunity is 
allowed to pass by it seems very probable 
that some other nation would interpose 
claims which would prevent it from being 
renewed* 224
It is interesting to note that on the only
reservations Salisbury expressed, he was reassured.
In May 1878 he had said he favoured the project if
it did not infringe British treaty rights with Brunei
and if no more foreigners were admitted to the enter- 
225
prise. Pauncefote argued that the project was a
bona fide British undertaking, Overbeck being only
226
an agent of a British association, and thus did 
not infringe the restrictive sections of the Brunei 
treaty. Edward Dent’s letter to Salisbury of 16 May 
1878 indicating that control of the undertaking was
223. See Report of a Meeting for the Discussion of Affairs
in Borneo. 26 March. 1879: (copy in P»P», 1882. LXXXI. pp. 
461-71); FO 12/54, Keppel to Salisbury, o Oct., 1879; and 
Alcock to Salisbury, 20 Oct., 1879*
224. Salisbury memo, 11 Oct., 1879, FO 12/54.
225. See above, p. 312.
226. Pauncefote minute, 7 May, I878, FO 12/53*
in the hands of Alfred Dent was reassuring.
The guiding hand of Pauncefote is seen in all 
aspects of the charter negotiations but in no place 
more obvious than in his moves to keep Dent and 
Alcock informed of the thinking inside the govern­
ment. Every argument for or against Dent’s 
interests was communicated in a private note or 
conversation. Dent and Alcock were thus prepared 
to present a rebuttal or explanation at the approp­
riate time in official letters to the Foreign Office. 
Thus Dent assured Lord Salisbury that the undertaking 
was British; and Alcock and Keppel confirmed the 
strategic value of the area. We have suggested, 
that the form of government recognition and support 
- by charter - was Pauncefote’s idea, as the least 
painful way of promoting British dominance on the 
area and of promoting and protecting the interests 
of British capitalists. Because of liberal and
radical opposition at home and opposition from
228
foreign powers Pauncefote realized that an
227. See above, pp. 312-3*
228. e.g. Holland.
annexation or protectorate was out of the question.
229
In answer to a suggestion by Consul Pauli that 
Britain and Germany should establish a joint pro­
tectorate over North Borneo Pauncefote minuted,
230
*a protectorate does not commend itself to my mind . 1
Salisbury was convinced but both the Colonial 
Office and the Admiralty had reservations about the 
Dent-Overbeck scheme. The Colonial Office contended 
that Raja Brooke had a better claim to North Borneo 
than had the new syndicate. They were suspicious 
of Baron Overbeckrs connection and the possibility 
that the cession would be sold to Germany or Austria,
On this point the Foreign Office admitted that both 
Ussher and Treacher had said there was nothing to 
prevent the owners from transferring their cession 
to a foreign power. But the Foreign Office argued 
that a charter giving control to Britain would prevent
22L
this. However, Hicks Beach decided that it was a 
Foreign Office matter and agreed not to press his
229* Pauli to FO, 13 Oct., 1879, FO 71/15.
230. Pauncefote minute, 27 Dec., 1879? FO 71/15*
231. Memo for the Cabinet, 6 Oct., 1879? FO 12/5*4.
The same argument could be used in the case of Sarawak 
but in that Pauncefote argued that Sarawak came under 
the restrictive clause of the Brunei treaty. See above
pp.160-2.
opposition if Salisbury were in favour of the scheme.
The Admiralty disagreed with Admiral Keppel*s
view. The northeast coast, said the naval hydro-
grapher, had little strategic value as most traffic
used a passage further east when sailing through the
Sulu Sea. The northwest coast, and especially Gaya
Bay, had some value and its possession by an enemy
in war time could be inconvenient - but no more so
than many other parts of the world. The Admiralty
thought no additional responsibility should be
accepted with respect to Borneo. If a gunboat
were called for by a charter, they were not in favour
of a charter. It was just such protection that Dent
23*4
and his associates envisaged.
At this point consideration of a charter was 
interrupted by correspondence with the Dutch over 
their interests in Borneo. From the beginning the
232. Herbert to Tenterden, 21 March, 1879.
233. Adm. to FO, 21 Oct., 1879? enclosing report of 
Frederick Evans, Hydrographer, of 20 Oct., 1879, FO 12/5*4. 
The Admiralty letter was. reminiscent of the view taken by 
Lord Wodehouse with respect to Sarawak in i860 and l86l.
It is interesting that this note confirmed the view that 
Labuan1s importance was strategic. See above pp.
23*4. e.g. Pryer to Capt.Edwards of IMS Kestral. 26 Aug. 
1879? FO 12/50. Keppel to Salisbury, 8 Oct., lo79? FO
Dutch official view was that the North Borneo
scheme was the promotion of a commercial group and
Britain had no political motives in granting a 
235
charter. The Dutch government perhaps wished
to play down their Borneo policy as they could see
little advantage in pressing Britain. The only basis,
the 182*+ treaty, was weakened by its frequent calling
up in the past on Borneo issues and by Britain1 s
refusal to admit its relevency. Nevertheless the
influential Liberal paper Nleuw Rotterdam Courant
in May 1879 had. tried to raise a protest on the basis
236
of the treaty. The British Charge Fenton was 
instructed to resist firmly if the Dutch government
23Z
took up the theme. . But in October the Dutch
Minister of Colonies declared in the States-General
that he viewed the project as commercial in nature
and that as it probably would not assume the character
2.38
of a British settlement the Dutch would not protest.
But the Dutch Foreign Minister, Baron Lynden, asked
235» Treacher to Salisbury, 2k Aug., 1878, FO 12/53* 
236. Fenton to FO, 9 May, 1879? FO 12/5*+.
237* Pauncefote minute, 13 May; and FO to Fenton,
20 May, 1879, FO 12/5*+.
238. P.P., 1882, LXXXI, pp.63-70, Stuart to Salisbury, 
2h Oct., 12 and 1*4 Nov., 1879? enclosing extracts from 
the debate on the budget of Netherlands India in the 
Second Chamber.
3^0
Salisbury to inform him when a decision on the charter 
239 AO
was made. This Lord Salisbury promised to do.
There was another dispute with the Dutch, This 
was over the boundary between North Borneo and Dutch 
Borneo at the Sibuco River. While this was never 
considered a serious quarrel it was irksome to the 
North Borneo authorities for the exact course of 
the river was unknown. • Should it be found to flow 
from a northerly direction there was a grave possib­
ility that North Borneo would grant away an extensive 
chunk of territory by recognition of the Sibuco as
2k1
the boundary. The dispute dragged on for years
and was finally settled in 1891 by decision of an
2h 2.
Anglo-Dutch boundary commission. The boundary
was established by survey in 1912*
A United States complaint against the Dent-
Over beck cession was made in the east by Commander
2k 3
R.W. Schufeldt of the USS Ticonderoga. He visited
239* P.P.. op.cit. pp.70-2, Baron Lynden to Count 
Bylandt, 11 Nov., 1879*
2k0. P.P.., op.cit., p.73* Salisbury to Stuart, 2k Nov..
1879. Salisbury's successor Lord Granville fulfilled the 
promise in July 1880. See P.P., op.cit., Granville to 
Stuart, 21 July, 1880. ." ’
2kl. Hertslet memo on boundary, 20 June 1882, FO 572/15 
(Conf.Print k6k7).
2k2# P.P. 1892, XCV, 721-6; and Hertslet, Treaties.... 
XIX, 7^ 6 .
Brunei and Labuan in late February 1880 and addressed
2kk
letters of protest to the sultan, and to II.H. Read,
2k 5
the Dent-Overbeck a gent in Singapore. The purport 
was that there was no guarantee that the rights of 
American citizens under Article II of the American- 
Brunei treaty of 1850 would be recognized in the
2k 6
part of Brunei now ceded to Dent and Overbeck.
2k7
The protest was answered by the sultan, who reminded 
the United States that there were no restrictive
terms in the treaty covering territorial cessions 
and that the United States had not objected when 
grants were made to Sarawak and to Consul Moses.
In the case of Moses the United States said it had
no objection to Americans holding territory as long 
as the most-favoured-nation rights were guaranteed
2k 8
to Americans. The Foreign Office noted the American
"2k3 . The Ticonderoga was on a special diplomatic and 
commercial mission. The commercial part involved contact 
with native rulers in an effort to promote trade. See 
Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1878-1879, p.6; Report.. 
1880, p.'k2. Schufeldt reportedly 'asked the sultan if he 
had any territory left which he would be willing to cede. 
2kk. Schufeldt to sultan, 1 March, i860. FO 12/55.
2k5. Schufeldt to Read, 26 Feb., 1880, FO 12/55.
2k6. Treacher to Read, 8 March, 1880, FO 12/55. Copy 
of treaty in Hunter Miller, op.cit., V, p.826.
2k7. Sultan to President of U.S., 8 March, 1880, FO 12/55*
2k8. President Hayes to Sultan, 8 June, 1880, FO lkk/5k.
protests and passed their Borneo dispatches on to 
the Minister in Washington. Here the matter ended. 
However, American rights under her treaty with 
Brunei were recognized in the territory and eventually
A 2
guaranteed by Britain.
Once it had been decided to sell the cession
to a British company Dent proceeded to make his
project acceptable to the government. While in
Labuan in 1878 he had offered to grant Britain a
lien on the territory and deposit the deeds in the
250
Foreign Office in return for 'moral support'.
Dent was aware of the difficulties caused by the 
presence of Overbeck, a foreigner, in the under­
taking. Now he made moves to remove the Baron from 
the association. In March 1879 Overbeck sold four
a n
of his shares in the project to John Dent. Alfred 
Dent urged Overbeck to sign over his title deeds
unconditionally. Overbeck refused.
In April 1879 the promoters had decided to turn 
over the task of organizing a company to Dent Brothers
2k9. Dent to Pryer, 5 March, 1880 BNBCoP; FO 5/1718, FO 
to Thornton, April 29, i860; and FO 12/60, Pauncefote 
memo, 28 April, I883.
250. Treacher to FO, 15 July, 1878. FO 12/53*
251. Agreement between A.Dent and Overbeck, 2k March, 
1879, BNBCoP.
252. Overbeck to Dent, 2 Dec., 1879, BNBCoP.
Company, and they agreed upon the terms of a 
prospectus. They were to seek a minimum price 
for the cession of £100,000. With this move 
Overbeck ceased to have a direct part in the
2 A .
management of the project. Then Dent and the
2 ^
Baron commenced a long drawn out quarrel.
Dent wanted a private appeal to friends for
support of the company while Overbeck argued
256
for a public advertisement for capital. Dent 
offered Overbeck a small cash payment for his 
interests plus shares in a company without
257
capital but which Dent would back financially.
But Overbeck pointed out that this seemed to be 
a scheme to organize a bogus company for which 
the shares would be valueless. Dent would 
retrieve all his outlay plus a profit, his firm 
would receive a handsome commission for organizing 
the company and Dent would continue in control of 
the project. Both men referred to legal counsel
253. Overbeck to Dent," 3 April, 1879, BNBCoP.
25k. Dent to Overbeck, 1 Dec., and Overbeck to Dent,
2 Dec., 1879, BNBCoP.
255* Correspondence between Dent and Overbeck, 1879 and 
1880, passim. BNBCoP..
256. Dent to Overbeck, 1 Dec., 1879, BNBCoP.
257* Ibidj and Overbeck to Dent, k Dec., 1879*
and Dent considered proceedings to oust Overbeck 
from'the North Borneo undertaking.. He was advised, 
however, that the Baron's rights under the various
25s
agreements were valid.
In the event, the project almost changed hands.
Lord Salisbury, although urged to do so by Pauncefote,
refused to grant a charter before the resignation of
259
the government* The conservatives had been 
defeated in the election of April 1880. With the 
advent of the Gladstone ministry which included 
some formidable anti-expansionists such as John Bright, 
Joseph Chamberlain and Gladstone himself, the chances 
of government support of the North Borneo venture 
seemed dim. Dent felt that the prospects of organ­
izing a company on the basis of the original agree­
ment was useless as capitalists would shun the project,
260
lacking government support. In order to retrieve
his outlay Dent agreed to sell his interests to 
26l
Overbeck. There was some disagreement as to terms.
258. Harwood to A.Dent, 7 June, 1879, BNBCoP.
259. Pauncefote and Salisbury minutes, 17 April 1880,
FO 12/55..
260. Pauncefote memo, 3 July, 1880, FO 12/55; and 
Dent-Read correspondence, July 1880 to Dec. 1881, BNBCoP. 
passim.
261. Dent to Overbeck, 23 April> 1880, BNBCoP.
3^ 5.
On 19 May Dent made a firm offer to Overbeck to sell
for £50>000 if Overbeck could raise the funds by 
262
19th June. Since January the Baron had been in 
Austria and Germany. Now Overbeck proposed to 
German capitalists that they should take advantage 
of Dent*s offer. Alexander Mosle, a Bremen merchant 
and Reichstag member, petitioned Bismarck for a 
state subsidy for a company to buy and develop
263
Overbeck*s land in North Borneo. Bismarck ignored
the request, probably still smarting from the recent
defeat, in the German parliament, of the Samoan
Subsidy Bill to which he had given his support.
This measure would have provided a government
subsidy to a south sea trading company controlled
26^
by the Hamburg firm of Godeffroy. Its passage, 
according to Townsend, would have set Germany on 
the path of colonial expansion in 1880. Its defeat, 
however, led the German chancellor to a more careful 
handling of further requests by the powerful colonial 
movement.
262. Dent to Overbeck, 1 and 19 May; Over beck to Dent, 
12 May, 1880, BNBCoP.
263. 'Baron Overbeck and the Germans1 containing a note 
of 29 May, 1880, from Berlin, No names attached. BNBCoP. 
Townsend, on.cit.. p.130. Mosle was the spokesman for 
the movement which was pressing the German government to 
acquire colonies.
26h. Ibid., and London Times« 27 and 28 April, 1880.
There was a rumour that Overbeck’s proposals would
be considered by a group of financiers who now stepped
in to handle the Samoan interests which the parliament
265
refused to subsidize. If in fact this group consid-
266
ered Overbeckfs project it was not successful* The
group announced its intention of pushing the trading
company by a reorganization, however, and in an
interesting sentence in a letter to Dent, Overbeck,
in Vienna, said, there was every probability of his
obtaining a good price for the cession 1 within a
couple of months, and to obtain which I am ready to
267
negotiate if entrusted with the requisite powers**
This was undoubtedly a reference to the Samoan group. 
It conceivably would have taken all of two months for 
the company reorganization and the negotiations with 
Overbeck.
Of Dent’s Dart in this matter we only know that
268
he wanted to recover his outlay of some £*+0,000 plus 
as much of a profit as possible. It is not clear 
whether or not his offer to sell to Overbeck and a
266. Note from Berlin, BNBCoP., op.cit*
267. Overbeck to Dent, 22 June, 1880.
265. Copies of articles from Cologne Gazette and 
Berlin Telegram of 21 May, 1880, BNBCoP.
3*+7.
European group was sincere for before the month
elapsed he was writing to Pryer that Overbeck was
trving to raise interest on the continent 'without
269
my approval.' Britain, he said, would not allow
a foreign company to settle the territory. The
suspicion arises that Dent was using the Baron*s
efforts in Germany and Austria to press the Gladstone
government for recognition of his project. In any
event Pauncefote used this threat of foreign interest
successfully when briefing the new Foreign Minister,
270
Lord Granville, on the North Borneo issue. He
wrote in a memorandum to Granville:
The German press have lately spread rumours 
of a German company, under government auspices* 
taking over the cessions, and the Spaniards 
would be glad enough to buy out Mr. Dent. The
Dutch also are covetous of this territory ....
and the Russians are said to be on the look out 
for a post in the China seas.
Dent, he explained, had expended much capital on the
project and if the charter was not granted he must
dispose of his cessions.
Pauncefote evidently felt that the anti-expansionist
philosophy of the Liberals and Radicals under Gladstone
2 6 8. Pauncefote memo, 3 July, l88o, F0 12/55.
269. Dent to Pryer, 4 June, 1880, BNBCoP.
270. Pauncefote memo, 3 July, 1880, F0 12/55*
could be countered by bearing down on the argument
of a foreign power threatening British interests.
The dislike of the Liberals for the restrictive
commercial policies of some European powers being
271
extended could undoubtedly be relied upon.
Pauncefote argued that short of annexation or a 
protectorate the best way to keep the territory 
out of foreign hands was to secure its settlement 
by British subjects under Dent's cession.
272
Undersecretary Tenterden supported Pauncefote,
and one by one the other officials at the Foreign
Office and Colonial Office followed. Dilke, the
parliamentary undersecretary, had some reservations
concerning the Dutch but felt the issue must be
273
settled because of foreign interest. Pie had
warned the Foreign Office in 1878 that Overbeck's
274
project was receiving much attention in Germany.
271. Kimberley in a memo, 13 July, mentioned this in 
connection with Germany, Spain and Holland, FO 12/55*
272. Tenterden minute, 7 July. 1880, FO 12/55*
273* Dilke minute, 7 July, I80O, FO 12/55* The Dutch 
he thought, should be sounded on the subject. See also 
Dilke minute, n.d. but follows Pauncefote minute of 
14 July, 1881, FO 12/56.
274. See above, p. 322
Kimberley also agreed that North Borneo should not
275
be allowed to fall to another power. He noted
the success of Sarawak and thought the North Borneo
company could follow suit. Finally, Granville agreed
to a charter and the Dutch minister, Bylandt, was
276
informed as promised..
It how remained for the law officers to iron out 
any legal problems and for the Cabinet to grant its 
approval. In the meantime Dent was informed privately
2ZZ
of the decision and soon after he succeeded in
2Z8
coming to terms with Overbeck. Pie wrote, 'Over­
beck is eliminated as far as necessary for all our
2Z2
purposes.' The baron's only remaining role was as 
agent for Dent in completing arrangements with Joseph 
Torrey for the handing over of the titles of the 
American Trading Company. Dent maintained that 
Torrey's leases were valueless but as an agreement 
existed between the American and Overbeck he thought
27!?. Kimberley memo, 13 July, 1880. FO 12/55.
276. P.P.., 1882, LXXXI, p.75* Granville to Stuart,
21 July, 1880: Granville to Stuart, 10 Aug., 1880,
FO 12/55.
277* Dent to R.B. Read, 24 and 30 July, 1880, BPIBCoP.
278. Agreement of 1 Sept., 1880 between Montgelas, Mitford, 
Overbeck and Alfred, Edward and John Dent, BNBCoP.
Overbeck who was being pressed in court by his creditors 
agreed to sell for £100 a share. Montgelas and Mitford 
also sold and the Dents became sole owners of the cession 
for £1 ,700.
279. Dent to Consul Lees, 10 Sept., 1880.BNBCoP.
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it better to ’compromise than fight’. ’Between
ourselves’, he wrote to Read, ’we are anxious to
281
get this small man out of the way’. The negot-
| iations took place in the east. Dent was anxious
to keep the charter decision secret for fear of
! Torrey’s demands if he knew that government
282
support was fait accompli. Dent agreed to pay
283
| #20,000 but hoped to get the titles for #10,000.
[
i Torrey, the Yankee trader, demanded #30,000 then raised
! 2&L
i it to #^0,000. • Dent increased his offer to #25,000
28?
I and Torrey accepted. Dent felt rather ’sold’ but
i[
| for this modest price he gained a clear title to
North Borneo. As for Torrey he undoubtedly made a 
profit on the American Trading Company. It is not 
known whether he shared the profit with the widow of 
his former partner, Harris, whose power-of-attorney 
he had obtained.
2E0~ Ibid.
281.. Dent to Read, 5 Nov., 1880, BNBCoP.
282. Ibid.
283. Dent to Read, 16 and 17 Dec., 1880, BNBCoP.
28*+. Read to Dent, *+ and 12 Jan., 1881, BNBCoP.
285. Dent to Read, 13 Jan., 1881; and 'Release of
J.W. Torrey and S. Harris, and the American Trading 
Co., to Overbeck and Dent', 15 Jan., 1881,BNBCoP.
In July the Dents transferred their deeds to the
British North Borneo Provisional Association for 
286
£120,000. But Alfred Dent continued to play a
leading role in the Association and later in the
British North Borneo Company. Considering that Dent
by admission spent about £*+0,000 on the project and
between £5,000 and £10,000 for the rights of Overbeck
and Torrey he still received a handsome profit, in
the vicinity of 100 per cent return.
The papers on the Dent request were circulated to
the Cabinet late in 1880 and a decision on granting
a charter was taken. It took almost another year
for the details of the charter to be worked out.
The Admiralty and the War Office were assured that
no armed force was intended for the protection of
North Borneo beyond that protection normally granted
278
to British subjects. Indeed, the Admiralty already
288
had standing orders to this effect. The question
of sovereignty over the area was of concern to the
Colonial Office. The law officers ruled that Britain
assumed no sovereignty and the company would administer
289
the territory under the suzerainty of the Sultans.
2 8 6 . Tregonning, op.cit.. p*27*
287. Pauncefote to Privy Council Office, 29 July, 1881, 
F0 12/56.
288. F0 to Adm., 11 Jan., 1881, F0 12/56.
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Finally by an order in council on 26 August,
1881, a charter was granted to the British North
290
Borneo Company. It authorized the company: to
govern the territory on the basis of the Sulu and
Brunei cessions; to protect the inhabitants in
their religion and customs; to discourage
slavery and abolish it by degrees; and to engage
in commerce and plartLng. The charter placed the
following restrictions upon the company: it must
remain British in character; there was to be no
transfer of territory without the consent of one
of the principle Secretaries of State; no trading
monopolies were to be established; the appointment
of a governor was to be approved by the government;
and Britain was to retain a veto power over the
Company's retreat of the inhabitants and over its
conduct of foreign relations, including the settle-
221
ment of disputes with the sultans.
289. Herbert to Pauncefote, 2 June, 1881; Pauncefote 
minute, same date; and L0 to FO, lU July, 1881, FO 12/56*
290. London Gazette, k Nov., 1881.
291* The foreign relations restriction was urged by 
the law officers in substitution for one proposed by 
Pauncefote which directed Britain to conduct the foreign 
relations of the territory, in order to 1 avoid respon­
sibility to Foreign Powers for the acts of agents of the 
Company1. See L0 to FO, 17 Sept., 1880, FO 12/55.
The justification for granting the charter with
the consequent expansion of British responsibilities
gave rise to some searchings of conscience among
members of the Liberal government. Some, including
Gladstone himself, Dilke, John Bright and Joseph
Chamberlain had long been advocates of non-expansion
292
of British territorial interests. For Gladstone and 
Dilke the charter question was particularly difficult. 
The election of 1880 had been fought largely over 
foreign and colonial policy. In his Midlothian 
campaign Gladstone argued strongly against increasing 
Britain's responsibilities overseas by annexation or
223
protection. Dilke had asked questions about the
29*4
North Borneo project while in opposition. He had 
urged another member of parliament, Peter Rylands, to
225
do the same.
292. Bright was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; 
and Chamberlain, President of the Board of Trade, in 1880. 
293* See VJ.E. Gladstone, Midlothian Campaign (speeches 
of Nov.-Dec., 1879) and March-April, 1880, reprinted 
from Scotsman), passim.
29H. e.g. Hansard. 2^0, 20 June, 1878, 1881; and 
Hansard 2^6, 12 June, 1879, 1698-9.
295* Dilke to Granville.IfDec.l88l.Add.Mss. (Gladstone 
Papers, British Museun}, ¥+lH9,f-5l; Gwynn and Tuckwell, 
The Life of the Rt.Hon.Sir Charles Dilke. pp.389-^0, 
cit es, Granville to Dilke, 27 De c., I88I.
When the papers were circulated to the Cabinet
members Dilke was worried that not enough attention
296
was given to the question. When it is remembered
that during the period the Irish question, especially
concerning the coercion and J»and bills, was the main
issue in Parliament and the Cabinet Dilke!s concern
221
is easily understood. When the papers return to 
the Foreign Office Dilke noted that there were four 
minutes against granting the charter and two in favour,
228
and no comment from Gladstone. Dilke wrote later
that at this point he had the papers sent again to 
the Prime Minister. Then Granville informed him
221
that Gladstone gave his approval. Upon this Dilke
300
decided not to oppose the charter.
296• Granville to Gladstone, 16 Dec., 1881. Add.Mss.
M+173* f.252,(Granville-Gladstone correspondence on the 
subject can be found in Agatha Ramm, The Political 
Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 
1876-1886, I); Gwynn and Tuckwell, op.cit., p .389•
297. Walling, (ed.) The Diaries of John Bright 
p.450.. Bright noted that in seven cabinet meetings 
between 10 Nov., and lk Dec., 1880, the period when the 
charter was considered, the one big issue of discussion 
was Ireland. He does not mention the charter.
298. Chamberlain, Bright, Childers (Sec. for War) , and 
Harcourt (Home Sec.) against; and Kimberley and Lord 
Chancellor Selborne for the charter. See Gwynn and 
Tuckwell, op.cit., p.389; and A.G. Gardiner, The Life of 
Sir William Harcourt, p.hlh.
299- Gwynn and Tuckwell, op.cit., p.389; and Ramm, op.cit. 
p.321.
300. Ibid.
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Whether in fact Gladstone saw the papers at this 
time is not clear. A year later after the charter was 
granted Dilke, in a letter to Granville - a copy of 
which he sent to Gladstone - pointed out the great
3Qi
difficulty of defending the charter in Parliament.
Such a charter, he said, was without precedent and 
it had not been sufficiently discussed by the cabinet. 
Gladstone declared that he could not remember having
302
seen the papers nor the decision of the Cabinet.
302
Granville sent the Borneo material to him. The 
Prime Minister perused it and still could remember
32k-
no Cabinet discussion. !I am1, he said !in the 
condition of one shutting the stable door after the 
steed has been stolen1. Gladstone, it developed, had 
reservations about the charter.
Dilke had, a few days previously, set out in a 
minute, certain inconsistencies in Pauncefote1s
j r n )
argument for the charter. /Dilke thought that if,
301. Dilke to Granville, lb Dec., 1881, Add.Mss.^l^jf. 51, 
and Granville to Gladstone, 16 Dec., 1881, Add.Mss.M+173* 
f.252.
302. Ibid and Dilke to Granville, 1*4 Dec., 1881;
PRO 30/29/121, (Granville Papers - PRO) and PRO 30/29/125, 
Gladstone to Granville, 3 Jan., 1882, (Ramm, p.326).
303. Granville to Gladstone, 18 Jan., 1882, Add.Mss. 
bbl7b, fo. 20 , (Ramm,II, 331).
30V. Gladstone .to Granville, 20 Jan., 1882 PRO 30/29/125, 
(Ramm',II,' 333) •
as Pauncefote argued, there was no necessity of 
protecting North Borneo thus no increased responsib­
ility, why was there such emphasis upon the strategic 
location and the fine defensive harbours of the 
territory. He had no objection to either occupying
M
the area or recognizing the company rule, but 
Parliament, said Dilke, would not accept the govern­
ments inconsistent argument. Dilke urged a tighter 
control over the Company because of the opium trade 
and the existence of slavery. He thought control 
ought to be administered by the Colonial Office.
Dilke*s attitude irritated Granville who regarded
it as an attempt to reopen an issue which Dilke had
307.
not opposed at the time. With Gladstone’s approval
308
Dilke was given a mild rebuke. Gladstone, however, 
was interested in Dilke!s second thoughts, and agreed
J6Z“. Gwynn and Tuckwell, p.389* Dilke: ’It was not
so much to the thing itself I was opposed as to the 
manner in which it was done.1
307* Granville to Gladstone, 15 Jan., 1882. Add.Mss.
kkl7k, fo.9, (Ramm, II, 328-9).
308. Gladstone to Granville, 16 Jan., 1882. PRO 30/29/135*
(Ramm 11,330); and Granville to Gladstone, Add.Mss. M+17*+,
fo 1*5, 13 Feb., 1882, (Ramm II,34l).
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with him that the government ought to have a firmer
309
control of the company. In addition Gladstone
thought Britain should assume no more military
responsibility in North Borneo than it had in
310.
Sarawak.
Granville and Pauncefote, however, were able 
to give a satisfactory interpretation of the 
charter. Granville thought it imperative that 
North Borneo be in British hands for strategical
iii
and commercial reasons.. The charter, he said, 
did not imply British sovereignty nor obligate 
Britain to defend North Borneo more than she was ■ 
already obligated to protect British subjects.
309. Gladstone to Granville, 20 Jan., 1882. PRO 30/29/125; 
(Ramm, 333-^).
310. Gladstone stretched the point when he remarked 
that Sarawak rhad had the countenance and approval of 
the government1. See Ch.3, passim.
311. Granville minute, 16 Jan., 1882, FO 572/9 
(Conf. Print *+6l5).
312. Pauncefote also used this argument yet one of 
his first moves following the granting of the charter 
was to recommend the Admiralty to protect North Borneo
W /Y subjects and property' s  a 'project which has received
M/1 1 the approval of Her Majesty's Government'. See FO 12/55?
^  Pauncefote minute, 25 Dec., 1880 on Adm. to FO, 23 Dec., 
1880. Dent wrote to Read at this time, 'the Admiralty 
are receiving special instructions to assist our enter­
prise'. See BNBCoP., Dent to Read, 31 Dec., 1880.
Pauncefote dwelt on the Strategic value of the 
territory as he had in his previous argument. He 
also argued that while the charter granted approval 
and support to the undertaking the company submitted 
to the curtailment and control of its powers by the 
government.
Granville reminded Gladstone that the Irish
question in late 1880 had occupied him so completely
that he had undoubtedly forgotten the action taken
31*4
on North Borneo. He, Granville, and Kimberley 
recalled that the question had been formally submitted 
to the Cabinet. But the evidence is strong that 
Granville and Pauncefote pushed through the charter 
without Gladstone's sanction and with only a minority 
of the Cabinet in favour of it.
Whether Gladstone would have rejected the charter 
had it not been a fait accompli as Dilke later conten-
315
ded is questionable. Certainly Granville's influence
313* Pauncefote minute, 17 Jan., 1882; and above pp.3^7-8. 
FO 572/9 (Conf.Print *+61*+). 2 See also Pauncefote's notes 
on the charter, 19 Jan., 1882, FO 572/9? (Conf.Print ^599)• 
He wrote, ’ the grant of this charter is based on 
grounds of political expediency'.
3l^ Granville to Gladstone, 23 Jan., 1882, Add.Mss.^17^?? 
32, (Ramm, I, 355-6).

359.
with the Prime Minister was extremely great. In any
event Gladstone defended the charter in the House of
316
Commons1 debate and received the warm thanks of
m z
Granville.
The debate centred on the following two points: 
that the charter extended British responsibilities, 
and was in effect protection if not annexation; and 
that the charter gave British protection to the opium 
trade and to slavery.
Gladstone argued that he wras not normally in 
favour of extending British affairs overseas, but 
that by leaving Sarawak on its own the government 
had not escaped responsibilities there. Now in North 
Borneo, he said, an experiment would be tried. The 
project had already been successfully underway for 
four years and could continue under the Joint Stock 
Companies Act. But, said Gladstone, a charter would 
give the government control and restraint of the
315. Gwynn and Tuckwell. op.cit., p.389.
316. Hansard (3rd). 267, 11^8-1130. (17 March, 1882).
317. Granville to Gladstone, 18 March 1882, Add.Mss,. 
(Ramm, I, 350).
318. Hansard, op.cit., 7lk-2k. (13 March, 1882).
319* Gee above, p. 23*+-236.
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company's powers while granting recognition to the 
undertaking, 'We do not say this is a system of 
which the success has been demonstrated, it may 
break down1, he said. The charter would control 
slavery and gradually abolish'it. If not the charter 
would be revoked.
In general both Liberals and Conservatives 
welcomed the charter. The liberals were chided 
for a volte face but were warmly seconded by ministers 
of the former government. Lord Carnarvon agreed with 
Granville and Kimberley that the strategic value of 
North Borneo demanded its control by Britain to
prevent it from falling to another power.
Soon after granting the charter Britain decided
to allow Sarawak to annex Baram, The Colonial Office
had supported Brooke since 1878. In January 1879
they decided to press for government sanction of
Brooke's move northward if the Foreign Office favoured
319
the Dent-Overbeck venture. The Foreign Office had
deferred a decision on Baram until the North Borneo
question was settled. But when the Sultan refused
to part wTith any more territory the Foreign Office
320
decided not to press him to do so. With this Brooke
320'. Treacher to FO, 3 May, 1879; and FO memo, 17 July 
1879? FO 12/52 •
had ceased his requests of the Sultan,
The Foreign Office were still suspicious of Brooke
because they had only slight control over him. This
suspicion was fed by Treacher* What, said Treacher,
would Britain1 s attitude be if the raja should die
321
while his heirs were in their minority? The 
implication was that Sarawak, enlarged by the 
addition of Baram, would be tempting to some other 
power.
The question was reopened in 1881 when Consul
Lees reported that Pengeran .Temenggong, the heir
/)
to the throne, wanted to cede Baram to Sarawak for
322
the yearly revenue. Lees noted that Commodore 
Schufeldt on his visit to Brunei the previous year 
had asked for a cession of territory. The Sultan, 
said Lees, would probably be induced to sell Baram 
to the highest bidder, and he thought Sarawak should 
have it because it was British. He advised sanctionin 
the cession with a restrictive stipulation against 
its transfer to another power.
321. Treacher to FO, 10 May,, 1878, FO 12/52
322. Lees to FO, 26 May, 1881, FO 12/52.
3 6 2
Lord Kimberley thought the annexation should be
allowed but the Sultan should be warned against ceding
323
any territory to a foreign power. rI am1, he said,
32h
'in favour of the agrandisement of Sarawak 1
Finally, in November the Foreign Office sent a warning
to the sultan and at the same time gave their consent
221
to the cession of Baram.
Thus it is seen that once it was decided to 
support North Borneo the Foreign Office could no
longer sustain their argument against Brooke*s
annexation of Baram. With the threat of another
grant of territory to America Britain acted in favour 
of Sarawak.
323. Kimberley to Granville, 6 Aug., 1881, FO 12/52. 
32h. Minute of 6 June, 1881, CO lH^f/55*
325. FO to Leys, 2 Nov., 1881, FO 12/52.
363.
Summary*
British policy in Borneo in 1878 was weak and 
some strengthening was necessary if Britain was to 
retain dominance on the northwest coast* Pressure 
from Spanish moves in Sulu dramatised the vulnerability 
of Britain*s position and in the protocol of 1877 she 
attempted to remedy the situation. The significance 
of the protocol to our study is not in what it stated 
but in what it omitted. Its importance was not that 
trade was to move freely but that Spanish sovereignty
3  ---------
£ t in Sulu_.and North Borneo was successfully resisted.
Spain gained also from the agreement for she 
was allowed to proceed in the Sulu Archipelago 
unhindered.
The challenge of Spain and suspicion of German 
intentions persuaded the government to support the 
Dent-Overbeck venture. The response of Lord Salisbury 
to the request for a charter was favourable from the 
beginning. Although the Colonial Office favoured 
Raja Brooke as the proper recipient of government 
support still they did not oppose the Foreign Office.
r / ‘
Under the Liberal government there was more restraint 
ahd soul searching but in the end they granted a 
charter for political expediency, to prevent North 
Borneo falling to another power.
The charter issue was a problem d ecided favour­
ably by Lord Salisbury in the Conservative government 
but it was left for the Liberals to accomplish, in 
much the same way that the case for the annexation
of Fiji had been prepared by the Liberals and carried
326
out by the Conservative government in 187^ •
The lobbying tactics organized by Dent and Alcock 
and encouraged by Pauncefote were in some respects a 
foretaste of the type of alliance later to be attempted 
with some success by the old China hands of the China 
Association and officials in Whitehall. For the 
establishment of personal relations with the Foreign 
Office by Dent and Alcock provided an opportunity for 
what Palcovits termed practicing the ’diplomacy of 
intimacy1.
127 /
326. See Ethel Drus, ’The Colonial Office and the Annex­
ation of Fiji’, in Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Soc., Ser.v, XXXII, pp.102-3.
327. N.A. Palcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office 
p.128. Dent was prominent among the organizers of the 
China Association in 1889. He undoubtedly found his 
experience of guiding the North Borneo charter through
the government valuable.
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Who gained by the granting of a charter? The 
company received the prestige of government support
in the area on a firmer footing than ever before, 
attaining a strong de .jure position to bolster 
that already held by terras on the 18^+7 treaty* The 
people of North Borneo gained a settled government 
which extended justice and protection, and devel­
oped the country by opening commerce and plantations, 
sm-amir u^-nam. Brunei gained an annual rent
The parallels with Sarawak’s early history are 
interesting, perhaps to the extent of indicating a 
pattern of the growth of British involvement in Borneo. 
Firstly, North Borneo and Sarawak were both settled 
by British subjects who very early received British 
naval support. The arguments in favour of official 
recognition were similar in both cases - strategic 
location and the forestalling of a foreign power.
Both were granted protection and declared to be 
within the British sphere. Both developed along 
colonial patterns.
and protection. Britain established its dominance
from territory she
she could not collect revenue
could not control and from which
3 6 6
By 1882 the weakest point of the British position 
in Borneo was Brunei. It was yet susceptible to 
foreign pressure and only under an informal British 
control. A strengthening of Britain*s relations 
with Brunei was one of the unfinished tasks of 
British policy in the area. In dealing with it 
Britain, as we shall see, was led to regularize her 
relationships with North Borneo and Sarawak.
The other unfinished task was the tying-up of 
the loose ends of the Sulu-Spanish question. When 
these tasks were completed Britain*s position of 
dominance in the area was absolute. We shall deal 
with these two issues in the next chapter.
367.
CHAPTER VT
BRITISH SOLUTIONS IN BORNEO: 
THE PROTOCOL OF 1885 ACT 
THE PROTECTORATES OF 1888,
In granting a charter to the British North 
Borneo Company Britain found herself the sponsor 
of a handful of colonial administrators in a 
sparsely populated jungle, area the size of Ireland* 
In the summer of 1881 Uilliam Treacher was loaned 
by the Colonial Office to become the first gover­
nor of North Borneo* He made Labuan the temporary 
headquarters of his government. The Provisional 
Association in London wanted Labuan for the head­
quarters of the new government and urged the
Colonial Office to turn over the colony to the 
1
company. But the Colonial Office, often critical 
of the company and its activities, decided in 1882
1. Dent to Treacher, 5 Aug,, and 7 Sept. Treacher to 
Dent, 17 Nov., 1881. BNBCoP.; CO minute, 19 Sept., 1881, 
CO 1 W 5 3 .
to maintain Labuan as a separate colony for a few 
2
more years. In so doing it followed the practice
which had grown up over the years when dealing
with the problems of that colony. It postponed
a final decision on the status of Labuan to some
future time. Sandakan thus became the governor’s
headquarters in 1883 after Kudat had been tried
for two years and failed to attract traders and
enterprise to what seemed in 1881 like a promising
k
location on Marudu Bay.*"* By the end of 1881 the 
company was well established on the littoral of 
its vast territory. It had a flourishing town at
i
Sandakan, and stations at Tempasuk and Papar as 
well as at Kudat. Little headway had been made in 
occupying the interior. To be sure Francis Nitti 
and Frank Hatton, two young employees of the North
2. Treacher to Dent, 28 March, 1882, BNBCoP; CO to
FO, 18 Jan., 1882, FO 12/57.
3. e.g. see above pp. 220-21.
k. Alcock - Dent correspondence, 1882-83, passim:
Nilliam Pryer*s Diaries, I878-I80I, passim. BNBCoP.
5. Ibid
6. For an account of the work of Hatton and Nitti see 
Frank Hatton, North Borneo: Explorations and Adventures 
on the Equator"! (London 18851) ; and Owen Rutter, HA 
Hungarian in Borneo1 in The Hungarian Quarterly. v.I, 
no. 6 (1936).
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Borneo administration had explored inland and had
charted rivers and watersheds in certain areas*
But with limited resources the company was in no
condition for a rapid settlement and based their
hopes on attracting Chinese immigrants and planters
to open up the rivers to trade in jungle and plan-
2
tation products.
The Protocol of 188?■ i ■ i — — — — — — — — — —
The chartering and recognition of company rule
in North Borneo did not settle the vexing problems
connected with the Spanish claim to the territory*
Moreover Britain’s sponsorship of North Borneo
rested on a rather tenuous diplomatic contrivance
in this respect. It will be remembered that in
1879 Pauncefote had persuaded the Foreign Office to
ignore the law officers’ ruling on the Spanish -
y Sulu treaty of 1878 that North Borneo was a depen-
t q f i i s s  "---------- —  - ■ ----------- — —
dency of Sulu and must be considered as having passed
^  ‘  8
under Spanish sovereignty* Pauncefote had recognized
> that the issue must one day be negotiated. But in
r on J 6
r  ______________________________
7* Correspondence between Dent and Alcock, 1882-1883? 
BNBCoP, passim*
8. See above pp.325-6
order to achieve the strongest possible government 
support for the company, which was then the pressing 
question, and at the same time to forestall Spain’s 
occupation of North Borneo Pauncefote successfully 
urged the continuance of the policy of non-recog­
nition of Spanish claims of sovereignty in Sulu 
as well as in North Borneo.
9
When Spain protested against the charter and
reports began to come in of a resumption of Spanish
10
attempts to establish a footing in North Borneo
Pauncefote and Tenterden brought out the Reilly
plan and decided that the uncertainties of Britain’s
11
legal position in the area must be removed* The 
Reilly compromise called for British recognition of 
Spanish sovereignty in the Sulu archipelago in return 
for Spain’s abandonment of her claims to North Borneo. 
But legalizing Spain’s position in Sulu was a step 
beyond the 1877 protocol which in its closest 
approximation to a political provision stated that
9. Spanish Minister to FO, 3 Dec., 1881, FO 12/58.
10. Consul, Manila to Commander of the China Station,
7 Jan., 1882; Adm.Willes to Admiralty, 11 Jan., 1882, 
FO 12/58.
11. Pauncefote and Tenterden minutes of 5 Dec., 1881. 
FO 12/58 and above p.325- Saleeby, op.cit., p.231, no 
that Spain’s assumption of control over Sulu’s foreign
Spain was free to establish customs houses in the
parts of Sulu actually occupied or which she might
12
occupy in the future. It will be remembered that
Germany had shown some reluctance to agree to these
terms but in the end had acceeded to them. This
then plus the fact that Germany and Britain had
agreed to co-operate in the Spanish-Sulu issue
made it imperative that Germany should be invited
to participate in any new agreement. Lord Granville,
upon the recommendation of Tenterden, approved the
plan. He sounded the Spanish minister and in due
course the Spanish government agreed to the principle
14
of the compromise. But Germany was unwilling to 
see Spain sovereign in Sulu and demanded unqualified 
adherence to the 1877 protocol. However, the Foreign
relations in the 1878 treaty and Sulu's apparent acquies­
cence was the fait accompli which Britain and Germany 
could not deny and which demanded a settlement of the 
issue.
12. see above p.p.299-300.
13* Granville to Spanish Minister, 7 Dec., 1881, FO 12/58. 
1*+. FO to Morier, 25 Jan., 1882. FO 71/16.
15. FO to Ampthill, 23 Jan., l8o2, Morier to FO, 9 Feb.,
1882, FO 71/16.
16. FO to Morier, 1*+ Feb., 1885, FO 71/16.
17. Townsend, on.cit.. pp. 80, 129-131; German warships
had for years made frequent visits to Sulu and North Borneo. 
■See Treacher to Alcock, 25 May, 1883, and 11 April, 188k, 
BNBCoP.
Office felt that Germany would come around if the
free trade guarantees of the 1887 agreement were
16
included in the new protocol, Bismarck at this 
time was under strong domestic pressure to wage a 
more vigorous policy for the protection of German 
traders and to acquire overseas stations and
IZ
colonies.
The complications of Bismarck1s European policies
affected many moves in the colonial field, German
support for Britain's unilateral Egyptian policy
18
was not yet in evidence. In the meantime Germany
was pursuing a rapprochement with France for, among
other things, a lever with which to gain credits
with Britain in return for support of Britain in 
12
Egypt. As it was to turn out these credits were
soon to be called for in the form of concessions to
20
Germany in the colonial fields.
18. It appeared late in the year. Vlilliam L, Langer, 
European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, (New York 
T95'5Tr™P^2751 German Diplomatic Documents 1871 to 19lH, 
(G.D.D). ed, E.T.’S. Dugdale, (London 1928) i, l6l-5, 
Herbert Bismarck to Prince Bismarck, 13 Sept., 1882, and 
memo by Herbert Bismarck, 22 Oct. , 1882.
19* Ibid, pp.155) 169 and pp.188-90.
20. The Holstein Parers, ed. N. Rich and H.H. Fisher 
(Cambridge 1957) ii* 175^.
It is evident that for these reasons - for the
protection of German trade and the particular state
of European politics - Germany was not so willing
to rush into a co-operation with Britain in Sulu
in 1882 as she had been in 1877* During 1882 and
1883 Germany found reasons for not agreeing to the
new Sulu plan. Spain had. postponed a routine commer-
21
cial treaty with Germany and Count Munster in London
told Pauncefote that Germany was not inclined to move
on a new protocol until the commercial treaty was
22
signed and ratified. In September 1883 the 
treaty was signed and the Foreign Office pressed 
for the new protocol. But now Germany delayed 
again. She demanded a formal request from Spain 
for the recognition of the Spanish sovereignty claim 
in Sulu and for a new protocol.
It seemed to the Foreign Office that Germany 
was manufacturing excuses for delay. Lord Ampthill 
reported from Berlin that when the latest demand 
was satisfied the Germans would find other reasons
2lT Amp thill to FO, 28 March, 1883, FO 71/7.
22. Ampthill to FO, 26 Jan.. 1833, FO 71/17.
23. FO minute, 10 Sent., 1883, FO 71/17.
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for delay. Finally in the summer of 1884 King
Alphonso of Spain visited Germany to observe military
manoeuvers. He spoke to the Germans of the pending
26
agreement over Sulu.. Soon after the Spanish minister
in London informed the Foreign Office that Germany had
now signified her willingness to go ahead with the 
26(a)
protocol. Late in the year Germany brought up another
point which had all the signs of another delaying tactic.
22
In a note to Britain in November the German Foreign 
Ministry declared that the terms of the protocol of 
1877 extended to North Borneo and thus German free 
trade rights in the company’s territory were guaranteed.
In taking this line Germany seemed to accept, as had 
the law officers, the Spanish interpretation of the 
treaty of 1878 that North Borneo was a dependency of Sulu. 
The fact that the 1877 document was already a year old 
by the time the Sulu-Spanish treaty was negotiated did
25. Ampthill to FO, 21 Dec., 1883 and FO to Ampthill 
18 Dec., 1883, FO 71/17.
26. Laiglesia to Granville, 16 June, 188*+, FO 71/17. 
26(a). Ibid.
27. Munster to FO, 16 Nov., I8 8 9, FO 71/17.
28. G.D.D., p.182, Bismark to Munster, 12 Aug., 188H; 
Memo of Prince Nm. Bismark, 23 Aug., 188H.
29. FO memo, k Dec., 188H, FO 71/17.
30. See above, p.327.
375
not seem to disturb the Germans. This line also 
suggests that Germany and Spain may have co-operated 
in an effort to force some sort of British concession 
or for BritainTs discomfiture. A hint as to Germany1 s 
diplomatic action toward Britain during the following 
months is contained in a memorandum by Prince William 
Bismarck, son of the German Chancellor and a member 
of his staff. He wrote that in the colonial arena 
because Britain was not forthcoming in a liberal 
attitude toward German colonial aspirations, Germany1s
object shou3d be to ’create every sort of diplomatic
28
difficulty for England.1
Although the German note created no serious
diplomatic difficulty, it was another annoying delay.
22
Britain replied that the protocol of 1877 specifically 
excepted North Borneo, for the protocol was based on 
the Sulu Archipelago as defined by the Treaty of 1836; 
the treaties of 1851 and 1878 being merely re-submissions
30
of Suly to the terms of the 1836 Agreement. The 
Foreign Office took the view that this was another 
excuse for delay because the North Borneo charter 
stipulated the freedom of trade in the company’s
376.
territory to all nations. That the Germans wanted 
this guaranteed to them in an international agree­
ment, rather than a British document which could 
be changed without reference to Germany was obvious. 
In the event Britain agreed to an article in the 
proposed protocol that guaranteed freedom of
2Z
trade in the companyTs territory.
Germany next maintained that Spain had promised
that the signing of the nrotocol was to coincide
21
with the signing of other agreements. These 
included rights for a coaling station at Fernando 
Po, and the guarantee of certain rights of occup­
ation to German settlers in Sulu. Spain denied 
making such a promise and in January asked Britain 
to proceed with the protocol without Germany. By 
March, however, all of Germany*s objections were 
cleared away and the protocol was signed. The 
Reilly compromise formed the main part of the
31. Article 17 of the charter (see P.P. 1882,LXXXI,
p.522).
32. FO minute of 11 Dec., 1884, FO 71/17* Article 
5 in the protocol of 1885*
33* Morier to FO, 26 Dec., 1884, FO 7l/l7.
34. Bunsen to FO, 14 Jan., 1885> FO 71/18.
35. Bunsen to FO, 4 March, and Morier to FO, 7 March,
1885, FO 71/17.
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protocol. Germany and Britain recognized Spanish 
Sovereignty in the Sulu Archipelago, including the 
islands of Balabac and of Cagayan-Jolo. Spain 
renounced all claims of sovereignty to North Borneo
A --------------------------
and the islands within three leagues, and the islands 
of Balambangan, Banggi, and Malwali. Article 4 re­
affirmed the freedom of trade terms of the 1877 
protocol and Article 5 guaranteed freedom of trade
in North Borneo.
The protocol tidied up the unsettled political 
questions of the area. The line between Spanish 
and British spheres was drawn. Spain was at long 
last recognized as supreme in Sulu, although for as 
long as Spain remained the colonial power in the
3Z
Philippines Sulu continued to be restive. Later, 
the United States was to have troubles in its handling
38
of Sulu. For Britain it meant another step toward 
bringing the Borneo territory under colonial super­
vision. She declared in direct terms in the inter­
national arena that North Borneo was within the British
W. Articles 1, 2, and 3. Copy in F\P. 188V-5, LXXXVII
p.606-9 .
37* Saleeby, op.cit., p.139.
38. See 'Annual deport of the Secretary of War for 1902 
and ' .... for 1903' in Five Years of the War Department;
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sphere as she had accepted the role of sponsor in 
granting the charter. The experience of Germany’s 
colonial policy undoubtedly stimulated Britain to a 
Sulu settlement, although the compromise with Spain 
on the basis of the Reilly plan would sooner or later 
have been achieved without the German catalyst. That 
German co-operation was sought is significant. 
Firstly, it indicated that Britain recognized 
Germany’s right to participate in any further 
settlement effecting or rising out of the 18 /7  
protocol which was a direct German interest, and 
secondly, it seemed to indicate that in such a demar­
cation of colonial spheres Germany, as a new and 
strong contender in the field, must be considered.
In effect this was a following through of the policy 
in Africa of defining areas of colonial interest.
The same procedure was to follow the next year in
32
the demarcation of areas in the Southwest Pacific.
In Borneo and Sulu there was no direct threat 
of German colonization. In fact Britain was willing
Uo
to see Germany in the Caroline Islands. But-Germany
3 %  See FO 93/36, v. 19-20.
Uo. The Holstein Papers, ii, 23*+n.
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had. legitimate commercial interests in the Borneo
Ul k2
area and,- as Bismarck so frequently reiterated,
the German policy in the Pacific was basically one
of the protection of trade.
The Scramble for Brunei. 1882 - 1888
The grant of a charter to the British Worth 
Borneo Company greatly strengthened Britainfs 
position in Borneo. From the l860*s Britain was 
'the dominant power in the northern part of that 
island, but that did not preclude incursions into 
the area by other powers from time to time. In 
London the development of policy during the l86o fs 
and 1870 !s was away from the narrow view of non­
involvement in overseas territories and toward a 
policy of annexation and dominion which reached a 
frenzy of activity in the raid-18801 s.
On the threshold of the latter development Britain 
was the unofficial protector of Sarawak and Brunei and 
the sponsor of North Borneo under the rule of a char­
tered company with headquarters in London. Her
¥i: ~ e ~  The German Borneo Company of Hamburg was active 
in Banggi and the Sulu Islands. See Treacher to Alcock,
26 July, 188? BIIBCoF., and Treacher to FO, 15 Sent., 1884, 
FO 12/61.
4-2. G.D.O-. p.131. , Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, 7 Aug., 1884;
p.169, Hatzfeldt to Munster, 4- April, 1884; and pp.178-9) 
Bismarck1Sgg^nutes on II. Bismarck to Prince Bismarck,
relationship with Sarawak had changed very little 
since 1863 when Lord Russell’s government had 
supported the coming to power of Charles Brooke.
Her connection with Brunei had been strengthened 
by interfering in Borneo politics in 1868 and 1875 
to compel the maintenance of the terms of the 18^7 
treaty in the face of the inability of the aged 
Sultan Mumin and his rajas to maintain a stable 
administration. From time to time the burdens of 
government were lessened for the sultan by permitting 
Sarawak to annex great chunks of Brunei territory. 
Then North Borneo, the largest cession of all was 
removed from Brunei - though it could hardly be 
missed for Brunei had not for years wielded authority 
there nor was the sultan deriving any revenue from 
the territory. Despite Britain’s enhanced position 
in Borneo Brunei remained a weak point in the British 
sphere, susceptible to foreign incursions.
The creation of the state of North Borneo 
presented Sarawak with a formidable challenge to 
her political supremacy and prestige in Borneo. It 
threatened to end her territorial expansion. By
1882 two quasi-British colonies faced each other 
in competition for the remaining territores of the 
weak and corruptly governed Sultanate of Brunei.
In the remainder of this chapter we will trace the 
final stages of Britain’s policy in Borneo which 
culminated in the assumption of protectorates over 
the three territories. There were four protagonists.
The heat of the controversy kept two, Sarawak and 
North Borneo, steadfastly opposed to each other.
The other t\io, Brunei and Britain, split into at 
least two factions each. The factions supported 
either North Borneo or Sarawak, and at times changed 
sides. Despite this, both Britain and Brunei had 
motives of their own which tended to unify the 
respective factions. Brunei wanted to maintain its 
separate identity as a state and Britain wanted to 
secure her position in this part of the South China 
Sea.
Raja Charles Brooke had never forgiven Dent and 
Overbeck for raising their state in territory which he 
considered it his manifest destiny eventually to occupy.
By 1881 the government of North Borneo was firmly 
established in control of its territory. Treacher, 
writing to Alfred Dent late that year, expressed 
the opinion that the Company was too well established 
rto fear any action Raja Brooke may feel inclined to
h i
take.f Although he had tried to prevent the
establishment of the Dent-Overbeck scheme, when it 
received British support and encouragement Raja 
Brooke accepted it as an accomplished fact. He 
continued, however, to resent acting Consul Treacher1 
support of Dent and his opposition to Sarawak. When 
Treacher became the company’s first governor it 
tended to confirm for the raja that the acting 
consul general’s support for the company had super­
seded his first duty of loyalty to the government 
and the maintenance of an impartial attitude.
Very early, North Borneo Company officials 
expressed hope that relations with Sarawak would
M+
become cordial. But that this was unlikely could
Wf. Treacher to "Dent7 18 Nov., 1881, BNBCoP.
M+. Treacher to Dent, 16, 28 July, 10 Aug., 1881, 
BNBCoP. It was not until November that Treacher felt 
the Company was in for trouble from Raja Brooke.
be seen from the fact that both states were ambitious 
in the same direction. Both wanted to annex Brunei 
territory as though the mantle of Brunei as the 
ruler over northern Borneo would fall to the winner. 
Sarawak’s ambitions were the more obvious. The raja’s 
thinly veiled antagonism toward North Borneo was met 
by the company's efforts to annex bordering territory 
better to secure their state against Sarawak aggression*. 
But eventually the company desired Brunei territory to 
keep it away from Sarawak and to prevent Raja Brooke 
from controlling Brunei or achieving undue influence 
there.
Before discussing events in Brunei a word must be 
said about Labuan which was also coveted by both Raja
hi
Brooke and the company. Britain had been unable to 
abandon Labuan and it was administered by a small staff. 
Its importance as the headquarters of British dominion 
in Borneo belied its own precarious financial condition 
and its reduced commercial role. It was common knowledge 
that Labuan was an embarrassment and source of annoyance
BNBCoP, passim; and Brooke memo to Lord Brassey, 
11 April, 1887, FO 12/75.
38*u
i+6
to the Colonial Office. The various proposals for 
its transfer to the Straits Settlements came to nought. 
Dent wanted Labuan for the company headquarters
hi
as Sandakan was too remote. He wanted the company
to administer Labuan also for prestige reasons.
Foreign states and natives alike would note that
the British North Borneo Company had been charged
4^8
with the government of a crown colony. Short of 
this company policy was to urge its retention as a
it2
colony and keep it'out of Raja Brooke's hands. The 
company's approaches to the Colonial Office to take 
over Labuan always failed. To a great extent this 
was because of the opposition of the permanent
52
officials to North Borneo. Since the days of 
Governor Ussher the Colonial Office had supported
k-6. e.g. Ch. IV passim; CO lk-H/55> passim.
U7 . Dent to W.H. Read, 1 April and 6 May, 1881, and 
Dent to Treacher, 23 Sept., 1881, BNBCoP. Dent wanted a 
999 year lease of Labuan for greater British support - 
'to keep the British government at our backs in position 
of our landlord'. See also Dent to YJ.H. Read, 15 Sept.,
1881. Dent wanted Treacher to become consul general and 
wanted the British flag quartered in the North Borneo 
flag. This degree of British recognition he thought 
'sufficient for our requirements.1 
Lf8. Dent to Treacher, 10 March, 1882, BNBCoP.
U9. Ibid., and Dent to Read, 31 Dec., 1880.
50. Treacher to Dent, 17 Nov., 1881; and above, p.237* 
BNBCoP.
Sarawak's move northward. The Colonial Office showed 
little sympathy for the Foreign Office's support of 
North Borneo. In this respect the Colonial Office had 
the warm backing of acting Governor Peter Leys from 
1881 to 1888. Raja Brooke, on the other hand, made 
only small effort to get Labuan for Sarawak. Later 
on he proposed to take it off British hands for the 
coal mines when he was reportedly trying to gain 
control of the coal sources on the northwest coast
2k
of Borneo.
Not least among the reasons against turning the
colony over to North Borneo was the fact that Britain
had assured the Dutch in 1882 that she assumed no
sovereignty over North Borneo as a result of the 
12
charter. If now the company were given the colony
it might indicate to the Dutch that Britain did indeed
claim sovereign rights in North Borneo and that the
11
company was merely the government's agent. In any 
event the government finally put an end for the time
51. Alcock to Creagh, 29 Nov., 1888 BNBCoP. C.V.Creagh 
was Assistant Resident of Perak from March 1883, was 
appointed governor of North Borneo in 1888.
52. Granville to Bylandt, 7 Jan., 1882, FO 12/58.
53. CO Minute, 21 Sect., 1881 CO 1MV55; Dent to Read, 
30 Sept., 1881, BNBCoP.
to requests from both by deciding that neither
ik
should have Labuan.
Although North Borneo officials realized Raja 
Brooke's dislike for their project as late as 
September 1881 they had no quarrel with him. Dent 
wrote that with the exception of the provisional 
association1s desire to have Labuan 'we have no
55.
secrets from him now.' One of Raja Brooke's 
acts which very early angered the North Borneo 
officials was a proclamation late in 1881 which he 
addressed to all Sarawak people living in the Company' 
territory. He urged his subjects to remove to 
Sarawak because North Borneo, he said, was unable 
to guarantee their protection. Company agent Read 
considered it 'outrageous' and Dent was angered at
2L
this 'unfriendly and discourteous act'.. Dent
complained privately to Pauncefote and the incident
undoubtedly did nothing to enhance the raja's repu-
i8
tation with the Foreign Office. Yet there is 
evidence that the raja meant merely to prevent
5 m  FO to Alc'ock, 10 June, 1387, BNBCoP.
55« Dent to Read, 15 Sept., 1881 BNBCoP.
56. Read to Treacher, 7 Nov., 1881; Treacher to 
Dent, 18 Nov., 1881. BNBCoP.
57. Dent to Read, 9 Dec., 1881. BNBCoP.
58. Dent to Treacher, 16 Dec., 1881, BNBCoP.
friction with North Borneo of the type he had 
frequently had with Brunei by ensuring that his 
subjects were not in a location to be the cause of 
dispute. The Ranee informed Dent that she thought 
the raja meant no incivility to North Borneo by 
the proclamation. Governor Lees also pointed out 
to Dent that the raja had acted similarly in the 
case of Sarawak Dyaks in Padas to prevent friction
i2
with Labuan authorities.
In May 1882 the British North Borneo Company 
bought out the British North Borneo Provisional 
Association and Rutherford Alcock became chairman
60
of the company while Dent became managing director. 
During the rest of the year, the new company concen­
trated on organizing its affairs in London and putting 
the company on a sound financial basis while expending 
the vast initial amounts needed for the development 
and equipping of company installations in Borneo. 
Indeed, the spending of funds and hiring of employees 
went on at such a pace that Treacher had to be warned
59. BNBCoP - Dent to Treacher, 6 Jan., 1882. Dent and 
Lees had called on the Ranee in London.
60. Dent to Treacher, 5 May, 1882. BNBCoP. The sale 
price was £300,000.
to slow down and economise or the companyTs funds
61
would be exhausted. In late 1882, Dent was sent
to Borneo to help establish a sounder fiscal admin- 
62
istration. Yet during this time certain undramatic 
events were transpiring in Brunei and around the 
southern boundary of the company's territory which 
contained the seeds of trouble.
61. Alcock to Dent, 1 Dec#, 1882, and 11 Jan., 1883*' 
BNBCoP. Treacher had a staff of h7 at £15,300 per annum 
to administer 28,000 square miles; while Sarawak, over 
hO,000 square miles, was administered by 28 officers at 
£11,000.
62. Alcock to Dent, 15 Nov., 1882. BNBCoP. The 
court of directors was not pleased with Treacher's 
administration especially his refusal to account for 
funds and to get approval before hiring officials.
Dent was authorised to replace Treacher, if necessary. 
The names of Captain Bloomfield-Douglas, resident of 
Selangor, and Sir Walter Medhurst, a former consul in 
China, were considered as successors to Treacher.
Once in the east, Dent apparently changed his opinion 
of the court's fiscal policy and approved of Treacher's 
actions. Dent was himself partly responsible for 
Treacher's extravagant fiscal policies for early in 
1882 he had informed Treacher that the company 'had 
considerable capital for years to come,1 ' actually 
£360,000. (See Dent to Treacher, 5 May, 1882). Dent 
spoke with enthusiasm of the company's prospects. 
Although eventually Alcock and Dent reached agreement 
on a policy of economy, the disagreement caused a 
strain between the two during I883. (See Alcock-Dent 
correspondence, 1882 and 1883, passim.)
In July 1881, Treacher expressed the belief that 
Sarawak's annexation of Baram would not effect North 
Borneo except as to NorthsBorneo's ambitions toward 
Labuan. But later in the year when the raja estab­
lished A.H. Everett, a former North Borneo employee,
6k
as his agent in Brunei and issued the proclamation
to his subjects in Sabah - as the company preferred
to call the territory, the company became perturbed.
Treacher strongly urged the Court to press for the
acquisition of Labuan as a counter to Brooke's move
61
northward to Baram, but the new governor^ Leys, felt 
that he could make the colony pay its way and in 
March 1882 the governor told Treacher that the colony 
would be continued for at least two more years, after
62
which it might be attached to the Straits Settlements.
Vf. BNBCoP. - Treacher to Dent, 28 July, 1881.
6h. Everett had negotiated a reduction of the lease
money for the North Borneo with the sultan under the 
guidance of Dent in 1880. (See' Dent to Read, 26 Nov., 1880, 
25 Jan., 1881, Read to Dent 22 March. 1881, BNBCoP).
Everett was granted leave in Oct., 1881 (Read to Treacher,
22 Oct., 1881). He resigned the company's service in 
June l8c2. (Read to Treacher, k July, 1882). In 188k, 
Everett was refused a concession of mineral rights in 
company territory because of his activity against the 
company at Brunei. (Alcock to Treacher, private, 9 May,l88k) 
There were other changes of loyalty. Raja Brooke lost 
several officers to the company's service during the l880's. 
See governor's correspondence with Ct. of Directors, BNBCoP., 
pa ssim.
bS. Treacher to Dent, 17 Nov., 1881, BNBCoP.
66. Ibid; and FO 12/57, GO to FO, 18 Jan., 1882.
Sarawak's annexation of Baram was approved in June
1882. The ease with which concessions could be 
bought at Brunei with ready cash was demonstrated 
the same year. W.C.Cowie leased the mineral rights 
of Muara, a peninsula at the mouth of Brunei River. 
Muara contained rich coal deposits and was the area 
leased by the Labuan Coal Companies, most recently by
the Oriental Coal Company, but never developed by
68
that concern. The next year two more leases were
sold by the sultan. One and one half miles of
coastline north of Brunei Bay went to one Lee Cheng
Lan and included 'independent governing authority of 
62
the area'.
In July 1883, Everett was granted the mineral
20
rights of the Pandasan River. The following year
67. Treacher to Alcock, 28 March, 1882, BNBCoP; see 
also CO to FO, 18 Jan., 1882, FO 12/57.
68. See pp. 191-193-By late 188k Muara, under Cowie's 
management was producing 300 to k-00 tons of coal per 
month. Treacher to Alcock, 10 Nov., 188k BNBCoP;
see also Lees on Muara coal in FO 12/59•
69. Leys to FO, 22 June, 1883, FO 12/59.
70. Leys to FO, 7 July, I883, FO 12/59.
71. Alcock to Treacher, 23 May, 188k, BNBCoP.
72. Treacher to Alcock, 5 June, 188k, BNBCoP.
73. Alcock to CO, 8 May, 1883, FO 12/59.
7h . Treacher to Alcock, 22 Sept., 1882, BNBCOP.
he was granted the revenue rights. As we have 
seen, the Company’s lease as far south as the Kimanis 
River was interrupted by several rivers belonging to 
independent chiefs and not included in the grant to 
Dent and Overbeck. These rivers formed enclaves in 
company territory and became a problem to the company 
in its attempt to develop the area. Rebellious 
natives, as well as slavers and smugglers, could
22
operate in company territory from these enclaves.
The Pandasan River was one of these' enclaves. Its
lease by Everett particularly irked the company.. The
officials suspected that Raja Brooke and Everett were
in alliance and meant to restrict the company by
controlling the enclaves and by preventing its approach
to Brunei in any possible territorial aggrandizement 
21
southward. Everett had been offered the position as
2k
resident of Baram by the raja. He had been petitioning 
the sultan for mineral rights over much of what remained 
of Brunei territory and when he succeeded in obtaining 
Pandasan he had also coveted several other urleased 
(^rivers. In 1885, Treacher leased the Putation district
\ — T 2
i for the company to prevent Everett going there.
7!?. Treacher to Alcock. 5 June, 188*4, BNBCoP.; and Alcock 
. / to Treacher, 18 July, 188*4. The pengerans1 desire for
money was insatiable. Treacher obtained PjyLtai^ .n by advancing 
#1500 of the regular North Borneo lease money in North Bornoe 
copper coin to be deducted in silver from the payment due in
The company found it necessary in order to protect 
its own interests in Brunei and on its southern 
frontier to engage in the scramble for Brunei 
territory. DentTs trip to the east in 1883 offered 
an opportunity. Dent and Treacher were instructed 
to negotiate for the cession of Brunei land border­
ing company territory. ’We are eager*, wrote 
Alcock to Dent, * to get a foothold in Brunei before
-ik
the death of the present sultan*. Dent was as 
eager as Everett to claim the minerals thought to
XL
be in Brunei. In June Dent asked the sultan for
the lease of the Kalias Peninsula and the Padas 
28
river. This was only the first step. What Alcock
envisaged for the company was the annexation of the
22
five main rivers emptying into Brunei Bay. In 
protesting against Everett*s and Brooke*s activ­
ities to thwart the company, Alcock wrote to the
December, 1885* Brunei received advances often years 
ahead. At one point in 1887 the total of money advanced 
stood at $30,718 and no further payments were due until 
1890. (Alcock to Treacher, 1 April, 1887)*
76. Alcock to Dent, 6 April, 1883, BNBCoP- 
77• Dent was also aware of coal and oil in Labuan and 
was eager to be first in on any new concessions there. 
(See Dent to Read, 2tJune, 1881, BNBCoP.)
78. Leys to FO, 2 and 7 June, 1883, FO 12/60.
79. Leys to FO, 5 May, 1883, FO 12/59. The five are,
Colonial Office that the rivers of Brunei Bay fall
80
’within our absorbing power’.
Treacher, the energetic governor of North Borneo,
was also convinced of the necessity of moving into
Brunei territory. Early in 188*4, he had become
acting Governor of Labuan and consul general on
81
Leys’ illness. He reported that the Limbang
River, under proper management, would be a rich
82
district for the company. The Limbang, of which
the Brunei River was an estuary, was perhaps the
most fertile of the lands left to Brunei. The
Brunei pengerans, however, extorted taxes and fines
to an extreme degree so that by the 1880’s the natives
of the River were in more or less open revolt against 
82
Brunei rule. In June 188H, the Limbang people attacked
besides the Kalias and Padas, the Lawas, Trusan and 
Limbang.
80. Alcock to CO, 8 May, 1883, FO 12/59.
81. Treacher to Alcock, 1*4 Jan., and 20 Feb., 188*4, 
BNBCoP. Although ill, Leys delayed his departure for 
further instructions. According to Treacher, Leys had 
thought Treacher was severing his connection with the 
company when recommending him to the Foreign Office for 
the post of acting consul general.- Now he had second 
thoughts about leaving Treacher in charge while still 
governor of North Borneo. Alcock was pleased that 
Treacher was to be acting consul general and governor 
and felt it a favourable development in the company’s 
campaign to obtain Labuan. (See Alcock to Treacher.
19 Dec., 1883; and a private letter of 23 March, I089, 
BNBCoP.)
82. Treacher to Alcock, 17 Jan., 188*4, BNBCoP.
83. Leys to FO, 5 May, 1883, FO 12/59, Treacher to FO,.  ^
8 Oct., 188*4 FO 12/61; Baring Gould ana Bampfylde, op.cit,
pp. 3*0-6.
and killed agents of the Temenggong, who were
84
extorting taxes. Later they successfully defeated 
a small force under the pengeran himself and followed 
it up by moving on Brunei, where they attacked several 
•houses on the outskirts. The sultan appealed to 
Treacher, who refused to intervene unless the sultan 
agreed to cease arbitrary taxation of the Limbang 
people and promised in writing to limit taxes to a 
poll tax and a 5% ad valorum duty on gutta percba.
The sultan reluctantly agreed, but while Treacher 
was in the Limbang getting the agreement of the 
Limbang chiefs to the document, Brunei resorted to 
the only power it had to retaliate. It urged the 
Muruts of the Trusan district to attack the Limbang. 
But Treacher was able to pursuade the chiefs to 
sign the truce. The chiefs relied upon the English 
to hold the sultan to the agreement.
In October the river chiefs were again threatening
85
to attack Brunei and the sultan was powerless to
Treacher to FO, 28' Oct., 1884, FO 12/6l.
Treacher to FO, 8 Oct., 1884, FO 12/61.
Treacher to FO, 15 Nov., 1881}-, FO 12/61.
Treacher to Alcock, 20 Dec., 1884, BNBCoP. 
Treacher to Alcock, 25 Dec., 1884, BNBCoP.
Alcock to Treacher (private), 21 Aug.; Alcock to 
A. Dent (private), same date, BNBCoP.
prevent them. At this point Treacher arrived in
86
Brunei on board HMS Pegasus, Captain Bickford.
The visit of the warship had a quieting effect upon 
the situation. The Temenggong was upbraided for 
allowing the Muruts to attack Limbang while Treacher 
was negotiating the truce in the river. He received 
an apology from the Brunei rajas. At the same time 
the Padas-Kalias cessions were offered to the North 
Borneo company and Treacher accepted them* With an 
eye to the rival claims of Sarawak Treacher had written 
into the Padas cession the stipulation that any pros­
pective cession of Brunei territory would first be
8Z
offered to the company.
Prior to this Treacher had suggested to the 
court of directors a pact with Raja Brooke for the 
partition of Brunei giving the company all Brunei 
territory to and including the Limbang River and
granting Sarawak land as far north as the Tutong
88
River. Such a settlement would grant Alcockrs
desires. The company would, in effect, surround
Brunei while the raja would be stopped somewhat
further south. Alcock had declared his interest
82
in obtaining Cowie's lease of Muara and had
proposed to Undersecretary Herbert, in a private
letter, an arrangement for taking over Labuan for
22
a period of three years. Had such plans been 
successful, the instability of the area during 
the next few years would have been prevented. As 
it turned out, only the offer of Muara was taken 
up.
Events in Brunei moved too fast for these plans.
In December, the company1s hopes for Brunei were 
thwarted when Sarawak got ahead of them in a bid
3k
for the Limbang River. F.O. Maxwell, Senior
Resident of Sarawak, acting for Raja Brook who
was in England, went to Brunei to seek compensation
for Sarawak traders who were killed by Muruts in the
Brunei owned Trusan River. The sultan and theTemenggon
who was regent, offered to cede the Trusan to Sarawak,
and Maxwell accepted. The Temenggong also offered 
22
Limbang. Maxwell accepted conditionally upon the 
raja's return. The sultan, however, refused to sanction
90. Alcock to Herbert (private) N.D. but probably 
Sept., or Oct., 1884, BKBCoP.
91. Treacher to FO, 21 Dec., 1881*, FO 12/61.
92. Ibid.
the cession of Limhang because much of the district
was crown property.
It became now the turn of the company to protest
against Sarawak1s action. When Treacher heard of
Maxwell's success in Brunei, he fired off angry
22
dispatches to the Foreign Office and to the court
o4
of directors. He urged Alcock to press the
Foreign Office to send him instructions. As consul,
he had reminded the sultan that British permission
must be granted to any cession of Brunei territory.
He wrote to Alcock,
I have strained every nerve to prevent any 
cession, using the agreement in the new Padas 
lease, with reference to submitting all offers 
of territory to the company in the first 
instance, as my principle card. It would be 
wearysome to relate all the steps I have -taken 
with this object in view.’
Treacher had indeed been active. Under his direction,
G.L. Davies, the company's west coast resident became
the company's agent in Brunei. With Maxwell and
Everett acting for the raja, the rivalry for cessions
reached a peak during December 1884. The Brunei
93* Baring Gould and Bampfylde, p.34?.
94. Ibid.
95* Treacher to Alcock, 2.0 Dec., 1884, BNBCoP.
pengerans aligned themselves with the parties, 
depending on their own personal interest. In his 
dispatch to the Foreign Office, Treacher said that 
Britain should decide whether Sarawak or North
2k
Borneo got the Limbang. Baram, he said, formed
a good boundary for Sarawak. Pending a decision
he proposed that both Sarawak and North Borneo
cease further negotiations for leases. Sarawak
deplored the action by Treacher of bringing North
Borneo into the picture for it maintained that
the company had not been offered Trusan or Limbang.
The crisis over Limbang showed up the factionalism
in Brunei. Nhile the sultan was old, imbecile and
weak, his pengerans, unable to protect themselves
from Limbang, divided on the question. At the time
of the Padas lease to North Borneo, the Temenggong
had agreed to press for the cession if the company
21
would loan him #25,000. When the company instead
96. Davies had offered #4,500 for Limbang plus a #5j000 
loan, and a gift of #1,000 to Yacob, the di Gadong's 
secretary. See Davies to Treacher, 18 Dec., 1884, BNBCoP.
97. Treacher to Alcock, 20 Dec., 1884. The company 
claimed that the Temenggong did nothing for them in the 
Padas case. BNBCoP.
advanced #15?000 to the di Gadong and the bandahara■ 
in return for pushing the negotiations the temenggong 
was angered. It was at this point that the temenggong 
leased the Trusan River to Sarawak for #4,500 and with 
his son-in-law, the bandahara, also offered the Limbang. 
The sultan and the di Gadong refused to sanction the 
Limbang lease. Thus while the temenggong and the 
bandahara favoured Sarawak in this instance, the di 
Gadong sided with North Borneo. The latter depended 
upon the company for part of his income, from the Padas 
lease money. It is interesting to note that in his 
officialcapacity the di Gadong held the sultan’s seal
and regalia. when the Temenggong became the regent
the di Gadong had refused to give up the seal. The
seal was necessary before any cession document was
valid. It was while he controlled the seal that the
di Gadong ceded Muara governing rights to W.C.Cowie,
22
without the sultan’s knowledge. But these alignments,
it must be understood, were tenuous and depended in no
small means on the monetary payments each rival could
100
or was willing to offer to the Brunei pengerans.
W. IbidL
99. Treacher to F0, 13 May, 1885, F0 12/72.
100. BNBCoP., passim.
In addition, both North Borneo and Sarawak used the 
threat of withholding payments for other leases in
101
order to keep the Brunei rajas in a sympathetic mood.
It was the di Gadong*s friendship and his control
of the sultan which the company exploited in their
attempt to gain the favoured position in Brunei and
102
to annex Limbang. Treacher instructed his west
coast resident, Davies, how to influence di Gadong
103
and the sultan. ’Maybe*, he said, *we can get the
government of Limbang, without actual cession,* by
inducing them to withold their ’chop* on the Trusan
and Limbang cessions to Sarawak. Davies was asked
to urge the sultan to write to the consul general
104
repudiating the cessions of Trusan and Limbang.
At the same time, Treacher got Maxwell to agree to
105
cease negotiating pending a decision from London.
Then, he outlined to Alcock all the reasons why the
106
company should control Burnei Bay. North Borneo,
101. Alcock to Treacher, 5 Oct., 1882, BNBCoP.; Treacher 
to Davies, 20 Dec., and Treacher to Alcock, 20 Dec., 1884.
102. Treacher to Alcock, 20 Dec., 1884, BNBCoP.
103. Treacher to Davies, 20 and 21 Dec., 1884, BNBCoP.
104. Ibid.
105. Treacher to F0, 22 Dec., 1884, F0 12/61.
106. Treacher to Alcock, 26 Dec., 1886, BNBCoP.
107* Alcock to Treacher, 13 Feb., 1885? BNBCoP.
108. Alcock to Treacher (private), 2 Jan., and 13 Feb., 
1884; Alcock to Pauncefote (private), 11 Feb., 1884. BNBCoP
he said, could develop Brunei Bay more economically 
than could Sarawak. The coal of Muara should be 
under British control through company rule. Limbang, 
Trusan, and Tutong, he said, should be under one rule 
for they formed an economic unit. Ethnologically 
these rivers, he claimed, were more akin to North 
Borneo for the Bisayas of the Limbang were the same 
people as the Bisayas in the Fadas River.. Moreover, 
said Treacher, these people in Brunei Bay were quite 
distinct from the Kayans and Dayaks of Sarawak. He 
again brought up the fears of Sarawak being an 
undependable party. The company’s succession is 
provided for, he wrote, whereas there might be trouble 
in Sarawak at the rajafs death.
Alcock agreed that it was important for the 
company to control Brunei but he hoped to do it by 
urging Britain to establish a protectorate over
107
Brunei and appoint the company to administer it.
Short of this, he hoped the company could annex Brunei.
But only as a last resort, for the company had its
hands full in plans for development of an already large
territory and only wanted to control Brunei and keep it
108
from falling to Sarawak.
With the Padas-Kalias cessions to North Borneo, 
and the Trusan-Limbang cessions to Sarawak to deal 
with the British government was handed the compli­
cations of Brunei to unravel. Both Sarawak and 
North Borneo protested against the cessions to the
other. The agents of both were busy buying influence
109
and advantage in Brunei. Raja Brooke again com­
plained of Treacher’s triple role as governor, acting
110
consul and acting governor of Labuan., Indeed, 
Treacher’s interests were conflicting. Pie was 
freely sending to the court of directors in London 
copies of his official correspondence with the British
109* e.g. Davies-Treacher correspondence, December 1884, 
BNBCoP. The company.advance the di Gadong #15,000 for the 
Padas-Kalias cession; it offered #4,500 for the Limbang, 
plus #1,000 to the sultan’s secretary if he could influence 
the cession, a #5,000 loan to the sultan, and a promise to 
Inche Mahomet, the British consular writer, of a ’good 
berth’ in Limbang if the company got it. For Sarawak 
Everett was instructed to offer #7,000 to #8,000 for the 
Padas River; Maxwell got the Trusan for #4,500 plus 
#13,000 advanced to the Temenggong and the•threat of with­
holding two years of the Sarawak cession money (#22,000).
110. Brooke to F 0 , 7 Nov., 1884, F0 12/63, Maxwell to 
Treacher, 22 Dec., 1884, and 10 Jan., 1885. F0 12/61.
Alcock to Treacher (private) , 2 Jan., 1885, BNBCoP.
403.
ill
government. He had negotiated the Padas cession
for North Borneo while visiting Brunei in a British
112
man-of-war as consul general. When the raja
pointed out that the cession was negotiated funder
cover of the consular flag1, Treacher remarked that
the accusation was rtoo childish to call for
refutation'. In answer to a question in Parliament
about Treacher's conflict of interest the parliamentary
undersecretary for the Colonial Office, Evelyn Ashley, 
11h
had replied that the sultan was fully aware of
the constitution of the British North Borneo Company
and of Treacher's role. In private the Colonial
Office officials were more candid. When in June
1885 Sultan Hasim was installed, Treacher as governor
of Labuan presented him'with a gift of a rifle. In
granting approval of this gesture Meade minuted,
it may be difficult for the new sultan to 
discriminate clearly between the acting 
governor of Labuan and the officer of the 
North Borneo Company as the giver of it. 115
111. e.g. Treacher to Alcock, 29 Oct., 10 Nov., 16 and
2k Nov., 188^, and 7 March, lo85« BNBCoP. "I enclose you', 
he wrote to Alcock, 'my draft of a report to the Foreign 
Office in full reliance that you x^ ill see that the Foreign
Office does not become aware of my having done so. *
Alcock replied that he could 'feel quite at ease about 
the safe custody of the enclosures'. (Alcock to Treacher, 
private, 17 April, 1885.)
112. Treacher to FO, 15 Nov., l88h; Brooke to FO, 7 Nov.,
I88*t, FO 12/61. ’ ’
The Colonial Office supported Raja Brooke's
protest and pointed out to the Foreign Office Treacher's
ll6
serious conflict of interest. Pauncefote agreed 
that there was a conflict in Treacher's case but he 
could find no instance where Treacher acted other
117
than scrupulously in support of British interests.
Treacher was assured of the confidence of the Foreign
118
Office by Lord Granville. This suggests that 
Pauncefote viewed company interests and British inter­
ests as one. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office with 
Foreign Office approval soon began making arrangements
119
for Governor Leys return to Borneo to relieve Treacher.
113* Treacher to Alcock, 15 March, 1885, BNBCoP.
11m-. Hansard (3rd) CCXCVI, 380-1 (2^ March, 1885)*
115* Minute of 2k July. 1885, CO 1*4*4/59*
llo. Meade minute of 2o Jan., 1885, CO lUH/58; CO
minute of 3 April, 1885 CO l¥+/59$ CO to FO, 23 April, 
1885, FO 12/66.
117* Pauncefote minute, 21 April, 1885, FO 12/67*
118. Granville to Treacher. 9 May, 1885, FO 12/6*4.
119* CO to FO, 23 April, 1885, FO 12/66: FO to CO,
9 May, 1885.
120. Alcock to FO, 15 Jan., 138*4, FO 12/67; Treacher to 
FO, 21 Dec., 188*4, FO 12/61.
121. Alcock to Treacher, (private) 2 Jan., 1885; Alcock 
to Pauncefote (private), 11 Feb., 1885, BNBCoP.
122. Treacher to FO, 7 March, 1885* FO 12/6*4. Treacher 
suggested a British resident xvith a small staff.
ko5.
Early in 1885 the government received the requests
120
for the sanction of the various cessions and the
121
company!s proposal for a protectorate over Brunei.
The protectorate proposal was supported by Treacher
122
as acting consul general. The company with its
court of directors headed by Alcock sitting in London
and with the sympathetic ear of Pauncefote and its man
as acting consul general was in a better position than
Sarawak to influence the government* Alcock revived the
fears of Sarawak1s political instability and the
possibility of its selling or passing to a foreign
power. He used this argument to the Foreign Office
in official letters and in private notes to Pauncefote
and Granville in attempts to prevent Sarawak1s annexation
128
of Brunei territory.
As for Sarawak, Raja Brooke was frequently in 
England, ^onsu.1 Leys during most of 188k and 1885
12k
was at home also. Both worked on government officials. 
Perhaps Sarawak's advantage, however, was the fact that 
generally she was favoured by the Colonial Office for
123. e.g. Alcock to Granville, 28 Jan*, 1885> FO 12/67. 
Alcock to Pauncefote (private) 31 Jan. and 11 Feb., 1885; 
Alcock to FO k March, 1885*
12k. e.g. Alcock to Treacher (private) 2 Jan., 18S5, 
BNBCoP; Brooke to F O , 7 Nov., 188k, FO 12/6l; Pauncefote 
minute of 21 April, 1885> FO 12/67*
Uo6.
125.
for reasons already discussed. Herbert pointed
out to the Foreign Office the inaccuracy of Alcoclc's
allegation of the susceptibility of Sarawak to
126
foreign pressure. For Raja Brooke had, with 
the Baram cession, formally agreed to a restric­
tive measure granting Britain veto over any transfer
12Z .
of territory. Lord Derby went on to suggest a
partition of Brunei territory between the two 
128
protagonists, to forestall any foreign power
in Brunei itself. For that state with its corrupt
and unstable government was the weak point in the 
129
Brunei scene. The Colonial Office actually was in 
favour of transferring Labuan to Sarawak and allowing 
it to annex all of Brunei. 'As far as the Colonial 
Office is concerned,' wrote Meade rve incline
See above, pp 229-23*+.
126. Herbert minute, 18 Feb., 1885, CO 1^/60. CO to FO 
20 Feb., 1885, FO 12/67.
127. Leys to FO, 13 June, 1882, FO 12/57-
128.. Derby to Granville, 20 Jan., 1885, FO 12/67-
129. Ibid.
130. Meade minute, 26 Jan., 1885* CO 1^/60.
131. Herbert minute, 18 Feb., 1885, CO 1M+/60. It is 
worth noting that Alcock*s judgement of Colonial Office 
thinking 011 the Brunei issue was wrong. We have already 
noted his suspicion of Meade's support of Raja Brooke.
On 13 Feb., he wrote privately to Treacher that Herbert 
was against granting more of Brunei to Raja Brooke and 
that the Colonial Office was considering a protectorate 
of Brunei 'with our assistance'. (Alcock to Treacher, 
private, 13 Feb., 1885, BNBCoP).
rather to the raja than to the company*. As for
Brunei and Labuan, he said, 'we tend to encourage
their transfer to Sarawak in preference to the
company.* Herbert pointed out that Sarawak was
sound financially while North Borneo vrould require
an imperial grant to administer additional territory.
Privately Lord Derby felt that Sarawak should have
132
Brunei, but he decided to 'hold off for a while1 
and not press for the Colonial Office's solution.
To forestall any transfer pending a decision, 
the Foreign Office instructed Treacher to forbid 
any cession except with permission of Her Majesty's
m  2Jh.
Government. The Colonial Office concurred in
this but warned that while it was important to preven
a foreign power having access to the northwest coast,
Britain must not exclude Raja Brooke and favour the 
135
company. -There was some belief among permanent 
officials that the North Borneo Company was headed 
for collapse and that when this happened, Raja Brooke 
ought to be in a position to take over the vacuum
TbidT
133- FO to Treacher, 21 Feb., 1885, FO 12/62.
13^- Herbert to Pauncefote, 1^ Feb., 1885, FO 12/67. 
135- CO to FO, 20 Feb., 1885, FO 12/67.
U08
thus created.
Therefore, while the Colonial Office favoured 
Sarawak’s annexation or protection of Brunei, on the 
immediate questions of the respective cessions the 
Colonial Office suggested that Britain approve them
137
in line with their previous proposal of a partition.
After all, this was a partial partition. ’I think1,
wrote Lord Derby, fa Sarawak protectorate of what
remains of Brunei might prove a good arrangement,
138
but we need not now say so.1 The Foreign Office 
139
agreed and notified Treacher that Britain would 
not object to the Brunei cessions of Padas Kalias
IkO
to North Borneo and of Trusan-Limbang to Sarawak.
The Colonial Office stand in favour of the 
partition of Brunei or its protection by Sarawak is
136. Herbert minute, 2 March, 1885, CO lUH/6 0. Fhile 
the company vras as yet not prospering, its financial 
position had improved somewhat. In March 1883 Alcock 
told Dent that if the expenditure of huge funds in 
Borneo was not curbed and the country paying for itself 
by the end of 188*4 the company would have to be wound up. 
Alcock had wanted to replace Treacher but Dent supported 
Treacher. Some economy was instituted and conditions 
gradually improved. (BNBCoP*, Alcock to Dent, 22 March, 
1883).
137. CO to FO, 31 March, 1885, FO 12/6 7.
138. Minute of 28 March, 1885, CO 1*4*4/60.
139. Pauncefote minute, 21 April, 1885 FO 12/67.
1*40. FO to Treacher, 30 May, 1885, FO 12/68.
partly explained by the fact that officials there 
were adamantly opposed to an administrative protec­
torate on the pattern of those in the Malay states.
In the case of Brunei it would necessitate an imperial
m i
grant. The North Borneo Company’s proposal thus
found little favour at the Colonial Office. Meade
minuted, Tto govern Brunei proper as a protectorate
from Labuan has not found official proposers or
lb 2
seconders within my memory'. A Sarawak protectorate
over Brunei would cost the British government no
1^ 3
additional expense. It seems clear that the 
Colonial Office expected and was prepared for the 
demise of the company and the extension of Sarawak’s 
power over the whole area of northern Borneo. Lord 
Derby thought that if the I8U7 treaty was not sufficient 
to protect Brunei against a foreign power, an ordinary 
protectorate without a resident might be proclaimed.
Such an arrangement would allow the absorption of the 
rest of Brunei by the two neighbouring states. Similar
ibl. CO to FO, 31 Ilarch, 1885. FO 12/67
lb2. Minute of 26 Jan., 1885, CO lbb/60.
lb-3. Herbert minute, 18 Feb., 1885, CO lbb/60.
lbb. CO to FO, 31 March, 1885, FO 12/67.
lb5. Pauncefote minute, 21 April, 1885. FO 12/67-
protectorates over North Borneo and Sarawak might 
also be established. Pauncefote said that the 
company’s protectorate proposal should be consid-
2hl
ered further. Brunei traders had petitioned
146
the Foreign Office in support of a protectorate
over the chaotic state and Treacher and the company
1*47
xvere continuing their pressure for protection.
At this point, Brunei affairs became even more 
complicated. The raja began occupying the Trusan
lb8
River# Before Brooke’s success in acquiring the 
Trusan, the company had shown interest in obtaining
149
Gowie’s mining lease at Muara. Cowie commenced
120
working the Muara coal in 1882. The company was
attracted by the idea of establishing at Muara a
151
coaling station for ships plying the China Seas.
146. Treacher to FO, 3° March, 1885 (Tel.) FO 12/66; 
petition of 30 March, 1885 in FO 12/64. Brooke and Leys 
showed that Treacher solicited the petition through Davies. 
(See Brooke to Granville -(Tel} - 27 March, 1885? FO 12/66).
147. e.g. Alcock to FO, 4 March, 1885 FO 12/67; Treacher 
to FO (Tel). 28 March, 1885, FO 12/66.
148. Treacher to FO, 7 March and 5 June, 1885 FO 12/64; 
Baring Gould and Bampfylde, pp.345-6..
149^ Alcock to Treacher (private) 21 Aug., 1884, BNBCoP.
150. Leys to FO, 31 Aug., 1882, FO 12/57.
151. Alcock to Dent (private) 21 Aug., 1884, BNBCoP..
Early in 1855? Cowie obtained from the sultan the land
±52
rents and revenue farms at Muara* In March he was
I B
granted the whole of Muara peninsula. The company 
feared that the raja, having encircled Brunei would 
be able to dominate the sultan unless the company 
could counter by obtaining Muara. In May 1885?
Cowie transferred Muara to the company with the 
sultan's seal of approval pending also the approval
125
of Her Majesty's government. This was almost the
last official act of Sultan Mumin's reign. He died
29 May and was succeeded by the Temenggong as Sultan 
156
Hasim. When the Foreign Office sent their approval 
of the cessions to North Borneo and Sarawak, news of 
the sultan's death had not reached London. The 
Foreign Office, consequently, did not know that the 
new Sultan had reconsidered the Limbang cession and
152. Treacher to FO, 24 Jan., 1885, FO 12/63.
153. Brooke to Leys (Tel.) March 27, 1885 FO 12/64.
154. Alcock to Treacher, private, 2o June, 1885; and 
(official) 17 July, 1885, BNBCoP.
155* Treacher to FO. 31 May, 1885 FO 12/68; Alcock to 
Salisbury, 1 Aug., 1885, FO 12/72.
156. Treacher to F0,3LMay, 1885, FO 12/64.
157* Treacher to FO, 22 July. FO 12/64; Alcock to
Treacher (private) 12 June, lo85, BNBCoP.
158. Ibid; and Treacher to FO, 7 March, 1885 FO 12/64.
1+12.
I2Z
now did not want to cede it to the raja. In 
March, upon the old sultan’s request, the rajas of 
Brunei in a burst of unanimity had agreed amongst
158
themselves not to cede any more Brunei territory.
But for a #*+0,000 loan, Brooke was able to persuade 
Sultan Hasim to agree not to cede territory to any
152
party other than Sarawak or Britain.
Alcock, of course, immediately remonstrated with
Salisbury and Pauncefote for allowing Brooke in
160
Trusan and Limbang. Alcock felt this setback all
the more for Pauncefote had been sitting with the
Suez Canal International Commission in Paris when
the instructions to approve the cessions had been
sent to Borneo. Thus, the company had not been
161
privately informed of the dispatch.. Lister went
so far as to point out that Pauncefote was the only
one at the Foreign Office who knew the whole Borneo 
162
issue. The result might have been different had 
Pauncefote not been absent for, although he had already
T?9~. Treacher to FO, 22 July, 1885, FO 1 2 / 6k. The sum
represented an advance of ten years lease money on the 
Trusan district.
160. Alcock to Pauncefote (private). 11 July: Alcock 
to Salisbury, 15 July, 1885 ’FO 12/6o.
161. Alcock to Treacher (private), 26 June, 1885 BNBCoP.
162. Alcock to Treacher (private) 12 June, 1885 BNBCoP.
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decided for the cessions in principle, Alcock
undoubtedly would have pointed out to him, as he
now did in his July protests, that the Limbang
cession cut Brunei in half and that by acquiring
163
Trusan, Sarawak surrounded Brunei. This was 
later regretted by Pauncefote and Herbert for
164
it meant a firm grasp on Brunei by Raja Brooke.
For its part the Colonial Office, now under Colonel 
165
Stanley, however, refused to sustain Alcock*s 
166
complaints. Like his predecessor Lord Derby, 
the Colonial Secretary pressed for the annexation 
of Brunei lands by both states. Unlike Derby, he 
was reluctant to assume even a simple protectorate. 
He felt that British interests were sufficiently 
protected by the 1847 treaty and by the agreement 
signed by Raja Brooke. In October the Foreign
163^ The Foreign Office maps of the area were not accurate 
and officials did not realize that Brunei was now surrounded 
by Sarawak territory. (See Herbert minute of 12 Nov.1885 
CO l44/6o); Pauncefote minute of 15 Oct. 1855 FO 12/68.
164. Pauncefote minute, 15 Oct. 1885 FO 12/68, Herbert 
minute 12 Nov. 1855, 00 144/60.
165. Colonel F.A. Stanley (1841-1908), Lord Stanley of 
Preston (1886); succeeded by his brother, Lord Derby, as 
16th Earl; governor general of Canada, 1884-1885; 
colonial secretary, June 1885-February 1886.
166. CO to FO, 24 Sept., 1885, FO 12/68.
1
Office reluctantly decided to stand by its sanction
167
of the cessions. Muara, it decided, however, to
168
keep under British control in one way or another.
The Colonial Office had not approved of North
Borneo having Muara unless the new sultan sanctioned 
169
the grant. It felt, however, that the transfer
to the company of Cowie*s commercial rights there
could not be resisted but Colonel Stanley informed
the Foreign Office that he was against ceding powers
of government over Muara to either North Borneo or 
170
Sarawak. Pauncefote, taking up the company*s
contention, argued that it was only fair to let
the company have Muara because the raja had been
given permission to annex Limbang and Trusan, non-
171
contiguous areas. Lord Salisbury agreed to this 
1Z2
arrangement and asked the Colonial Office to
173
reconsider Its stand. The Foreign Office wanted
167. Pauncefote minutes, lj and 24 Oct., 1885, FO 12/68.
168. FO to GO, 4 Nov., CO to FO, 16 Nov., 1885, FO 12/68.
169. CO minute, 11 July, 1885, CO 144/60.
170. CO minute, 13 Aug. 1885; CO to FO, 11 Sept., 1885,
CO 144/60.
171. Pauncefote minute, 24 Oct., 1885, FO 12/68.
172. Ibid.
173. FO to CO, k Nov. 1885, FO 12/68.
174. Herbert minute, 12 Nov., 1885, CO 14*1/60.
175. CO to FO, 14 Nov., 1885, FO 12/68.
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to avoid the possibility of Muara and its coal 
passing out of British hands* Under Herbert1s 
strong urging, the Colonial Office accepted the 
Foreign Office scheme, fie noted the danger of 
either France or Germany stepping in as both were
17U
active in the east. But the Colonial Office 
insisted that Britain should retain the right of 
assuming the sovereignty over Muara and the mouthizs
of the Brunei Fiver at any time in the future.
There was yet some fear of the consequences should
the company fail.
In January 1886, the Foreign Office informed
the company that it could have Muara ’subject to
certain conditions’, which the government would 
176
decide later. In October Alcock had withdrawn
formal application for the sanction of the cession
of Muara because of what seemed to him Foreign Office
indifference. With the return of Leys, and the
opposition of the new sultan, the raja and the
consul general, the pressure was more than the
177
company cared to bear for the sake of Muara.
17^ 1 FO to company, 21 Jan., 1886, BNBCoP.
177. Alcock to FO, 13 Oct., 1885, FO 12/72.
Although the company regretted the government’s
decision to uphold the sanction of Limbang and Trusan
to Sarawak, they were now happy to have the promise
of Muara with its coal and excellent harbour. Alcock
wrote to Treacher ’it may prove a valuable acquis-
iZ8
ition at no distant date’. Treacher was instructed 
to keep watch on the situation and to cultivate Cowie,
m
but not make any agreement with him.
As for the rest of Brunei affairs, Alcock and
Treacher were agreed to leave them alone and ’be
rid of Brunei-Sarawak intrigues’ and to concentrate
180
upon the development of North Borneo territory.
Now that Treacher had been relieved as acting consul ■
general the company was at a distinct disadvantage in
Brunei politics.
The new sultan considered the grant of Muara to
Cowie invalid because it had been sanctioned without
181
consulting him or the Bandahara. He had been the 
regent at the time. Britain was reluctant to force
178. Alcock to Treacher, 22 Jan., 1886, BNBCoP.
179* Ibid; Alcock to Treacher (private) 22 Jan., 1886.
180. Ibid.
181. Leys to FO, Ilf Dec., 1885, FO 12/68.
182. Ibid; Everett to Leys, 9 Jan.. 1886 (copy) enclosed 
in Treacher to Alcock, 18 Jan., 188b. BNBCoP.
183. Salisbury minute of 2b Oct., 1885, FO 12/68.
the transfer of Muara against the sultan’s wishes, 
especially as it developed that the di Gadong who 
had control of the sultan’s seal had sealed the
1 8 2
cession document without consulting the old sultan. 
Moreover, di Gadong was to some extent a company 
man as his income was derived from the Padas 
cession. Now the sultan refused to give up Limbang 
to the raja and Muara to the company. Britain was 
not ready to force him. Yet there was strong senti­
ment for deciding the Brunei question because of the 
instability of the area and its vulnerability to 
possible French or German overtures. While the 
Colonial Office pressed for the absorption of 
Brunei by North Borneo and Sarawak and Lord Salisbury
18
in 1885 had agreed, he had noted rather sardonically,
I agree to the proposal but I look with some 
apprehension to the Colonial Office plan of 
pressing the wreck of Brunei. Remember the 
new principles .Bismarck has introduced into 
colonial politics. He might as likely as 
not seize the balance while we are awaiting 
to see it reach the proper stage of decay.
Barly in 1886 the Liberals were again in office.
Now Hnade and Herbert persuaded Granville, once again
the colonial secretary, to support a protectorate over
Brunei on the basis of proposals which Leys had made on
184
his return to Labuan. Leys suggested that Trusan
be the boundary between Sarawak and North Borneo, and
that only the Brunei River and Muara be left to the
Brunei rajas. Pauncefote agreed to press for Leys
partition plan and further suggested that Britain
185
establish protectorates over all three states*
The Colonial Office requested that Admiral Hamilton,
commander of the China station, be instructed to
survey the area around Brunei Bay and investigate
186
the cessions of both states. Hamilton was
further instructed to look into a protest by chiefs
of the Padas River who were not consulted on the
187
cession of their lands. Leys and the sultan were
reportedly supporting the claims of the Padas chiefs
188
against the.company, while Treacher insisted that
they were instigated by Raja Brooke abetted by Leys
189
and Everett. Meade at the Colonial Office, urged
120
the inquiry into the claims* He was irritated
184. Meade and Herbert minutes, 30 June, 1886, CO 144/62, 
CO to FO, 2 Aug., 1886, FO 12/72.
185. Pauncefote minute, 27 Aug.. 1886, FO 12/70.
186. Herbert minute, 30 June, 1886, CO 144/62.
187. Alcock to Treacher, 29 Oct., 1886, BNBCoP.
188. CO minute 3 March, 1886, CO 144/62: Leys to FO,
14 Bee., 1885, FO 12/63.
189. Treacher to Alcock, 11 Jan. and 25 May. 1886, BNBCoP.
190. Meade minute, 3 March and 30 June, 188b, CO 144/62.
because the Foreign. Office had, in his opinion, rushed
their approval of the Padas cession the previous year.
The Colonial Office questioned the propriety of
Treacher as consul general sanctioning the Padas
cession for the company.
In further consultation the Colonial Office and
the Foreign Office agreed on a plan of settlement
for the Borneo problem. Leys* partition plan formed
the basis. Simple, political protectorates were
planned. It was decided that the issue demanded the
visit of a special commissioner to observe the
situation and press for the settlement. Pauncefote
192
wrote to the Colonial Office,
.... it appears to the Secretary of State that 
the authority of the British Crown is not 
defined with sufficient precision to obviate 
the risk of an attempt being made by some 
foreign power to obtain a footing in those 
regions.
It was necessary to secure the British position, he 
continued,
.... not only from the magnitude of the* 
commercial interests involved, but also 
from the strategical position of the 
territories in question. The remarkable 
activity which has been displayed during
191. F 0 to CO, 20 Oct., CO to FO, 30 Nov.., 1886, F0 12/73
192. FO to CO, 13 Jan., 1887, FO 12/75.
the last few years by some foreign states 
in the acquisition of colonies and new out­
lets for trade call for the utmost vigilance 
on the part of Her Majestyrs Government, in 
order to avoid rival claims and encroachments 
in territories where British interests prepon­
derate so largely as they do in that part of 
Borneo,
When Lord Salisbury took over the Foreign Office
2=23.
following Lord Iddesleighfs death Pauncefote, in 
briefing him on the mission, pointed out that the
colonizing propensities of Germany made it necessary/
to safeguard ^ritish rights on the Borneo coast, and
19k
prevent Sarawak falling to a foreign power. As
happened in the past the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements was entrusted with the mission to Borneo, 
Governor Frederick Weld was instructed to present the
195
plan of settlement to the Sultan of Brunei, In
193* Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, first Earl of 
Iddesleigh, foreign secretary July 1886 to his death 
in January 1887.
19^. Pauncefote memo to Salisbury, 28 Jan,, 1887? FO 12/76, 
The Undersecretary continued to be unduly suspicious of 
Raja Brooke,
195. FOto 00, ]3Jaa,l887, FO 12/75* The Colonial Office also 
considered the possibility of combining Labuan, Muara and 
Brunei into one unit. Governor Leys who had been optimistic 
about making Labuan pay its way had recently sent in a most 
depressing financial report on the colony, (See Ley to CO, 
12 Oct., 1886, CO IM4/6I; and CO minute, 10 Dec., 1886),
h21.
196
Brunei Weld found the Limbang chiefs still in a 
state of rebellion and willing to accept any arrange-
131
ment rather tha.n to return to Brunei rule* The
sultan had a small force blocking the river. Weld
persuaded both sides to agree to a truce until the
whole problem should be decided by Britain. The
sultan feared that Britain would force him to cede
Limbang and Muara as Leys and Everett had led him 
198
to believe. Weld reassured him that this was
not the case, after receiving a telegram from Lord
1 2 2.
Salisbury to this effect. Salisbury urged the
200
sultan to cede Limbang. But the sultan declared 
his intention not to cede any more territory because
196. Lovat, Alice (Lady), The Life of Sir Frederick Weld 
G.C.H.G., (London 191*0 ? pp. 39^-bOk^ gives an interesting 
account of Weld’s mission to Borneo from his diaries and 
letters to his wife. The version corresponds closely to
WeldTs official reuort to be found in Weld to Holland,
20 June, 1887, CO lkk/6k.
197* Ibid. p.3975 Weld to Lady Weld, 25 May, 1887; and 
Weld to Holland, 20 June, 1887, CO 1M+/6U.
193. Leys to Sultan, 18 Nov., 1886 and Everett to Sultan 
11 Feb., 1886, CO lbk /Sk .
199* Salisbury to Weld (Tel.) 25 May, 1887. CO lkb/6k* 
The sultan had written to the Foreign Office before Weld1 
arrival, expressing his fears and asking for a resident.
200. Weld to Sultan, 5 June. I887 CO lbk/6k.
201. Weld to CO, lU June, I887, CO IM4/63.
k22
of the Brunei rajas1 agreement before the death of
the former sultan. He reiterated his desire for a
201
British protectorate and a resident*,
held agreed with the sultan and recommended a 
protectorate similar to those in the states of the
( Malay Peninsul^ with a resident who would also 
• ' ' /  202
administer Labuan and be the consul. ¥eld sug­
gested that while the government was considering 
his recommendations a temporary resident be 
appointed for a period of six months. He mentioned 
the name of W.E. Maxwell, the acting resident 
councillor of Penang. The time when the plan of 
settlement could be implemented was long past, 
said Weld, for the sultan was adamant in his stand 
on Limbang. Further, he recommended that North 
Borneo and Sarawak be granted protection only if 
they requested it. So confident of his solution
was Weld that he led all parties to believe that a
201
resident would soon arrive in Brunei. Davies, 
the company1s west coast resident, with Governor
POT: Weld to CO, l k June, 1887 CO IM+/63.
202. Weld to Holland, 20 June, I8 87, CO l W 6k.
203. Weld to the people of Limbang, June 1887, CO lbb /6b .  
(Conf.Print 5577); and Crocker to Alcock, 30 June, 1887?
BNBCoP.
b23.
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Crocker’s backing, applied for the post.
The Colonial Office was less than satisfied with 
Weld’s mission. Officials there considered his 
insistence upon a resident and an administrative 
protectorate financially impracticable. Herbert
20 5
noted that Brunei could not support a resident 
and the Treasury would not make an imperial grant.
Both 3ir James Ferguson, the parliamentary under­
secretary at the Foreign Office, and Pauncefote
20o
agreed with Herbert. Pauncefote, true to his 
sympathies with North Borneo, insisted that Labuan 
should be reserved for North Borneo if it were ever 
to be handed over to a non-imperial authority. He 
pointed out that Labuan was closer to North Borneo.
’It is therefore important*, he said, ’that Sarawak 
authority should not prevail there1.
The simple protectorate over Brunei was agreed 
to by the Undersecretaries. Moreover, dispatches 
from Leys since the return of the Weld mission 
indicated that the sultan was now willing to cede
W k .  Davies to Weld, 30 June, I887. CO
205. Herbert minute, Dec., I8 87, FO 12/77, Tregonning,
on.cit. p. 37 incorrectly states that Weld supported Davies 
candidacy. Weld merely passed on Davies application to 
the Colonial Office with all the other papers on the mission. 
Meld’s candidate was U.B.Maxwell,
206. Ferguson minute, 9 Dec. and Pauncefote minute 30 Dec., 
1887? FO 12/77.
k 2 k .
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Limbang to Sarawak for the sake of the subsidy.
Thus the original partition scheme was adopted.
The whole plan was submitted to Lord Salisbury.
He had some reservations. Sarawak and North Borneo,
' " ' A  °aOo
he noted were rapidly ’crushing out1 Brunei.
fI think1, he wrote,
I think we had better let them finish it, 
and make no agreement with the Sultan of 
Brunei which would stand in the way of a 
consummation which is inevitable and, on 
the whole, desirable.
Nevertheless, he agreed to submit to the Cabinet
any simple protectorate scheme for Sarawak and
North Borneo which had Colonial Office approval.
The partition of Brunei and protectorates over the
two neighbouring states would make a resident in
Brunei unnecessary. The Colonial Office under Sir 
209
Henry Holland held out for the simple protec­
torate over Brunei as well pointing out that it 
would not stand in the way of the absorption, of
207. Ibid.
208. Salisbury minute, Jan. 1888 FO 12/78.
209. Sir Henry T. Holland, colonial secretary, I887-I892 
created Baron Khutsford, I088.
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Brunei by the two states when the time came.
Indeed) said Herbert) it would make the acceptance 
of that end more palatable to the sultan.
Thus in 1888 the government negotiated protec-
301
torates with all three states. As they had already 
agreed to the extension of both Sarawak and North 
Borneo into Brunei territory, the final settle­
ment of the Brunei problem was substantially as 
the plan had been given to l/elcL. Two rivers' south 
of Brunei, Belait and Tutong, as well as the Brunei 
river and the two Huaras remained under the sultan. 
Though British permission for the cession of Limbang 
to the raja still stood on the record it remained 
nominally under the sultan. In practice the chiefs 
of Limbang were independent until 1890 when they
placed themselves under the rule of Raja Brooke and
302
he annexed the district. Contrary to Herbertfs 
prediction the sultan did not readily a ccept the 
cession of the Limbang to Sarawak,
300, Herbert minute of 31 Jan., and Holland minute of 
1 Feb., 1888, FO 12/78.
301. FO 12/785 copies also in IVP., 1888, LXXIII,
pp.179-85. The company and Raja Brooke readily accepted 
protectorates and signed agreements on 12 May and 5 Sept., 
respectively. Hugh Low, of Perak, negotiated the agreement 
with the sultan, 17 Sept., 1888.
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The agreements provided for no interference with
the internal affairs of the respective states. The
303
important provision, however, have Britain control
over the foreign relations of the three states.
While the protectorate agreements were being
considered there was some fear of giving offence
304
to the Netherlands. . Count Bylandt had made an 
inquiry concerning a rumour that Britain was planning 
to extend protection over northern Borneo. But Britain 
had always maintained her rights in Borneo. Herbert 
minuted, *We must face, I think, the dislike of 
Holland (if it is real) to what it is not entitled
302
to object to!. However much Holland may have dis­
liked it she did not pursue the subject. A Dutch
newspaper summed up the most obvious sentiment
under the circumstances:
30*4. Hertslet memo, 12. Jan., 1888, FO 12/78.
305. Minute of 31 Jan., 1888 CO lkk/65*
306. Copy of a translation of an article from 
Het Vaderland enclosed in FO to CO, 6 Anril, 1888.
co"iW6T.—
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However much we may deplore it now that 
we, not even being able to develop our 
infinite Indian empire, have not exten­
ded our authority over the whole of the 
island of Borneo, we have no right, as 
the case stands now, to prevent another 
power from establishing itself there.
We have no authority whatever in North 
Borneo, and if, through jealousy, we 
should, try to thwart England, we should 
only make ourselves ridiculous.
Summary
The motives of the protagonists are fairly simple 
to define. Brunei was in the last stages of decline. 
Her sultan and ministers, competed with each other 
for wealth to be had by making cessions. Enriching 
themselves was their main motive in their role in 
the partition of their state. But another motive 
finally appeared with some effect. The rapid absorp­
tion of the state alarmed the old sultan and his heir. 
Thus the continued existence of Brunei became a motive. 
How much this could stand against the offer of ready
money was seen later when in 1890 Brooke annexed
807
Limbang and offered a payment of #6,000 a year.
307* F0 minute, n.d. 1895? F0 12/106. Baring Gould and 
Bampfylde, op.cit., p.353.
The sultan refused the money and it was used to 
develop the Limbang district.
As we have seen the various rajas allied 
themselves with the most lucrative proposition 
presented by Davies and Everett, agent of North 
Borneo and Sarawak respectively. Raja Brooke 
of Sarawak had ambitions to rule all of northern 
Borneo. The company interfered with these ambitions 
and so Brooke increased the pace of his movement 
northward by pressing for now part, now all, of 
Brunei. The company, at first, was fairly content 
with its large cession.. But under the energetic 
administration of Treacher, it decided to oppose 
Brooke’s advance and itself developed an absorp­
tion policy toward Brunei to prevent it falling 
to Brooke.
Under the heightened fervour of imperial 
activity in Africa and the Pacific, Britain’s 
objective was to prevent an opening for a foreign 
footing in northern Borneo and to secure her own 
dominant position there as an imperial power.
1+29
This involved stabilizing the political situation 
by settling the rival claims of Sarawak and North 
Borneo to Brunei territory; delineating the boun­
daries of the three states and placing the relations 
between each one and Britain on a regulated basis by 
establishing simple political protectorates. It is 
quite clear also, that both the Colonial Office and 
the Foreign Office fully expected Brunei to be com­
pletely absorbed by her neighbours. Nothing in the
/ protectorate agreement stood in the way. When Raja
—   — —  ---------------------------------------------------- *
"Brooke annexed Limbang, it was not surprising then 
. that Britain raised no protest. Labuan was turned
over to the company to administer in 1889, strictly
according to Pauncefote1 s recommendations of the
jvv~v
^  previous year, because Muara had been promised
^  Aj w • . ■.
them but not included in the North Borneo share
l
. v
(rtf of Brunei territory.
^30
CONCLUSION
The protection of the China trade route as a motive 
for the British presence in the South China Sea is not 
a new idea. Seen in retrospect the decision to dominate 
the northwest coast of Borneo was taken by Palmerston in 
l8*+6 when Labuan was annexed.. The decision was acknow­
ledged two decades later with the declaration of a 
sphere of influence by Disraeli. In the meantime, after 
i860, two factors prompted action which led to an 
increase in Britain1s involvement in Borneo# The 
threats from other powers who were increasing their 
activity in the area was one factor. The other was 
the political instability on the northwest coast. 
Britain1s answer was to provide naval protection 
for Sarawak and for British commercial interests 
in the area.
Until 1881 Britain was content with a sphere 
of influence based on the I8U7 treaty and naval 
protection. As a base of operations Labuan was 
sufficient as long as a naval and coaling station 
was all that was required. But it became evident
that the I8V7 treaty while adequate with respect 
to its commercial terms was a weak base for 
political policy. It deterred the sultaia from 
granting territory to foreigners only when 
accompanied by pressure from the British consul. 
Had a serious challenge to Britain1s position in 
Borneo arisen reliance would have been placed 
upon naval intervention not upon the restrictive 
clause of the treaty. Article X came close to 
being a dead letter.
During the I87O !s changes in attitude toward 
colonial problems in Britain marked the beginning 
of a protection-annexation policy* It was aimed 
at territories unoccupied by any other European 
power. The policy was stimulated by the expan­
sion of German and French commercial and colonial 
interests. In Borneo the change of attitude was 
reflected in Colonial Office support for Sarawak1s 
expansionist tendencies, and by an attempt at the 
Foreign Office to define its Borneo policy - a 
policy which hitherto had been vague. The Foreign 
Office supported the Dent-Overbeck project because
^32.
of Spanish pressure in Sulu and North Borneo and
because of suspicion of German intentions. Personal
contacts between officials of the British North
Borneo Company and the Foreign Office were mutually
advantageous. Sir Julian Pauncefotefs formulation
of Borneo policy at this time proved effective in
increasing British hegemony in Borneo. Britain
sponsored the British North Borneo Company. She
O
agreed with Spain and Germany on a demarcation of 
territory be tv/e en the Spanish Philippines and 
British Borneo. Finally to stabilise the political 
situation in Borneo and in order to leave no weak 
point exposed to the intervention of another power 
Britain assumed protectorates over Sarawak, Brunei 
and North. Borneo.
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